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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
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`TAMMY SIKO, )
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` Plaintiff, ) Civil Action No. 23-1184
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` v. ) District Judge W. Scott Hardy
` ) Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly
`ASTRAZENECA PHARMACEUTICALS )
`LP, )
` )
` Defendant. )
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`MEMORANDUM OPINION
` This employment discrimination action comes before the Court on Plaintiff Tammy Siko’s
`Objections (Docket No. 54) to the Report and Recommendation (Docket No. 53) (“R&R”) entered
`by Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly on April 15, 2025. The R&R recommends that Defendant
`AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP ’s (“ AstraZeneca”) Partial Motion to Dismiss the Second
`Amended Complaint (Docket No. 43) be granted and that Count II alleging a “regarded as”
`disability discrimination claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) be dismissed
`with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). On April 24, 2025, Siko filed
`her Objections to the R&R. (Docket No. 54). On May 8, 2025, AstraZeneca filed its Response in
`Opposition to Objections (Docket No. 55), to which Siko filed a Reply on May 15, 2025. (Docket
`No. 58). The matter is fully briefed and ripe for decision.
`As set forth herein, this Court concludes that the text of the ADA instructs that an
`employer’s companywide COVID vaccine mandate does not magically inoculate that employer
`from a cognizable dis ability discrimination claim based upon its perception that a noncompliant
`employee’s immune system was weakened, diminished, or otherwise affected or influenced by her
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`unvaccinated status. Accordingly, the Court will sustain Siko’s Objections and decline to adopt
`the R&R. AstraZeneca’s Partial Motion to Dismiss will be denied.
`I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1
`AstraZeneca is a global biopharmaceutical company that employed Siko as a field -based
`Executive Cardiovascular Hospital Sales Specialist. (Docket No. 42, ¶¶ 6- 7). In August 2021,
`AstraZeneca announced it would require all employees to disclose their COVID -19 vaccination
`status and require unvaccinated employees to wear masks and undergo weekly testing. (Id., ¶¶ 11-
`12).
`On August 19, 2021, Siko was the only unvaccinated employee who attended an all -day
`work meeting for AstraZeneca employees at a restaurant in Latrobe, Pennsylvania. ( Id., ¶ 50).
`She was also the only employee in attendance required to wear a mask, though one of the
`vaccinated employees in attendance tested positive for COVID -19 that same night. ( Id.).
`AstraZeneca held an emergency call the next morning and told Siko that she alone had to
`quarantine for seven to ten days, but none of the vaccinated employees who attended the meeting
`were required to quarantine even though none of them had worn a mask at the meeting. ( Id., ¶
`51).
`On January 31, 2022, AstraZeneca abruptly revised its COVID policy to impose a COVID-
`19 vaccine mandate upon Siko and all U.S. employees despite increasing evidence of vaccine
`inefficacy and an apparent overall decrease in severity of COVID-19 infections nationwide. (Id.,
`¶ 14). AstraZeneca’s revised policy provided “exemption opportunities” for employees with
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`1 The factual allegations set forth in the Second Amended Complaint must be taken as true and viewed in the
`light most favorable to Siko a t this stage of the case. Accordingly, the fact ual recitation herein is drawn from Siko’s
`pleadings with all reasonable inferences drawn in a light most favorable to her. See Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen
`Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011). Notably, this recitation does not fully address Siko’s allegations concerning her
`religious discrimination claim because AstraZeneca’s Partial Motion to Dismiss does not pertain to that claim.
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`medical or religious objections and gave until February 26, 2022, for such employees to submit
`their exemption requests. (Id., ¶ 15). Siko timely submitted her request for exemption on February
`25, 2022. ( Id., ¶ 17). AstraZeneca subsequently announced that the deadline for employees t o
`either receive the COVID-19 vaccine or have an exemption granted was March 31, 2022. (Id., ¶
`16).
`On March 31, 2022, AstraZeneca denied Siko’s request for an exemption from its vaccine
`mandate2 stating she was not “qualified for a reasonable accommodation” and informed her that
`she had until April 22, 2022, to comply with its vaccine mandate or “face termination” on April
`29, 2022. (Docket Nos. 42, ¶ 21; 42-1). AstraZeneca’s denial notice also informed Siko that it is
`“entitled to deny requests for reasonable accommodation where the request poses undue hardship
`. . . [which] can include, but is not limited to, business disruption/increased cost resulting from
`illness-related absences.” ( Id., ¶ 22; 42-1). The same day Siko received this denial notice, she
`asked AstraZeneca whether it had taken her natural immunity to COVID -19 into account. (Id., ¶
`23). Then, on April 20, 2022, Siko asked AstraZeneca to reconsider her previously denied
`exemption request and offered to supply documentation evidencing that she had a natural
`immunity to COVID-19 because she previously tested positive for it and recovered. (Id., ¶ 28).
