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Case 4:12-cv-01255-MCC Document 45 Filed 11/22/13 Page 1 of 39
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
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`Civil No. 4:12-CV-1255
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`(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
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`JEFFREY HUDSON,
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`Plaintiff
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`v.
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`GUARDSMARK, LLC,
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`Defendant
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`MEMORANDUM OPINION
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`This action presents a dispute between Jeffrey Hudson and his former
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`employer, Guardsmark, LLC. Hudson is a former security guard for Guardsmark,
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`which among other things provides security services for companies engaging in oil
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`and natural gas exploration in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Hudson
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`represents that he suffers from anxiety and depression, and alleges that Guardsmark
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`discriminated against him on the basis of his mental health disabilities. Hudson
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`further alleges that Guardsmark failed to accommodate his disability, retaliated
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`against him on the basis of his disability, and eventually terminated his employment
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`in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Pennsylvania Human
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`Relations Act.
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`Case 4:12-cv-01255-MCC Document 45 Filed 11/22/13 Page 2 of 39
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`Guardsmark has moved for summary judgment on Hudson’s claims, arguing
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`that Guardsmark honored each of Hudson’s requests for accommodation, and that the
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`decisionmakers who ultimately decided to terminate Hudson’s employment were
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`entirely unaware of his purported disabilities. The plaintiff, in contrast, argues that
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`employees of the defendant, including his manager, met his requests for workplace
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`accommodation with hostility and discriminatory comments, and that they made
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`derogatory comments to Mr. Hudson’s supervisors about his medical conditions and
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`need for time off of work. The plaintiff maintains that there is evidence to show that
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`the defendant’s eventual decision to terminate his employment was discriminatory,
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`and that the non-discriminatory bases given for his termination were pretextual.
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`The parties have each filed two briefs in support of, and opposition to, the
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`motion. The parties have also filed competing factual statements, which are
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`themselves filled with numerous instances of the parties parsing and endeavoring to
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`explain the facts presented and their significance to this case. Thus, in addition to
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`answering the defendant’s factual record, the plaintiff has identified 146 separate
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`factual assertions with citation to record evidence, which the plaintiff contends make
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`summary judgment unwarranted.
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`On the basis of this hotly disputed factual record, a record marked in some
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`material respects by confusion, contradiction and controversy, we conclude that, with
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`Case 4:12-cv-01255-MCC Document 45 Filed 11/22/13 Page 3 of 39
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`the exception of the plaintiff’s failure-to-accommodate claim, the parties have jointly
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`demonstrated the existence of myriad issues of disputed fact, and thus questions
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`regarding the plaintiff’s claims for discrimination and retaliation must be resolved in
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`this case by a factfinder, not by the court on summary judgment. Accordingly,
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`mindful of standard of review which governs the court’s assessment of the pending
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`motion, and construing all facts and the reasonable inferences that can drawn from
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`them in the plaintiff’s favor, the motion for summary judgment will be granted in part
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`and denied in part.
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`II.
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`BACKGROUND1
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`Jeffrey Hudson is a 43 year-old male who lives in McElhattan, Pennsylvania.
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`(Doc. 37, Pl. Counterstatement of Facts, ¶ 1) Hudson is a high school graduate and
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`served in the military from 1989 until 2009, when he was honorably discharged. (Id.,
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`¶¶ 2-3.) Guardsmark is a national company that provides a variety of security
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`services to clients, including oil and gas companies operating in the Commonwealth
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`of Pennsylvania. (Doc. 33, Def. Statement of Facts, ¶ 1) One of Guardsmark’s
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`1
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` The factual background is taken from the parties’ competing submissions
`of undisputed facts, to the extent the facts are admitted or otherwise undisputed.
`In addition, the facts have been taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as
`the nonmoving party, with all reasonable inferences drawn in his favor. However,
`nothing in this background will be taken to conclusively establish any fact that
`may ultimately be the subject of dispute at trial.
