Case 2:14-cv-01445-MBC Document 31 Filed 12/07/15 Page 1 of 10
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
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`ANDREA M. MELAN,
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`Plaintiff
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`v.
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`BELLE VERNON AREA SCHOOL
`DISTRICT,
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`Defendant
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`Civ. No. 2:14-cv-01445
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`Judge Maurice B. Cohill, Jr.
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`OPINION AND ORDER
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`Pending before the Court is Belle Vernon .Area School District's ("District") Motion for
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`Summary Judgment [ECF No. 19] pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
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`and L.R. 56.1 of the Local Civil Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District
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`of Pennsylvania.
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`On March 17, 2015, Mrs. Melan filed an Amended Complaint in th_is action, seeking lost
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`wages and other appropriate damages as a result of alleged age and disability related
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`employment discrimination. More particularly, Mrs. Melan alleges that she was forced to retire
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`from her job as a teacher in the District due to her age and/or disability status.
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`On May 8, 2015, the District filed its Answer to Amended Complaint, generally denying
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`the allegations contained in the Amended Complaint. After a disputed matter of law halted
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`court-ordered mediation proceedings, the parties filed a Joint Motion for Entry of Modified Case
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`Management Order, agreeing that'the District should file a motion for summary judgment "on
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`the legal significance of the agreement entered into by the Parties to resolve a union grievance."
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`Joint Motion,~ 2. Once the Joint Motion was granted, the District filed its Motion for Summary
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`Judgment on May 28, 2015, claiming that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact, and
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`Case 2:14-cv-01445-MBC Document 31 Filed 12/07/15 Page 2 of 10
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`Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. For the reasons set forth below, the
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`District's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. Defendant is not entitled to judgment as a
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`matter of law at this point in the proceedings.
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`I. Standard of Review.
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`Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material
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`fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). See also
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`Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The parties must support their. respective
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`position by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions,
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`documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including
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`those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
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`materials." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(l)(A). In other words, summary judgment may be granted only
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`if there exists no genuine issue of material fact that would permit a reasonable jury to find for the
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`nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505
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`(1986).
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`In reviewing the evidence, the court draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non(cid:173)
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`moving party. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000);
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`Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986); Huston v.
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`Procter & Gamble Paper Prod. Corp., 568 F.3d 100, 104 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). It is
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`not the court's role to weigh the disputed evidence and decide which is more probative, or to
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`make credibility determinations. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Marino v. Indus. Crating Co.,
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`358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004); Boyle v. County of Allegheny, 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir.
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`1998). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
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`law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48. An·
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`Case 2:14-cv-01445-MBC Document 31 Filed 12/07/15 Page 3 of 10
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`issue is "genuine" if a reasonable jury could possibly hold in the non-movant's favor with regard
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`to that issue. See id. "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a reasonable trier of fact
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`to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial."' Matsushita, 475 U~S~ at
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`587; Huston, 568 F.3d at 104.
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`II. Relevant Facts.
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`Mrs. Melan was employed as an elementary school teacher in the District from in or
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`about October 1973 until she resigned in June 2014. In or about November 2012, because of
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`medical conditions, Mrs. Melan took a medical leave of absence from her teaching position. She
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`returned to work in August 2013. Mrs. Melan alleges that soon thereafter, on or about,
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`September 30, 2013, the District conducted a performance evaluation of Plaintiff, the result of
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`which was that she was given an "unsatisfactory" rating. Furthermore, Mrs. Melan alleges that
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`she was told that she had to comply with an improvement plan or she would be forced to retire or
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`would be fired in March 2014.
