[J-21-2018]
`IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
`WESTERN DISTRICT
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`SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.
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`Appellant
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`v.
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`JOHN STAPAS,
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`GIANT EAGLE, INC., A PENNSYLVANIA
`ENTITY; GIANT EAGLE, INC., T/D/B/A
`GETGO FROM GIANT EAGLE, A
`PENNSYLVANIA ENTITY; GIANT EAGLE
`INC., T/D/B/A SOUTHSIDE GETGO, A
`PENNSYLVANIA ENTITY; NADEEN
`MCSHANE, AN INDIVIDUAL; GETGO
`PARTNERS SOUTH, A PENNSYLVANIA
`ENTITY; GETGO PARTNERS SOUTH-
`MARYLAND, LLC, A PENNSYLVANIA
`ENTITY; AND GETGO HOLDINGS, LLP,
`A PENNSYLVANIA ENTITY,
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`Appellees
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`No. 44 WAP 2017
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`Appeal from the Order of the Superior
`Court entered December 23, 2016 at
`No. 1287 WDA 2015, vacating the
`Judgment of the Court of Common
`Pleas of Allegheny County entered
`July 24, 2015 at No. GD09-012965
`and remanding.
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`ARGUED: April 10, 2018
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`JUSTICE MUNDY
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`DECIDED: NOVEMBER 21, 2018
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`OPINION
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`In this appeal by allowance, we consider whether Giant Eagle was required to
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`object to the jury’s verdict awarding future lost wages to preserve its challenge to the
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`verdict, which Giant Eagle labeled as a weight of the evidence challenge in its post-trial
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`motion. We conclude that an objection to a jury’s verdict that is premised on trial errors,
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`correctable before the jury is discharged, must be raised before the jury is discharged.
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`

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`Accordingly, we reverse the Superior Court’s order awarding Giant Eagle a new trial on
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`damages.
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`In this premises liability case, John Stapas sued Giant Eagle and related entities
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`(collectively Giant Eagle) for injuries he sustained at a GetGo convenience store. At the
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`time of the incident, Stapas was 17 years old and worked full-time as a busboy and
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`dishwasher at a restaurant, earning $8.25 per hour plus $14.00-$20.00 per shift in tips.
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`On July 18, 2007, Stapas went to GetGo after his restaurant shift. At GetGo, he was
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`talking to his friend, Crystal Stogden, who worked the night shift there. Minutes after
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`Stapas arrived, a customer exiting the store held the door open for Brandon McCallister
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`to enter. McCallister had been banned from patronizing that GetGo location.
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`McCallister, who appeared intoxicated, started arguing with Stogden about his
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`ban. Stapas was not initially involved in the argument. After about one minute, Stapas
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`intervened to attempt to diffuse the argument and protect Stogden and another female
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`employee, LaToya Stevens.
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`Eventually, Stapas, McCallister, Stogden, and Stevens exited the store into the
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`parking lot area. Outside the store, McCallister’s friend was waiting for him. Stapas told
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`Stogden to get back inside the store, and Stevens remained outside. McCallister
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`continued screaming at the employees as Stapas followed him to his vehicle, insisting
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`that he leave. As they approached McCallister’s car, McCallister initiated a physical fight
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`with Stapas. During the fight, McCallister pulled out a gun, which he had concealed on
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`his person, and shot Stapas four times. Stapas missed six weeks of work while
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`recovering from the injuries, and he continues to have daily stomach pain from the
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`shooting.
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`On July 16, 2009, Stapas filed a writ of summons, and on November 10, 2009,
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`Stapas filed a complaint asserting negligence claims against Giant Eagle. This case
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`[J-21-2018] - 2
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`proceeded to a five-day jury trial, from November 10 to November 17, 2014. Pertinent to
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`this appeal, Stapas did not present evidence on, or make any claim for, future wage loss.
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`In his closing argument, Stapas’s counsel mentioned Stapas’s potential future lost
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`wages if he could not continue to work with his injuries, but stated that Stapas was “not
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`sitting here asking you for, you know [$]6-700,000 in wages for the rest of his life, because
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`he’s going to fight through this. . . . [T]hat’s a decision we made. And the Judge will give
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`you the numbers of past and present wage loss. It’s small. It’s six weeks of eight or nine
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`dollars an hour, and it’s not much.” N.T., 11/17/14, at 836. Similarly, Giant Eagle’s
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`counsel estimated Stapas’s wage loss at $2,000 to $3,000. Id. at 804.