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`Case 4:12-cv-01255-MCC Document 45 Filed 11/22/13 Page 4 of 39
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`clients is Anardarko Petroleum Corporation, which operates a facility in
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`Williamsport, Pennsylvania. (Id., ¶ 2.) Hudson was hired by Guardsmark as a
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`security guard on November 4, 2010, and was hired to work as a security guard on
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`Anadarko work sites. (Doc. 37, Pl. Counterstatement of Facts, ¶ 4; Doc. 35, ¶ 10)
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`According to the plaintiff, he suffers from certain serious mental health
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`conditions, including anxiety and depression, and these conditions required him
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`periodically to take time off of work in 2011 while he sought medical treatment.
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`Hudson was diagnosed more than a decade ago with anxiety, and was more recently
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`diagnosed in the summer of 2011 with depression. During the hiring process, Hudson
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`informed Doug McKinney, a former Guardsmark manager, that he suffered from
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`anxiety. (Doc. 37, ¶ 6) According to Hudson, he informed McKinney about his
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`condition because he wondered whether his anxiety diagnosis would affect his
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`chances of securing employment or affect his ability to complete his responsibilities
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`as a security guard. (Id.)
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`During his time of employment with Guardsmark, Hudson worked as a security
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`officer at various locations until his employment was terminated on August 27, 2011.
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`(Id., ¶ 7.) Among his job duties, Hudson was responsible for guarding the worksite
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`perimeter, greeting visitors, and securing the site. (Id., ¶ 8.) During his employment,
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`Hudson was supervised by, among others, Kaitlyn Deinarowicz, who was a senior
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`Case 4:12-cv-01255-MCC Document 45 Filed 11/22/13 Page 5 of 39
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`supervisor who was later promoted to Relationship Manager. (Id., ¶ 9 and Def.
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`Response to Counterstatement, ¶ 9.) Ms. Deinarowicz was not the plaintiff’s direct
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`supervisor, but supervised the salaried supervisors, who in turn directly supervised
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`the plaintiff. (Doc. 37, Pl. Counterstatement of Facts, ¶ 9; Doc. 39, Def. Response,
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`¶ 9) The salaried supervisors who were Hudson’s direct supervisors included
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`Matthew Winslow, Ron Yeagle, and Eric Paplarin. These supervisors reported to
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`Deinarowicz. (Doc. 37, Pl. Counterstatement of Facts, ¶ 10) Deinarowicz was
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`responsible for preparing the plaintiff’s work schedule. (Id., ¶ 20.)
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`Prior to commencing his employment, the plaintiff received a two-hour training
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`session, which was supplemented with on-the-job training throughout the course of
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`his time with Guardsmark. (Id., ¶ 12.) Hudson’s first assignment was at a work
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`location known as the Texas Blockhouse, and this assignment lasted three or four
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`months. (Id., ¶ 13.) Typically throughout his employment, Hudson worked 12-hour
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`shifts, two or three days per week. (Id., ¶ 14.)
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`In June 2011, Hudson requested and took two weeks off of work because of his
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`mental health conditions. (Id., ¶ 21.) During this time, Hudson provided the
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`defendant with a medical excuse for his absences from work. (Id., ¶ 22.) In addition,
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`Hudson testified that he was absent from work approximately six or seven other times
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`because of his mental health needs. (Id., ¶ 23.) According to Hudson, every time he
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`Case 4:12-cv-01255-MCC Document 45 Filed 11/22/13 Page 6 of 39
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`needed to take time away from work to deal with his health, he contacted the
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`defendant, and informed his supervisors of the reason for his absence. (Id., ¶ 24.)
