(Slip Opinion)
`
`OCTOBER TERM, 2010
`
`1
`
`Syllabus
`
`NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
`prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
`See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`Syllabus
`
`BULLCOMING v. NEW MEXICO
`CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW MEXICO
`No. 09–10876. Argued March 2, 2011—Decided June 23, 2011
`The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause gives the accused “[i]n
`all criminal prosecutions, . . . the right . . . to be confronted with the
`witnesses against him.” In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36, 59,
`this Court held that the Clause permits admission of “[t]estimonial
`statements of witnesses absent from trial . . . only where the decla-
`rant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior
`opportunity to cross-examine.” Later, in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachu-
`setts, 557 U. S. ___, the Court declined to create a “forensic evidence”
`exception to Crawford, holding that a forensic laboratory report, cre-
`ated specifically to serve as evidence in a criminal proceeding, ranked
`as “testimonial” for Confrontation Clause purposes. Absent stipula-
`tion, the Court ruled, the prosecution may not introduce such a re-
`port without offering a live witness competent to testify to the truth
`of the report’s statements. 557 U. S., at ___.
`Petitioner Bullcoming’s jury trial on charges of driving while in-
`toxicated (DWI) occurred after Crawford, but before Melendez-Diaz.
`Principal evidence against him was a forensic laboratory report certi-
`fying that his blood-alcohol concentration was well above the thresh-
`old for aggravated DWI. Bullcoming’s blood sample had been tested
`at the New Mexico Department of Health, Scientific Laboratory Divi-
`sion (SLD), by a forensic analyst named Caylor, who completed,
`signed, and certified the report. However, the prosecution neither
`called Caylor to testify nor asserted he was unavailable; the record
`showed only that Caylor was placed on unpaid leave for an undis-
`closed reason. In lieu of Caylor, the State called another analyst,
`Razatos, to validate the report. Razatos was familiar with the testing
`device used to analyze Bullcoming’s blood and with the laboratory’s
`testing procedures, but had neither participated in nor observed the
`test on Bullcoming’s blood sample. Bullcoming’s counsel objected, as-
`
`

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`BULLCOMING v. NEW MEXICO
`
`Syllabus
`serting that introduction of Caylor’s report without his testimony
`would violate the Confrontation Clause, but the trial court overruled
`the objection, admitted the SLD report as a business record, and
`permitted Razatos to testify. Bullcoming was convicted, and, while
`his appeal was pending before the New Mexico Supreme Court, this
`Court decided Melendez-Diaz. The state high court acknowledged
`that the SLD report qualified as testimonial evidence under
`Melendez-Diaz, but held that the report’s admission did not violate
`the Confrontation Clause because: (1) certifying analyst Caylor was a
`mere scrivener who simply transcribed machine-generated test re-
`sults, and (2) SLD analyst Razatos, although he did not participate in
`testing Bullcoming’s blood, qualified as an expert witness with re-
`spect to the testing machine and SLD procedures. The court affirmed
`Bullcoming’s conviction.
`Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.
`147 N. M. 487, 226 P. 3d 1, reversed and remanded.
`JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court with respect
`to all but Part IV and footnote 6. The Confrontation Clause, the opin-
`ion concludes, does not permit the prosecution to introduce a forensic
`laboratory report containing a testimonial certification, made in or-
`der to prove a fact at a criminal trial, through the in-court testimony
`of an analyst who did not sign the certification or personally perform
`or observe the performance of the test reported in the certification.
`The accused’s right is to be confronted with the analyst who made the
`certification, unless that analyst is unavailable at trial, and the ac-
`cused had an opportunity, pretrial, to cross-examine that particular
`scientist. Pp. 8–16.
`(a) If an out-of-court statement is testimonial, it may not be intro-
`duced against the accused at trial unless the witness who made the
`statement is unavailable and the accused has had a prior opportunity
`to confront that witness. Pp. 8–14.
`(i) Caylor’s certification reported more than a machine-generated
`number: It represented that he received Bullcoming’s blood sample
`intact with the seal unbroken; that he checked to make sure that the
`forensic report number and the sample number corresponded; that he
`performed a particular test on Bullcoming’s sample, adhering to a
`precise protocol; and that he left the report’s remarks section blank,
`indicating that no circumstance or condition affected the sample’s in-
`tegrity or the analysis’ validity. These representations, relating to
`past events and human actions not revealed in raw, machine-
`produced data, are meet for cross-examination. The potential ramifi-
`cations of the state court’s reasoning, therefore, raise red flags. Most
`witnesses testify to their observations of factual conditions or events.
`Where, for example, a police officer’s report recorded an objective fact
`
`

