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Case 1:19-cv-01496-SES Document 13 Filed 11/23/20 Page 1 of 27
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
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`FILOMENA LAMBAKIS,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`ANDREW SAUL,
`Commissioner of Social Security,
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`Defendant.
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` CIVIL NO: 1:19-CV-01496
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`I. Introduction.
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`MEMORANDUM OPINION
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`This is a social security action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The
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`plaintiff, Filomena Lambakis, seeks judicial review of the final decision of the
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`Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her claims for
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`Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income under Titles II
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`and XVI of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C.
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`§§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner’s
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`decision will be vacated, and the case will be remanded to the Commissioner for
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`further consideration.
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`Case 1:19-cv-01496-SES Document 13 Filed 11/23/20 Page 2 of 27
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`II. Background and Procedural History.
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`We refer to the transcript provided by the Commissioner. See docs.
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`4-1 to 4-18.1 In December 2016, Ms. Lambakis filed an application for Disability
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`Insurance Benefits and an application for Supplemental Security Income
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`contending that she became disabled on January 1, 2005. Admin. Tr. at 276–86.
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`After the Commissioner denied Ms. Lambakis’s claims at the initial level of
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`administrative review, Ms. Lambakis requested an administrative hearing. Id. at
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`221–22. On June 25, 2018, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Richard Guida
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`held a hearing at which Ms. Lambakis and a vocational expert testified. Id. at 153–
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`80. At the hearing, Ms. Lambakis, through her counsel, amended the alleged onset
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`date of her disability to March 16, 2016. Id. at 174.
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`By a decision dated October 9, 2018, the ALJ determined that Ms. Lambakis
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`was not disabled from March 16, 2016, through the date of his decision, and so he
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`denied her benefits. Id. at 33. Ms. Lambakis appealed the ALJ’s decision to the
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`Appeals Council, which denied her request for review on June 26, 2019. Id. at 1–4.
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`This makes the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner subject to
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`judicial review by this court.
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`1 Because the facts of this case are well known to the parties, we do not repeat
`them here in detail. Instead, we recite only those facts that bear on Ms.
`Lambakis’s claims.
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`2
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`In August of 2019, Ms. Lambakis began this action by filing a complaint
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`claiming that the ALJ erred and requesting that the court reverse the
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`Commissioner’s decision and award her benefits and such other relief as is
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`justified. Doc. 1. The Commissioner filed an answer and a certified transcript of
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`the administrative proceedings. Docs. 3, 4. The parties, who consented to proceed
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`before a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), have filed briefs, and this
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`matter is ripe for decision. Docs. 10–12.
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`III. Legal Standards.
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`A. Substantial Evidence Review—the Role of This Court.
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`When reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision denying a claimant’s
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`application for benefits, “the court has plenary review of all legal issues decided by
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`the Commissioner.” Ficca v. Astrue, 901 F. Supp. 2d 533, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2012).
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`But the court’s review of the Commissioner’s factual findings is limited to whether
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`substantial evidence supports those findings. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v.
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`Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2019). “[T]he threshold for such evidentiary
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`sufficiency is not high.” Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154. Substantial evidence
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`“means—and means only—‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
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`accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id. (quoting Consol. Edison Co. of
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`New York v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
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`3
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`Substantial evidence “is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more
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`than a mere scintilla.” Jesurum v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
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`48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995). A single piece of evidence is not substantial
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`evidence if the ALJ ignores countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a conflict
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`created by the evidence. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993).
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`But in an adequately developed factual record, substantial evidence may be
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`“something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two
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`inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ’s] finding
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`from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm’n,
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`383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). “In determining if the Commissioner’s decision is
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`supported by substantial evidence the court must scrutinize the record as a whole.”
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`Leslie v. Barnhart, 304 F.Supp.2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003).
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`The question before this court, therefore, is not whether Ms. Lambakis is
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`disabled, but whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s finding
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`that she is not disabled and whether the Commissioner correctly applied the
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`relevant law.