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`Hudson attested that he specifically informed Deiairowicz about his need for time off
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`to deal with his anxiety, and that when he informed Mr. Paplarin, his supervisor
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`would in turn inform Deinarowicz. (Id., ¶¶ 26-27.) On one of these occasions,
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`Hudson provided Paplarin with a medical note to excuse the absence, and Paplarin
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`provided a copy of the doctor’s note to Deinarowicz. (Id., ¶ 28.) Hudson claims that
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`this same pattern of notice was provided to Mr. Yeagle. (Id., ¶ 29.) Hudson attests
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`that during his conversations with Deinarowicz about his anxiety and need for time
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`off, he observed Deinarowicz to be visibly upset about the requests, and that she
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`informed him that he was “missing a lot of time” and that she was “tired of finding
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`people to fill in for you.” (Id., ¶ 32.)
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`Upon his return from a medical absence in June 2011, the plaintiff’s work
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`assignment was changed and he began working at the COP 728 Tank Farm, where he
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`worked until August, 2011, when his employment was terminated. (Id., ¶ 37.) The
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`plaintiff was reassigned to the Tank Farm primarily because he had asked to be
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`transferred to a busier work location, a request he made approximately three months
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`earlier. (Doc. 35, ¶ 31; Doc. 37, Pl. Response, ¶ 31)
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`Case 4:12-cv-01255-MCC Document 45 Filed 11/22/13 Page 7 of 39
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`Hudson did not receive any discipline of any kind for the first six months of his
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`employment, and Hudson’s supervisors concluded that he performed his job
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`satisfactorily during this time. (Doc. 37, Pl. Counterstatement of Facts, ¶ 38)
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`Neither Yeagle nor Paplarin ever observed the plaintiff to be rude or disrespectful
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`during work, but instead found that he acted in a professional manner. (Id., ¶ 39.)
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`However, shortly after Mr. Hudson informed Ms. Deinarowicz that he was suffering
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`from anxiety and needed to take some time off of work to treat the condition, he was
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`subjected to three instances of discipline. (Id., ¶ 40; Doc. 39, Def. Response, ¶ 40.)
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`In one instance, on May 26, 2011, Deinarowicz told Eric Paplarin to issue
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`Hudson a written sanction for failing to wear proper protective gear on site, even
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`though Ms. Deinarowicz did not observe the plaintiff on that day. (Doc. 37, Pl.
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`Counterstatement of Facts, ¶ 41) According to the plaintiff, he was issued this
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`discipline despite the fact that Deinarowicz had previously told him that he did not
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`need to wear protective gear at that particular job site. (Id., ¶ 42.) Hudson interpreted
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`the contradiction between what he understood was permissible and the discipline he
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`received to be evidence that he was disciplined because of his absence from work to
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`treat his anxiety, and the defendant’s desire to get rid of him. (Id., ¶ 44.) The
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`defendant disputes this conclusion, and points to evidence showing that other
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`Guardsmark security officers were routinely disciplined for failing to wear proper
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`Case 4:12-cv-01255-MCC Document 45 Filed 11/22/13 Page 8 of 39
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`uniforms. (Doc. 39, Def. Response, ¶ 44 and Ex. U) Nevertheless, the plaintiff
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`testified that he observed other employees at work sites who did not wear protective
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`clothing, and they were not were not disciplined. (Doc. 37, Pl. Counterstatement of
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`Facts, ¶ 45)
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`In addition to requesting time off for his mental health needs, Hudson also
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`requested that he be permitted to work at a site that was busy, instead of a site where
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`there were no other employees, contractors, or visitors with whom he could interact.
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`(Id., ¶ 49.) According to Hudson, the absence of such opportunities for interaction
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`could lead to anxiety and resulting panic attacks. (Id.) However, Hudson says that
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`Deinarowicz told him that she could not transfer him to another site because he was
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`“missing a lot of time” and because she was not responsible for setting his schedule.
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`(Id., ¶ 50.) The plaintiff made a similar request to supervisor Winslow, and received
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`a similar response, namely, that the request could not be honored because he was
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`missing too much time from work. (Id., ¶¶ 51-52.) Instead of being granted his
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`choice of an active worksite, the plaintiff attested that he was moved from site to site
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`for a few days at a time. (Id., ¶ 53.) The defendant has submitted evidence to show
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`that this was a normal and routine practice for assigning workers to job locations.