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`Following the parties’ closing arguments, the trial court charged the jury that if it
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`found Giant Eagle liable, its damages award should “fairly and adequately compensate
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`[Stapas] for all the physical and financial injuries he has sustained as a result of the
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`incident. The amount . . . must compensate [Stapas] completely for damages sustained
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`in the past, as well as damage [Stapas] will sustain in the future.” Id. at 848. The trial
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`court did not specifically instruct the jury on past and future wage loss. Id. at 848-50.
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`Additionally, the trial court instructed the jury to return its verdict in “a single lump sum.”
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`Id. Giant Eagle did not object to the trial court’s instructions on damages or request an
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`instruction on past or future wage loss.
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`The trial court gave the jury a verdict slip with six interrogatories. The first five
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`interrogatories related to the various elements of negligence. The sixth interrogatory,
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`related to damages, called for the jury to:
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`State the amount of damages, if any, sustained by the Plaintiff
`as a result of the accident (occurrence), without regard to and
`without reduction by the percentage of causal negligence, if
`any, that you have attributed to the Plaintiff, including the
`items listed below. In the event that you find in favor of
`Plaintiff, you will add the sums of damage together and return
`your verdict in a single, lump sum.
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`[J-21-2018] - 3
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`Verdict Slip, 11/17/14, Question 6 (R. 1063a).
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`Below the sixth interrogatory, there was a list of five categories of damages,
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`followed by a line beginning with “total.” Giant Eagle did not object to the verdict form.
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`The jury found Giant Eagle liable and filled out the damages interrogatory by handwriting
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`an amount next to each category (indicated below with bold and underlining), even though
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`they were not specifically directed to, and then writing the sum on the “total” line, as
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`follows:
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`a. Scarring liposuction $3000
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`b. Wage loss past $3000, future $1,300,000
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`c. Past and future medical expenses past $30,000 future 0
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`d. Past, present and future pain and suffering $500,000
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`e. Loss of life’s pleasures $250,000
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`Total: $2,086,000
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`Id. (R. 1064a).
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`When the jury returned the verdict slip, the trial court’s tipstaff read the itemized
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`damages, including the amount for wage loss, and the total amount. Giant Eagle did not
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`object. Immediately after the verdict, the trial court polled the jury, confirmed that counsel
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`had no further questions or objections, and dismissed the jury. The trial court entered a
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`molded verdict in favor of Stapas and against Giant Eagle for $1,552,780.00, which
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`reflected the jury’s finding that Giant Eagle was 73% negligent and Stapas was 27%
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`negligent. Additionally, on February 25, 2015, the trial court added delay damages of
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`$279,795.17, for a total award of $1,802,575.17.
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`[J-21-2018] - 4
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`On November 26, 2014, Giant Eagle filed a motion for post-trial relief, requesting
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`a new trial, JNOV, or remittitur.1 The trial court continued oral argument on the motion
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`pending the preparation of the complete trial transcript. The transcript was not filed until
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`July 20, 2015, which was approximately eight months after Giant Eagle filed its motion.
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`On July 24, 2015, Stapas filed a praecipe to enter judgment because more than 120 days
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`had passed since Giant Eagle filed its post-trial motion, which rendered the post-trial
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`motion denied by operation of law. See Pa.R.C.P. 227.4(1)(b). On August 21, 2015,
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`Giant Eagle filed a notice of appeal in the Superior Court.
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`Although the trial court did not have an opportunity to rule on Giant Eagle’s post-
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`trial motions, it filed an opinion expressing its view that Giant Eagle had waived its
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`objections to the jury’s calculation of the $2,086,00.00 general verdict. Trial Ct. Op. at 5
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`(citing Picca v. Kriner, 645 A.2d 868, 871 (Pa. Super. 1994) (holding the request for a
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`new trial is waived if objections to a jury’s inconsistent verdict are not raised before the
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`jury is dismissed)). The trial court explained that the parties jointly drafted and agreed to
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`the jury verdict slip containing the six interrogatories, the trial court gave the verdict form
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`to the jury without objection, and Giant Eagle did not object to the jury’s verdict before the
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`trial court dismissed the jury. The trial court noted if Giant Eagle had objected before the
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`jury was dismissed, the trial court could have required the jury to clarify its verdict.
