Case 2:24-cv-04170-MAK Document 46 Filed 04/22/25 Page 1 of 16
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`JEFF SAIDI
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
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`: CIVIL ACTION
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`: NO. 24-4170
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`:
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`v.
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`TROOPER BIJAN RASTEGARPANAH
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`KEARNEY, J.
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`MEMORANDUM
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` April 22, 2025
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`A Pennsylvania State Trooper’s audit of car titles and registrations led him to criminally
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`charge a used car dealer with distinct frauds at different times in two Pennsylvania counties. The
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`Commonwealth eventually dismissed the second-filed charges but transferred those charges to the
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`first-filed county. The Commonwealth and the used car dealer then reached a plea deal: he pleaded
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`guilty to two of the charges in exchange for the nolle prosse dismissal of the other charges. The
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`state court judge convicted him on the two pleaded charges.
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`The car dealer turned around and pro se sued the investigating State Trooper two years later
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`for malicious prosecution claiming the Trooper lacked a basis for the later dismissed claims. We
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`allowed discovery. The Trooper now moves for summary judgment. We find no genuine issue of
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`material fact requiring a jury to decide whether the car dealer obtained a favorable termination on
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`the charges voluntarily dismissed in exchange for a plea. We cannot find the Commonwealth’s
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`dismissal of some charges in exchange for a guilty plea on other charges constitutes a favorable
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`termination. There is no evidence the Trooper did anything wrong. He arrested a car dealer based
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`on an audit, witness statement, and a confidential informant and undercover operation leading to
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`different charges. The Commonwealth decided to partially combine the charges and later accept a
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`guilty plea on two of the charges instead of going to trial on all charges. The car dealer is not
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`Case 2:24-cv-04170-MAK Document 46 Filed 04/22/25 Page 2 of 16
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`exonerated; no one found him not guilty of the dismissed charges. We grant the Trooper summary
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`judgment.
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`Undisputed Material Facts
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`I.
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`Pennsylvania State Trooper Bijan Rastegarpanah worked as an investigator in the Vehicle
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`Fraud Investigations Unit of the Pennsylvania State Police in late 2019 and 2020.1 He conducted
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`audits of tag agencies and car dealerships licensed by the Pennsylvania Department of
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`Transportation (PennDOT).2 He determined 147 title or registration plate transactions had been
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`obtained using fraudulent drivers’ licenses during an October 2019 audit of a Delaware County tag
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`agency.3 Trooper Rastegarpanah knew some car dealerships charged fees to create vehicle
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`registrations for foreign nationals (who may otherwise not obtain title for lack of documents)
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`through fraudulent means.4 This type of fraudulent scheme involved delivering a large quantity of
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`car title transactions to tag agents with fictitious documents, such as fraudulent drivers’ licenses
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`and insurance cards, to obtain a “washed” title.5
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`Trooper Rastegarpanah learned during his October 2019 audit that Jeff Saidi—a used car
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`dealer and commissioned notary public in Montgomery County—had notarized the seller’s
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`signatures on thirty-four of the 147 suspect titles.6 Mr. Saidi performed notary services but was not
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`a tag agent for PennDOT.7 Trooper Rastegarpanah spoke with unidentified persons at PennDOT’s
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`Risk Management Office and learned Mr. Saidi frequented PennDOT’s headquarters in Dauphin
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`County.8 The unidentified PennDOT employees informed Trooper Rastegarpanah Mr. Saidi often
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`requested “dealer titles,” which were titles PennDOT previously identified as fraudulent.9
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`Obtaining a “dealer title” removes PennDOT’s administrative hold on a vehicle title obtained
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`fraudulently, therefore allowing the car to be retitled without further investigation.10 Trooper
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`2
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`Case 2:24-cv-04170-MAK Document 46 Filed 04/22/25 Page 3 of 16
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`Rastegarpanah learned Mr. Saidi obtained driver titles from PennDOT and immediately transferred
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`them to other individuals using fraudulent drivers’ licenses.11
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`Trooper Rastegarpanah investigated the thirty-four titles fraudulently notarized by Mr.