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`Mrs. Melan sought assistance from her union, the Pennsylvania State Education
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`Association. On or about October 7, 2013, the Union then filed a grievance with the District with
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`respect to the unsatisfactory rating the District issued Mrs. Melan on or about September 30,
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`2013. The grievance process was started but not completed because the parties arid the Union
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`executed a Settlement Agreement. Under the Settlement Agreement, the District agreed to
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`rescind the unsatisfactory rating, to remove the improvement plan it had imposed on Mrs. Melan,
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`and not to impose any additional improvement plans on her for the remainder of the 2013-2014
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`school year. Under the Settlement Agreement, the union agreed to withdraw the grievance filed
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`on Mrs. Melan's behalf. Under the Settlement Agreement, Mrs. Melan agreed to submit an
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`irrevocable letter of retirement to the District, with an effective date of June 30, 2014. The
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`Case 2:14-cv-01445-MBC Document 31 Filed 12/07/15 Page 4 of 10
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`Agreement also provided that it "shall be enforceable through the grievance procedure in the
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`parties' collective bargaining agreement. Any disagreement over the interpretation or application
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`of this Agreement shall be subject to the grievance procedure set forth in the parties' collective
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`bargaining agreement." Finally, the parties agreed in the Settlement Agreement that they
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`"acknowledge that they understand this Agreement and enter into it voluntarily, that this is a
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`complete settlement agreement, and that there are no written or oral understandings or
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`agreements that are not set forth herein."
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`III. Parties' Arguments.
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`In its Motion for Summary Judgement, Defendant contends:
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`The District is entitled to judgment as a matter of law based upon the fact that
`Plaintiff, along with her legal representatives, negotiated, drafted, and executed a
`Settlement and Release Agreement with the District which describes the
`circumstances surrounding Plaintiffs election to retire from the District as
`"knowing and voluntary." These same circumstances now give rise to Plaintiffs
`claims of discrimination and "forced resignation."
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`Motion for Summary Judgment, ~ 2. In support thereof, the District argues m its
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`Supporting Brief:
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`in direct contravention of the terms of the Agreement, Plaintiff has now filed suit
`against the District claiming that her retirement was compelled, rather than
`voluntary, and that it was prompted by alleged discrimination based upon her age
`and perceived disability. Based upon the language of the Agreement as drafted
`and executed by Plaintiff and her legal counsel, Plaintiffs discrimination claims
`should be dismissed, and summary judgment should be granted in favor of the
`District. Additionally, summary judgment should be granted in favor of the
`District because .Plaintiffs claims arise out of the terms of the Agreement, and the
`Agreement makes clear that disputes regarding its 'terms are to be pursued only
`through the grievance process, and not through a lawsuit like the one filed by
`Plaintiff.
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`Supporting Brief, pp. 3-4.
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`Case 2:14-cv-01445-MBC Document 31 Filed 12/07/15 Page 5 of 10
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`In response, Plaintiff contends:
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`The District now argues that Ms. Melan released her claims against the District in
`a prior settlement agreement. Yet that agreement included no release whatsoever,
`let alone any release related to the discrimination claims that Ms. Melan advances
`in this litigation.
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`The District also seeks to compel Ms. Melan to prosecute her statutory
`discrimination claims throl.lgh a contractual grievance process rather than in
`litigation. Once again, however, the District's arguments come up short. The
`settlement agreement requires Ms. Melan to use the grievance process to resolve
`ahy disagreement over the "interpretation or application" of the settlement
`agreement. The validity of Ms. Melan's discrimination claims does not tum on the
`interpretation of the settlement agreement, nor did Mr. Melail expressly agree to
`use the grievance process to litigate her statutory discrimination claims.
`Accordingly, Ms. Melan is entitled to litigate those claims in this court.
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`Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 1.
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`The District further argues in its Reply Brief:
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`all statutes relied upon by Plaintiff in the case require a showing that Plaintiff
`suffered an adverse employment action in order to establish a prima facie case of
`discrimination. Plaintiff has failed to meet this burden, as she has not· established
`that she suffered any adverse employment action for which she has not previously
`received redress through the grievance process.
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`Plaintiff voluntarily retired from the District. She has acknowledged as much in
`.clear, unambiguous tenus in a legal document, which she signed after having
`availed herself of the advice of legal counsel. While the Settlement Agreement
`itself does not explicitly release employment discrimination claims,_ it does bar
`Plaintiff from arguing that her retirement is anything other than what she said that
`it was: voluntary. Because she has failed to allege any conduct o~ the part of the
`District that would permit an inference of constructive discharge; Plaintiff is left
`without an adverse employment action upon which to form the basis of a prima
`facie employment discrimination case. No reasonable trier of fact would be
`permitted to disregard Plaintiffs representations within the Agreement. Thus, the
`case should not be submitted to a jury, and the District is entitled to judgment as a
`matter oflaw.