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`B. Initial Burdens of Proof, Persuasion, and Articulation for the ALJ.
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`To receive benefits under the Social Security Act by reason of disability, a
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`claimant must demonstrate an inability to “engage in any substantial gainful
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`activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment
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`which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
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`last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C.
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`§§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 416.905(a).
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`To satisfy this requirement, a claimant must have a severe physical or mental
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`impairment that makes it impossible to do his or her previous work or any other
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`substantial gainful activity that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C.
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`§§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 416.905(a).
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`To receive disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security
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`Act, a claimant must show that he or she contributed to the insurance program, is
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`under retirement age, and became disabled prior to the date on which he or she was
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`last insured. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a); 20 C.F.R. § 404.131(a).2 Unlike with disability
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`2 “Disability insurance benefits are paid to an individual if that individual is
`disabled and ‘insured,’ that is, the individual has worked long enough and paid
`social security taxes.” Jury v. Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-2002, 2014 WL 1028439, at *1
`n.5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 2014) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 415(a), 416(i)(1)). “The last
`date that an individual meets the requirements of being insured is commonly
`referred to as the ‘date last insured.’” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(2)). Here, the
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`insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, “[i]nsured status is
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`irrelevant in determining a claimant’s eligibility for supplemental security income
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`benefits” under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. Snyder v. Colvin, No. 3:16-
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`CV-01689, 2017 WL 1078330, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 2017). Supplemental
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`Security Income “is a federal income supplement program funded by general tax
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`revenues (not social security taxes)” “designed to help aged, blind or other disabled
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`individuals who have little or no income.” Id.
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`In determining whether the claimant is disabled, the ALJ follows a five-step
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`sequential evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). Under this
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`process, the ALJ must sequentially determine: (1) whether the claimant is engaged
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`in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment;
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`(3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals a listed impairment;
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`(4) whether the claimant is able to do his or her past relevant work; and
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`(5) whether the claimant is able to do any other work, considering his or her age,
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`education, work experience, and residual functional capacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R.
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`§§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).
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`The ALJ must also assess a claimant’s RFC at step four. Hess v. Comm’r of
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`Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 198 n.2 (3d Cir. 2019). RFC is “that which an individual
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`ALJ determined that Ms. Lambakis met the insured-status requirements through
`December 31, 2020. Admin. Tr. at 21.
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`is still able to do despite the limitations caused by his or her impairment(s).”
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`Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations
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`omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545(a)(1), 416.920(e),
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`416.945(a)(1). In making this assessment, the ALJ considers all the claimant’s
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`medically determinable impairments, including any non-severe impairment
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`identified by the ALJ at step two of his or her analysis. 20 C.F.R.
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`§§ 404.1545(a)(2), 416.945(a)(2).
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`“The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four” of the
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`sequential-evaluation process. Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 632, 634 (3d
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`Cir. 2010). But at step five, “the burden of production shifts to the Commissioner,
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`who must . . . show there are other jobs existing in significant numbers in the
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`national economy which the claimant can perform, consistent with her medical
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`impairments, age, education, past work experience, and residual functional
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`capacity.” Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 39 (3d Cir. 2001).
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`The ALJ’s disability determination must also meet certain basic substantive
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`requisites. Most significantly, the ALJ must provide “a clear and satisfactory
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`explication of the basis on which” his or her decision rests. Cotter v. Harris, 642
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`F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981). “The ALJ must indicate in his decision which
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`evidence he has rejected and which he is relying on as the basis for his finding.”
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`Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 181 F. 3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 1999). The
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`“ALJ may not reject pertinent or probative evidence without explanation.” Johnson
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`v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 204 (3d Cir. 2008). Otherwise, “the
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`reviewing court cannot tell if significant probative evidence was not credited or
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`simply ignored.” Burnett, 220 F.3d at 121 (quoting Cotter, 642 F.2d at 705).