`Nonetheless, AstraZeneca informed Siko that her employment was terminated on April 29, 2022.
`(Id., ¶ 29).
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`2 Siko alleges at Count I of her Second Amended Complaint that AstraZeneca unlawfully discriminated against
`her based on her Christian religion in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e -2(a),
`because it failed to afford alternatives to the COVID -19 vaccine mandate to accommodate her religious beliefs and
`practices and then terminated her employment for failing to become vaccinated. (Docket No. 42, ¶¶ 17-22, 27-9, 32-
`37). Again, those allegations are not germane to AstraZeneca’s motion currently pending before the Court.
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`Siko avers that those employees who complied with AstraZeneca’s vaccine mandate
`received an mRNA -based COVID -19 vaccine authorized by the U.S. Food and Drug
`Administration (“FDA”) for emergency use were “physically changed” by it. (Id., ¶¶ 42-45). She
`further avers that because of this “physical difference,” AstraZeneca regarded Siko as having a
`physiological condition limiting her immune system due to her unvaccinated status and despite her
`natural immunity, and thus considere d her to be much more likely to be infected by COVID -19
`than vaccinated employees, thereby rendering her unable to perform her job. (Id., ¶¶ 45-46, 55).
`Furthermore, Siko avers that AstraZeneca regarded her and other employees who did not
`receive a COVID-19 vaccine in compliance with its mandate, unlike its vaccinated employees, “as
`if they were perpetually infected by COVID -19, even when asymptomatic, and/or perpetually
`substantially more susceptible of becoming infected by COVID-19 and then infecting others . . ..”
`(Id., ¶ 41). Siko also avers that AstraZeneca perceived her purported immunocompromised and
`infectious condition to be serious, current, indefinite, and substantially limiting of all her major
`life activities that involve personal interaction with others because AstraZeneca viewed her and
`other unvaccinated employees as posing an unacceptable risk to others and that such employees
`were unable to perform a range of jobs, including Siko’s job, and also believed that reasonable
`accommodations or modifications (such as continued masking and testing) would not eliminate or
`effectively reduce that perceived threat. (Id., ¶¶ 49, 60, 64-65). AstraZeneca’s perception that Siko
`was immunocompromised and thus impaired is made manifest by requiring Siko t o quarantine
`when exposed to a coworker who tested positive for COVID -19 despite having natural immunity
`and being masked, but not requiring other exposed vaccinated coworkers to quarantine because it
`did not perceive them to be similarly immunocompromised. (Id., ¶ 56).
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`Siko also avers that her perceived immunocompromised condition was not minor because
`the symptoms, hospitalization, and mortality rates for COVID-19 are much more severe and higher
`when compared to other illnesses such as swine flu and seasonal flu ( Id., ¶ 47), and because
`AstraZeneca perceived her condition to be serious enough that she needed to be physically
`quarantined for seven to ten days after being exposed to someone (despite themselves having been
`vaccinated) who tested positive for COVID-19. (Id., ¶¶ 57, 60). Siko also alleges that AstraZeneca
`believed her perceived immunocompromised condition would require frequent quarantines that
`would significantly and indefinitely restrict her ability to work. ( Id., ¶¶ 57, 60). More broadly,
`Siko alleges that AstraZeneca systematically discriminated against those employees who did not
`receive COVID-19 vaccines in compliance with its policy mandate. ( Id.). As such, AstraZeneca
`“singled out Siko personally” for less favorable treatment and ultimately fired her because it
`“assumed that [she], unlike her [unmasked but vaccinated] coworkers, had symptoms of and was
`afflicted with COVID -19, was disabled as such, and could not work due to the perceive d
`disability.” (Id., ¶¶ 29, 50, 54).
