Case 2:19-cv-04034-JMY Document 56-1 Filed 03/03/20 Page 1 of 21
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
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`KAREN HEPP,
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`Plaintiff,
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`Civil Action No. 19-cv-4034-JMY
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`v.
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`FACEBOOK, INC., ET AL.,
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`Defendant.
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`§
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`DEFENDANT FACEBOOK, INC.’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW
`IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................1
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`SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS .........................................................................2
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`ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................3
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`I.
`
`II.
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`III.
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`IV.
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`Applicable Standard of Review ...............................................................................3
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`Facebook Is Immune From Liability For Hosting Content Provided by
`Third Parties. ............................................................................................................4
`
`A.
`
`B.
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`Plaintiff’s Right of Publicity Claims Are Barred By the CDA. ...................5
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`Facebook Meets the Criteria for CDA Immunity. .......................................7
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`1.
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`2.
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`3.
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`Facebook is an Interactive Computer Service. ................................7
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`Plaintiff Does Not Allege That Facebook is the Content
`Provider. ..........................................................................................8
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`Plaintiff’s Claims Treat Facebook as a Publisher or
`Speaker. ..........................................................................................10
`
`Even Absent Application of the CDA, Facebook Is Immune from
`Liability for Plaintiff’s Statutory Right of Publicity Claim. ..................................11
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`Plaintiff Fails to Allege Facts Sufficient to Sustain Her Common Law
`Right of Publicity Claim. .......................................................................................12
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`Cases
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`AFL Phila. LLC v. Krause,
`639 F. Supp. 2d 512 (E.D. Pa. 2009) ........................................................................................ 13
`
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
`556 U.S. 662 (2009) ................................................................................................................ 3, 4
`
`Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
`550 U.S. 544 (2007) .............................................................................................................. 3, 14
`
`Brennerman v. Guardian News & Media Ltd.,
`No. 14-188-SLR/SRF, 2016 WL 1271461 (D. Del. Mar. 30, 2016) ........................................ 10
`
`Cabaniss v. Hipsley,
`151 S.E.2d 496 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966) ......................................................................................... 15
`
`Caraccioli v. Facebook, Inc.,
`167 F. Supp. 3d 1056 (N.D. Cal. 2016) .................................................................................. 6, 9
`
`Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc.,
`339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) .................................................................................................... 6
`
`Delfino v. Agilent Techs., Inc.,
`52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 376 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) .................................................................................. 7
`
`Dimeo v. Max,
`433 F. Supp. 2d 523 (E.D. Pa. 2006) .............................................................................. 4, 5, 8, 9
`
`Doe v. MySpace, Inc.,
`528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008) ...................................................................................................... 8
`
`Evancho v. Fisher,
`423 F.3d 347 (3d Cir. 2005) ....................................................................................................... 4
`
`Evans v. Wurkin Stiffs, Inc.,
`No. 15-61934-CIV, 2016 WL 8793339 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 21, 2016) .......................................... 12
`
`Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc.,
`488 F. Supp. 2d 491 (E.D. Pa. 2007) ........................................................................................ 13
`
`Faegre & Benson, LLP v. Purdy,
`367 F. Supp. 2d 1238 (D. Minn. 2005) ....................................................................................... 7
`
`Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC,
`521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) .................................................................................................... 5
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`Gabriel v. Giant Eagle, Inc.,
`124 F. Supp. 3d 550 (W.D. Pa. 2015) ....................................................................................... 14
`
`GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups,
`429 S.W.3d 752 (Tex. App. 2014) .............................................................................................. 7
`
`Green v. Am. Online (AOL),
`318 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 2003) ............................................................................................. 5, 8, 10
`
`Inman v. Technicolor USA, Inc.,
`No. 11-666, 2011 WL 5829024 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2011) ...................................................... 11
`
`Jurin v. Google Inc.,
`695 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (E.D. Cal. 2010) .................................................................................... 11
`
`Kabbaj v. Google, Inc.,
`No. CV 13-1522-RGA, 2014 WL 1369864 (D. Del. Apr. 7, 2014) ..................................... 9, 10
`
`Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc.,
`836 F.3d 1263 (9th Cir. 2016) .................................................................................................. 11
`
`La’Tiejira v. Facebook, Inc.,
`272 F. Supp. 3d 981 (S.D. Tex. 2017) ........................................................................................ 9
`
`Mmubango v. Google, Inc.,
`No. 12-1300, 2013 WL 664231 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 2013) .......................................................... 9
`
`Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co.,
`157 F.3d 686 (9th Cir. 1998) .................................................................................................... 15
`
`Parker v. Google, Inc.,
`422 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2006) .................................................................................. 5, 6, 9
`
`Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC,
`488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007) .................................................................................................... 7
`
`Sahoury v. Meredith Corp.,