`
`Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)
`
`3
`
`Syllabus
`such as the read-out of a radar gun, the state court’s reasoning would
`permit another officer to introduce the information, so long as he or
`she was equipped to testify about the technology the observing officer
`deployed and the police department’s standard operating procedures.
`As, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 547 U. S. 813, 826, makes plain, how-
`ever, such testimony would violate the Confrontation Clause. The
`comparative reliability of an analyst’s testimonial report does not
`dispense with the Clause. Crawford, 541 U. S., at 62. The analysts
`who write reports introduced as evidence must be made available for
`confrontation even if they have “the scientific acumen of Mme. Curie
`and the veracity of Mother Teresa.” Melendez-Diaz, 557 U. S., at ___,
`n. 6. Pp. 10–11.
`(ii) Nor was Razatos an adequate substitute witness simply be-
`cause he qualified as an expert with respect to the testing machine
`and the SLD’s laboratory procedures. Surrogate testimony of the
`kind Razatos was equipped to give could not convey what Caylor
`knew or observed about the events he certified, nor expose any lapses
`or lies on Caylor’s part. Significantly, Razatos did not know why
`Caylor had been placed on unpaid leave. With Caylor on the stand,
`Bullcoming’s counsel could have asked Caylor questions designed to
`reveal whether Caylor’s incompetence, evasiveness, or dishonesty ac-
`counted for his removal from work. And the State did not assert that
`Razatos had any independent opinion concerning Bullcoming’s blood
`alcohol content. More fundamentally, the Confrontation Clause does
`not tolerate dispensing with confrontation simply because the court
`believes that questioning one witness about another’s testimonial
`statements provides a fair enough opportunity for cross-examination.
`Although the purpose of Sixth Amendment rights is to ensure a fair
`trial, it does not follow that such rights can be disregarded because,
`on the whole, the trial is fair. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548
`U. S. 140, 145. If a “particular guarantee” is violated, no substitute
`procedure can cure the violation. Id., at 146. Pp. 11–14.
`(b) Melendez-Diaz precluded the State’s argument that introduc-
`tion of the SLD report did not implicate the Confrontation Clause be-
`cause the report is nontestimonial. Like the certificates in Melendez-
`Diaz, the SLD report is undoubtedly an “affirmation made for the
`purpose of establishing or proving some fact” in a criminal proceed-
`ing. 557 U. S., at ___. Created solely for an “evidentiary purpose,”
`id., at ___, the report ranks as testimonial. In all material respects,
`the SLD report resembles the certificates in Melendez-Diaz. Here, as
`there, an officer provided seized evidence to a state laboratory re-
`quired by law to assist in police investigations. Like the Melendez-
`Diaz analysts, Caylor tested the evidence and prepared a certificate
`concerning the result of his analysis. And like the Melendez-Diaz
`
`

`
`4
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`BULLCOMING v. NEW MEXICO
`
`Syllabus
`certificates, Caylor’s report here is “formalized” in a signed document,
`Davis, 547 U. S., at 837, n. 2. Also noteworthy, the SLD report form
`contains a legend referring to municipal and magistrate courts’ rules
`that provide for the admission of certified blood-alcohol analyses.
`Thus, although the SLD report was not notarized, the formalities at-
`tending the report were more than adequate to qualify Caylor’s as-
`sertions as testimonial. Pp. 14–16.
`GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part IV
`and footnote 6. SCALIA, J., joined that opinion in full, SOTOMAYOR and
`KAGAN, JJ., joined as to all but Part IV, and THOMAS, J., joined as to all
`but Part IV and footnote 6. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed an opinion concurring
`in part. KENNEDY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROBERTS,
`C. J., and BREYER and ALITO, JJ., joined.
`
`