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`Saidi and interviewed the owner of one of the cars with questionable title on January 31, 2020.12
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`The car purchaser, a foreign national, confirmed someone forged her signature on the title.13 The
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`title transfer indicated a “Herb Byrd” sold her the car and Mr. Saidi notarized the signature.14 The
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`Trooper discovered seven other titles notarized by Mr. Saidi with the car seller identified as “Herb
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`Byrd.”15
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`Several months after the interview with the foreign national, a confidential informant told
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`Trooper Rastegarpanah of Mr. Saidi’s fraudulent scheme to obtain registrations for foreign
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`nationals.16 The Trooper learned Mr. Saidi notarized items without the individual present, charged
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`foreign nationals between $800 and $1,000 for license plates, and used the pen name “Herb Byrd”
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`when notarizing title transfers.17
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`Trooper Rastegarpanah then arranged for an undercover State Trooper, Sergio Colon, to
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`meet Mr. Saidi at one of his car dealerships on September 16, 2020 in an attempt to purchase a
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`registration plate with fraudulent documents.18 Undercover Trooper Colon provided Mr. Saidi a
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`title for a 2003 Nissan with the back of the title blank.19 Mr. Saidi requested Trooper Colon forge
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`the signature of the seller of the Nissan.20 Trooper Colon complied, gave the title to Mr. Saidi, and
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`provided Mr. Saidi with fictitious contact information using the name Fernando Ramirez.21 He did
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`not provide Mr. Saidi with a Pennsylvania driver’s license or identification.22 Mr. Saidi told
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`Trooper Colon the registration plate cost $900.23 Trooper Colon paid Mr. Saidi $700 and Mr. Saidi
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`made a note the Trooper still owed him $200.24 Mr. Saidi told Trooper Colon he would have the
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`registration plate ready as soon as possible.25
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`3
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`Mr. Saidi contacted Trooper Colon the next day and told him he could come pick up the
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`license plate.26 Trooper Colon visited the dealership on September 18, 2020 and paid Mr. Saidi the
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`$200 balance.27 Mr. Saidi then gave Trooper Colon a Pennsylvania registration plate and card with
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`the number LKC1057.28
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`Trooper Rastegarpanah’s review of the records for this registration plate LKC1057
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`confirmed the registration plate had been obtained in Allentown.29 PennDOT records showed an
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`active record submitted on September 17, 2020 for “Fernando Ramirez” with registration plate
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`LKC1057 obtained with a fraudulent driver’s license and insurance information.30 Trooper
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`Rastegarpanah’s investigation of Mr. Saidi confirmed his involvement in the title fraud scheme to
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`obtain authentic vehicle registrations for foreign nationals.31
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`The Trooper charges Mr. Saidi in Montgomery County.
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`Trooper Rastegarpanah filed a criminal complaint and affidavit of probable cause on
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`September 28, 2020 in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania.32 Judge Scott approved a warrant for
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`Mr. Saidi’s arrest on September 28, 2020.33 Trooper Rastegarpanah arrested Mr. Saidi on October
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`1, 2020 after executing a search warrant of Mr. Saidi’s residence and his used car dealerships.34
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`Trooper Rastegarpanah filed eleven criminal charges against Mr. Saidi in Montgomery County:
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`deceptive or fraudulent business practices; corrupt organizations; dealing in proceeds of unlawful
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`activity; thirty-five counts of forgery; washing vehicle titles; thirty-five counts of perjury; thirty-
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`five counts of tampering with public records or information; thirty-five counts of tampering with
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`records or identification; altered, forged, or counterfeit documents and plates; and tampering with
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`or fabricating physical evidence.35 He later withdrew the charge for dealing in proceeds of
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`unlawful activity.36 An unidentified judge set Mr. Saidi’s bail at $600,000 on October 1, 2020, then
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`lowered it to $50,000 on October 14, 2020.37
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`4
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`Case 2:24-cv-04170-MAK Document 46 Filed 04/22/25 Page 5 of 16
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`The Trooper charges Mr. Saidi in Dauphin County.