`No. 11-5180 (KSH), 2012 WL 3185964 (D.N.J. Aug. 2, 2012) ............................................. 14
`
`Saliba v. Att’y Gen. of U.S.,
`828 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2016) ....................................................................................................... 4
`
`Saponaro v. Grindr, LLC,
`93 F. Supp. 3d 319 (D.N.J. 2015) ............................................................................................... 4
`
`Scott v. Moon,
`No. 2:19CV5, 2019 WL 332415 (W.D. Va. Jan. 24, 2019) ....................................................... 6
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`Shulman v. Facebook.com, No. 17-764 (JMV) (LDW),
`2018 WL 3344236 (D.N.J. July 9, 2018) .................................................................................... 9
`
`The Choice Is Yours, Inc. v. The Choice Is Yours,
`No. 14-CV-1804, 2015 WL 5584302 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2015) .............................................. 13
`
`Worthy v. Carroll,
`No. 02-6882, 2003 WL 25706359 (E.D. Pa. July 16, 2003) .................................................... 14
`
`Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc.,
`129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) .......................................................................................... 5, 10, 11
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`Statutes
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`42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8316(a) .......................................................................................................... 11
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`42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8316(d) ..................................................................................................... 1, 12
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`47 U.S.C. § 230 ...................................................................................................................... passim
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`47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) ..................................................................................................................... 8
`
`47 U.S.C. § 230(c) ...................................................................................................................... 5, 6
`
`47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) .................................................................................................................. 5, 8
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`47 U.S.C. § 230(e) .......................................................................................................................... 5
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`47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) ...................................................................................................................... 6
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`47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) ...................................................................................................................... 6
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`47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) .................................................................................................................. 5, 6
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`47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(4) ...................................................................................................................... 6
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`47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5) ...................................................................................................................... 6
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`47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) ...................................................................................................................... 8
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`47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) ...................................................................................................................... 9
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`Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C ......................................................................................... 13
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`Rules and Regulations
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)............................................................................................................... 3, 4
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Defendant Facebook Inc. (“Facebook”) operates free online and mobile social
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`networking services that provide billions of users a platform on which to share photos, videos,
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`messages, and links to other content. In addition to allowing users to post and discover content,
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`Facebook allows third parties to create and post advertisements about their products and services
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`on the Facebook platform.
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`Plaintiff Karen Hepp (“Plaintiff” or “Hepp”) brings this right of publicity suit against
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`Defendant Facebook based on the inclusion of her photograph in an advertisement for the
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`FirstMet dating app, which she alleges appeared on the Facebook platform. Plaintiff did not
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`allege that Facebook created or authored the advertisement, nor could she. The advertisement
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`promotes FirstMet – not Facebook; and the face of the advertisement displays the notation
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`“Sponsored,” indicating that it is a third party’s ad. Notably, Plaintiff has not asserted any claims
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`against FirstMet, the entity whose services were promoted using her image. Instead, she has
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`focused her claims only on Facebook and other well-known social media platforms.
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`Plaintiff asserts two claims against Facebook: (1) violation of her statutory right of
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`publicity under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8316(d) and (2) violation of her common-law right of
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`publicity. Each of Plaintiff’s claims against Facebook are misdirected and based on untenable
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`legal theories attempting to hold online and mobile platforms liable for the actions of third-party
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`advertisers. Accordingly, this Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Facebook for at
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`least the following reasons:
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`1.
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`2.
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`Facebook is immune from liability for each of Plaintiff’s right of publicity
`claims under the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (47 U.S.C. § 230);
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`Facebook is immune from liability under Pennsylvania’s right of publicity
`statute; and
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`3.
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`Plaintiff fails to allege facts that constitute an actionable violation of her
`common-law publicity rights.