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`Accordingly, the trial court concluded Giant Eagle had waived its right to a new trial by
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`failing to object to the jury’s damages award before the trial court dismissed the jury.
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`1 While the post-trial motion set forth a claim for remittitur, Giant Eagle did not pursue this
`claim either in the Superior Court or in this appeal. In particular, Giant Eagle has not
`sought a reduction of the lump sum award of damages ($2,086,000) on the grounds that
`it was excessive and not supported by the evidence of record. Instead, Giant Eagle has
`focused its efforts exclusively on attempts to obtain a new trial based upon the weight of
`the evidence for the award for future lost wages noted on the verdict slip.
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`[J-21-2018] - 5
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`On appeal, a unanimous panel of the Superior Court vacated the judgment and
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`remanded for a new trial on damages. The Superior Court explained it reviews the denial
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`of a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion or error of law. Stapas v. Giant Eagle,
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`Inc., 153 A.3d 353, 359 (Pa. Super. 2016). Further, the court noted a claim that the verdict
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`was against the weight of the evidence warrants a new trial only “where the verdict is so
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`contrary to the evidence it shocks one’s sense of justice.” Id. (quoting Cangemi ex rel.
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`Estate of Cangemi v. Cone, 774 A.2d 1262, 1265 (Pa. Super. 2001)).
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`The Superior Court first classified the verdict as a “general verdict with special
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`findings.” Id. at 363. The court reasoned that while the trial court instructed the jury to
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`return a general verdict, the jury actually returned a general verdict with special findings
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`by assigning an amount of damages to each category listed in the damages interrogatory
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`on the verdict slip. Id.
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`Next, the Superior Court disagreed with the trial court that Giant Eagle had waived
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`its argument for failing to object before the jury was dismissed. Id. at 364. The court
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`stated that a party “who fails to object to an ambiguous or flawed jury verdict before the
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`jury is dismissed waives the right to challenge the verdict in post-trial motions.” Id. (citing
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`Criswell v. King, 834 A.2d 505, 508 (Pa. 2003)). The Superior Court noted the trial court,
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`citing Picca, relied on this rule to conclude Giant Eagle’s issue was waived. Id. at 363.
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`However, the court noted an exception to this rule is that a party does not have to raise a
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`challenge to the weight of the evidence before the jury is discharged; instead, it may be
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`raised for the first time in post-trial motions. Id. at 364 (citing Criswell, 834 A.2d at 512).
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`Because Giant Eagle’s post-trial claim was framed as a challenge to the sufficiency and
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`weight of the evidence, the Superior Court concluded “Giant Eagle properly preserved its
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`right to seek a new trial by filing a timely post-trial motion contending the verdict was
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`against the weight of the evidence and shocked one’s sense of justice.” Id. at 364.
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`[J-21-2018] - 6
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`Analyzing Giant Eagle’s weight of the evidence challenge, the Superior Court
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`concluded the record did not support the verdict for future lost wages because Stapas did
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`not seek and did not prove that category of damages. Id. at 365. The court acknowledged
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`that if the jury had followed the trial court’s instructions to return a lump sum verdict, the
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`court would not be able to discern the jury’s error in awarding future lost wages. Id.
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`However, the jury’s special findings reflected the award of $1,300,000.00 for future lost
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`wages, which the court concluded was “inconsistent with the general verdict.” Id. (relying
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`on Fritz v. Wright, 907 A.2d 1083, 1092 (Pa. 2006) (stating “in the usual case where
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`special findings are consistent with the general verdict, the special findings are
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`considered merely advisory”)). According to the court, “[u]nder these circumstances, the
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`special findings compel us to conclude that the verdict was against the weight of the
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`evidence and that the trial court abused its discretion by not granting Giant Eagle a new
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`trial.” Id. Therefore, the Superior Court vacated the judgment and remanded for a new
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`trial limited to damages. Id. at 372.