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`IV. The ALJ’s Decision Denying Ms. Lambakis’s Claims.
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`On October 9, 2018, the ALJ denied Ms. Lambakis’s claims for benefits.
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`Applying the sequential-evaluation process, the ALJ determined that Ms.
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`Lambakis was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.
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`At step one of the sequential-evaluation process, the ALJ found that Ms.
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`Lambakis has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 16, 2016 (her
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`amended alleged onset date). Admin. Tr. at 23.3
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`At step two of the sequential-evaluation process, the ALJ found that Ms.
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`Lambakis has the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease,
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`osteoarthritis of the knees, generalized anxiety disorder, major depressive disorder,
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`and post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). Id. He also determined that Ms.
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`3 Ms. Lambakis testified that she works at an Italian restaurant taking orders at the
`counter, answering the phone, and making cold sandwiches. Admin. Tr. at 157–58.
`But she works only part-time. Id. at 157.
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`Lambakis has thyroid nodules, stress incontinence, sinusitis/chronic pansinusitis,
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`mild bilateral sensorineural hearing loss, and bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, but
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`he concluded that those impairments are non-severe impairments. Id. at 24.
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`At step three of the sequential-evaluation process, the ALJ found that Ms.
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`Lambakis does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or
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`medically equaled an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix
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`1. Id. at 24–27. More specifically, the ALJ discussed Listing 1.02 (Major
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`dysfunction of a joint(s) (due to any cause)) with respect to Ms. Lambakis’s knee
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`impairments and Listing 1.04 (Disorders of the spine (e.g., herniated nucleus
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`pulposus, spinal arachnoiditis, spinal stenosis, osteoarthritis, degenerative disc
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`disease, facet arthritis, vertebral fracture), resulting in compromise of a nerve root
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`(including the cauda equina) or the spinal cord) with respect to the impairments of
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`Mr. Lambakis’s lumbar spine, cervical spine, and thoracic spine. Id. at 24–25.
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`With respect to Ms. Lambakis’s mental impairments, the ALJ considered Listing
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`12.04 (Depressive, bipolar and related disorders) and Listing 12.06 (Anxiety and
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`obsessive-compulsive disorders). Id. at 25–27.
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`After finding that Ms. Lambakis’s impairments did not meet or equal a
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`listing, the ALJ assessed Ms. Lambakis’s RFC. The ALJ found that Ms.
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`Lambakis had the RFC to perform light work except that she is “limited to up to
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`frequent postural movements,” “no more than occasional ladders, ropes, scaffolds,
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`and stooping,” no “concentrated exposure to vibration,” and “[s]he is limited to
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`simple, routine tasks involving only simple work related decision[s] with few, if
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`any, workplace changes. Id. at 27.
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`In making the RFC assessment, the ALJ reviewed Ms. Lambakis’s
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`assertions and testimony regarding her impairments and symptoms. Id. at 28. He
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`found that Ms. Lambakis’s medically determinable impairments reasonably could
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`be expected to cause her alleged symptoms. Id. But he found that Ms. Lambakis’s
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`statements regarding the “intensity, persistence and limiting effects” of her
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`symptoms were “not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other
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`evidence in the record for the reasons explained in [his] decision.” Id.
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`As to Ms. Lambakis’s physical impairments, the ALJ reviewed the medical
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`records—some of which support Ms. Lambakis’s assertions regarding the severity
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`of her symptoms and some of which, the ALJ suggests, do not. Id. at 28–29.