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`Moreover, Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed with prejudice because she cannot amend her
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`Amended Complaint to overcome the legal flaws and pleading deficiencies that are fatal to her
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`claims.
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`SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
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`Defendant Facebook owns and operates Facebook.com, a well-known social media
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`internet site. See Amended Complaint ¶ 8. As is common with social media sites, Facebook
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`permits its users to post and share messages, photos, and content on its platform. Facebook also
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`allows third-party businesses to create, post, and share sponsored advertisements that promote
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`their products and services on the Facebook platform. See e.g., Id., Ex. L.
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`Plaintiff alleges that she is currently a television news anchor in Philadelphia. Id. ¶ 37.
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`According to Plaintiff, approximately two years ago, she discovered that her photograph was
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`being used by third parties in online advertisements without her consent. Id. ¶ 43. After seeing
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`the photograph in advertisements, Plaintiff concluded that it was taken by a security camera in a
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`New York City convenience store without her knowledge. Id. ¶¶ 43–44, Ex. K.
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`Plaintiff alleges that her photograph was featured in an advertisement promoting
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`FirstMet’s dating app that appeared on the Facebook platform. Id. ¶ 46, Ex. L. In the FirstMet ad,
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`Plaintiff’s image is shown alongside another unidentified woman. Id. The advertisement includes
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`the term “Sponsored” in the upper left corner, referencing the fact that the ads shown were
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`sponsored by the entities promoting their services. A copy of the advertisement is attached to the
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`Amended Complaint and reproduced below:
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`On September 4, 2019, Plaintiff filed her original Complaint against Facebook, not
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`FirstMet. See generally Complaint. On February 18, 2020, after Facebook and other defendants
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`moved to dismiss the original Complaint, Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint alleging that
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`Facebook violated her statutory and common-law publicity rights by the inclusion of her
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`photograph in the FirstMet advertisement promoting its dating app. Amended Complaint ¶ 46,
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`Ex. L. Her Amended Complaint still did not name FirstMet as a defendant. Plaintiff seeks an
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`injunction and monetary relief including “actual damages, reputational damages, and/or
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`Defendants’ profits in an amount in excess of $10,000,000.” Id., Prayer for Relief ¶ 4.
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`I.
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`Applicable Standard of Review
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`ARGUMENT
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`To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the factual allegations of a complaint
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`“must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and the plaintiff must offer
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`more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
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`Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
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`In evaluating the sufficiency of a claim, courts “first . . . tak[e] note of the elements a
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`plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009). Courts then
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`identify the allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the
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`assumption of truth.” Id. at 679; see also Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 351 (3d Cir. 2005)
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`(“[A] court need not credit either ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal conclusions’ in a complaint when
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`deciding a motion to dismiss.” (citation omitted)). Finally, courts “assume the[] veracity [of well-
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`pleaded factual allegations] and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement
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`to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
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`In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts “consider only the complaint,
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`exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic
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`documents if the complainant’s claims are based upon these documents.” Saliba v. Att’y Gen. of
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`U.S., 828 F.3d 182, 189 (3d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).
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`II.
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`Facebook Is Immune From Liability For Hosting Content Provided by Third
`Parties.
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`Plaintiff’s statutory and common-law publicity claims are barred by the Communications
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`Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (the “CDA”). Congress enacted § 230 of the CDA to protect
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`freedom of expression and innovation on the internet by broadly immunizing website operators
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`from liability for hosting third-party content. Dimeo v. Max, 433 F. Supp. 2d 523, 528 (E.D. Pa.
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`2006) aff’d, 248 F. App’x 280 (3d. Cir. 2007). Without this immunity, websites, including social
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`media networks, would face a dilemma of choosing between either overly policing content or
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`removing the ability of users to exchange content and ideas. See Saponaro v. Grindr, LLC, 93 F.
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`Supp. 3d 319, 325 (D.N.J. 2015) (“[I]f social network hosts are faced with liability every time
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`third-party communications . . . result in harm, they are left with two extreme courses of action
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`. . . either over-police their networks . . . or[] strip users of the ability to post communications.”).