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`(Doc. 39, Def. Response, ¶ 53 and Ex. V)
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`Case 4:12-cv-01255-MCC Document 45 Filed 11/22/13 Page 9 of 39
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`Guardsmark admits that it never met with Hudson to discuss his
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`accommodation requests, and did not refer him to speak with the company’s human
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`resources department on this matter. (Doc. 39, Pl. Counterstatement of Facts, ¶¶ 56-
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`67; Doc. 39, Def. Response, ¶¶ 52-53) Instead, some months after he initially made
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`the request, Hudson was eventually transferred to work at a busier worksite, the Tank
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`Farm. The facts regarding this eventual transfer are the subject of dispute between
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`the parties. (Id. ¶¶ 59-61.)
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`Guardsmark maintains a written progressive discipline policy, which includes
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`steps of discipline, including: a written or verbal warning for first offenses; a write
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`up for a second offense; a three-day suspension for a third offense; and termination
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`following a fourth offense. (Doc. 37, Pl. Counterstatement of Facts, ¶ 62 and Ex. P)
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`This policy was not followed in every instance. (Id., ¶ 63; Doc. 39, Def. Response,
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`¶ 64) In the plaintiff’s case, he was not suspended prior to being terminated; instead,
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`he was terminated following his third offense. (Id., ¶ 64.) The parties agree that there
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`have been instances where other security guards have violated company rules or even
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`broken the law, but have not received discipline for the conduct. (Doc. 37, Pl.
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`Counterstatement of Facts, ¶ 68) As a supervisory employee, Deinarowicz was
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`empowered to suspend and terminate Guardsmark employees, and in fact did have
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`some involvement in employee terminations. (Id., ¶¶ 72-77.)
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`Case 4:12-cv-01255-MCC Document 45 Filed 11/22/13 Page 10 of 39
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`On August 18, 2011, Mr. Hudson was working on the Anadarko site at the
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`Tank Farm. (Id., ¶ 78.) James Hansel is the Regional Security Manager for
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`Anadarko. On August 18, 2011, Hansel went to the site with Michael Martin,
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`Guardsmark’s vice president of operations. (Id., ¶ 79.) According to the plaintiff, on
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`that day he approached Mr. Hansel and said, “How are you doing today?” (Id., ¶ 80.)
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`Hudson claims that Hansel responded by saying, “do you know who I am?” (Id., ¶
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`81.) There followed an exchange in which Mr. Hudson confirmed that he knew who
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`Mr. Hansel was, but when Mr. Hansel asked whether Hudson was going to sign him
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`into the site, Hudson said he was not supposed to, and then Mr. Hansel left. (Id., ¶
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`82.)
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`This encounter apparently led to Guardsmark’s eventual decision to terminate
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`the plaintiff’s employment on August 27, 2011. Although the parties now seem to
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`agree that Mr. Hudson did not do anything during this exchange that was
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`inappropriate, (Id., ¶ 85), it also appears that as the result of this brief encounter, Mr.
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`Hudson was issued written discipline and counseling from Mr. Yeagle, at Ms.
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`Deinarowicz’s direction. (Id., ¶¶ 86-87.) The factual detail regarding the decision
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`to discipline the plaintiff for this incident, and the ultimate decision to terminate his
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`employment, is somewhat unclear from the evidence in the record.
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`Case 4:12-cv-01255-MCC Document 45 Filed 11/22/13 Page 11 of 39
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`According to Hudson, at the site where he was working on August 18, 2011,
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`security guards were not required actually to sign in any visitors, and instead had to
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`come out of the guard shack and make contact with the visitor. (Id., 89-90.) If a
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`security officer knows Mr. Hansel, they are not required to ask who he is or to ask
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`him to identify his business purpose. (Id., ¶ 91.) Prior to August 2011, Mr. Hudson
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`had met and interacted with Mr. Hansel, and thus was not required to ask him for his
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`identity and business purpose on the site, and both Mr. Winslow and Ms.