`
`Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)
`
`1
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
`preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
`notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash­
`ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
`that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`No. 09–10876
`_________________
`DONALD BULLCOMING, PETITIONER v. NEW
`
`MEXICO
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
`
`NEW MEXICO
`
`[June 23, 2011]
`
`JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court,
`except as to Part IV and footnote 6.*
`In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U. S. ___ (2009),
`this Court held that a forensic laboratory report stating
`that a suspect substance was cocaine ranked as testimo­
`nial for purposes of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation
`Clause. The report had been created specifically to serve
`as evidence in a criminal proceeding. Absent stipulation,
`the Court ruled, the prosecution may not introduce such a
`report without offering a live witness competent to testify
`to the truth of the statements made in the report.
`In the case before us, petitioner Donald Bullcoming
`was arrested on charges of driving while intoxicated
`(DWI). Principal evidence against Bullcoming was a foren­
`sic laboratory report certifying that Bullcoming’s blood­
`alcohol concentration was well above the threshold for
`aggravated DWI. At trial, the prosecution did not call as a
`witness the analyst who signed the certification. Instead,
`the State called another analyst who was familiar with the
`——————
`* JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR and JUSTICE KAGAN join all but Part IV of this
`opinion. JUSTICE THOMAS joins all but Part IV and footnote 6.
`
`

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`2
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`BULLCOMING v. NEW MEXICO
`
`Opinion of the Court
`laboratory’s testing procedures, but had neither partici­
`pated in nor observed the test on Bullcoming’s blood sam­
`ple. The New Mexico Supreme Court determined that,
`although the blood-alcohol analysis was “testimonial,” the
`Confrontation Clause did not require the certifying ana­
`lyst’s in-court testimony.
`Instead, New Mexico’s high
`court held, live testimony of another analyst satisfied the
`constitutional requirements.
`The question presented is whether the Confrontation
`Clause permits the prosecution to introduce a forensic
`laboratory report containing a testimonial certification—
`made for the purpose of proving a particular fact—through
`the in-court testimony of a scientist who did not sign the
`certification or perform or observe the test reported in the
`certification. We hold that surrogate testimony of that
`order does not meet the constitutional requirement. The
`accused’s right is to be confronted with the analyst who
`made the certification, unless that analyst is unavailable
`at trial, and the accused had an opportunity, pretrial, to
`cross-examine that particular scientist.
`I
`
`A
`
`In August 2005, a vehicle driven by petitioner Donald
`Bullcoming rear-ended a pick-up truck at an intersection
`in Farmington, New Mexico. When the truckdriver exited
`his vehicle and approached Bullcoming to exchange insur­
`ance information, he noticed that Bullcoming’s eyes were
`bloodshot. Smelling alcohol on Bullcoming’s breath, the
`truckdriver told his wife to call the police. Bullcoming left
`the scene before the police arrived, but was soon appre­
`hended by an officer who observed his performance of field
`sobriety tests. Upon failing the tests, Bullcoming was
`arrested for driving a vehicle while “under the influence of
`intoxicating liquor” (DWI), in violation of N. M. Stat. Ann.
`§66–8–102 (2004).
`
`

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`Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)
`
`3
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Because Bullcoming refused to take a breath test, the
`police obtained a warrant authorizing a blood-alcohol analy­
`sis. Pursuant to the warrant, a sample of Bullcoming’s
`blood was drawn at a local hospital. To determine Bull­
`coming’s blood-alcohol concentration (BAC), the police
`sent the sample to the New Mexico Department of Health,
`Scientific Laboratory Division (SLD). In a standard SLD
`form titled “Report of Blood Alcohol Analysis,” partici­
`pants in the testing were identified, and the forensic ana­
`lyst certified his finding. App. 62.
`SLD’s report contained in the top block “information . . .
`filled in by [the] arresting officer.” Ibid. (capitalization
`omitted). This information included the “reason [the]
`suspect [was] stopped” (the officer checked “Accident”),
`and the date (“8.14.05”) and time (“18:25 PM”) the blood
`sample was drawn. Ibid. (capitalization omitted). The
`arresting officer also affirmed that he had arrested Bull­
`coming and witnessed the blood draw. Ibid. The next two
`blocks contained certifications by the nurse who drew
`Bullcoming’s blood and the SLD intake employee who
`received the blood sample sent to the laboratory. Ibid.
`Following these segments, the report presented the
`“certificate of analyst,” ibid. (capitalization omitted), com­
`pleted and signed by Curtis Caylor, the SLD forensic
`analyst assigned to test Bullcoming’s blood sample. Id., at
`62, 64–65. Caylor recorded that the BAC in Bullcoming’s
`sample was 0.21 grams per hundred milliliters, an inordi­
`nately high level. Id., at 62. Caylor also affirmed that
`“[t]he seal of th[e] sample was received intact and broken
`in the laboratory,” that “the statements in [the analyst’s
`block of the report] are correct,” and that he had “followed
`the procedures set out on the reverse of th[e] report.” Ibid.
`Those “procedures” instructed analysts, inter alia, to “re­
`tai[n] the sample container and the raw data from the
`analysis,” and to “not[e] any circumstance or condition
`which might affect the integrity of the sample or otherwise
`
`