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`The CDA promotes and protects internet speech by immunizing internet service
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`providers like Facebook from liability based on third-party content that appears on their
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`platforms. Specifically, § 230(c) of the CDA provides, in relevant part, “[n]o provider or user of
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`an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
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`provided by another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). The CDA further
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`provides that “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any
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`State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3). In enacting the
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`CDA, Congress confirmed that state law claims, whether grounded in statute or common law, are
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`barred where the defendant qualifies for CDA immunity. Dimeo, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 528 (noting
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`that the CDA overrides the traditional treatment of publishers under statutory and common law);
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`see also Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that § 230(e) of the
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`CDA “counteracts the caution counseled by the [statutory] interpretive canon favoring retention
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`of common law principles”).
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`The broad immunity afforded by the CDA is not merely an affirmative defense. Rather, it
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`provides robust statutory immunity from suit in the first instance. Green v. Am. Online (AOL),
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`318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that § 230 “‘precludes courts from entertaining claims
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`that would place a computer service provider in a publisher’s role,’ and therefore bars lawsuits
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`seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial
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`function” (citation omitted)); Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492, 501 n.6 (E.D. Pa.
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`2006); see also Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d
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`1157, 1175 (9th Cir. 2008) (construing CDA immunity broadly to protect websites not merely
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`from ultimate liability, but from having to fight costly and protracted legal battles). Thus,
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`dismissal of claims at the pleading stage is warranted when a defendant qualifies for immunity
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`from liability under the CDA.
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`A.
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`Plaintiff’s Right of Publicity Claims Are Barred By the CDA.
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`The immunity provided by § 230 of the CDA is subject to five exceptions: (1) for
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`enforcement of any “Federal criminal statute,” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1); (2) for claims under laws
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`“pertaining to intellectual property,” id. § 230(e)(2); (3) for claims under state laws that are
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`consistent with the CDA, id. § 230(e)(3); (4) for claims under communications privacy laws, id.
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`§ 230(e)(4); and (5) for claims related to sex trafficking, id. § 230(e)(5). None of these
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`exceptions to CDA immunity apply to Plaintiff’s right of publicity claims.
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`Indeed, this Court has held that CDA immunity applies to right of publicity claims. In
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`Parker v. Paypal, the plaintiff asserted right of publicity and right of privacy claims against
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`defendants who purportedly used his name and likeness on their online platforms to sell
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`infringing copies of a book. No. 16-4786, 2017 WL 3508759 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 2017). Relying
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`on the CDA, this Court found plaintiff’s “state law claims [] clearly preempted and prohibited by
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`§ 230 [of the CDA].” Id. at *7.
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`While the Third Circuit has yet to confirm that the CDA is applicable to right of publicity
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`claims, the holding in Paypal is supported by courts in other jurisdictions, including the Fourth
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`and Ninth Circuits. See, e.g., Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir.
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`2003) (affirming judgment for defendant and holding that § 230 of the CDA barred publicity
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`claims asserted by plaintiff, a popular actress); Scott v. Moon, No. 2:19CV5, 2019 WL 332415,
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`at *3 (W.D. Va. Jan. 24, 2019) (holding that under § 230 of the CDA, plaintiff’s allegations of
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`appropriation of name and likeness fail to state claims), aff’d, 773 F. App’x 138 (4th Cir. 2019),
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`cert. denied, No. 19-5720, 2019 WL 5686543 (U.S. Nov. 4, 2019); Caraccioli v. Facebook, Inc.,
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`167 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (denying leave to amend pleading to add a right of
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`publicity claim because it would be barred by § 230(c) of the CDA), aff’d, 700 F. App’x 588 (9th
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`Cir. 2017) ), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1027 (2018), and reh’g denied, 138 S. Ct. 2021 (2018);
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`Faegre & Benson, LLP v. Purdy, 367 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1249 (D. Minn. 2005) (“[Defendant] is
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`immune [under the CDA] from . . . appropriation [of name or likeness] claims” asserted by a
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`well-known blogger because the complained-of content was posted by a third-party);
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`GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752, 753 (Tex. App. 2014) (applying § 230 of the
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`CDA, reversing the trial court, and directing judgment for defendant as to plaintiffs’ claims for
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`wrongful appropriation of their names and likenesses); Delfino v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 52 Cal.
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`Rptr. 3d 376, 390 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (concluding that CDA immunity has been applied to right
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`of publicity claims after surveying cases).