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`Similarly, as to Ms. Lambakis’s mental impairments, the ALJ reviewed the
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`medical records, noting that she “was assessed with clinical examination findings
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`of a dysphoric affect, a dysthymic mood, a somewhat impaired recent and remote
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`memory, and a sad and depressed mood,” but that she was also “assessed with
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`clinical examination findings of a euthymic mood, an appropriate affect,
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`appropriate eye contact, normal motor behavior, clear speech, adequate expressive
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`and receptive language skills, a coherent thought process, clear sensorium, and
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`good insight and judgment.” Id. at 29 (citations to the record omitted). The ALJ
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`also concluded that although the fact that Ms. Lambakis received mental health
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`therapy and was prescribed psychotropic medication, “provides some support for
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`her allegations regarding her symptoms and limitations pertaining to her mental
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`impairments,” other evidence cited “indicates she does not experience symptoms
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`or limitations related to her mental impairment with either the intensity or
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`persistence that she suggested.” Id. at 29–30. Similarly, the ALJ concluded that
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`Ms. Lambakis’s “medical records on a longitudinal basis” are not consistent with
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`the degree of limitation in activities of daily living alleged by Ms. Lambakis. Id. at
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`30.
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`Although Ms. Lambakis “alleged experiencing medication side effects of
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`dizziness and drowsiness,” the ALJ concluded that her medical records do not
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`support a finding that she experiences “medication side effects with such intensity
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`or persistence that they would preclude her from performing jobs consistent with”
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`the RFC he set forth. Id.
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`The ALJ also considered the opinion evidence. He gave “little weight” to
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`the state agency psychological consultant’s opinion that Ms. Lambakis’s mental
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`impairments are non-severe impairments because that opinion “is not consistent
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`with the entirety of the objective evidence pertaining to the claimant’s mental
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`impairments, including some abnormal clinical examination findings.” Id. at 31.
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`And he gave “little weight” to Ms. Lambakis’s primary care physician’s opinion
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`that she was disabled from March 2009 through 2015, because that opinion does
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`not relate to the relevant time period. Id.4
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`That ALJ gave “great weight” to the State agency medical consultant’s
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`“physical residual functional capacity assessments that indicate[] the claimant is
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`capable of performing a range of work at the light exertional level that includes
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`postural limitations and an environmental limitation.” Id. (citation to the record
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`omitted). The ALJ concluded that those opinions “are consistent with clinical
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`examination findings of a normal gait, normal station, normal balance, 5/5 strength
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`of the upper extremities and lower extremities, a normal posture, no muscle
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`atrophy, and normal range of motion of the hips.” Id.
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`The ALJ gave “some weight” to the opinion of Dr. Kneifati, a consultative
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`examiner. Id. at 30. He found Dr. Kneifati’s opinion that Ms. Lambakis could
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`lift/carry up to 20 pounds consistent with his RFC. Id. But he concluded that “Dr.
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`Kneifati’s sit/stand/walk limitations do not correspond to the mild/moderate MRI
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`4 As set forth above, Ms. Lambakis’s counsel amended the alleged onset date of
`disability from January 1, 2005, to March 16, 2016.
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`Case 1:19-cv-01496-SES Document 13 Filed 11/23/20 Page 13 of 27
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`findings.” Id. (citation to the record omitted). The ALJ also concluded that “Dr.
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`Kneifati’s positive straight leg raising notations do not correspond to treatment
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`records indicating normal straight leg raising” and his notation of carpal tunnel
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`syndrome as one of the reasons for his “sit/stand/walk limitations is not logical as
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`hand abnormalities do not affect sit/stand/walk.” Id. The ALJ did give “great
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`weight” to Dr. Kneifati’s opinion that Ms. Lambakis has no hand limitations “as it
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`matches his normal hand findings upon examination.” Id. at 31.
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`The ALJ gave “little weight” to the opinion of “Steve Broker, M.P.T., a
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`physical therapist who performed a functional capacity evaluation” of Ms.
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`Lambakis and who opined that she could work either at the sedentary-exertional
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`level or part-time at the light-exertional level. Id. The ALJ explained that he gave
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`“little weight” to Broker’s opinion “because it is not consistent with the entirety of
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`the objective evidence of record, including clinical examination findings of a
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`normal gait, normal station, normal balance, 5/5 strength of the upper extremities
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`and lower extremities, a normal posture, no muscle atrophy, and normal range of
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`motion of the hips.” Id.