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`4
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`BULLCOMING v. NEW MEXICO
`
`Opinion of the Court
`affect the validity of the analysis.” Id., at 65. Finally, in a
`block headed “certificate of reviewer,” the SLD examiner
`who reviewed Caylor’s analysis certified that Caylor was
`qualified to conduct the BAC test, and that the “estab­
`lished procedure” for handling and analyzing Bullcoming’s
`sample “ha[d] been followed.” Id., at 62 (capitalization
`omitted).
`SLD analysts use gas chromatograph machines to de­
`termine BAC levels. Operation of the machines requires
`specialized knowledge and training. Several steps are
`involved in the gas chromatograph process, and human
`error can occur at each step.1
`——————
`1Gas chromatography is a widely used scientific method of quan­
`titatively analyzing the constituents of a mixture. See generally H.
`McNair & J. Miller, Basic Gas Chromatography (2d ed. 2009) (hereinaf­
`ter McNair). Under SLD’s standard testing protocol, the analyst ex­
`tracts two blood samples and inserts them into vials containing an
`“internal standard”—a chemical additive. App. 53. See McNair 141–
`142. The analyst then “cap[s] the [two] sample[s],” “crimp[s] them with
`an aluminum top,” and places the vials into the gas chromatograph
`machine. App. 53–54. Within a few hours, this device produces a
`printed graph—a chromatogram—along with calculations representing
`a software-generated interpretation of the data. See Brief for State of
`New Mexico Dept. of Health, SLD as Amicus Curiae 16–17.
`Although the State presented testimony that obtaining an accurate
`BAC measurement merely entails “look[ing] at the [gas chromatograph]
`machine and record[ing] the results,” App. 54, authoritative sources re­
`veal that the matter is not so simple or certain. “In order to perform
`quantitative analyses satisfactorily and . . . support the results under
`rigorous examination in court, the analyst must be aware of, and
`adhere to, good analytical practices and understand what is being done
`and why.” Stafford, Chromatography, in Principles of Forensic Toxicol­
`ogy 92, 114 (B. Levine 2d ed. 2006). See also McNair 137 (“Errors that
`occur in any step can invalidate the best chromatographic analysis, so
`attention must be paid to all steps.”); D. Bartell, M. McMurray, &
`A. ImObersteg, Attacking and Defending Drunk Driving Tests §16:80
`(2d revision 2010) (stating that 93% of errors in laboratory tests for
`BAC levels are human errors that occur either before or after machines
`analyze samples). Even after the machine has produced its printed
`result, a review of the chromatogram may indicate that the test was not
`
`

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`Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)
`
`5
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`Opinion of the Court
`Caylor’s report that Bullcoming’s BAC was 0.21 sup­
`ported a prosecution for aggravated DWI, the threshold for
`which is a BAC of 0.16 grams per hundred milliliters, §66–
`8–102(D)(1). The State accordingly charged Bullcoming
`with this more serious crime.
`B
`The case was tried to a jury in November 2005, after our
`decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36 (2004),
`but before Melendez-Diaz. On the day of trial, the State
`announced that it would not be calling SLD analyst Curtis
`Caylor as a witness because he had “very recently [been]
`put on unpaid leave” for a reason not revealed. 2010–
`NMSC–007, ¶8, 226 P. 3d 1, 6 (internal quotation marks
`omitted); App. 58. A startled defense counsel objected.
`The prosecution, she complained, had never disclosed,
`until trial commenced, that the witness “out there . . .
`[was] not the analyst [of Bullcoming’s sample].” Id., at 46.
`Counsel stated that, “had [she] known that the analyst
`[who tested Bullcoming’s blood] was not available,” her
`opening, indeed, her entire defense “may very well have
`been dramatically different.” Id., at 47. The State, how­
`ever, proposed to introduce Caylor’s finding as a “business
`——————
`valid. See McNair 207–214.
`Nor is the risk of human error so remote as to be negligible. Amici
`inform us, for example, that in neighboring Colorado, a single forensic
`laboratory produced at least 206 flawed blood-alcohol readings over a
`three-year span, prompting the dismissal of several criminal prosecu­
`tions. See Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
`et al. as Amici Curiae 32–33. An analyst had used improper amounts
`of the internal standard, causing the chromatograph machine system­
`atically to inflate BAC measurements. The analyst’s error, a supervi­
`sor said, was “fairly complex.” Ensslin, Final Tally on Flawed DUI:
`206 Errors, 9 Tossed or Reduced, Colorado Springs Gazette, Apr. 19,
`2010, p. 1 (internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://
`www.gazette.com/articles/report-97354-police-discuss.html. (All Inter­
`net materials as visited June 21, 2011, and included in Clerk of Court’s
`case file).
`
`