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`Trooper Rastegarpanah conducted a search warrant of another property owned by Mr. Saidi
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`in Plymouth Meeting on October 6, 2020.38 He found 100 annual PennDOT inspection stickers
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`and 101 PennDOT inspection and emissions stickers.39 PennDOT at some point issued the stickers
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`to an inspection station in Ridley Township, PA, but the inspection station owner reported them
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`stolen on September 16, 2020.40 The stickers originally belonged to PennDOT in Harrisburg.41 Mr.
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`Saidi purchased the stickers from a reliable vendor on social media at the market price.42
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`Trooper Rastegarpanah filed a new criminal complaint and affidavit of probable cause in
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`Dauphin County and an unidentified judge issued a warrant for Mr. Saidi’s arrest on December 1,
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`2020.43 Trooper Rastegarpanah filed 201 counts of receiving stolen property against Mr. Saidi in
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`Dauphin County.44
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`Trooper Rastegarpanah withdrew the charges in Dauphin County on April 19, 2021.45 The
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`Commonwealth’s attorneys then transferred the Dauphin County receiving stolen property charge
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`to the earlier filed Montgomery County Docket and amended the Montgomery County bill of
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`information to include the receiving stolen property charge (originally filed in Dauphin County)
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`on August 15, 2022.46
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`Mr. Saidi pleads guilty to receipt of stolen property and then sues the Trooper.
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`Mr. Saidi pleaded guilty to receiving stolen property and operating a car dealership on a
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`Sunday on August 15, 2022.47 The Commonwealth nolle prossed all the original Montgomery
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`County charges as part of a guilty plea with Mr. Saidi so only the stolen property charge from
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`Dauphin County remained on the docket.48 The Commonwealth also added one additional
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`summary offense of operating a car dealership on a Sunday.49
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`5
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`Case 2:24-cv-04170-MAK Document 46 Filed 04/22/25 Page 6 of 16
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`Mr. Saidi pro se sued Trooper Rastegarpanah and other state actors for various civil rights
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`violations and state law claims almost two years later on August 12, 2024.50 We allowed his Fourth
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`Amendment malicious prosecution claim against Trooper Rastegarpanah to proceed to discovery.51
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`II.
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`Analysis
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`Trooper Rastegarpanah now moves for summary judgment on Mr. Saidi’s malicious
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`prosecution claim.52 Mr. Saidi opposes.53 Mr. Saidi, to proceed to trial on a civil rights malicious
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`prosecution claim, must show: (1) the Trooper initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal
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`proceeding ended in Mr. Saidi’s favor; (3) the Trooper began the proceeding without probable
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`cause; (4) the Trooper acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing Mr. Saidi to justice;
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`and (5) Mr. Saidi suffered a deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a
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`consequence of a legal proceeding.54
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`Trooper Rastegarpanah argues the proceedings did not end in Mr. Saidi’s favor because Mr.
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`Saidi pleaded guilty to certain charges.55 Mr. Saidi succinctly responds both criminal cases ended
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`in his favor because the Commonwealth dismissed the Dauphin County case in its entirety on April
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`19, 2021, and the Commonwealth nolle prossed the Montgomery County charges on August 15,
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`2022.56 Mr. Saidi also argues he is not a PennDOT agent authorized to perform title and registration
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`services; he simply performed notary services for immigrants because it is his “moral viewpoint”
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`undocumented persons must be able to drive vehicles to perform labor vital to the country’s
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`economy.57 He also questions why the Commonwealth charged him, the notary, with criminal
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`conduct but did not charge the tag agency.58 It is unclear which element of malicious prosecution
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`his last few arguments are intended to support; Mr. Saidi seemingly argues the charges themselves
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`are morally dubious, or at the very least, levied at the wrong person. But we have no power to
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`change Pennsylvania law and the question of why Trooper Rastegarpanah did not charge other
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`6
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`Case 2:24-cv-04170-MAK Document 46 Filed 04/22/25 Page 7 of 16
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`persons is not before us today. We instead begin and end our analysis by deciding whether Mr.
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`Saidi adduced evidence the criminal proceedings ended in his favor as necessary to proceed to trial
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`on his malicious prosecution claim.