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`The ALJ gave “moderate weight” to the opinion of Dr. Plowman, a
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`consultative psychologist who completed a mental status evaluation of Ms.
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`Lambakis on March 16, 2017, and who completed a Medical Source Statement of
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`Ability to do Work-Related Activities (Mental). Id. at 30, 772–779. The ALJ
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`found Dr. Plowman’s opinion “consistent with the claimant’s medical records on a
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`longitudinal basis, including clinical examination findings of a euthymic mood, an
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`appropriate affect, appropriate eye contact, normal motor behavior, clear speech,
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`adequate expressive and receptive language skills, a coherent thought process,
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`clear sensorium, and good insight and judgment; notations by a physical therapist
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`that indicate she was pleasant and cooperative and was able to follow instructions
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`and maintain a conversation adequately throughout the evaluation; and
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`observations of a field office representative of the Social Security Administration
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`indicating the claimant exhibited no difficulty pertaining to understanding,
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`coherency, talking, answering, or concentrating.” Id.
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`The ALJ gave “little weight” to the Mental Residual Functional Capacity
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`Assessment completed by Ted. A. Hummel, M.S., “a mental health therapist with
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`whom the claimant treated[.]” Id. at 31. The ALJ concluded that Hummel’s
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`opinion was “not consistent with the entirely of the evidence of record pertaining
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`to the claimant’s mental impairments, including clinical examination findings of a
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`euthymic mood, an appropriate affect, appropriate eye contact, normal motor
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`behavior, clear speech, adequate expressive and receptive language skills, a
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`coherent thought process, clear sensorium, and good insight and judgment and the
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`claimant’s lack of persistent mental health therapy treatment.” Id.
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`In sum, the ALJ found that Ms. Lambakis had the RFC to perform “a range
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`of work at the light exertional level that includes postural limitations and an
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`environmental limitation.” Id. “Furthermore, to accommodate some degree of the
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`combined effects of the claimant’s medication side effect (i.e. drowsiness) and
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`mental impairments the [ALJ] . . . limited the claimant to work that entails simple,
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`routine tasks involving only simple work related decision[s] with few, if any,
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`workplace changes.” Id. at 31-32.
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`At step four of the sequential-evaluation process, the ALJ found that Ms.
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`Lambakis could not perform her past relevant work as a bank teller. Id. at 32.
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`At step five of the sequential-evaluation process, considering Ms.
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`Lambakis’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, as well as the testimony of
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`a vocational expert, the ALJ found that there were other jobs—such as information
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`clerk, ticket taker, and potato chip sorter—that exist in significant numbers in the
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`national economy that Ms. Lambakis could perform. Id. at 32–33.
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`In sum, the ALJ concluded that Ms. Lambakis was not disabled at any time
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`from March 16, 2016 (her amended alleged onset date) through the date of his
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`decision on October 9, 2018. Id. at 33.
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`V. Discussion.
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`Ms. Lambakis claims that the ALJ erred: (1) by failing to include in her RFC
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`limitations from her degenerative disc disease, osteoarthritis of the knees,
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`generalized anxiety disorder, major depressive disorder, and PTSD, which
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`impairments the ALJ determined to be severe impairments; (2) by failing to
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`include in her RFC: limitations from her stress incontinence and bilateral carpal
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`tunnel syndrome, which impairments the ALJ determined to be non-severe
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`impairments; and limitations from the meniscus tear in her right knee, disc bulge in
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`her thoracis spine at T4-T5, cervical disc disease, bilateral pars defect at L5, and
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`partial foraminal stenosis of the lumbar spine, which conditions, according to Ms.
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`Lambakis, the ALJ did not even mention in his decision; (3) by not affording
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`sufficient weight to the opinions of Ted Hummel, Steve Broker,5 and Dr. Kneifati;
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`and (4) by failing to consider the Grid Rules. We begin by discussing Ms.