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`Deinarowicz acknowledged as much. (Id., ¶¶ 92-94.)
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`Nevertheless, in Guardsmark’s response to Mr. Hudson’s later filed charge
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`with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the company stated that
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`Hudson was disciplined for “failing to properly ask personnel about signing log-in
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`sheet.” (Id., ¶ 95 and Ex. O.) The response further stated that “[a]ll security officers
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`working at this location must require all visitors, contractors and employees to sign
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`in if they enter or leave the site” and that Mr. Hudson “failed to require the client’s
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`Regional Security Manager, Jim Hansel, to sign in upon entering the site.” (Id., ¶ 96
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`and Ex. O.)
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`Guardsmark’s EEOC response also stated that “Hansel complained to
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`Guardsmark Relationship Manager Kaitlyn Deinarowicz about [Hudson’s] failure to
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`follow sign-in procedures” and that “Deinarowicz then spoke to [Hudson] who
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`Case 4:12-cv-01255-MCC Document 45 Filed 11/22/13 Page 12 of 39
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`admitted such conduct.” (Id., ¶ 97.) However, during this litigation, Deinarowicz
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`admitted that she never spoke to Mr. Hudson about his August 18, 2011, interaction
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`with Mr. Hansel, or about anything related to the sign-in procedures on that date.
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`(Id., ¶ 98 and Ex. R.)
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`Thus, despite the fact that security guards at the Tank Farm were apparently not
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`required to sign-in anyone, Hudson may have been disciplined for not signing in Mr.
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`Hansel, and the written discipline he received states that Hudson “did not properly
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`ask personnel about signing log in sheet.” (Id., ¶ 99.)
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`The plaintiff highlights the fact that during this litigation, Guardsmark actually
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`changed its position and claimed that Mr. Hudson failed to properly ask Mr. Hansel
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`about the purpose of his visit; Guardsmark clarifies this by asserting that it has not
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`actually changed its position, but merely “learned more about what occurred over the
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`course of the discovery process.” (Id., ¶ 100; Doc. 39, Def. Response, ¶ 100.) The
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`evidence also shows that, at best, Guardsmark was inconsistent in disciplining
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`security guards who were found to have violated the company’s sign-in procedures.
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`(Doc. 37, Pl. Counterstatement of Facts, ¶ 101; Doc. 39, Def. Response, ¶ 101) Mr.
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`Yeagle testified that other than Mr. Hudson, he was unaware of any other security
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`officer who was terminated for failing to follow sign-in procedures. (Doc. 37, ¶ 102)
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`Prior to instructing Mr. Yeagle to discipline Mr. Hudson for the incident on August
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`Case 4:12-cv-01255-MCC Document 45 Filed 11/22/13 Page 13 of 39
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`18, 2011, Ms. Deinarowicz never spoke to Mr. Hudson to learn his version of the
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`events, and neither Yeagle nor Deinarowicz observed Hudson violate any sign-in
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`procedures. (Id., ¶¶ 103-14.)
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`For his part, Hudson claims that the reasons that have been given for his
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`termination vary widely. He attests that he was specifically informed that the reason
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`he was being disciplined was for failing to refer to Mr. Hansel as “sir”. (Id., ¶ 105.)
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`He also attested that the disciplinary document that was provided to him during his
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`deposition differed materially from the document that he was actually provided on
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`August 18, 2011, and he thus maintains that the disciplinary document that was
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`provided to him during discovery was fabricated, forged, or otherwise altered to make
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`it appear that he had really been disciplined for failing to follow sign-in procedures.
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`(Id., ¶ 106.)