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`We granted allocatur to consider whether Giant Eagle waived its challenge to the
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`damages award by not objecting before the jury was discharged but instead raising the
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`issue for the first time in its post-trial motions. We also granted allocatur to consider
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`whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicted with this Court’s decisions in Dilliplaine
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`v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 322 A.2d 114 (Pa. 1974), and Straub v. Cherne Industries,
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`880 A.2d 561 (Pa. 2005). Stapas v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 171 A.3d 1283 (Pa. 2017). The
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`applicability of waiver principles presents a question of law, over which our standard of
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`review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Straub, 880 A.2d at 566 n.7.
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`As the parties’ arguments involve a discussion of Dilliplaine, Criswell, and Straub,
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`we will first discuss those cases to provide the legal background surrounding the issue.
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`In Dilliplaine, this Court held that a “timely specific objection” must be raised to preserve
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`allegations of trial error. Dilliplaine, 322 A.2d at 117. In so doing, this Court abolished
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`the “fundamental error” doctrine, which had allowed an appellate court to consider
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`fundamental errors for the first time on appeal. Id. at 116-17. The Dilliplaine Court
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`explained that requiring a timely, specific objection at trial promoted judicial efficiency by
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`giving the trial court the opportunity to correct trial errors, reducing appellate review of
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`those issues, and avoiding the delay to litigants inherent in appellate review. Id. at 117.
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`Accordingly, the Dilliplaine Court held that the appellant waived his objection to a jury
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`instruction because he did not offer a point for charge or object to the trial court’s jury
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`instruction. Id.
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`The Dilliplaine rule has come to be known as the “contemporaneous objection”
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`rule. It is now codified in Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 227.1(b), which provides:
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`(b) Except as otherwise provided by Pa.R.E. 103(a), post-trial
`relief may not be granted unless the grounds therefor,
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`in pre-trial
`raised
`then available, were
`if
`(1)
`proceedings or by motion, objection, point for charge,
`request for findings of fact or conclusions of law, offer
`of proof or other appropriate method at trial; and
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`(2) are specified in the motion. The motion shall state
`how the grounds were asserted in pre-trial proceedings
`or at trial. Grounds not specified are deemed waived
`unless leave is granted upon cause shown to specify
`additional grounds.
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`Pa.R.C.P. 227.1(b)(1)-(2). Further, the note to Rule 227.1 explains “[i]f no objection is
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`made, error which could have been corrected in pre-trial proceedings or during trial by
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`timely objection may not constitute a ground for post-trial relief.” Pa.R.C.P. 227.1, Note.
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`In Criswell, this Court held that a weight of the evidence challenge does not have
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`to be raised before the jury is discharged to preserve it, and a weight claim can be raised
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`for the first time in post-trial motions. Criswell, 834 A.2d at 506. Criswell involved a
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`[J-21-2018] - 8
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`negligence claim arising out of an automobile accident in which the parties presented
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`competing evidence to the jury, mainly on damages. Id. at 507. The jury in Criswell found
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`the appellee’s negligence did not cause the appellant’s injuries in response to a causation
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`interrogatory. Id. at 507. The appellant did not object before the jury was discharged and
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`later filed a post-trial motion for a new trial, arguing the verdict was against the weight of
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`the evidence. Id. The trial court found the jury’s verdict on causation was against the
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`weight of the evidence and granted a new trial. Id.
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`However, the Superior Court reversed, concluding the appellant waived the weight
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`challenge by failing to object before the jury was discharged. Id. at 508. To reach its
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`conclusion, the Superior Court applied its decision in Picca, which held a party’s failure
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`to object to the jury’s ambiguous response to special interrogatories before the jury was
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`dismissed waives the ability to challenge the verdict in post-trial motions. Id. (citing Picca,
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`645 A.2d at 868). The Superior Court reasoned that if the appellant had objected to the
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`verdict, the trial court could have instructed the jury to clarify its ambiguous verdict. Id.
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`This Court reversed the Superior Court and concluded that a weight of the
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`evidence claim ripens after the jury’s verdict, reasoning:
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`A weight challenge is sui generis. Such a claim is not
`premised upon trial court error or some discrete and
`correctable event at trial, but instead ripens only after, and
`because of, the jury’s ultimate verdict in the case. The
`challenge does not dispute the power of the jury to render the
`verdict it rendered, nor does it even allege any facial error in
`the verdict of the jury (be it, in the eyes of the challenger, a
`flaw, an inconsistency or a total injustice). Assuming that the
`case properly was ripe for jury consideration--i.e., neither of
`the parties was entitled to a directed verdict because a
`properly joined issue of material fact remained for resolution-
`-the jury is fully empowered to rule in favor of either or any
`party. The basis for a weight claim derives from the fact that
`the trial court, like the jury, had an opportunity to hear the
`evidence and observe the demeanor of the witnesses; the
`hope and expectation animating a weight challenge is that the
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`[J-21-2018] - 9
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`trial court will conclude that the verdict was so contrary to what
`it heard and observed that it will deem the jury's verdict such
`a miscarriage of justice as to trigger the courts time-honored
`and inherent power to take corrective action.