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`Lambakis’s contentions regarding the opinion of Ted Hummel.
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`5 Although Ms. Lambakis does not reference Broker by name, she contends that
`the ALJ should have given more weight than he did to the results of the Functional
`Capacity Evaluation performed on May 24, 2018, which is the evaluation
`performed by Broker. See Doc. 10 (Lambakis’s brief) at 19, 23–24; Admin. Tr. at
`939–949 (May 24, 2018 Functional Capacity Evaluation by Broker).
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`Case 1:19-cv-01496-SES Document 13 Filed 11/23/20 Page 17 of 27
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`A. The ALJ’s treatment of Ted Hummel’s opinion is not supported by
`substantial evidence.
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`Ms. Lambakis contends that the ALJ failed to properly consider the opinion
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`of Ted Hummel. Hummel completed a Mental Residual Functional Capacity
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`Assessment dated May 16, 2008. Admin. Tr. at 868–872. Among other things,
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`Hummel opined that Ms. Lambakis had extreme limitations in the ability to ask for
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`help when needed, the ability to state her own point of view, and the ability to
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`manage her psychologically based symptoms. Id. at 870, 872. He also opined that
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`Ms. Lambakis had marked limitations in her ability to follow one-or-two step oral
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`instructions to carry out a task; the ability to describe work activity to someone
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`else; the ability to sequence/complete multi-step activities; the ability to use reason
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`and judgment to make work-related decisions; the ability to handle conflict with
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`others; the ability to respond appropriately to requests, suggestions, criticisms,
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`correction, and challenges; the ability to complete tasks in a timely manner; the
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`ability to ignore or avoid distractions; the ability to change activities or work
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`settings without being disruptive; the ability to work close to or with others without
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`interrupting or distracting them; the ability to work a full day without needing
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`more than the allotted number or length of rest periods during the day; the ability
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`to respond to demands; the ability to adapt to changes; the ability to distinguish
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`between acceptable and unacceptable work performance; the ability to set realistic
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`
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`17
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`Case 1:19-cv-01496-SES Document 13 Filed 11/23/20 Page 18 of 27
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`goals; and the ability to make plans for herself independently of others. Id. at 869–
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`72.6 Hummel also stated that Ms. Lambakis’s impairment would substantially
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`interfere with her ability to work on a regular and sustained basis at least 15% of
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`the time and that she would miss work two days a month because of her mental
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`impairments or treatment for those impairments. Id. at 872. Hummel concluded
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`that Ms. Lambakis could work part-time in a supportive environment. Id. Suffice
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`it to say that if the ALJ had accepted or given more weight to Hummel’s opinions,
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`the RFC that he fashioned for Ms. Lambakis would have included different and
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`additional limitations.
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`Ms. Lambakis refers to Hummel as her treating source for her mental health.
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`Doc. 10 at 19. And she contends that the ALJ failed to consider Hummel’s
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`opinions as a treating source. Id. at 23. Parroting the reasons set forth by the ALJ,
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`the Commissioner contends that the ALJ properly gave Hummel’s opinion “little
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`weight.” Doc. 11 at 13–14. The Commissioner fails, however, to respond Ms.
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`Lambakis’s contention that Hummel’s opinion should have been considered as a
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`treating-source opinion.7 Given that the Commissioner does not dispute Ms.
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`6 Hummel also opined that Ms. Lambakis had moderate limitations in numerous
`other areas. Admin. Tr. at 869–72.
`7 It should go without saying that the Commissioner should address the
`contentions raised by the plaintiff.