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`Even if plaintiff attempts to characterize her right of publicity claims as “intellectual
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`property” claims under Pennsylvania law, § 230 of the CDA preempts state intellectual property
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`claims seeking to hold online service providers liable for content provided by third parties.
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`Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1119 (9th Cir. 2007). In Perfect 10, the Ninth
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`Circuit directly addressed whether a state law right of publicity claim was “pertaining to
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`intellectual property” for purposes of CDA immunity. The court construed “intellectual
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`property” in the CDA to mean “federal intellectual property.” Id. In reaching that conclusion, the
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`Ninth Circuit reasoned:
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`While the scope of federal intellectual property law is relatively well-
`established, state laws protecting ‘intellectual property,’ however defined,
`are by no means uniform. Such laws may bear various names, provide for
`varying causes of action and remedies, and have varying purposes and
`policy goals. Because material on a website may be viewed across the
`Internet, and thus in more than one state at a time, permitting the reach of
`any particular state’s definition of intellectual property to dictate the
`contours of this federal immunity would be contrary to Congress’s
`expressed goal of insulating the development of the Internet from the
`various state law regimes.
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`Id. at 1118. Allowing a state law right of publicity claim to circumvent the protection of the
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`CDA would contradict the “the policy of the United States . . . to preserve the vibrant and
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`competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet … unfettered by…State
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`regulation.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2).
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`This Court should follow its previous decision and the decisions of other courts that CDA
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`immunity applies to right of publicity claims.
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`B.
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`Facebook Meets the Criteria for CDA Immunity.
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`Facebook is entitled to CDA immunity because (1) it is an interactive computer service,
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`(2) the offending content was provided by another information content provider, and (3)
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`Plaintiff’s claims treat Facebook as the publisher or speaker of the offending content. See 47
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`U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); see also Dimeo, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 529.
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`1.
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`Facebook is an Interactive Computer Service.
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`The CDA defines an “interactive computer service” as “any information service, system,
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`or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a
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`computer server.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2). Facebook falls squarely within that definition as the
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`provider of a social media internet platform, which allows people to access its computer servers
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`for the purposes of posting and sharing photos, messages, and content. See Amended Complaint
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`¶ 8 (describing Facebook as a “social media internet site[]”).
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`There is broad precedent that social media platforms like Facebook are interactive
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`computer services under the CDA. See, e.g., Green, 318 F.3d at 471 (finding AOL entitled to
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`CDA immunity as an interactive computer service for messages transmitted through its service);
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`Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 415 (5th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1031 (2008)
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`(finding the MySpace social network entitled to CDA immunity as an interactive computer
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`service).
`
`Unsurprisingly, courts, including at least one in the Third Circuit, have specifically
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`concluded that Facebook is an interactive computer service under the CDA. See, e.g., Shulman v.
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`Facebook.com, No. 17-764 (JMV) (LDW), 2018 WL 3344236, at *7 (D.N.J. July 9, 2018), aff’d
`
`sub nom., Shulman v. Facebook.com (Inc.), 788 F. App’x 882 (3d Cir. 2019); La’Tiejira v.
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`Facebook, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 3d 981, 993 (S.D. Tex. 2017), appeal dismissed, No. 17-20565,
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`2018 WL 1224417 (5th Cir. Feb 15, 2018); Caraccioli, 167 F. Supp. 3d at 1065.
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`2.
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`Plaintiff Does Not Allege That Facebook is the Content Provider.
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`Under § 230(f)(3) of the CDA, an “‘information content provider’ means any person or
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`entity that is responsible . . . for the creation or development of information provided through the
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`Internet or any other interactive computer service.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). Defendants who are
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`not content providers within the meaning of § 230(f)(3) are immune from liability that is based
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`on the publication of third-party content.
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`Third Circuit courts, including this Court, have applied § 230(f)(3) of the CDA to hold
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`that defendants who neither “create [n]or author the [content] in controversy, but rather [are]
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`provided that [content] by a third-party . . . cannot be held liable.” Mmubango v. Google, Inc.,
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`No. 12-1300, 2013 WL 664231, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 2013); Dimeo, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 530
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`(dismissing with prejudice plaintiff’s suit on CDA grounds where defendant did not create the
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`anonymous posts, which were authored by third parties); Kabbaj v. Google, Inc., No. CV 13-
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`1522-RGA, 2014 WL 1369864, at *3 (D. Del. Apr. 7, 2014), aff'd, 592 F. App’x 74 (3d Cir.
