[J-91-2017]
`IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
`MIDDLE DISTRICT
`
`SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.
`
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`RALPH M. BAILETS
`
`
`
`
`
`PENNSYLVANIA TURNPIKE
`COMMISSION, ANTHONY Q. MAUN,
`(DIRECTOR OF ACCOUNTING), AND
`NIKOLAUS H. GRIESHABER, (CHIEF
`FINANCIAL OFFICER)
`
`
`APPEAL OF: PENNSYLVANIA
`TURNPIKE COMMISSION
`
`
`
`No. 126 MAP 2016
`
`Appeal from the Order of the
`Commonwealth Court at No. 265 MD
`2009 dated December 1, 2016.
`
`ARGUED: November 29, 2017
`
`:
`:
`:
`:
`:
`:
`:
`:
`:
`:
`:
`:
`:
`:
`:
`
`OPINION
`
`
`
`JUSTICE DOUGHERTY
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Decided: March 27, 2018
`
`This
`
`is a direct appeal by defendant/appellant Pennsylvania Turnpike
`
`Commission (“PTC”) from the Commonwealth Court’s order entering judgment on a
`
`$3.2 million verdict in favor of plaintiff/appellee Ralph M. Bailets (“Bailets”) following a
`
`non-jury trial of his claims arising under the Whistleblower Law, 43 P.S. §§1421-1428
`
`(“Law”). The verdict included $1.6 million in non-economic damages. PTC presents a
`
`question of first impression in Pennsylvania: whether non-economic damages for items
`
`such as embarrassment, humiliation, loss of reputation and mental anguish are
`
`available to plaintiffs in actions brought under the Law. Additionally, if non-economic
`
`damages are authorized under the Law, PTC asks us to determine whether the verdict
`
`amount was excessive in this case. We conclude non-economic damages are available
`
`

`

`to successful plaintiffs under the Law and the trial court did not err or abuse its
`
`discretion in entering a verdict amount of $1.6 million. Accordingly, we affirm the
`
`judgment.
`
`
`
`A. Background
`
`Bailets was employed by PTC for ten years prior to his termination in November
`
`2008. He was the Manager of Financial Systems and Reporting, responsible for a staff
`
`of programmers and business analysts, and it was his duty, among other things, to
`
`ensure PTC’s financial reports were produced accurately and in a timely fashion.
`
`Bailets reviewed submissions in response to requests for proposals PTC issued seeking
`
`bids for the creation and implementation of a computerized financial reporting system.
`
`He voiced concern to his immediate supervisor, Director of Accounting, Anthony Q.
`
`Maun (“Maun”), that one of the bidders for the implementation contract, Ciber, Inc.
`
`(“Ciber”), had an unfair advantage over other vendors/bidders, because Ciber had
`
`previously been awarded a $3.4 million contract to identify the requirements upon which
`
`any implementation would be based. In 2005, despite having submitted the highest bid,
`
`Ciber was awarded a $53.8 million implementation contract. Maun told Bailets not to
`
`make waves regarding Ciber or his job would be in jeopardy.
`
`After Ciber secured the implementation contract, Bailets voiced numerous
`
`complaints to Maun regarding Ciber’s poor performance, including high turnover and
`
`absenteeism of Ciber consultants, testing failures, and lack of knowledge transfer from
`
`Ciber consultants to PTC employees. In 2007, Bailets reported to Maun that senior
`
`management should be informed implementation problems were being caused by
`
`Ciber’s deficient performance, particularly in the area of knowledge transfer, i.e., Ciber
`
`
`[J-91-2017] - 2
`
`