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`We find no evidence the criminal proceeding ended in his favor. “[A] malicious prosecution
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`claim cannot be predicated on an underlying criminal proceeding which terminated in a manner
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`not indicative of the innocence of the accused.”59 Mr. Saidi may meet this element by
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`demonstrating his earlier criminal proceeding terminated with “(a) a discharge by a magistrate at
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`a preliminary hearing, or (b) the refusal of a grand jury to indict, or (c) the formal abandonment of
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`the proceedings by the public prosecutor, or (d) the quashing of an indictment or information, or
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`(e) an acquittal, or (f) a final order in favor of the accused by a trial or appellate court.”60
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`This is a simple test complicated in this case by the fact the Commonwealth charged Mr.
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`Saidi in two criminal proceedings in two different counties based on distinct facts. Trooper
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`Rastegarpanah filed criminal charges against Mr. Saidi in Montgomery and Dauphin Counties and
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`withdrew the charges in Dauphin County in April 2021. The Commonwealth amended the
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`Montgomery County bill of information on August 15, 2022 to add the Dauphin County charges.
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`The Commonwealth then nolle prossed the original Montgomery County charges as part of a plea
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`agreement so only the Dauphin County stolen property charge (plus a later-added summary offense
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`of operating a car dealership on a Sunday) remained. Mr. Saidi pleaded guilty to the stolen property
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`charge and the summary offense.
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`We must answer two questions: (1) did the Trooper’s dropping the charges in Dauphin
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`County and the Commonwealth later transferring them to a different county result in a favorable
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`termination in the Dauphin County proceedings? and, (2) did the Commonwealth nolle prossing
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`the Montgomery County charges result in a favorable termination in the Montgomery County
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`7
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`Case 2:24-cv-04170-MAK Document 46 Filed 04/22/25 Page 8 of 16
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`proceedings? We considered these questions at the motion to dismiss stage but revisit them now
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`with the benefit of adduced evidence.61
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`We distinguish between conviction, acquittal, and charges nolle prossed. If a person is
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`convicted of some charges and acquitted of others, “upon examination of the entire criminal
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`proceeding, the judgment must indicate the plaintiff’s innocence of the alleged misconduct
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`underlying the offenses charged.”62 “When the circumstances—both the offenses as stated in the
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`statute and the underlying facts of the case—indicate that the judgment as a whole does not reflect
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`the plaintiff’s innocence, then the plaintiff fails to establish the favorable termination element.”63
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`We should not apply a charge-by-charge analysis to the favorable termination element.64 Still,
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`“when a plaintiff is convicted on one charge but not the other,” we “may still hold that the criminal
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`proceeding favorably terminated if the charged offenses ‘contained distinct statutory requirements’
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`and ‘aimed to punish two different sets of conduct.’”65 Our Court of Appeals directs us to “apply
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`a two-step analysis to determine whether the prosecution was favorably terminated.”66 We must
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`“consider whether the offenses of conviction and acquittal (1) share common elements or involve
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`lesser-included offenses; and (2) stem from the same underlying conduct, such that they ‘cannot
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`be divorced.’”67
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`Trooper Rastegarpanah largely repeats the argument he made when moving to dismiss. He
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`claims the criminal charges levied against Mr. Saidi in both counties “aimed to punish the same
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`conduct—namely, the fraudulent scheme and illegal operations occurring at [Mr. Saidi’s] used car
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`businesses.”68 He further argues Mr. Saidi cannot prove the dropped charges in Montgomery
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`County constituted a favorable termination because the Commonwealth dropped the charges as
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`part of Mr. Saidi’s negotiated plea deal.69
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`8
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`Trooper Rastegarpanah does not address whether transferring the charges levied against
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`Mr. Saidi in Dauphin County to his Montgomery County docket constituted a favorable
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`termination of the Dauphin County proceeding. But plainly we must answer this question in the
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`negative. We cannot find the Dauphin County proceeding ended in Mr. Saidi’s favor because he
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`pleaded guilty to the receiving stolen property charge, albeit in a different county.70
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`The
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`first-filed Montgomery County proceeding
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`is
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`less straightforward. The
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`Commonwealth nolle prossed the original Montgomery County charges as part of the plea
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`agreement under which Mr. Saidi pleaded guilty to the receiving stolen property charge and the
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`summary offense of operating a dealership on a Sunday.71 When we studied this issue months ago
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`based solely on the pleadings, we found the charges Mr. Saidi pleaded guilty to (receiving stolen
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`property and the summary offense) did not arise from the same conduct charged in Montgomery
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`County (forgery, tampering with records, and ID-writing).72 We pointed out Trooper
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`Rastegarpanah did not address whether Montgomery County charges contained different statutory
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`requirements than the Dauphin County charges.