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`18
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`Case 1:19-cv-01496-SES Document 13 Filed 11/23/20 Page 19 of 27
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`Lambakis’s contention that Hummel is a treating source, we will consider him as
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`such.8
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`“Medical opinions are statements from acceptable medical sources that
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`reflect judgments about the nature and severity of [a claimant’s] impairment(s),
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`including [her] symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [a claimant] can still do
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`despite impairment(s), and [a claimant’s] physical or mental restrictions.” 20
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`C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(1) (applicable to claims filed before Mar. 27, 2017). “In
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`evaluating medical reports, the ALJ is free to choose the medical opinion of one
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`doctor over that of another.” Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 505 (3d
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`Cir. 2009). But “[a] cardinal principle guiding disability eligibility determinations
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`is that the ALJ accord treating physicians’ reports great weight, especially ‘when
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`their opinions reflect expert judgment based on a continuing observation of the
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`patient’s condition over a prolonged period of time.’” Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d
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`8 “A therapist is not an acceptable medical source.” Pelton v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
`No. 4:19-CV-1164, 2020 WL 2992041, at *5 (M.D. Pa. June 4, 2020). And
`“[o]pinions from non-acceptable medical sources are not entitled to controlling
`weight” as treating source opinions. Id. But a “licensed or certified psychologist”
`is an acceptable medical source. Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1502, 416.902). It
`is not clear from the record whether Hummel is a licensed or certified
`psychologist. But since the Commissioner does not contest Ms. Lambakis’s
`characterization of him as a treating source, we will assume that he is. But even if
`Hummel cannot be considered to have provided a treating source opinion, for the
`same reasons discussed below, we would nevertheless conclude that the ALJ did
`not provide good reasons for according Hummel’s opinion little weight.
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`
`
`19
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`Case 1:19-cv-01496-SES Document 13 Filed 11/23/20 Page 20 of 27
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`310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir.
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`1999)). For claims—like Ms. Lambakis’s claims—filed before March 27, 2017,
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`the regulations provide that if “a treating source’s medical opinions on the issue(s)
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`of nature and severity of [a claimant’s] impairments is well-supported by medically
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`acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent
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`with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record,” the Commissioner “will
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`give it controlling weight.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). Where the Commissioner
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`does not give a treating source’s medical opinion controlling weight, it analyzes
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`the opinion in accordance with a number of factors including, the “[l]ength of the
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`treatment relationship and the frequency of examination,” the “[n]ature and extent
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`of the treatment relationship,” the “[s]upportability” of the opinion, the
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`“[c]onsistency” of the opinion with the record as whole, the “[s]pecialization” of
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`the treating source, and any other relevant factors. Id. at § 404.1527(c)(2)–(c)(6).
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`The regulations provide that opinions on issues reserved for the
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`Commissioner—such as whether a claimant is disabled and a claimant’s residual
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`functional capacity—are not considered medical opinions under the regulations
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`and are not entitled to any “special significance” based on the source of the
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`opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.152(d). Nevertheless, “[t]he ALJ must consider the
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`20
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`Case 1:19-cv-01496-SES Document 13 Filed 11/23/20 Page 21 of 27
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`medical findings that support a treating physician’s opinion that the claimant is
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`disabled.” Morales, 225 F.3d at 317.
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`“In choosing to reject the treating physician’s assessment, an ALJ may not
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`make ‘speculative inferences from medical reports’ and may reject ‘a treating
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`physician’s opinion outright only on the basis of contradictory medical evidence’
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`and not due to his or her own credibility judgments, speculation or lay opinion.” Id.
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`at 317–18 (quoting Plummer, 186 F.3d at 429). The ALJ also may not disregard a
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`treating physician’s “medical opinion based solely on his own ‘amorphous
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`impressions, gleaned from the record and from his evaluation of [the claimant]’s
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`credibility.’” Id. at 318 (quoting Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 115 (3d Cir.
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`1983)).
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`Further, the ALJ must “provide ‘good reasons’ in his decision for the weight
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`he gives to a treating source’s opinion.” Ray v. Colvin, No. 1:13-CV-0073, 2014
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`WL 1371585, at *18 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2014) (quoting 20 C.F.R.
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`§ 404.1527(c)(2)). “A decision denying benefits ‘must contain specific reasons for
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`the weight given to the treating source’s medical opinion, supported

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