`

`consultants failed to deliver information to PTC employees regarding how the
`
`computerized financial reporting system actually operated.
`
`Bailets also complained about Ciber’s performance to a co-worker, Nikolaus H.
`
`Grieshaber (“Grieshaber”). Grieshaber acknowledged Ciber was politically connected
`
`within the PTC hierarchy, and warned Bailets to tread lightly in his complaints about
`
`Ciber. The problems with implementation of the system continued and by June 2008,
`
`the roll-out of the system was three months behind schedule. In June 2008, Grieshaber
`
`was promoted to the position of CFO, becoming Maun’s immediate superior. Shortly
`
`after his promotion, Grieshaber sent an email to PTC’s COO, George Hatalowich,
`
`stating, among other things, that Grieshaber had “a lot of misgivings about … Bailets[,]”
`
`and that PTC needed to “keep a short leash on him.” Trial Ct. Op., 10/6/16 at 9 (citing
`
`Trial Ex. 137).1 In July 2008, Bailets was reassigned to the purchasing department. In
`
`August 2008, Ciber was awarded an additional $19.7 million contract to conduct
`
`knowledge transfer. Bailets continued to complain to Maun regarding Ciber’s
`
`deficiencies. On November 20, 2008, PTC’s Human Resources Director informed
`
`Bailets his position was being eliminated for budgetary reasons. Bailets was directed to
`
`immediately pack his personal belongings and was escorted from the building.
`
`Believing he was terminated in retaliation for his reports of wrongdoing and
`
`waste, Bailets filed a complaint in the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction,
`
`alleging a single claim under the Law against PTC.2 PTC filed a motion for summary
`
`
`1 Trial took place in the Commonwealth Court from May 23, 2016 to May 26, 2016,
`following remand by this Court from a prior appeal. See Bailets v. Pa. Turnpike
`Comm’n, 123 A.3d 300 (Pa. 2015). We refer to the Commonwealth Court’s unpublished
`opinion in support of its verdict as “Trial Ct. Op.”
`
`2 The parties filed a pre-trial stipulation of discontinuance as to additional named
`defendants Anthony Q. Maun and Nikolaus H. Grieshaber.
`
`
`[J-91-2017] - 3
`
`

`

`judgment claiming Bailets was terminated, along with fourteen other employees, in an
`
`organization-wide effort to reduce expenses. In an unreported single-judge opinion, the
`
`court held the decision to terminate Bailets was “a management discretionary action,
`
`motivated by legitimate employer objectives[,]” and granted summary judgment in favor
`
`of PTC. Bailets v. Pa. Turnpike Comm’n, No. 265 MD 2009, unpublished memorandum
`
`at 11 (Pa. Cmwlth. February 4, 2014). Bailets appealed and this Court reversed,
`
`reasoning Bailets’s complaint clearly presented prima facie evidence of violations of the
`
`Law which “at the very least created material issues of fact to preclude the grant of
`
`summary
`
`judgment[,]” and remanded
`
`to
`
`the Commonwealth Court
`
`for
`
`further
`
`proceedings. Bailets v. Pa. Turnpike Comm’n, 123 A.3d 300, 309-10 (Pa. 2015).
`
`A four-day non-jury trial in the Commonwealth Court ensued in May 2016 at
`
`which Bailets presented evidence in support of his claim he was fired by PTC due to his
`
`reports of waste and wrongdoing. With respect to evidence of economic damages,
`
`Bailets presented the expert testimony of economist Andrew Verzilli, who, among other
`
`things, testified the accumulation of Bailets’s past and future lost earnings resulting from
`
`his termination amounted to an “overall loss of $1,649,316[.00].” N.T. 5/25/16 at 514.
`
`With respect to non-economic damages, Bailets testified the emotional impact of losing
`
`his PTC employment was “devastating[,]” “humiliating[,]” “painful[,]” “very demeaning[,]”
`
`and “very difficult emotionally[,]” which caused him “no end of sleepless nights[.]” N.T.
`
`5/23/16 at 190. Bailets specifically testified to the humiliation he felt because of the way
`
`he was fired — “being walked out of your employer with a box in your hand and being
`
`escorted out.” Id. He further explained it was “certainly humiliating to use an
`
`unemployment card at [a] local grocery store” and testified he suffered mental distress
`
`contemplating “paying basic bills, repairs on an aging family van, [educational]
`
`expenses for my three daughters[,] . . . retirement savings, medical costs, all of those
`
`
`[J-91-2017] - 4
`
`