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`Reply Brief, p. 3.
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`Case 2:14-cv-01445-MBC Document 31 Filed 12/07/15 Page 6 of 10
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`In response, Plaintiff argues that this argument should not be considered by this
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`Court because this contention is outside the scope of the issue the parties agreed to bring
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`before this Court by way of a motion for summary judgment, the argument is being raised
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`for the first time in a reply brief, and it is premature prior to the parties conducting fact
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`discovery. Plaintiffs Sur-Reply in Further Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
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`Summary Judgment, pp. 2-3.
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`IV. Legal Analysis.
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`A. Whether Plaintiff waived her ADEA claim.
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`The Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990 (OWBPA"), 29 U.S.C. § 626,
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`amended the ADEA to ensure that waiver of ADEA rights is knowing and voluntary.
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`Specifically, 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(l) states that an employee "may not waive any right or claim
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`under [the ADEA] unless the waiver is knowing and voluntary." Id. The OWPBA then provides
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`standards for what constitutes a kllowing and voluntary waiver:
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`(1) ... Except as provided in paragraph (2) [which not applicable in this case], a waiver may not
`be considered knowing and voluntary unless at a minimum-
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`(A) the waiver is part of an agreement between the individual and the employer that is written in
`a manner calculated to be understood by such individual, or by the average individual eligible to
`participate;
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`(B) the waiver specifically refers to rights or claims arising under this chapter;
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`(C) the individual does not waive rights or claims that may arise after the date the waiver is
`executed;
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`(D) the individual waives rights or claims only in exchange for consideration in addition to
`anything of value to which the individual already i"s entitled;
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`(E) the individual is advised in writing to consult with an attorney prior to executing the
`agreement;
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`Case 2:14-cv-01445-MBC Document 31 Filed 12/07/15 Page 7 of 10
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`29 U.S.C.A. § 626 (West). Moreover, in Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422 (1998),
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`the Supreme Court held that a purported waiver must comply with the "stringent safeguards" of
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`section 626(f) in order to be effective. Id. at 427-28. Moreover, "the party asserting the validity
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`of a waiver shall have the burden of proving in a co-qrt of compete~t jurisdiction that a waiver
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`was knowing and voluntary .... " 29 U.S .C. § 626(f)(3).
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`Upon review of the Settlement Agreement, the Court finds that the document does
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`not contain any language that can be construed to be a waiver of Mrs. Melan's rights
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`under the ADEA. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs ADEA
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`claim based upon the contention that -plaintiffs Settlement Agreement with the District
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`precludes her ADEA claim is denied.
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`B. Whether Plaintiff waived her remaining federal and state discrimination
`claims.
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`A plaintiff may waive federal statutory rights via a release agreement if the
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`plaintiff entered in to the release agreement knowingly and voluntarily.
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`Upon review of the Settlement Agreement, we find that the document does not
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`contain any language that can be construed to be a waiver of any of Mrs. Melan's
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`remaining federal and state law discrimination claims. Defendant's Motion for Summary
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`Judgment on Plaintiffs discrimination claims based upon the contention that Plaintiffs
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`Settlement Agreement with the District precludes these claims is denied.
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`C. Whether Plaintiff must adjudicate her discrimination claims through the
`grievance process procedure set forth in the collective bargaining agreement entered into
`by the District and Plaintiffs union:
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`The provision of the Settlement Agreement upon which the District relies in support of its
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`argument that Plaintiffs discrimination claims must be decided through the grievance process
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`procedure set forth in the collective bargaining agreement entered into between the District and
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`Case 2:14-cv-01445-MBC Document 31 Filed 12/07/15 Page 8 of 10
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`the Union, and not by this Court, reads: "This Agreement shall be enforceable through the
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`grievance procedure in the parties' collective bargaining agreement. Any disagreement over the
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`interpretation or application of this Agreement shall be subject to the grievance procedure set
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`forth in the parties' collective bargaining agreement." Settlement Agreement,~ 9~
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`An agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires the parties to litigate their
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`discrimination claims outside of a judicial forum is enforceable as a matter of law. See, for
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`example, 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 274 (2009) ("We hoh;l that a collective(cid:173)
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`bargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate ADEA
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`claims is enforceable as a matter of federal law). Upon review of the Settlement Agreement, the
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`Court finds that the Settlement Agreement makes no reference to the preclusion of this forum for
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`the adjudication of Plaintiffs discrimination claims. As such,_Plaintiff is not precluded by the
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`terms of the Settlement Agreement from litigating her federal and state law discrimination claims
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`in this Court. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied to the extent it is premised
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`on the argument that Plaintiffs discrimination claims arise out of the terms of the Settlement
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`Agreement and the Agreement makes clear that disputes regarding its terms are to be pursued
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`only through the grievance process.