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`Trooper Rastegarpanah still does not argue the two sets of charges share common elements.
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`With the benefit of the record before us, we remain unconvinced the charges in Montgomery
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`County aimed to punish the same conduct as the charges in Dauphin County. It appears the offenses
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`charged in Montgomery County arising from Mr. Saidi’s false title scheme are different from the
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`offenses charged in Dauphin County arising from his unlawful possession of inspection and
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`emissions stickers. But we need not address the elements of the offenses or make a finding as to
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`whether the charges stem from the same conduct. Even assuming the charges aimed to punish
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`different conduct, Mr. Saidi still could not show the favorable termination required to proceed on
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`a malicious prosecution claim.
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`Case 2:24-cv-04170-MAK Document 46 Filed 04/22/25 Page 10 of 16
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`Why not? We now have evidence the Commonwealth nolle prossed the Montgomery
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`County charges in exchange for Mr. Saidi’s guilty plea on the Dauphin County charges. “[A] nolle
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`prosequi indicates termination of the charges in favor of the accused ‘only when their final
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`disposition is such as to indicate the innocence of the accused.’”73 “A prosecutor’s decision to drop
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`charges as part of a compromise with the accused does not amount to a ‘favorable termination’ of
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`state proceedings for purposes of permitting the accused to maintain a subsequent claim under
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`[section] 1983 for malicious prosecution.”74 Our Court of Appeals in Hilfirty v. Shipman held
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`“unlike a situation where the prosecution seeks a grant of nolle prosequi ‘because of insufficient
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`evidence,’ dismissal of charges as a result of a compromise is not an indication that the accused is
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`actually innocent of the crimes charged.”75 Our Court of Appeals followed this rule ten years later
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`in Marable v. West Pottsgrove Township, finding it insignificant the state prosecutor dropped the
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`charge of making terroristic threats as part of a plea agreement he reached with the plaintiff.76
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`Mr. Saidi does not adduce evidence creating a fact issue with respect to the plea agreement.
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`The dismissal of the Montgomery County charges resulted from Mr. Saidi’s plea agreement, not
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`from his innocence.77 It follows he cannot establish a favorable termination.78 Without a favorable
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`termination, Mr. Saidi cannot proceed. We need not consider whether there are genuine issues of
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`material fact on the remaining elements of a malicious prosecution claim.79
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`III. Conclusion
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`Mr. Saidi cannot demonstrate a question of material fact suggesting he obtained the
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`favorable termination necessary to proceed on his malicious prosecution claim. Mr. Saidi admitted
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`his guilt on two charges. But no one ever found him not guilty on the remaining charges. The
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`Commonwealth dismissed the remaining charges as part of a plea agreement. The Trooper is
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`10
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`Case 2:24-cv-04170-MAK Document 46 Filed 04/22/25 Page 11 of 16
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`entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We grant Trooper Rastegarpanah’s Motion for summary
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`judgment.
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`1 ECF 33-1 ¶ 3.
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` Id. ¶ 4.
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` 2
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` 3
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` Id. ¶ 5. Anyone wishing to legally obtain registration and new title for a vehicle in Pennsylvania
`must provide his or her driver’s license or another acceptable form of identification, an original
`motor vehicle title, and a copy of the vehicle’s insurance. Applicants must be physically present in
`the tag agency at the time of the transfer to sign the title in front of the PennDOT agent. Id. ¶ 6;
`ECF 44 ¶ 6.