`

`things, you know, kept me awake many nights and laid heavily on me.” Id. at 190-91.
`
`Bailets anguished over facing his father-in-law to inform him “I was no longer a provider
`
`for his daughter and his grandchildren.” Id. at 190. He testified it was painful to tell his
`
`thirteen-year-old triplet daughters he no longer had a job and it “broke [his] heart” when
`
`one of his daughters later apologized to him “for needing new cleats because she
`
`outgrew them.” Id. at 194.
`
`Mrs. Ann Bailets testified her husband was terminated shortly before the
`
`Thanksgiving holiday and “he was embarrassed and humiliated about facing the
`
`members of my family . . . and telling them . . . he no longer had a job.” N.T. 5/25/16 at
`
`536. Mrs. Bailets additionally testified her husband initially took a minimum wage job as
`
`a driver at an automobile dealership just to have “some income,” and in hopes of
`
`making business contacts that might lead to a better employment opportunity. Id. at
`
`537-38. However, he became “frustrated” by his lack of success in securing adequate
`
`employment, and “he cried on occasions because he began to wonder if he was ever
`
`going to get a job.” Id. at 538. Additionally, on a number of occasions he expressed his
`
`“guilt[ ] for putting our family through this.” Id. Specifically, “he said that . . . maybe he
`
`should never have notified his employers of these things that were going wrong[,]”
`
`because if “he hadn’t done that, . . . he would still be there.” Id. At the same time, she
`
`testified he said he “wanted to be able to look in the mirror” and “know that . . . he had
`
`done what he thought was the right thing to do.” Id.
`
`The trial court concluded Bailets met his burden under the Law of proving he
`
`made a good faith report of PTC’s wrongdoing and waste and PTC fired him in
`
`retaliation for making the report. In determining the issue of damages, the court first
`
`noted the Law permits the recovery of “actual damages,” Trial Ct. Op. at 19, quoting 43
`
`
`[J-91-2017] - 5
`
`

`

`P.S. §1425,3 and accepted the testimony of Bailets’s forensic expert calculating his
`
`economic damages at $1.6 million. The court observed “[t]he term actual damages is
`
`not defined under the Law,” but noted this Court has “made clear that actual damages
`
`include not only economic but non-economic injuries such as ‘impairment of reputation
`
`and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and
`
`suffering.’” Id. at 21, quoting Joseph v. Scranton Times L.P., 129 A.3d 404, 429 (Pa.
`
`2015) (additional citation omitted). The court relied on O’Rourke v. Dep’t of Corrections,
`
`778 A.2d 1194 (Pa. 2001), for the proposition the Law is remedial in nature and must be
`
`liberally construed. The court reasoned actual damages must include compensation for
`
`non-economic damages because O’Rourke emphasized a whistleblower must be put “in
`
`no worse a position for having exposed the wrongdoing[.]” Trial Ct. Op. at 22, citing
`
`O’Rourke, 778 A.2d at 1202. The court concluded “[w]ithout compensation for harm to
`
`his reputation, humiliation and mental anguish, Bailets would be in a far worse position
`
`for having reported the wrongdoing.” Id. at 23 (footnote omitted). The court also noted
`
`other jurisdictions with “similar, if not identical, whistleblower protection laws[,]” have
`
`concluded non-economic damages are recoverable. Id. at 22-23 citing Robertson
`
`County v. Wymola, 17 S.W.3d 334, 347 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (actual damages under
`
`whistleblower law include damages for mental anguish).
`
`
`3 Specifically, Section 1425 of the Law provides: “A court, in rendering a judgment in an
`action brought under this act, shall order, as the court considers appropriate,
`reinstatement of the employee, the payment of back wages, full reinstatement of fringe
`benefits and seniority rights, actual damages or any combination of these remedies. A
`court shall also award the complainant all or a portion of the costs of litigation, including
`reasonable attorney fees and witness fees, if the complainant prevails in the civil
`action.” 43 P.S. §1425 (emphasis added).
`
`
`
`
`[J-91-2017] - 6
`
`