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`D. Whether or not Plaintiff can establish a prima facie employment discrimination case:
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`As stated, in its Reply Brief, the District argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter
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`of law because Plaintiff has not and cannot establish that she suffered an adverse employment
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`action and therefore, cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination: "[ n ]o reasonable trier
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`of fact would be permitted to disregard Plaintiffs representations within the Agreement." Reply
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`Brief, p. 3.
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`Case 2:14-cv-01445-MBC Document 31 Filed 12/07/15 Page 9 of 10
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`We find that Defendant's argument is premature at this point in the litigation. Defendant
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`is free to raise this argument again once discovery has concluded in this matter. Defendant's
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`Mo~ion for Summary Judgment is denied without prejudice to the extent that it is based on the
`contention that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie employment discrimination case.
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`V. Conclusion.
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`The Defendant District's Motion for Summary Judgment shall be denied.
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`An appropriate order follows:
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`ORDER
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`AND NOW, this 7th day of December, 2015, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and
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`DECREED that Defendant's Motion Summary Judgment [ECF No. 19] is hereby DENIED.
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`It is further hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the parties shall
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`continue the mediation of this case and said mediation shall be concluded no later than February
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`1,2016.
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`It is further hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGJ?D, and DECREED that:
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`1. The parties shall complete fact discovery on or before April1, 2016. All
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`interrogatories, depositions, requests for admissions and requests for
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`production shall be served with sufficient time to allow responses to be
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`completed prior to the close of discovery.
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`2. Procedures Following Inadvertent Disclosure ("Clawback"): Pursuant to
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`Local Rule LCvR 16.1(D), and to aid in the implementation of Fed. R. Evid.
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`502, the following is ordered in the event of an inadvertent disclosure of any
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`privileged or trial preparation/ attorney work product material:
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`Case 2:14-cv-01445-MBC Document 31 Filed 12/07/15 Page 10 of 10
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`(a)The producing party shall promptly notify all receiving parties of the
`inadvertent production of any privileged or trial preparation material.
`Anyreceiving party who has reasonable cause to believe that it has
`received privileged or trial preparation material shall promptly notify
`the producing party.
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`(b) Upon receiving notice of inadvertent production, any receiving
`party shall immediately retrieve all copies of the inadvertently
`disclosed material and sequester such material pending a resolution of
`the producing party's claim either by the Court or by agreement of the
`parties.
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`(c) If the parties cannot agree as to the claim of privilege, the producing
`party shall move the Court for a resolution within 30 days of the notice
`set forth in subparagraph (a). Nothing herein shall be construed to
`prevent a receiving party from moving the court for a resolution, but
`such motion must be made within the 30-day period.
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`3· The parties have elected to have a post-discovery status conference
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`following the completion of fact discovery. Counsel shall contact the
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`court to schedule the post -discovery conference within one week of the close of
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`discovery. At this conference the Court will address:
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`(a) possibility of settlement;
`(b) dates for the completion of expert discovery and expert reports; should be
`completed;
`(c) dates by which dispositive motions should be filed and responded to;
`(d) dates by which the parties' pre-trial statements should be filed;
`(e) dates by which motions in limine should be filed and responded to;
`(f) date for the final pre-trial conference; and
`(g) trial dates.
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`~ .. =u.;. ito ita) \-r~ ;
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`Maur1ce B. Cohill, Jr.
`Senior United States District Court Judge
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