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` ECF 33-11 ¶ 5.
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` Id.
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` ECF 33-1 ¶¶ 1–2, 8; ECF 44 ¶ 8.
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` ECF 44 ¶¶ 2, 8, 12, 13.
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` ECF 33-1 ¶ 9; ECF 44 ¶ 9.
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` ECF 33-1 ¶ 9.
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` 4
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` 5
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` 6
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` 7
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` 8
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` 9
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`10 Id.
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`11 Id.
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`12 Id. ¶ 10.
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`13 Id.
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`14 Id.
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`15 Id. ¶ 11.
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`16 Id. ¶ 12; ECF 33-6 at 5 (using the pagination assigned by the CM/ECF docketing system).
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`17 ECF 33-1 ¶ 12; ECF 33-6 at 5. Mr. Saidi responds only that “Herb Byrd [i]s authorized to sign
`for the Vehicle Titles owned by the Plaintiff’s dealership.” ECF 44 ¶¶ 10, 12. Mr. Saidi does not
`dispute he used the name Herb Byrd for transactions.
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`18 ECF 33-1 ¶ 13.
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`11
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`Case 2:24-cv-04170-MAK Document 46 Filed 04/22/25 Page 12 of 16
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`19 Id.
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`20 Id.
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`21 Id.
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`22 Id.
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`23 Id.
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`24 Id.
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`25 Id. Mr. Saidi maintains he collected the money for the tag agency, not for himself, as his
`dealership is not a place for someone to buy a registration plate. ECF 44 ¶ 13. He “simply
`performed Notary acts for the sellers.” Id.
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`26 ECF 33-1 ¶ 14.
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`27 Id. ¶ 15.
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`28 Id.
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`29 Id. ¶ 16.
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`30 Id.
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`31 ECF 33-11 ¶ 6.
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`32 ECF 33-1 ¶ 17.
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`33 Id.; ECF 33-6 at 6.
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`34 ECF 33-1 ¶ 18. The search warrant for 550 Plymouth Road and Mr. Saidi’s used car dealerships
`does not appear to be included in the Commonwealth’s record; only the later-issued search warrant
`for Mr. Saidi’s property at 835 Woodbrook Lane, Plymouth Meeting, PA is attached. ECF 33-6 at
`2–7. But Mr. Saidi does not challenge the propriety of the first search, so the missing search warrant
`does not impact our decision.
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`35 Id. ¶ 19; ECF 33-5.
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`36 ECF 33-12 at 215 (using the pagination assigned by the CM/ECF docketing system).
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`37 ECF 33-9 at 3 (using the pagination assigned by the CM/ECF docketing system).
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`38 ECF 33-1 ¶ 20.
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`12
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`Case 2:24-cv-04170-MAK Document 46 Filed 04/22/25 Page 13 of 16
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`39 Id. ¶ 23; ECF 33-6 at 9.
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`40 ECF 33-1 ¶ 23; ECF 33-10 at 5 (using the pagination assigned by the CM/ECF docketing
`system). Mr. Saidi disputes the inspection stickers were stolen because the discovery he received
`from Trooper Rastegarpanah contained no evidence the stickers were reported stolen. ECF 44 ¶
`23. But Trooper Rastegarpanah adduced an affidavit of probable cause where he swore the owner
`of an inspection station reported the stickers as stolen to the Ridley Township Police Department
`on September 16, 2020; this affidavit also contains the incident number for the police report. ECF
`33-10 at 5 (Bates labeled DEF_050). There is no dispute Mr. Saidi received this affidavit in
`discovery as shown by the Bates numbering system.
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`41 EF 33-1 ¶ 24; ECF 44 ¶ 24 (“Inspection station purchased the stickers from PennDOT[.]”).
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`42 ECF 44 ¶ 23.
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`43 ECF 33-11 ¶ 10.
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`44 ECF 33-1 ¶ 25; ECF 33-12 at 216.
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`45 ECF 33-1 ¶ 26.
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`46 Id. ¶¶ 21, 26; ECF 33-7; ECF 33-12 at 216.
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`47 ECF 33-1 ¶ 22; ECF 33-8.