`

`In assessing the value of Bailets’s non-economic damages, the trial court
`
`credited “the testimony of Bailets and his wife” regarding the deep humiliation, anguish
`
`and harm to reputation Bailets suffered as a result of his termination. Trial Ct. Op. at
`
`24. The court concluded, “There is no doubt that [PTC’s] wrongful termination of Bailets
`
`had a profound effect on Bailets and caused a major disruption to his life. Therefore,
`
`this court concludes that for his non-economic actual damages, which include harm to
`
`his reputation, humiliation, and mental anguish, Bailets is entitled to an award equal to
`
`that of his economic damages, or $1.6 million.” Id. at 25.
`
`PTC filed a motion for post-trial relief seeking, alternatively, judgment in its favor
`
`notwithstanding the verdict (n.o.v.), a new trial, reduction in the amount of economic
`
`damages (remittitur), and vacation or remittitur of the amount of non-economic
`
`damages. Following the denial of its post-trial motion and entry of judgment on the
`
`verdict, PTC appealed. This Court granted oral argument limited to the following issue,
`
`and affirmed the trial court’s order in all other respects:
`
`Was the award of $1.6 million in non-economic damages proper where the
`Whistleblower Law does not permit such damages and where the amount
`of non-economic damages awarded was arbitrary, excessive, and lacking
`in any rational basis in the record?
`
`Bailets v. Pa. Turnpike Comm’n., 168 A.3d 172 (Pa. 2017) (quotation marks deleted).
`
`
`I. Availability Of Non-Economic Damages
`
`PTC asserts Section 1425 of the Law does not permit a court to award non-
`
`economic damages. PTC acknowledges the Law permits an award of “actual
`
`damages,” but argues where the General Assembly intends a statute’s recovery for
`
`“actual damages” to include damages for non-economic harm, it does so explicitly.
`
`PTC’s Brief at 26-27, citing 42 Pa.C.S. §8315 (actual damages arising from identity theft
`
`
`[J-91-2017] - 7
`
`

`

`include harm to reputation); 42 Pa.C.S. §8316.1(c) (actual damages arising from
`
`unlawful dissemination of intimate image include harm to reputation); 43 P.S. §959(f)(1)
`
`(actual damages
`
`for unlawful discrimination
`
`include
`
`those
`
`for humiliation and
`
`embarrassment). PTC posits if the phrase “actual damages” contained in a statute
`
`necessarily includes recovery for non-economic losses, there would be no reason for
`
`the General Assembly to explicitly include specific categories of such losses in some
`
`statutes but not others.
`
`Moreover, PTC argues although non-economic damages are often described as
`
`compensatory, “they have essentially the same deterrent effect as punitive damages.”
`
`PTC’s Brief at 28, citing D’Ambrosio v. Pa. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 431 A.2d 966, 970
`
`(Pa. 1981), quoting Murray on Contracts §232 at 472 (1974) (“it is difficult, if not
`
`impossible, to draw an incisive line between compensatory and punitive damages”), and
`
`quoting Dobbs on Remedies §12.4 at 819 (1973) (“Probably there is some thought, too,
`
`that mental distress damages closely resemble punitive damages in many instances
`
`and that such damages should be denied in all those cases where punitive damages
`
`are denied.”). Thus, according to PTC, “[a]s a policy matter,” the phrase actual
`
`damages as contained in the Law should not be read to include damages for non-
`
`economic losses because punitive damages are not authorized under the Law. Id.,
`
`citing Feingold v. SEPTA, 517 A.2d 1270, 1277 (Pa. 1986) (public policy implications of
`
`assessing damages against taxpayers weighed against necessity of punishing entity
`
`performing public function; inappropriate to assess punitive damages against SEPTA, a
`
`Commonwealth agency, because punitive damages are windfall for fully compensated
`
`plaintiff). PTC asserts, “[t]his public policy concern is at its zenith” in the context of the
`
`present statute and others like it that create potential liability for the Commonwealth and
`
`its agents because “[e]xceptions to the Commonwealth’s sovereign immunity must be
`
`
`[J-91-2017] - 8
`
`