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`Id. at 512. Because a weight challenge is addressed to the trial court’s discretion, only
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`the trial judge can resolve it; the trial court cannot instruct the jury to weigh the evidence
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`differently. Id. at 513. Accordingly, a party seeking to raise a weight challenge is not
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`required to object before the jury is discharged to preserve the claim, because the jury
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`cannot resolve the claim. Id. Based on this analysis, this Court concluded the appellant
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`presented a weight claim that ripened only after the verdict, and he did not have to object
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`to the verdict before the trial court dismissed the jury. Id.
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`In Straub, this Court held the defendant waived its argument, advanced for the first
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`time in its post-trial motion, that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict.
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`Straub, 880 A.2d at 567. The jury in Straub found, in response to special interrogatories,
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`that the defendant’s product was not defective but that the defendant was negligent. Id.
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`at 565. The defendant did not object to the interrogatories, the trial court’s jury
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`instructions, or the verdict. Id. at 567. Instead, the defendant filed a post-trial motion,
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`which asserted the jury’s finding that the defendant was negligent could not stand
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`because the jury found the product was not defective and the plaintiff did not produce any
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`independent evidence of negligence unrelated to the condition of the product. Id. at 565.
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`Applying Rule 227.1, the Straub Court held that the defendant waived this argument. Id.
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`at 567. This Court reasoned that the defendant’s argument was that the jury could not
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`find the defendant negligent as a matter of law, not that the jury erred in weighing the
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`evidence. Id. (explaining “[the defendant] is not arguing that the verdict cannot stand
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`because a reasonable jury could not have found [the defendant] negligent based on the
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`evidence that [the plaintiffs] introduced at trial”). Therefore, this Court concluded the
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`[J-21-2018] - 10
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`defendant’s objections were waived because the verdict sheet and the jury instructions
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`did not accurately state the law, and the defendant did not object to them. Id.
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`We now turn to the parties’ arguments in this case. Stapas argues that Giant Eagle
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`waived its challenge to the flawed jury verdict by failing to object at trial. Stapas asserts
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`that Dilliplaine requires a contemporaneous objection to problematic verdicts and trial
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`errors.
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` Stapas contends
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`that despite Dilliplaine’s contemporaneous objection
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`requirement, Giant Eagle failed to object to the verdict or the trial court errors preceding
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`the verdict. First, Stapas notes that the jury’s verdict did not conform to the trial court’s
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`instructions because the jury did not return a single, lump sum of damages; instead, the
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`jury created its own special findings. However, Giant Eagle did not object. Second, Giant
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`Eagle did not request a point for charge on wage loss. Third, Giant Eagle did not object
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`to the trial court’s instructions explaining wage loss. Fourth, Giant Eagle did not object to
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`the verdict slip that listed “wage loss,” but did not differentiate between past wage loss
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`and future wage loss. Therefore, according to Stapas, Giant Eagle waived its right to a
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`new trial on damages based on the jury’s flawed verdict.
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`Additionally, Stapas contends this Court has established a bright-line rule for when
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`an objection to a verdict must be raised to preserve an issue for appeal in Straub and
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`Samuel-Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc., 34 A.3d 1, 46 (Pa. 2011) (holding the failure
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`to object to a molded verdict waived the issue on appeal). If the verdict is the product of
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`trial error, or involves a discrete, correctable event at trial, or involves the capacity of the
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`jury to return the verdict at all, the objection must be lodged before the jury is discharged.
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`On the other hand, under Criswell, a weight of the evidence challenge may be raised for
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`the first time in post-trial motions. In this case, Stapas contends Straub is controlling
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`because Giant Eagle disputed the right of the jury to make its findings as a matter of law.
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`Further, Stapas argues the Superior Court erred in not considering Straub in its decision.