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`6
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`BULLCOMING v. NEW MEXICO
`
`Opinion of the Court
`record” during the testimony of Gerasimos Razatos, an
`SLD scientist who had neither observed nor reviewed
`Caylor’s analysis. Id., at 44.
`Bullcoming’s counsel opposed the State’s proposal. Id.,
`at 44–45. Without Caylor’s testimony, defense counsel
`maintained, introduction of the analyst’s finding would
`violate Bullcoming’s Sixth Amendment right “to be con­
`fronted with the witnesses against him.” Ibid.2 The trial
`court overruled the objection, id., at 46–47, and admitted
`the SLD report as a business record, id., at 44–46, 57.3
`The jury convicted Bullcoming of aggravated DWI, and the
`New Mexico Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, con­
`cluding that “the blood alcohol report in the present case
`was non-testimonial and prepared routinely with guaran­
`tees of trustworthiness.” 2008–NMCA–097, §17, 189 P. 3d
`679, 685.
`
`C
`While Bullcoming’s appeal was pending before the New
`Mexico Supreme Court, this Court decided Melendez-Diaz.
`In that case, “[t]he Massachusetts courts [had] admitted
`into evidence affidavits reporting the results of forensic
`analysis which showed that material seized by the police
`and connected to the defendant was cocaine.” 557 U. S., at
`___ (slip op., at 1). Those affidavits, the Court held, were
`“‘testimonial,’ rendering the affiants ‘witnesses’ subject to
`——————
`2The State called as witnesses the arresting officer and the nurse
`who drew Bullcoming’s blood. Bullcoming did not object to the State’s
`failure to call the SLD intake employee or the reviewing analyst. “It
`is up to the prosecution,” the Court observed in Melendez-Diaz v. Massa-
`chusetts, 557 U. S. ___, ___, n. 1 (2009) (slip op., at 5, n. 1), “to decide
`what steps in the chain of custody are so crucial as to require evidence;
`but what testimony is introduced must (if the defendant objects) be
`introduced live.”
`3The trial judge noted that, when he started out in law practice,
`“there were no breath tests or blood tests. They just brought in the cop,
`and the cop said, ‘Yeah, he was drunk.’ ” App. 47.
`
`

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`Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)
`
`7
`
`Opinion of the Court
`the defendant’s right of confrontation under the Sixth
`Amendment.” Ibid.
`In light of Melendez-Diaz, the New Mexico Supreme
`Court acknowledged that the blood-alcohol report intro­
`duced at Bullcoming’s trial qualified as testimonial evi­
`dence. Like the affidavits in Melendez-Diaz, the court
`observed, the report was “functionally identical to live, in­
`court testimony, doing precisely what a witness does on
`direct examination.” 226 P. 3d, at 8 (quoting Melendez-
`Diaz, 557 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4)).4 Nevertheless, for
`two reasons, the court held that admission of the report
`did not violate the Confrontation Clause.
`First, the court said certifying analyst Caylor “was a
`mere scrivener,” who “simply transcribed the results gen­
`erated by the gas chromatograph machine.” 226 P. 3d,
`at 8–9. Second, SLD analyst Razatos, although he did not
`participate in testing Bullcoming’s blood, “qualified as
`an expert witness with respect to the gas chromatograph
`machine.” Id., at 9. “Razatos provided live, in-court tes­
`timony,” the court stated, “and, thus, was available for
`cross-examination regarding the operation of the . . . ma­
`chine, the results of [Bullcoming’s] BAC test, and the
`SLD’s established laboratory procedures.” Ibid. Razatos’
`testimony was crucial, the court explained, because Bull­
`coming could not cross-examine the machine or the writ­
`ten report. Id., at 10. But “[Bullcoming’s] right of con­
`frontation was preserved,” the court concluded, because
`Razatos was a qualified analyst, able to serve as a surro­
`gate for Caylor. Ibid.
`We granted certiorari to address this question: Does the
`Confrontation Clause permit the prosecution to introduce
`
`——————
`4In so ruling, the New Mexico Supreme Court explicitly overruled
`State v. Dedman, 2004–NMSC–037, 102 P. 3d 628 (2004), which had
`classified blood-alcohol reports as public records neither “investigative
`nor prosecutorial” in nature. 226 P. 3d, at 7–8.
`
`