`Finally, Siko avers that the science and data available to AstraZeneca regarding the efficacy
`of the COVID-19 vaccine at the time it terminated her employment supports the conclusion that
`Siko and other unvaccinated coworkers posed no more threat to AstraZeneca’s workf orce,
`vendors, or customers, than did its vaccinated employees. ( Id., ¶ 63). Ultimately, Siko contends
`that AstraZeneca’s perception that Siko’s immune system was impaired because she did not
`receive the COVID -19 vaccine, and despite her natural immunity, is based upon stereotypes,
`stigma, unwarranted fears, and ignorance rather than on reliable medical or other objective
`evidence and individualized assessments of Siko’s actual condition. (Id., ¶ 58).
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`II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND STANDARD FOR REVIEWING OBJECTIONS
`TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION.
`This is the second time this Court is addressing Siko’s objections to a report and
`recommendation that her disability discrimination claim be dismissed. This Court adopted an
`earlier R&R3 (as modified) as its Opinion and granted AstraZeneca’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
`ADA claim because, in this Court’s view, the First Amended Complaint insufficiently plead
`factual averments to state a plausible ADA “regarded as” claim for failure to aver facts identifying
`Siko’s perceived impairment.4 (Mem. and Ord. of Ct., Docket No. 41, Sep. 9, 2024.). Following
`the Court’s ruling, Siko amended her Complaint to add more factual averments to support her
`ADA “regarded as” claim that AstraZeneca perceived her as being immunocompromised because
`of her unvaccinated status and therefore regarded her as having a physical impairment 5 and
`discriminated against her because of it. ( See Docket No. 42, ¶¶ 42- 49, 52-58, 60-62, 65-66.).
`AstraZeneca once again seeks to dismiss Siko’s ADA claim, contending that Siko’s Second
`Amended Complaint did not cure those pleading deficiencies. (Docket No. 43) . The R&R
`recommends granting that motion. (Docket No. 53). This Court disagrees.
`As noted above, Siko timely objected to the R&R, so this Court must conduct a de novo
`review of any part of the R&R that has been properly objected to. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2),
`(b)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). In doing so, t he Court may accept, reject, or modify the
`recommended disposition, as well as receive further evidence or return the matter to the magistrate
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`3 See Docket No. 33 (referred to herein as the “First R&R”).
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`4 Siko’s First Amended Complaint alleged claims for religious discri mination at Count I, disability
`discrimination at Count II, and age discrimination at Count III. The Court dismissed the disability and age
`discrimination claims without prejudice and gave Plaintiff leave to file another amended complaint. Siko subsequently
`filed her Second Amended Complaint realleging religious and disability discrimination claims while reserving
`appellate rights for the dismissed age discrimination claim that she did not replead.
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`5 Siko asserted this same contention in her briefing in response to AstraZeneca’s prior Motion to Dismiss and
`in her Objections to the First R&R (Docket Nos. 26 at 9- 11; 34 at 6-7), but that argument was not grounded on any
`factual averments contained in the then-operative complaint. See Memorandum Op., at 10 n.10. (Docket No. 41).
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`judge with instructions. See id. The underlying matter at issue here is whether Siko sufficiently
`plead a plausible ADA “regarded as” claim – specifically, whether Siko plead that she was
`“regarded as having such an impairment” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(1)(C) and
`(3). In undertaking a de novo review of the R&R, this Court must evaluate AstraZeneca’s Motion
`to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and the clearly established authority set forth in
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and
`their progeny. Accordingly, this Court must accept all factual allegations contained in the Second
`Amended Complaint as true, it must construe those factual allegations in the light most favorable
`to Siko, and it must “determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, [Siko]
`may be entitled to relief.” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting
`Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)); see Twombly , 550 U.S. at
`563 n.8.
`Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement
`of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” the pleading must “‘give the defendant
`fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231
`(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). Moreover,
`while “this standard does not require ‘det ailed factual allegations,’” Rule 8 “demands more than
`an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
`at 555); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). To survive a motion to dismiss,
`“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that
`is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The Supreme
`Court has noted that a “claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
`allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
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`alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The standard “‘does not impose a probability
`requirement at the pleading stage,’ but instead ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable
`expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of’ the necessary element.” Phillips , 515 F.3d at
`234 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Moreover, the requirement that a court accept as true all
`factual allegations does not extend to legal conclusions; thus, a court is “‘not bound to accept as
`true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
`550 U.S. at 555 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).
`To review a complaint under this standard, the Court proceeds in three steps. Connelly v.
`Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016). First, the Court notes the elements of the
`claim. See id. (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675). Second, the Court eliminates conclusory allegations.
`See id. (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). And finally, the Court assumes the remaining well-pleaded
`facts are true and assesses “‘whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.’” Id.
`(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). This plausibility determination is “a context- specific task that
`requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556
`U.S. at 679.
`III. ADA “Regarded As” Claims
`The employment subchapter of the ADA 6 prohibits employe rs from “discriminat[ing]
`against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the
`hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other
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`6 The ADA was enacted in 1990 and is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq . Congress amended the ADA by
`the ADA Amendments Act of 2008. See Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3558 (2008). As amended, the ADA
`is comprised of four subchapters: (I) employment; (II) public services; (III) public accommodations and services
`operated by private entities; and (IV) miscellaneous provisions. In addition to these subchapters, the ADA also
`contains certain generally applicable provisions express ing Congressional “findings and purpose” at 42 U.S.C. §
`12101, and a statute-wide definition of “disability” and other terms at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102 – 12103. Certain of these
`generally applicable provisions are critically important here, along with the subchapter pertaining to employment,
`which is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 – 12117.
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`terms, conditions, and privilege s of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The text of the ADA
`expressly construes this provision to include several additional prohibited actions that are set forth
`at 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1)-(7). Among these additional prohibitions is “limiting [or] segregating
`a[n] . . . employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status of such . . . employee
`because of the disability of such . . . employee[,]” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1), and “using qualification
`standards, employment tests or other s election criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an
`individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities . . ..” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6).
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`Siko alleges that AstraZeneca discriminated against her and then terminated her employm ent
`because it regarded her as being immunocompromised after she declined to abide by its COVID -
`19 vaccine mandate and despite her natural immunity. Here, AstraZeneca seeks to dismiss Siko’s
`disability discrimination claim by contending that she was not “r egarded as having such an
`impairment” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(C) and (3). In accordance with the
`process outlined above for evaluating a pleading when deciding a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
`P. 12(b)(6), the Court will now outline t he elements of pleading and proving a “regarded as”
`disability discrimination claim under the ADA, Connelly, 809 F.3d at 787, noting that the parties
`dispute what the ADA requires to establish such a claim.
`To state an ADA employment discrimination claim, Siko must allege: (1) she is a disabled
`person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) she is otherwise qualified to perform the essential
`functions of the job, with or without the employer’s reasonable accommoda tions; and (3) she has
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`7 The use of such qualification standards, tests, or selection criteria that is “shown to be job- related for the
`position in question and is consistent with business necessity” is not considered discriminatory. 42 U.S.C. §
`12112(b)(6). Moreover, the ADA provides a defense if “performance” of such qualification standards, tests, or
`selection criteria “cannot be accomplished by reasonable accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a). It is also a defense
`for a qualification standard to “include a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or
`safety of other individuals in the workplace.” 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b).
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`suffered an adverse employment decision as a result of discrimination. Sulima v. Tobyhanna Army
`Depot, 602 F.3d 177, 185 (3d Cir. 2010); Rocco v. Gordon Food Service , 998 F. Supp. 2d 422,
`425 (W.D. Pa. 2014). AstraZeneca ’s Motion to Dismiss is narrowly focused on whether Siko
`adequately pleads that she is a disabled person in the “regarded as” sense, so only the first of these
`three elements is relevant at this juncture.
`A. The Ordinary Public Meaning of “Impairment” Used In 42 U.S.C. §§
`12102(1)(C) and (3) Supplies the Operative Standard Upon Which Siko’s
`Pleading Must be Measured.
`The ADA provides three variant definitions of the term “disability.” 42 U.S.C.
`12102(1)(A), (B), and (C).
` Siko need only plead enough to establish one of them. The first variant
`is an actual disability, the second is having a record of a disability, and the third is being regarded
`as such. Id. Here, although the principal issue in dispute is whether Siko adequately pleads that
`she is disabled within the meaning of the “regarded as” variant, it is helpful to consider the
`definitions of both “actual” and “regarded as” variants comparatively to better understand the
`statutory contours of a “regarded as” ADA claim. “As always, we start with the statutory text[.]”
`Lundeed v. 10 West Ferry Street Operations LLC d/b/a Logan Inn, 156 F.4
`th 332, 337 (3d Cir.