`

`narrowly interpreted.” PTC’s Brief at 28, citing Mascaro v. Youth Study Center, 523
`
`A.2d 1118, 1123 (Pa. 1987) (real estate exception to Political Subdivision Tort Claims
`
`Act, as exception to immunity, must be narrowly interpreted given expressed legislative
`
`intent to insulate political subdivisions from tort liability). PTC insists the waiver of
`
`sovereign immunity must be “‘unequivocally expressed’” and “‘[a]ny ambiguities in the
`
`statutory language are to be construed in favor of immunity[.]’” Id. at 28, quoting F.A.A.
`
`v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 290 (2012).
`
`PTC argues the Commonwealth Court’s reliance on Scranton Times is misplaced
`
`because that decision discussed actual damages for the tort of defamation, which by its
`
`nature, uniquely involves non-economic injury. PTC further argues the trial court’s
`
`focus on the policy considerations announced by this Court in O’Rourke with respect to
`
`the remedial nature of the Law cannot be read in isolation, or outside the principles of
`
`statutory interpretation. PTC additionally notes the United States Supreme Court
`
`stated, “Because the term ‘actual damages’ has this chameleon-like quality, we cannot
`
`rely on any all-purpose definition but must consider the particular context in which the
`
`term appears.” Cooper, 566 U.S. at 294 (unlawful disclosure of pilot’s medical
`
`information did not entitle pilot to recover damages for mental and emotional distress
`
`under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. §552a(g)(4)(a)).
`
`PTC ultimately asserts if the General Assembly agrees non-economic damages
`
`should be included in a tabulation of actual damages for purposes of the Law, it can
`
`explicitly amend the Law to define the term in that manner, but as it is, the language is
`
`unclear, and the trial court’s resolution is erroneous as a matter of law. In sum, PTC’s
`
`argument rests on the assertion the Law is meant to provide an exception to sovereign
`
`immunity, and as such, its provisions must be strictly and narrowly construed.
`
`
`[J-91-2017] - 9
`
`

`

`Bailets responds “PTC’s mischaracterization of the Law as a waiver of sovereign
`
`immunity requiring a narrow interpretation[,]” is contrary to binding precedent set forth
`
`by this Court, which ruled the Law is “chiefly a remedial measure intended to ‘enhance
`
`openness in government and compel the government’s compliance with the [L]aw by
`
`protecting those who inform authorities of wrongdoing.’” Bailets’s Brief at 41-42, quoting
`
`O’Rourke, 778 A.2d at 1202. Bailets observes this Court has explained, “remedial
`
`statutes are to be liberally construed to effect their objects.” Id. at 42, quoting O’Rourke
`
`at 1203, citing 1 Pa.C.S. §1928(c) (all statutory provisions, other than eight enumerated
`
`classes not applicable here, must be liberally construed). Thus, Bailets asserts
`
`anything short of full protection of whistleblowers would undermine the remedial
`
`purpose of the Law.
`
`Bailets additionally asserts, in light of the important remedial nature of the Law
`
`articulated by this Court in O’Rourke, the term “actual damages” is not ambiguous.
`
`Bailets instead maintains “[o]ur courts have long considered the term ‘actual damages’
`
`to include non-economic as well as economic damages[,]” observing this Court’s
`
`decision in Scranton Times explained actual damages include relief for “monetary and
`
`non-monetary injuries, such as ‘impairment of reputation and standing in the
`
`community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering.’” Bailets’s Brief at
`
`43-44, quoting Scranton Times, 129 A.3d at 429, quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
`
`418 U.S. 323, 349-50 (1974). Bailets points out this Court’s broad and inclusive
`
`definition of “actual damages” comports with the Black’s Law Dictionary definition at the
`
`time the Law was enacted, and which equated actual damages with compensatory
`
`damages. Id. at 44, citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979); see also 22
`
`AM.JUR.2D §25 (actual damages synonymous with compensatory damages). Bailets
`
`maintains, in crafting the Law, the legislature was well aware of the meaning and
`
`
`[J-91-2017] - 10
`
`