`
`8
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`BULLCOMING v. NEW MEXICO
`
`Opinion of the Court
`a forensic laboratory report containing a testimonial certi­
`fication, made in order to prove a fact at a criminal trial,
`through the in-court testimony of an analyst who did not
`sign the certification or personally perform or observe the
`performance of the test reported in the certification. 561
`U. S. ___ (2010). Our answer is in line with controlling
`precedent: As a rule, if an out-of-court statement is testi­
`monial in nature, it may not be introduced against the
`accused at trial unless the witness who made the state­
`ment is unavailable and the accused has had a prior op­
`portunity to confront that witness. Because the New
`Mexico Supreme Court permitted the testimonial state­
`ment of one witness, i.e., Caylor, to enter into evidence
`through the in-court testimony of a second person, i.e.,
`Razatos, we reverse that court’s judgment.
`II
`The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause confers
`upon the accused “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, . . . the
`right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”
`In a pathmarking 2004 decision, Crawford v. Washington,
`we overruled Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980), which
`had interpreted the Confrontation Clause to allow admis­
`sion of absent witnesses’ testimonial statements based on
`a judicial determination of reliability. See Roberts, 448
`U. S., at 66. Rejecting Roberts’ “amorphous notions of ‘re­
`liability,’” Crawford, 541 U. S., at 61, Crawford held
`that fidelity to the Confrontation Clause permitted admis­
`sion of “[t]estimonial statements of witnesses absent from
`trial . . . only where the declarant is unavailable, and only
`where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross­
`examine,” id., at 59. See Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U. S.
`___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 7) (“[F]or testimonial evidence
`to be admissible, the Sixth Amendment ‘demands what
`the common law required: unavailability [of the witness]
`and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.’” (quoting
`
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`Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)
`
`9
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Crawford, 541 U. S., at 68)). Melendez-Diaz, relying on
`Crawford’s rationale, refused to create a “forensic evi­
`dence” exception to this rule. 557 U. S., at ___–___ (slip
`op., at 11–15).5 An analyst’s certification prepared in
`connection with a criminal investigation or prosecution,
`the Court held, is “testimonial,” and therefore within the
`compass of the Confrontation Clause. Id., at ___–___ (slip
`op., at 15–18).6
`The State in the instant case never asserted that the
`analyst who signed the certification, Curtis Caylor, was
`unavailable. The record showed only that Caylor was
`placed on unpaid leave for an undisclosed reason. See
`supra, at 5. Nor did Bullcoming have an opportunity
`to cross-examine Caylor. Crawford and Melendez-Diaz,
`therefore, weigh heavily in Bullcoming’s favor. The New
`Mexico Supreme Court, however, although recognizing
`that the SLD report was testimonial for purposes of the
`Confrontation Clause, considered SLD analyst Razatos an
`adequate substitute for Caylor. We explain first why
`Razatos’ appearance did not meet the Confrontation
`Clause requirement. We next address the State’s argu­
`ment that the SLD report ranks as “nontestimonial,” and
`——————
`5The dissent makes plain that its objection is less to the application
`of the Court’s decisions in Crawford and Melendez-Diaz to this case
`than to those pathmarking decisions themselves. See post, at 5 (criti­
`cizing the “Crawford line of cases” for rejecting “reliable evidence”);
`post, at 8–9, 11 (deploring “Crawford’s rejection of the [reliability­
`centered] regime of Ohio v. Roberts”).
`6To rank as “testimonial,” a statement must have a “primary pur­
`pose” of “establish[ing] or prov[ing] past events potentially relevant to
`later criminal prosecution.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U. S. 813, 822
`(2006). See also Bryant, 562 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 11). Elaborating
`on the purpose for which a “testimonial report” is created, we observed
`in Melendez-Diaz that business and public records “are generally
`admissible absent confrontation . . . because—having been created for
`the administration of an entity’s affairs and not for the purpose of
`establishing or proving some fact at trial—they are not testimonial.”
`557 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 18).
`
`