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`48 ECF 33-1 ¶ 21; ECF 33-8; ECF 33-12 at 215–16.
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`49 ECF 33-7; ECF 33-8; ECF 33-9 at 3; ECF 33-12 at 216.
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`50 ECF 1. Mr. Saidi obtained counsel several months after we denied Trooper Rastegarpanah’s
`Motion to dismiss. ECF 30. We later granted Mr. Saidi’s counsel leave to withdraw. ECF 37.
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`51 ECFs 16, 17. We found no favorable termination at the Motion to dismiss stage as to the
`malicious prosecution claim in Montgomery County because the charges Mr. Saidi ultimately
`pleaded to arose from different conduct than the charges the Commonwealth nolle prossed. ECF
`16 at 7–8. We allowed the malicious prosecution charge in Dauphin County to proceed because
`the Commonwealth only moved to dismiss that claim based on timeliness, not on the merits. We
`could not find the Dauphin County charges terminated favorably on the face of the amended
`Complaint, thus triggering the statute of limitations, so we had no grounds to dismiss the claim as
`time barred. Id. at 13–14.
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`52 ECF 36. Summary judgment is proper when “the movant shows that there is no genuine issue
`as to any material fact that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
`Civ. P. 56(a). “Material facts are those ‘that could affect the outcome’ of the proceeding, and ‘a
`dispute about a material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is sufficient to permit a reasonable jury
`to return a verdict for the non-moving party.’” Pearson v. Prison Health Servs., 850 F.3d 526, 534
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`13
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`Case 2:24-cv-04170-MAK Document 46 Filed 04/22/25 Page 14 of 16
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`(3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir. 2011)). On a motion for
`summary judgment, “we view the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most
`favorable to the nonmovant.” Pearson, 850 F.3d at 533–34 (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,
`378 (2007)). “The party seeking summary judgment ‘has the burden of demonstrating that the
`evidentiary record presents no genuine issue of material fact.’” Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313,
`323 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Willis v. UPMC Children’s Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 808 F.3d 638, 643 (3d
`Cir. 2015)). If the movant carries its burden, “the nonmoving party must identify facts in the record
`that would enable them to make a sufficient showing on essential elements of their case for which
`they have the burden of proof.” Willis, 808 F.3d at 643 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
`317, 323 (1986)). Where “a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence
`of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof
`at trial . . . there can be ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof
`concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts
`immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23. “The moving party is ‘entitled to a judgment as a matter
`of law’ because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential
`element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.” Id. at 323.
`
`We are mindful of Mr. Saidi’s status as a pro se litigant. The Supreme Court instructs us to hold
`pro se allegations “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers . . . .”
`Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). “However, despite this liberal interpretation, the same
`standards for summary judgment apply to pro se litigants.” Watson v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 629 F.
`Supp. 2d 481, 485 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (citing United States v. Asken, No. 01–0026, 2002 WL
`32175416, at *1 n.11 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2002)). Mr. Saidi “is not relieved of his obligation under
`Rule 56 to point to competent evidence in the record that is capable of refuting a defendant’s
`motion for summary judgment.” Ray v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 05-2507, 2007 WL 1377645, at *3 (E.D.
`Pa. May 10, 2007), aff ’d sub nom. Ray v. Fed. Ins. Co./Chubb, 256 F. App’x 566 (3d Cir. 2007).
`
`53 ECF 45.
`
`54 DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood, 407 F.3d 599, 601 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Est. of Smith v.
`Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003)).
`
`55 ECF 36 at 12–15 (using the pagination assigned by the CM/ECF docketing system).
`
`56 ECF 45 at 5–6 (using the pagination assigned by the CM/ECF docketing system). Mr. Saidi also
`attempts to now argue a civil rights claim against Trooper Rastegarpanah for depriving him of
`reasonable bail under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 4–5. But Mr. Saidi did not plead an Eighth
`Amendment unreasonable bail claim in his amended Complaint (ECF 13), so we do not consider
`these unpleaded allegations related to excessive bail.
`
`57 ECF 45 at 8–11.