`

`definition of the phrase “actual damages,” which he asserts unambiguously includes
`
`damages for non-economic harm. Moreover, Bailets argues other states with
`
`whistleblower statutes similar or identical to the Law have concluded the term “actual
`
`damages” includes damages for non-economic harm.
`
`Bailets also maintains the legislature’s inclusion of damages for particular
`
`categories of non-economic losses in some other statutes does not show any intent to
`
`exclude non-economic damages as a whole from the tabulation of actual damages
`
`available under the Law, and to accept PTC’s suggestion that actual damages under
`
`the Law include only economic damages would render superfluous the Law’s mandate
`
`that remedies include the payment of back wages. Bailets’s Brief at 48, citing 43 P.S.
`
`§1425. Ultimately, Bailets argues to award anything short of Bailets’s full damages —
`
`including non-economic damages — would undermine the very purpose of the Law to
`
`protect and encourage employee reporters of waste and wrongdoing.4
`
`As stated,
`
`the
`
`first question before us
`
`involves
`
`the propriety of
`
`the
`
`Commonwealth Court’s order denying PTC’s post-trial motion for judgment n.o.v.5 Our
`
`
`4 In support of Bailets, amicus A.F.S.C.M.E. District Council 33, similarly argues
`“[u]nless workers possess the unhindered ability to report such issues [(waste and
`wrongdoing)] to employers or law enforcement authorities, the principal aims of the
`Whistleblower Law — protecting the public against waste and fraud in government by
`encouraging employees not to remain silent for fear of losing their jobs — will remain
`unfulfilled. AFSCME’s Brief at 2. In addition, The Pennsylvania Association for Justice
`also argues the Law is a remedial statute intended to encourage and protect those who
`would expose public waste and wrongdoing, and supports its intended objective by
`permitting the recovery of both economic and non-economic damages. “Any other
`conclusion undermines the statute and its capacity to fulfill the public policy that
`animates its provisions.” PAJ’s Brief at 2.
`
`5 PTC’s first issue involves its claim for judgment n.o.v. or vacation of the award of non-
`economic damages on the assertion non-economic damages are not available under
`the Law. Alternatively, in its second issue discussed infra, PTC seeks remittitur of the
`non-economic damages awarded, alleging the award is excessive.
`
`
`[J-91-2017] - 11
`
`

`

`scope of review with respect to whether judgment n.o.v. is appropriate is plenary, as
`
`with any review of questions of law. Shamnoski v. PG Energy, 858 A.2d 589, 593 (Pa.
`
`2004). Our standard of review when examining the lower court’s refusal to grant a
`
`judgment n.o.v. is whether, when reading the record in the light most favorable to the
`
`verdict winner and granting that party every favorable inference therefrom, there was
`
`sufficient competent evidence to sustain the verdict. Id. Although we accord deference
`
`to a trial court with regard to its factual findings, our review of its legal conclusions is de
`
`novo. Commonwealth ex rel. Gibson v. DiGiacinto, 439 A.2d 105, 107 (Pa. 1981). The
`
`trial court’s determination regarding the scope of the term “actual damages” under the
`
`Law constitutes a legal conclusion and issues of statutory interpretation present this
`
`Court with questions of law for which our standard of review is de novo, and our scope
`
`of review is plenary. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm’n v. Andrew Seder/The Times
`
`Leader, 139 A.3d 165, 172 (Pa. 2016).
`
`We begin by observing the Law does not define the term “actual damages,” and
`
`it appears only once, in Section 1425:
`
` A
`
` court, in rendering a judgment in an action brought under this act, shall
`order, as the court considers appropriate, reinstatement of the employee,
`the payment of back wages, full reinstatement of fringe benefits and
`seniority rights, actual damages or any combination of these remedies. A
`court shall also award the complainant all or a portion of the costs of
`litigation, including reasonable attorney fees and witness fees, if the
`complainant prevails in the civil action.”
`
`43 P.S. §1425 (emphasis added). Our precedent does not readily provide a definition of
`
`the term, but we have previously described three separate categories or types of
`
`damages:
`
`Compensatory damages are such damages as measure the actual loss,
`and are allowed as amends therefor. Exemplary, punitive, or vindictive
`damages are such damages as are in excess of the actual loss, and are
`allowed in theory when a tort is aggravated by evil motive, actual malice,
`deliberate violence, or oppression or fraud. . . . Of nominal damages, the
`
`
`[J-91-2017] - 12
`
`