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`BULLCOMING v. NEW MEXICO
`
`Opinion of the Court
`therefore “[was] not subject to the Confrontation Clause”
`in the first place. Brief for Respondent 7 (capitalization
`omitted).
`
`A
`The New Mexico Supreme Court held surrogate testi­
`mony adequate to satisfy the Confrontation Clause in
`this case because analyst Caylor “simply transcribed the
`resul[t] generated by the gas chromatograph machine,”
`presenting no interpretation and exercising no independ­
`ent judgment. 226 P. 3d, at 8. Bullcoming’s “true ‘ac­
`cuser,’” the court said, was the machine, while testing
`analyst Caylor’s role was that of “mere scrivener.” Id., at
`9. Caylor’s certification, however, reported more than a
`machine-generated number. See supra, at 3–4.
`Caylor certified that he received Bullcoming’s blood
`sample intact with the seal unbroken, that he checked to
`make sure that the forensic report number and the sample
`number “correspond[ed],” and that he performed on Bull­
`coming’s sample a particular test, adhering to a precise
`protocol. App. 62–65. He further represented, by leaving
`the “[r]emarks” section of the report blank, that no “cir­
`cumstance or condition . . . affect[ed] the integrity of the
`sample or . . . the validity of the analysis.” Id., at 62, 65.
`These representations, relating to past events and human
`actions not revealed in raw, machine-produced data, are
`meet for cross-examination.
`The potential ramifications of the New Mexico Supreme
`Court’s reasoning, furthermore, raise red flags. Most wit­
`nesses, after all, testify to their observations of factual
`conditions or events, e.g., “the light was green,” “the hour
`was noon.” Such witnesses may record, on the spot, what
`they observed. Suppose a police report recorded an objec­
`tive fact—Bullcoming’s counsel posited the address above
`the front door of a house or the read-out of a radar gun.
`See Brief for Petitioner 35. Could an officer other than the
`
`

`
`Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)
`
`11
`
`Opinion of the Court
`one who saw the number on the house or gun present the
`information in court—so long as that officer was equipped
`to testify about any technology the observing officer de­
`ployed and the police department’s standard operating
`procedures? As our precedent makes plain, the answer is
`emphatically “No.” See Davis v. Washington, 547 U. S.
`813, 826 (2006) (Confrontation Clause may not be “evaded
`by having a note-taking police[ officer] recite the . . . tes­
`timony of the declarant” (emphasis deleted)); Melendez-
`Diaz, 557 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6) (KENNEDY, J., dis­
`senting) (“The Court made clear in Davis that it will not
`permit the testimonial statement of one witness to enter
`into evidence through the in-court testimony of a second.”).
`The New Mexico Supreme Court stated that the number
`registered by the gas chromatograph machine called for
`no interpretation or exercise of independent judgment on
`Caylor’s part. 226 P. 3d, at 8–9. We have already ex­
`plained that Caylor certified to more than a machine­
`generated number. See supra, at 3–4. In any event, the
`comparative reliability of an analyst’s testimonial report
`drawn from machine-produced data does not overcome the
`Sixth Amendment bar. This Court settled in Crawford
`that the “obviou[s] reliab[ility]” of a testimonial statement
`does not dispense with the Confrontation Clause. 541
`U. S., at 62; see id., at 61 (Clause “commands, not that
`evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a
`particular manner: by testing [the evidence] in the cruci­
`ble of cross-examination”). Accordingly, the analysts who
`write reports that the prosecution introduces must be
`made available for confrontation even if they possess “the
`scientific acumen of Mme. Curie and the veracity of
`Mother Teresa.” Melendez-Diaz, 557 U. S., at ___, n. 6
`(slip op., at 14, n. 6).
`
`B
`Recognizing that admission of the blood-alcohol analysis
`
`

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`BULLCOMING v. NEW MEXICO
`
`Opinion of the Court
`depended on “live, in-court testimony [by] a qualified ana­
`lyst,” 226 P. 3d, at 10, the New Mexico Supreme Court
`believed that Razatos could subst