`
`58 Id. at 11.
`
`59 Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2009), abrogated on other grounds by Thompson
`v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36 (2022).
`
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`60 Id. (quoting Donahue v. Gavin, 280 F.3d 371, 383 (3d Cir. 2002)).
`
`61 ECF 16 at 6–8, 13–14.
`
`62 Kossler, 564 F.3d at 188.
`
`63 Id.
`
`64 See id. at 193.
`
`65 Alburg v. Jones, No. 21-2580, 2023 WL 2823895, at *3 n.13 (3d Cir. Apr. 7, 2023) (quoting
`Kossler, 564 F.3d at 191).
`
`66 Jones v. Grill, No. 21-2091, 2024 WL 3423707, at *2 (3d Cir. July 16, 2024) (citing Kossler,
`564 F.3d at 188–89).
`
`67 Id. (quoting Kossler, 564 F.3d at 188–89).
`
`68 ECF 36 at 14.
`
`69 Id. at 14–15.
`
`70 As we noted in our December 13, 2024 Opinion, the Supreme Court in Thompson v. Clark held
`a plaintiff does not need to show an “affirmative indication of innocence” for a section 1983
`malicious prosecution claim; instead, he or she only needs to “show that the criminal prosecution
`ended without a conviction.” 596 U.S. 36, 49 (2022). ECF 16 at 14. But the state court judge in
`this case convicted Mr. Saidi of the stolen property charge after Mr. Saidi agreed he violated
`Pennsylvania Law. See ECF 33-8.
`
`71 ECF 33-8 at 2 (using the pagination assigned by the CM/ECF docketing system); ECF 33-9 at
`3.
`
`72 ECF 16 at 7–8.
`
`73 Weaver v. Beveridge, 577 F. App’x 103, 105 (3d Cir. 2014).
`
`74 Marable v. W. Pottsgrove Twp., 176 F. App’x 275, 281 n.1 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Hilfirty v.
`Shipman, 91 F.3d 573, 580 (3d Cir. 1996)).
`
`75 91 F.3d 573, 580 (3d Cir. 1996) (first quoting Haefner v. Burkey, 626 A.2d 519, 521 (Pa. 1993);
`then citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 660 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1977); and then citing
`Davis v. Chubb/Pacific Indem. Grp., 493 F.Supp. 89, 92 (E.D.Pa.1980)), abrogation on other
`grounds recognized in Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782 (3d Cir. 2000). However,
`our Court of Appeals in Hilfirty concluded there had been a favorable termination and reversed the
`district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff Miller’s malicious prosecution claim because Plaintiff Miller
`
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`herself “neither compromised with the prosecution to obtain her grant of nolle prosequi nor
`formally accepted the nolle prosequi in exchange for a release of future civil claims.” Id. at 575.
`Rather, the compromise occurred between Plaintiff Miller’s co-defendant and the prosecution, and
`Plaintiff Miller was simply a beneficiary of that agreement. Id. at 581.
`
`76 Marable, 176 F. App’x 281 n.1.
`
`77 See Rosembert v. Borough of E. Lansdowne, 14 F. Supp. 3d 631, 645 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (first
`quoting White v. Brown, 408 F. App’x 595, 599 (3d Cir. 2010); then citing Marable, 176 F. App’x
`at 281 n.1).
`
`78 See id. Further, “a finding that [Mr. Saidi] was maliciously prosecuted would necessarily imply
`the invalidity of his conviction, which is prohibited by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Heck [v.
`Humphrey].” Id. (first citing Marable, 176 F. App’x at 281; then citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512
`U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994). The Supreme Court in Heck held “to permit a convicted criminal
`defendant to proceed with a malicious prosecution claim would permit a collateral attack on the
`conviction through the vehicle of a civil suit.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 484.
`
`79 See Kossler, 564 F.3d at 187 n.3 (declining to analyze whether defendants initiated the criminal
`proceeding because plaintiff failed to satisfy the favorable termination element), 194 (“We reiterate
`that district courts need not reach the probable cause element unless they first make a finding of
`favorable termination after examining whether the proceeding as a whole indicates the innocence