`

`definition is a trivial sum awarded where a mere breach of duty or
`infraction of right is shown with no serious loss sustained.
`
`Springer v. J.H. Somers Fuel Co., 46 A. 370, 372 (Pa. 1900).
`
`Moreover, the parties advance different definitions for “actual damages,” both of
`
`which are arguably supported by the plain language. See, e.g., Cooper, 566 U.S. at
`
`294 (phrase “actual damages” has “chameleon-like quality” which an “all purpose
`
`definition” does not satisfy). Under such circumstances, where the meaning is not clear
`
`and unambiguous, we turn to our well-established principles of statutory construction.
`
`See, e.g., A.S. v. Pennsylvania State Police, 143 A.3d 896, 903 (Pa. 2016) (when
`
`statutory text is ambiguous Court may go beyond text and look to other considerations
`
`to discern legislative intent, such as the occasion and necessity for the statute, the
`
`circumstances under which it was enacted, the mischief to be remedied, and the object
`
`to be attained).
`
`The cardinal rule of all statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the
`
`intent of the Legislature. See 1 Pa.C.S. §1921(a). In doing so, we do not interpret
`
`statutory words or phrases in isolation, but must read them with reference to the context
`
`in which they appear. Moreover, we may also consider such factors as the mischief to
`
`be remedied, see 1 Pa.C.S. §1921(c)(3); the object to be attained, see 1 Pa.C.S. §1921
`
`(c)(4); and the consequences of a particular interpretation, see 1 Pa.C.S. §1921(c)(6).
`
`In this case, the parties embrace diametrically opposed viewpoints regarding the Law’s
`
`purpose. PTC asserts it is meant to provide a limited exception to sovereign immunity,
`
`and as such, its provisions must be strictly construed to avoid a punitive outcome, while
`
`Bailets argues the Law is remedial in nature, and thus, its provisions must be liberally
`
`construed to promote a fully restorative outcome.
`
`It is clear enough the Commonwealth did not expressly waive immunity for
`
`whistleblower claims until the enactment of the Law. Cf. Doe v. Franklin Co., 174 A.3d
`
`
`[J-91-2017] - 13
`
`

`

`593, 605 (Pa. 2017) (where General Assembly intends to provide exceptions to
`
`immunity, such exceptions must be specifically and explicitly expressed). It is equally
`
`clear, as this Court has previously held, the Law is primarily designed as a “remedial
`
`measure intended to ‘enhance openness in government and compel the government’s
`
`compliance with the law by protecting those who inform authorities of wrongdoing.’”
`
`O’Rourke, 778 A.2d at 1202 (emphasis added, additional citation omitted). Although we
`
`recognize the Law’s design perhaps entails overlapping purposes of waiving sovereign
`
`immunity on the one hand, and of compelling compliance by protecting those who
`
`expose wrongdoing on the other, we cannot accept PTC’s conclusion the sovereign
`
`immunity waiver aspects of the Law override its remedial protective aspects when it
`
`comes to determining the precise meaning of the phrase “actual damages” under the
`
`Law.6 We therefore reject PTC’s suggestion the provisions of the Law must be narrowly
`
`construed. See O’Rourke, 778 A.2d at 1203 (remedial statutes are to be liberally
`
`construed to effect their objects), citing generally 1 Pa.C.S. §1928(c). Instead, we view
`
`the immunity waiver aspect of the Law as supportive of its primary purpose — to protect
`
`whistleblowers who come forth with good faith reports of wrongdoing. Our conclusion in
`
`this regard is buttressed by the fact the Law is not strictly limited to public employers,
`
`but also protects employees fired in retaliation for exposing wrongdoing by private
`
`employers that receive public funds. Accordingly, we determine the Law’s provisions
`
`
`6 Indeed, this Court has previously noted the “penal” provisions of the Law, see 43 P.S.
`§1426 (permitting imposition of civil fines and suspension from public service for up to
`six months against employers), are secondary to and supportive of the primary purpose
`of the statute, which is to encourage employees to come forward in good faith with
`information about substantial illegal or unethical conduct. O’Rourke v. Dep’t of
`Corrections, 778 A.2d 1194, 1203 n.11 (Pa. 2001), citing 43 P.S. §1424, Historical and
`Statutory Notes (stating purpose of Law is to “provid[e] protection for employees who
`report a violation[.]”) (emphasis added).
`
`
`[J-91-2017] - 14
`
`