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`2015) (dismissing plaintiff’s claim with prejudice where the defendants merely hosted, but did
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`not create or author the third-party content at issue); Parker v. Google Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492
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`at 500–501 (dismissing plaintiff’s claims against Google, which attempt to hold Google
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`accountable for the tortious acts of third parties).
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`Here, Plaintiff does not allege that Facebook created or authored the advertisement
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`containing her image. This glaring omission alone is fatal to Plaintiff’s claims against Facebook.
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`See Kabbaj, 2014 WL 1369864, at *3 (dismissing with prejudice plaintiff’s claims because he
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`failed to allege that any defendant created or authored the offending content).
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`Moreover, the advertisement itself belies any allegation that Facebook created it.
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`Brennerman v. Guardian News & Media Ltd., No. 14-188-SLR/SRF, 2016 WL 1271461, at *1
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`(D. Del. Mar. 30, 2016) (dismissing claims on § 230 grounds, refusing to credit plaintiff’s
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`allegations that a defendant published various materials because “the actual exhibits attached to
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`the complaint indicate otherwise” (emphasis added)). Exhibit L to the Amended Complaint
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`shows the advertisement in its entirety and the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from
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`it is that Facebook did not create it:
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`• The advertisement is identified as a “Sponsored” ad, which by definition is
`an advertisement placed on the platform to promote the entity featured in
`the ad;
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`• The advertisement promotes FirstMet’s dating services—not Facebook;
`and
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`• The advertisement includes a “Create Ad” link in the upper right corner
`inviting users to create their own ads. See Amended Complaint, Ex. L.
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`Plaintiff fails to allege, and nothing in her Amended Complaint infers, that Facebook did
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`anything more than allow the advertisement at issue to be posted on its platform.
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`3.
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`Plaintiff’s Claims Treat Facebook as a Publisher or Speaker.
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`A plaintiff’s claim treats a defendant as a publisher if the cause of action pertains to the
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`exercise of traditional editorial functions, such as deciding whether to publish content. Zeran,
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`129 F.3d at 330. In other words, CDA immunity attaches when the plaintiff’s fundamental tort
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`claim is that the defendant published the allegedly harmful content provided by third parties.
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`Green, 318 F.3d at 471.
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`Plaintiff’s sole allegation directed to Facebook is that the photograph is featured in a
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`“Facebook advertisement”. Amended Complaint ¶ 46. As explained above, the only reasonable
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`interpretation of “Facebook advertisement” is that the advertisement at issue appeared on the
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`Facebook platform. Plaintiff does not allege, and the advertisement contradicts any assertion,
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`that Facebook did anything other than allow a third party to post the ad on the Facebook
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`platform.
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`Allowing third party advertisements on the Facebook platform is a quintessential internet
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`service provider function, which is the very activity the CDA is aimed to protect. See Inman v.
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`Technicolor USA, Inc., No. 11-666, 2011 WL 5829024, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2011)
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`(explaining that CDA immunity bars claims arising from “the dissemination of a third party’s
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`content” (citation omitted)); see also Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1269–71 (9th Cir.
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`2016) (finding that defendant was not liable under § 230 for “‘republishing’ . . .
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`advertisements”); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1124, 1137 (E.D. Va. 1997) (finding
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`that § 230 preempted claim relating to third-party advertising); Jurin v. Google Inc., 695 F. Supp.
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`2d 1117, 1123 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (noting that CDA immunity applied where defendant only
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`provided a space and a service for third party advertisements).
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`Facebook satisfies each of the three elements of § 230 of the CDA. Thus, it is immune
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`from liability for Plaintiff’s right of publicity claims, and the Motion to Dismiss should be
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`granted.
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`III. Even Absent Application of the CDA, Facebook Is Immune from Liability for
`Plaintiff’s Statutory Right of Publicity Claim.
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`Pennsylvania’s statutory right of publicity law provides, “[a]ny natural person whose
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`name or likeness has commercial value and is used for any commercial or advertising purpose
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`without the written consent of such natural person . . . may bring an action.”