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`Thus, Stapas maintains that Giant Eagle’s failure to object waived the issue.
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`Further, Stapas argues that Giant Eagle’s attempt to label its challenge to the jury’s
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`verdict as a weight of the evidence issue fails. Stapas asserts that Giant Eagle argued
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`the jury’s apparent award of future wage loss was unsupported by any evidence; Giant
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`Eagle did not argue that the jury improperly weighed competing evidence on future wage
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`loss. Because the jury in this case did not resolve a factual dispute over future wage loss,
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`Stapas argues this case is distinguishable from Criswell. Instead, Stapas views Straub
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`as controlling because the jury verdict arose from errors in the jury instructions and the
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`verdict sheet, to which Giant Eagle did not object. According to Stapas, this is not a
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`weight of the evidence issue, it is an assertion that the jury could not award future wage
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`loss as a matter of law. As such, Stapas concludes Giant Eagle waived it by failing to
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`object before the jury was discharged.
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`Lastly, Stapas contends that if Giant Eagle had objected to the jury verdict, the trial
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`court could have recharged the jury by defining wage loss. Stapas points out the trial
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`court opined it could have corrected the errors before it discharged the jury. If the jury
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`then returned the same amount, it would have represented the jury’s clarification that it
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`mischaracterized the damages as “future wage loss.” Stapas posits that the jury might
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`have intended to compensate Stapas for working the rest of his life in pain or for the
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`mental stress of worrying about being unemployable because of his injuries. On the other
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`hand, if the jury returned a lesser amount after being recharged, it would have clarified
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`that it was confused by the “wage loss” category without further instructions. Thus, the
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`error was correctable at trial, and Giant Eagle had to raise an objection at trial to preserve
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`the issue.
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`Stapas contends that if we do not enforce the contemporaneous objection rule, we
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`would be giving a windfall to Giant Eagle. Specifically, the jury awarded over $750,000.00
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`in noneconomic damages. By not raising the issue until the post-trial stage, Giant Eagle
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`obtained a new trial on damages with a new jury free to award a different amount of
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`noneconomic damages. Stapas argues this creates a disincentive to objecting at trial
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`and giving the trial court the opportunity to correct trial errors to arrive at a more
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`unobjectionable verdict.
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`In response, Giant Eagle maintains that its challenge to the jury’s verdict was not
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`waived because it is a true weight of the evidence claim. Giant Eagle stresses that its
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`post-trial motions argued the jury’s award of $1.3 million for future wage loss shocked the
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`judicial conscience. Giant Eagle submits that the jury’s verdict was not facially
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`inconsistent; instead, the jury’s damages award was excessive in light of the evidence.
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`Accordingly, Giant Eagle asserts it was not necessary to object to give the jury an
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`opportunity to correct its findings.
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`Giant Eagle relies on Criswell’s reasoning that a challenge to the weight of the
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`evidence ripens after the verdict, and the trial court cannot issue a corrective instruction
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`requiring the jury to reweigh the evidence because it would essentially be directing a
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`verdict. Giant Eagle argues that the jury’s verdict in this case was legally and logically
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`consistent, but still not supported by the evidence. The consistency of this verdict
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`distinguishes it from Straub, where the verdict was inherently inconsistent. Giant Eagle’s
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`challenge to the verdict is not based on a claim of inconsistency, but is based on the
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`verdict shocking the conscience. Because of this, Giant Eagle argues that the trial court
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`could not have corrected the jury’s award of damages for future wage loss with additional
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`instructions and the jury redeliberating.
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`[J-21-2018] - 13
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`Giant Eagle also contends the trial court did not issue erroneous jury instructions.
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`It points out that Stapas endorsed the trial court’s instructions and verdict slip. Giant
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`Eagle posits that under Stapas’s theory, Giant Eagle should have requested an instruction
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`that punitive damages were not available as they were not requested or proven.
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`According to Giant Eagle, it did not challenge the jury instructions or inconsistency of the
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`verdict, but its lack of evidentiary support.
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`Giant Eagle concludes by noting that the Superior Court properly awarded a new
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`trial on damages because even Stapas admits the evidence did not support the verdict
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`awarding damages for future wage loss. Further, Stapas does not advocate a worthy
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`cause or seek to vindicate any rights. Instead, Stapas concedes he has no right to the
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`award for future wage loss but relies on a waiver rule to keep the verdict.