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`According to Hudson, Mr. Hansel sent an email to one of Hudson’s
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`supervisors, Mr. Winslow, to advise him about his interaction with Hudson at the
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`Tank Farm on August 18, 2011. Winslow then called Mr. Hudson to speak to him
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`about the sign-in procedures for that particular job site. (Id., ¶ 108.) Winslow then
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`spoke to Hudson about the interaction, but never mentioned anything about failing
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`to follow proper sign-in procedure. (Id., ¶ 109.) Hansel also contacted Deinarowicz
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`and informed her about the interaction. (Id., ¶ 110.) However, Hansel never
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`Case 4:12-cv-01255-MCC Document 45 Filed 11/22/13 Page 14 of 39
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`recommended that Guardsmark remove, discipline, or terminate Mr. Hudson’s
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`employment. (Id., ¶ 111.)
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`Nevertheless, after Mr. Winslow spoke to Mr. Hudson about his interaction
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`with Hansel, he informed Ms. Deinarowicz about what Mr. Hudson had said, and
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`Deinarowicz told him to type up a statement about the conversation and send it to
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`John Davis, Guardsmark’s Accounts Manager. Winslow did so by email. (Id., ¶
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`113.) Thereafter, Deinarowicz called John Davis and explained the situation to him.
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`(Id., ¶ 114.)
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`In August 2011, Deinarowicz was supervised by Michael Dunn, Guardsmark’s
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`Branch Manager, and also by John Davis, the Accounts Manager. (Id., ¶ 119.)
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`Following the incident involving Mr. Hansel, Mr. Dunn was provided with copies of
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`all instances of written discipline that had been issued to the plaintiff at
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`Deinarowicz’s direction. (Id., ¶ 120.) Then, in late August, with participation and
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`consultation from Deinarowicz, Winslow, and Davis, Dunn made the decision to
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`terminate the plaintiff’s employment with Guardsmark. (Id., ¶¶ 122-128.) On a
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`Guardsmark payroll status form, it is indicated that Mr. Hudson’s employment was
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`terminated because he “could not follow proper site sign in procedures” and does not
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`indicate that Hudson was terminated for having a poor attitude or because he was
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`unprofessional. (Id., ¶ 129.)
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`Case 4:12-cv-01255-MCC Document 45 Filed 11/22/13 Page 15 of 39
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`Deinarowicz was the supervisory employee who told Hudson that his
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`employment was being terminated. (Id., ¶ 136.) According to Deinarowicz, Mr.
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`Hudson was terminated from employment because there was no other work available
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`for him. (Id., ¶ 137.) However, Hudson attested that during his conversation with
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`Deinarowicz, she told him that he was being fired because he was absent from work
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`too often. (Id., ¶ 138.) Mr. Hudson says that he responded to this information by
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`explaining that he had provided doctor’s excuses for his absences, which were due
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`to medical conditions that he could not help. (Id., ¶ 139.) Mr. Hudson claims that
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`Deinarowicz responded to this explanation by dismissively saying “whatever,” and
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`informing him that he was also being terminated for not being clean shaven and for
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`not calling Mr. Hansel “sir”. (Id., ¶¶ 140, 142.) For his part, Dunn attested that he
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`never told Deinarowicz to tell Mr. Hudson that the reason he was being terminated
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`was that he missed too much time from work, and he never told Deinarowicz that he
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`was being let go because he had a bad attitude. (Id., ¶¶ 132-33.)
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`Guardsmark admits that Deinarowicz never told Mr. Hudson that his
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`employment was being terminated because there was no other work available for him,
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`although that too now seems to be a nondiscriminatory reason that has been provided
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`for the decision to terminate the plaintiff’s employment. (Id., ¶ 145.) As the
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`foregoing suggests, the factual details leading up and surrounding the ultimate
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`Case 4:12-cv-01255-MCC Document 45 Filed 11/22/13 Page 16 of 39
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`decision to terminate Mr. Hudson’s employment, and the way in which this decision
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`was reached and ultimately handled are the subjects of some level of dispute between
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`the parties and within the factual record, and particularly with respect to what role,
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`if any, Deinarowicz played in instigating or influencing the discipline and termination
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`decisions that were ultimately made. (Doc. 35, ¶¶ 50-66; Doc. 37, Pl. Response, ¶¶
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`50-66)
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`III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
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`The plaintiff initiated this action by filing a complaint on June 29, 2012. (Doc.