`2025) (citing Garland v. Cargill, 602 U.S. 406, 415 (2024)).
`The ADA defines an individual with an actual disability, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
`§ 12102(1)(A), as one who has “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
`more major life activities of such individual.” By contrast, the ADA defines an individual who is
`regarded as disabled, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(C) and (3)(A), as one who is “regarded
`as having such an impairment” if that “individual establishes t hat he or she has been subjected to
`an action prohibited [by the ADA] 8 because of an actual or perceived physical or mental
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`8 Actions prohibited by the ADA are delineated at 42 U.S.C. §12112(a) and (b).
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`impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.” 42
`U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(C) and (3)(A).9 So, while these statutory definitions each incorporate certain
`identical terms (e.g., physical or mental impairment, major life activities, etc.), they fundamentally
`differ by their textual usage and context within the statutory framework such that an actual
`disability, as defined by Section 12102(1)(A), or even merely an actual impairment, need not be
`averred and ultimately proven to establish the “regarded as” variant of an ADA-covered disability
`pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § § 12102(1)(C) and (3). See also Jakomas v. City of Pittsburgh, 332 F.
`Supp. 3d 342, 645- 648 (W.D. Pa. 2018) (interpreting the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 as no
`longer requiring a showing that an impairment substantially limit a major life activity to establish
`a “regarded as” claim); Rubano v. Farrell Area Sch. Dist., 991 F. Supp. 2d 678, 690-91 (W.D. Pa.
`2014) (same). Rather, all that the plain text of the ADA requires for establishing that a person is
`“regarded as” disabled within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(C) and (3) is that the
`employer perceive there to be a physical or mental impairment, regardless of whether such
`impairment actually limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.
`10 Id. It is also noteworthy
`that Congress directs courts to construe 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (defining each variant of disability)
`“in favor of broad coverage of individuals under [the ADA], to the maximum extent permitted by
`[the ADA’s] terms.”
` 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A).
`The text of the ADA , both pre - and post -2008 Amendments, and applicable case law ,
`instruct this Court to determine the existence of an ADA -covered disability on an individualized,
`case-by-case basis. Indeed, once again, the text of the ADA expressly provides that “[t]he term
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`9 For “regarded as” claims, the ADA express ly excludes actual or perceived impairments that are “transitory
`and minor.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B). See infra.
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`10 Major life activities are also defined expressly in the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) and (B). See infra.
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`‘disability’ means, with respect to an individual – . . . (C ) being regarded as having such an
`impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (emphasis added), and that “[a]n individual meets the
`requirement of ‘being regarded as having such an impairment’ if the individual establishes that he
`or she has been subjected to a [pr ohibited] action . . ..” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A)) (Emphasis
`added); see also EEOC v. Hussey Copper Ltd., 696 F. Supp. 2d 505, 517 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (“the
`ADA requires an individualized inquiry into the ability of an employee or applicant to perform a
`particular job, one which focuses on the medical condition's actual effect on the specific plaintiff.
`. . . In conjunction with this requirement, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that
`under the ADA, it is the employer's burden to educate itself about the varying nature of an
`impairment and to make individualized determinations about affected employees . . ..”); Taylor ,
`177 F.3d at 192- 93 (“the ADA . . . requires an interactive relationship between employer and
`employee, and concomitantly requires an individualized evaluation of employees’ impairments . .
`. under the ADA, it is the employer’s burden to educate itself about the varying nature of
`impairments and to make individualized determinations about affected employees . . . it is not
`reasonable for an employer to extrapolate from information provided by an employee based on
`stereotypes or fears about the disabled . . . A belief that anyone with bipolar disorder or HIV
`infection is substantially limited in a major life activity is a conclusion a bout the effects of the
`impairment and only secondarily about the particular employee. An employer with such a belief
`is failing to make an individualized determination, as the ADA requires, and thus acts at its peril.”).
`Moreover, courts also instruct that pleading a “regarded as” claim is not difficult. See, e.g., EEOC
`v. BNSF Railway Co., No C14- 1488MJP 2016 WL 98510 at *8 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 8, 2016)
`(Describing the threshold for a regarded as claim as an “extremely low bar”) ; Garcia-Hicks v.
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`Vocational Rehab Admin., 148 F. Supp. 3d 157, 167 (D. P.R. 2015) (citing case that “emphasiz[e]
`the low bar for establishing a disability under the post-ADAAA standard.”)