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`After careful review, we conclude Giant Eagle waived its challenge to the jury’s
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`verdict by failing to object to the verdict before the trial court dismissed the jury. Under
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`Dilliplaine and Rule 227.1(b), post-trial relief cannot be granted if the basis for the post-
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`trial motion related to a verdict arose during the trial proceedings and the party seeking
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`relief did not raise a contemporaneous objection. See Dilliplaine, 322 A.2d at 117;
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`Pa.R.C.P. 227.1(b)(1).
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`Here, Giant Eagle is challenging the jury’s ability to award damages for future lost
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`wages even though Stapas did not introduce any evidence of future wage loss and the
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`trial court did not instruct the jury on the definition of “wage loss.” Giant Eagle had multiple
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`opportunities to preserve this ground for post-trial relief during the trial court proceedings
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`but failed to do so. Specifically, Giant Eagle did not request a point for charge limiting
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`wage loss to only past wage loss, did not object to the jury interrogatory listing “wage
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`loss” as a category of damages, and did not object to the trial court’s damages
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`instructions. Additionally, Giant Eagle did not object to the jury’s verdict in which the jury
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`[J-21-2018] - 14
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`specified that it awarded Stapas $1,300,000.00 for future wage loss. When the trial
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`court’s tipstaff read the jury’s itemized verdict, Giant Eagle had a basis to object because
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`the verdict did not conform to the trial court’s instruction to return a single, lump-sum
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`verdict and because the jury awarded damages for future lost wages, a category of
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`damages that Stapas was not entitled to as a matter of law. By failing to raise an objection
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`at any point during the trial before the jury was discharged, Giant Eagle waived its
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`challenge to the jury’s verdict.
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`Dilliplaine’s judicial efficiency rationale for the contemporaneous objection
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`requirement supports this conclusion. In this case, the trial court did not instruct the jury
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`on the difference between past wage loss and future wage loss, and the verdict slip did
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`not qualify the category of “wage loss” damages. In fact, the trial court instructed the jury
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`to “compensate [Stapas] completely for damages sustained in the past, as well as
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`damage [Stapas] will sustain in the future.” N.T., 11/17/14, at 848. As the trial court
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`explained, if Giant Eagle had objected before it dismissed the jury, it could have required
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`the jury to clarify the verdict. Alternatively, it could have provided the jury with an
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`instruction on past wage loss. Compare Pa. Suggested Standard Civil Jury Instructions
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`§ 7.110 (providing jury instruction for past lost earnings) with id. § 7.40 (supplying jury
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`instruction for future loss of earnings and lost earnings capacity). Because the trial court
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`did not instruct the jury at all on the definition of “wage loss” as used in the interrogatories,
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`such an instruction could have clarified the issue for the jury.2 Further, such an instruction
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`would not be directing the jury to reweigh the evidence, but it would provide direction on
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`which type of wage loss was recoverable as a matter of law. By not objecting to the
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`2 The dissent maintains, “the jury acted unpredictably and against the direction of the trial
`court and all counsel.” Dissenting Op. at 1. However, the jury was not instructed that it
`could not award damages for future wage loss or that it could award damages only for
`past lost earnings. Instead, it was presented with a verdict slip that listed “wage loss” as
`a category of damages.
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`[J-21-2018] - 15
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`verdict, Giant Eagle deprived the trial court of the opportunity to efficiently correct a trial
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`error. Raising the issue for the first time in a post-trial motion is an inefficient use of
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`judicial resources, which Dilliplaine sought to eliminate through the contemporaneous
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`objection requirement. See Dilliplaine, 322 A.2d at 117.
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`Giant Eagle’s characterization of its challenge to the verdict as a weight of the
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`evidence challenge does not avoid waiver. Giant Eagle’s challenge was not grounded in
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`the weight of the evidence. As the Criswell Court explained, a weight of the evidence
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`claim ripens after the verdict because it does not challenge the jury’s ability to render a
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`verdict; instead, it contends the jury’s resolution of competing evidence was “a
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`miscarriage of justice.” Criswell, 834 A.2d at 512. Further, if either party was entitled to
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`a directed verdict on the issue because there were no material facts for the jury to resolve,
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`the issue is no