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`1) The plaintiff thereafter amended the complaint on January 22, 2013, and the
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`defendant filed its answer on January 25, 2013. (Docs. 23, 24) On April 22, 2013,
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`Guardsmark filed its motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 33) The parties filed
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`multiple briefs in support of and opposition to the motion, with the defendant filing
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`an initial brief and a reply brief, as well as directing the Court to recent Supreme
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`Court case law that Guardsmark believed to have relevance to this case. (Docs. 34,
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`38, 44) For his part, Hudson filed an initial brief in opposition to the motion, as well
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`as a sur-reply brief. (Docs. 36, 43) In addition, the parties submitting competing
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`factual recitations in support of their respective positions, and to contest the facts
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`offered by the opposing party, including citation to the evidence developed during the
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`discovery process in this case. (Docs. 35, 37, 39)
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`Case 4:12-cv-01255-MCC Document 45 Filed 11/22/13 Page 17 of 39
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`IV.
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`STANDARD OF REVIEW
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`Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:
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`A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each
`claim or defense – or the part of each claim or defense – on
`which summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant
`summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
`genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
`entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court should
`state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the
`motion.
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). For purposes of Rule 56, a fact is material if proof of its
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`existence of nonexistence might affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable
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`substantive law. Haybarger v. Laurence Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 667 F.3d 408,
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`412 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
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`(1986)). For an issue to be genuine, “all that is required is that sufficient evidence
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`supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve
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`the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S.
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`at 248-49).
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`Accordingly, in support of a motion for summary judgment, the moving party
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`must show that if the evidence of record were reduced to admissible evidence in
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`court, it would be insufficient to allow the non-moving party to carry its burden of
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`proof. See Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Provided the moving party
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`Case 4:12-cv-01255-MCC Document 45 Filed 11/22/13 Page 18 of 39
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`has satisfied this burden, “its opponent must do more than simply show that there is
`
`some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380
`
`(2007). Instead, if the moving party has carried its burden, the non-moving party
`
`must then respond by identifying specific facts, supported by evidence, which show
`
`a genuine issue for trial, and may not rely upon the allegations or denials of its
`
`pleadings. See Martin v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 295 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Fed. R.
`
`Civ. P. 56(c).
`
`In adjudicating the motion, the court must view the evidence presented in the
`
`light most favorable to the opposing party, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and draw all
`
`reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Big Apple
`
`BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992).
`
`Where the non-moving party’s evidence contradicts the movant’s, then the non-
`
`movant’s must be taken as true. Id. Additionally, the court is not to decide whether
`
`the evidence unquestionably favors one side or the other, or to make credibility
`
`determinations, but instead must decide whether a fair-minded jury could return a
`
`verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented. Id. at 252; see also Big Apple
`
`BMW, 974 F.2d at 1363. In reaching this determination, the Third Circuit has
`
`instructed that:
`
`18
`
`

`
`Case 4:12-cv-01255-MCC Document 45 Filed 11/22/13 Page 19 of 39
`
`To raise a genuine issue of material fact . . . the opponent
`need not match, item for item, each piece of evidence
`proffered by the movant. In practical terms, if the
`opponent has exceeded the “mere scintilla” threshold and
`has offered a genuine issue of material fact, then the court
`cannot credit the movant’s version of events against the
`opponent, even if the quantity of the movant’s evidence far
`outweighs that of its opponent. It thus remains the
`province of the factfinder to ascertain the believability and
`weight of the evidence.