`With the foregoing text, statutory definitions , and contextual framework in mind, the
`critical legal inquiry at issue here is simply to determine the meaning of the term “impairment” as
`used in 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(C) and (3). The ADA itself does not expressly supply a definition,
`though the EEOC provides a regulatory definition of “impairment” at 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(h) 11.
`However, as the Supreme Court recently affirmed, courts must exercise independent judgment in
`determining the meaning of statutory provisions. Loper Bright, 603 U.S. 369, 395 (2024). “In
`exercising such judgment . . . courts may . . . seek aid from the interpretations of those responsible
`for implementing particular statutes. Such interpretations ‘constitute a body of experience and
`informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance . . ..” Id., at 394
`(internal quotation omitted). Courts may consider an agency’s regulation for guidance and its
`weight “will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
`reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give
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`11 Although Congress originally tasked the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”), the United States
`Department of Transportation (“DOT”), and the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the
`“EEOC”) with specified authority to enforce different components of the ADA, the Supreme Court noted in 1999 that
`no agency “has been given authority to issue regulations implementing the generally applicable provisions of the ADA
`[42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 – 12102] . . .. Most notably, no agency has been del egated authority to interpret the term
`‘disability.’” Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. , 527 U.S. 471, 479 (1999). Even so, the EEOC issued regulatory
`guidance without Congressional authority in 1992, supplying its own definitions for certain constituent terms in the
`text of the ADA that Congress uses to define “disability,” namely: “(1) ‘physical or mental impairment,’ (2)
`‘substantially limits,’ and (3) ‘major life activities.’” Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)–(j) (1992)). The EEOC likewise
`issued una uthorized iterative definitions of the term “impairment” beginning in 1992, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)
`(1992). Congress subsequently enacted the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110–325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008),
`which, among other things, provides statutory definitions for the terms “disability” and “major life activities” and
`supplies related rules of construction applicable to these statutory terms and related definitions . See 42 U.S.C. §
`12102. It also authorized the EEOC to issue regulations implementing the definitions of disability in 42 U.S.C. §
`12102. 42 U.S.C. § 12205a. Courts have noted that Congress amended the ADA specifically to address certain
`impairments, including cancer, HIV-AIDS, epilepsy, diabetes, multiple sclerosis, amputated and partially amputated
`limbs, post -traumatic stress disorder, and intellectual and developmental disabilities, that were not receiving the
`protection Congress initially intended. See Koller v. Riley Riper Hollin & Calagreco, 850 F. Supp. 2d 502, 513 (E.D.
`Pa. 2012)); see also Morgan v. Allison Crane & Rigging LLC, 114 F.4th 214, 217 (3d Cir. 2024) (noting that the ADA
`Amendments Act of 2008 expanded the scope of coverage under the ADA).
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`it power to persuade . . ..” Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). Even when Congress
`delegates authority to an agency, as done here in 2008 for “issuing regulations implementing the
`definitions of disability in [42 U.S.C. § 12102],” see 42 U.S.C. § 12205a, the role of the reviewing
`court is, as always, to independently interpret the statute and effectuate the will of Congress subject
`to constitutional limits. Loper Bright , 603 U.S. at 395. As stated in Loper Bright, “[t]he court
`fulfills that role by recognizing constitutional delegations, ‘fix[ing] the boundaries of [the]
`delegated authority,’ . . . and ensuring the agency has engaged in ‘reasonable decisionmaking’
`within those boundaries.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
`In fulfilling this independent duty to effectuate the will of Congress , the Supreme Court
`instructs that a statute be interpreted “in accord with the ordinary public meaning of its terms at
`the time of its enactment.” Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., Georgia, 590 U.S. 644, 654 (2020). So, what
`does the statutory term “impairment” mean? The Webster’s New World College Dictionary
`defines an “impairment” as “a deterioration or weakening.” Impairment , YourDictionary.com,
`http://yourdictionary.com/impairment (last visited December 10, 2025). The Merriam -Webster
`Dictionary defines “impairment” as “diminishment or loss of function or ability.” Impairm ent,
`Merriam-Webster.com, http://merriam-webster.com/dictionary/impairment (last visited
`December 10, 2025). See also The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language
`(defining “impair” as “[ t]o cause to weaken, be damaged, or diminish, as in quality.”)
`(https://ahdi