`

`must be liberally construed to effect its salutary remedial object. O’Rourke, 778 A.2d at
`
`1203.
`
`Next, we observe our jurisprudence has long recognized non-economic losses
`
`are actual losses. See Singer v. Sheppard, 346 A.2d 897, 901 n.9 (Pa. 1975)
`
`(“Pennsylvania law clearly indicates that non-economic losses are actual losses.”),
`
`citing Laurelli v. Shapiro, 206 A.2d 308 (Pa. 1965), and Corcoran v. McNeal, 161 A.2d
`
`367 (Pa. 1960). Indeed, PTC does not submit, nor could it, that losses for categories of
`
`injury such as humiliation, mental anguish, and loss of reputation are not “actual.”
`
`PTC’s argument, instead, is that the General Assembly intended “actual damages”
`
`under the Law to include recovery for economic injury only.
`
`As stated, the phrase “actual damages” appears in the Law in the following
`
`context: “in rendering a judgment in an action brought under this act, [a court] shall
`
`order, as the court considers appropriate, reinstatement of the employee, the payment
`
`of back wages, full reinstatement of fringe benefits and seniority rights, actual damages
`
`or any combination of these remedies.” 43 P.S. §1425. Thus, actual damages are
`
`included with the combination of remedies available under the Law, some of which,
`
`such as payment of back wages, are clearly understood as pertaining to purely
`
`economic losses. If “actual damages” was meant by the General Assembly to de-limit
`
`recovery only to economic losses, its inclusion in the tabulation of potential remedies
`
`with “back wages” would appear to add recompense for only one additional category of
`
`harm; i.e., future economic loss. Such a construction would render the phrase “actual
`
`damages” practically superfluous as the phrase would encompass future economic loss
`
`only. Moreover, such a construction would ignore precedent which holds actual
`
`damages include those for non-economic losses, see, e.g., Scranton Times, 105 A.3d
`
`655, as well as the long-held understanding that actual damages are synonymous with
`
`
`[J-91-2017] - 15
`
`

`

`compensatory damages which, of course, include damages for actual loss. J.H.
`
`Somers Fuel Co., 46 A. at 372.
`
`Turning to an examination of the object to be attained, this Court has concluded
`
`via statutory analysis of a separate passage in the Law, that the General Assembly’s
`
`intent in enacting the Law was “protecting those who inform authorities of wrongdoing,”
`
`and that absent some assurance an “employee will ultimately be put in no worse a
`
`position for having exposed the wrongdoing[,]” the Commonwealth would forego the
`
`benefit whistleblowers provide. O’Rourke, 778 A.2d at 1202. O’Rourke also noted
`
`“recovery under the statute is proportionate to the harm suffered, as punitive damages
`
`are not available.” Id. at 1202-03. Given the overriding purpose of the Law and our
`
`determination a whistleblower must be put in no worse a position for having reported the
`
`wrongdoing, we cannot view the phrase “actual damages” as excluding damages for
`
`such items of loss as humiliation, embarrassment and mental anguish because if no
`
`recovery for such items of loss are available, a whistleblower cannot be made whole.
`
`Similar