`
`Id. In contrast, “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of
`
`fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita
`
`Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal
`
`quotation marks omitted); NAACP v. North Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d
`
`464, 476 (3d Cir. 2011).
`
`IV. DISCUSSION
`
`Guardsmark argues that it is entitled to summary judgment for three reasons.
`
`First, the defendant contends that the plaintiff’s claim that Guardsmark failed to
`
`reasonably accommodate his disability fails because even assuming that the company
`
`was aware of the disability, it honored each request that the plaintiff made. In this
`
`regard, Guardsmark maintains that after the plaintiff requested to be transferred and
`
`stationed at a busier work site, this request was honored by transferring the plaintiff
`
`19
`
`

`
`Case 4:12-cv-01255-MCC Document 45 Filed 11/22/13 Page 20 of 39
`
`to the Tank Farm, and the plaintiff was granted time off of work for his medical needs
`
`upon request.
`
`Second, Guardsmark argues that the plaintiff’s claim that he was terminated
`
`because of his anxiety and depression fails as a matter of law because the undisputed
`
`evidence shows that John Davis and Michael Dunn, who Guardsmark claims made
`
`the decision to remove Hudson from the Anadarko account and to terminate his
`
`employment with Guardsmark were completely unaware of the plaintiff’s disabilities.
`
`Therefore, Guardsmark argues, neither Davis nor Dunn could have harbored
`
`discriminatory animus towards the plaintiff.
`
`Finally, Guardsmark argues that it has proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory
`
`reasons for terminating the plaintiff’s employment, namely his repeated violation of
`
`Guardsmark rules and his negative attitude towards Guardsmark’s client, Anadarko.
`
`Accordingly, Guardsmark insists that the plaintiff’s retaliation claim fails as a matter
`
`of law.
`
`A.
`
`The ADA and Workplace Discrimination2
`
`2
`
` The plaintiff has also brought parallel claims alleging unlawful
`discrimination in violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. Cons.
`Stat. Ann. §§ 951 et seq. The legal standards and analysis applicable to ADA
`claims is substantively identical to discrimination claims under the PHRA. See
`Rinehimer v. Cemcolift, Inc., 292 F.3d 375, 382 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that the
`statutes are interpreted in accord with one another, and “[t]herefore, our
`disposition of [the plaintiff’s] ADA claim applies with equal force to his PHRA
`
`20
`
`

`
`Case 4:12-cv-01255-MCC Document 45 Filed 11/22/13 Page 21 of 39
`
`Under the ADA, “no covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified
`
`individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to
`
`job application procedures, the hiring, advancement or discharge of employees,
`
`employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
`
`employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The ADA defines a qualified individual with
`
`a disability as a person “with a disability who, with or without reasonable
`
`accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that
`
`such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Finally, the Act defines a
`
`“disability” to mean “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
`
`or more of the major life activities of [an] individual; (B) a record of such an
`
`impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. §
`
`12102(2). In this case, the parties agree, at least for purposes of summary judgment,
`
`that the plaintiff’s long-standing diagnosis with anxiety, and his more recently
`
`diagnosed depression, constitute disabilities that would fall within the protections of
`
`the ADA.
`
`claim.”); Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105-06 (3d Cir. 1996)
`(“Pennsylvania courts . . . generally interpret the PHRA in accord with its federal
`counterparts.”). The defendant has, accordingly, combined its arguments in favor
`of summary judgment with respect to the plaintiff’s federal and state claims, and
`we will address the plaintiff’s ADA and PHRA claims collectively.
`
`21
`
`

`
`Case 4:12-cv-01255-MCC Document 45 Filed 11/22/13 Page 22 of 39
`
`To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff
`
`must show that: (1) he is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) he
`
`is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without
`
`reasonable accommodations by the employer; and (3) he has suffered an otherwise
`
`adverse employment decision as a result of discrimination.” Taylor v. Phoenixville

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