(Slip Opinion)
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2011
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`Syllabus
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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` Syllabus
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` GREENE, AKA TRICE v. FISHER, SUPERINTENDENT,
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` STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION AT
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` SMITHFIELD, ET AL.
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`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
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`THE THIRD CIRCUIT
` No. 10–637. Argued October 11, 2011—Decided November 8, 2011
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` During petitioner Greene’s trial for murder, robbery, and conspiracy,
`the prosecution introduced the redacted confessions of two of
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` Greene’s nontestifying codefendants. A jury convicted Greene. The
` Pennsylvania Superior Court upheld the conviction, reasoning that
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`the rule announced in Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123, did not
`apply because the confessions were redacted to remove any specific
`reference to Greene. While Greene’s petition to the Pennsylvania
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` Supreme Court was pending, this Court announced in Gray v. Mary-
`land, 523 U. S. 185, that Bruton does apply to some redacted confes-
`sions. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to hear Greene’s
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` appeal, and he then sought federal habeas relief. Under the Antiter-
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` rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a federal
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` court may not grant such relief to a state prisoner on any claim that
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`has been “adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” un-
`less that adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
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` involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
`law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28
`U. S. C. §2254(d)(1). Here, the District Court concluded that, because
`the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Gray had not yet been
`issued when the Pennsylvania Superior Court adjudicated Greene’s
`claim, the condition for granting habeas relief had not been met. The
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` Third Circuit affirmed.
`Held:
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`1. Under §2254(d)(1), “clearly established Federal law, as deter-
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`mined by the Supreme Court of the United States” includes only this
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`GREENE v. FISHER
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`Syllabus
`Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court adjudica-
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` tion on the merits. The Court’s decision last Term in Cullen v. Pin-
`holster, 563 U. S. ___, established that §2254(d)(1)’s “backward-
`looking language requires an examination of the state-court decision
`at the time it was made.” Id., at ___. As the Court explained in Cul-
`len, §2254(d)(1) requires federal courts to measure state-court deci-
`sions “against this Court’s precedents as of ‘the time the state court
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` renders its decision.’ ” Id., at ___. That reasoning determines the re-
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`sult here. Pp. 3–6.
` 2. Because the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s decision—the last
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`state-court adjudication on the merits of Greene’s claim—predated
`Gray by nearly three months, the Third Circuit correctly held that
`Gray was not “clearly established Federal law” against which it could
`measure the state-court decision. It therefore correctly concluded
`that the state court’s decision neither was “contrary to,” nor “involved
`an unreasonable application of,” any “clearly established Federal
`law.” Pp. 6–7.
`606 F. 3d 85, affirmed.
` SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
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` Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2011)
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`Opinion of the Court
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`_________________
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` No. 10–637
`_________________
` ERIC GREENE, AKA JARMAINE Q. TRICE, PETI-
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` TIONER v. JON FISHER, SUPERINTENDENT,
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` STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION AT
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` SMITHFIELD, ET AL.
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`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
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`APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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`[November 8, 2011]
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` JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
`Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
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`Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a federal court may not grant habe-
`as relief to a state prisoner with respect to any claim that
`has been “adjudicated on the merits in State court pro-
`ceedings” unless the state-court adjudication “resulted in a
`decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
`application of, clearly established Federal law, as deter-
`mined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28
`U. S. C. §2254(d)(1). We consider whether “clearly estab-
`lished Federal law” includes decisions of this Court that
`are announced after the last adjudication of the merits in
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`state court but before the defendant’s conviction becomes
`final.
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`I
`In December 1993, petitioner Eric Greene and four
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`co-conspirators robbed a grocery store in North Philadel-
`phia, Pennsylvania. During the robbery, one of the men
`shot and killed the store’s owner. The five were appre-
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`GREENE v. FISHER
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`Opinion of the Court
` hended, and two of them confessed to taking part in the
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`robbery. Greene did not confess, but he was implicated by
`the others’ statements.
`When the Commonwealth sought to try all of the co-
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`conspirators jointly, Greene sought severance, arguing,
`inter alia, that the confessions of his nontestifying code-
`fendants should not be introduced at his trial. The trial
`court denied the motion to sever, but agreed to require
`redaction of the confessions to eliminate proper names. As
`redacted, the confessions replaced names with words like
`“this guy,” “someone,” and “other guys,” or with the word
`“blank,” or simply omitted the names without substitution.
`A jury convicted Greene of second-degree murder, rob-
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`bery, and conspiracy. He appealed to the Pennsylvania
`Superior Court, arguing that severance of his trial was
`demanded by the rule announced in Bruton v. United
`States, 391 U. S. 123 (1968), that the Confrontation Clause
`forbids the prosecution to introduce a nontestifying co-
`defendant’s confession implicating the defendant in the
`crime. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the
`conviction, holding that the redaction had cured any prob-
`lem under Bruton.
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`Greene filed a petition for allowance of appeal to the
`Pennsylvania Supreme Court, raising the same Bruton
`claim. While that petition was pending, we held in Gray v.
`Maryland, 523 U. S. 185, 195 (1998), that “considered as a
`class, redactions that replace a proper name with an
`obvious blank, the word ‘delete,’ a symbol, or similarly
`notify the jury that a name has been deleted are similar
`enough to Bruton’s unredacted confessions as to warrant
`the same legal results.” The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
`granted the petition for allowance of appeal, limited to the
`question whether admission of the redacted confessions
`violated Greene’s Sixth Amendment rights. After the
`parties filed merits briefs, however, the Pennsylvania
`Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as improvidently
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` Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2011)
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`Opinion of the Court
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`granted.
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`Greene then filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the
`United States District Court for the Eastern District of
`Pennsylvania, alleging, inter alia, that the introduction
`of his nontestifying codefendants’ statements violated the
`Confrontation Clause. Adopting the report and recom-
`mendation of a Magistrate Judge, the District Court de-
`nied the petition. It concluded that since our decision in
`Gray was not “clearly established Federal law” when the
`Pennsylvania Superior Court adjudicated Greene’s Con-
`frontation Clause claim, that court’s decision was not
`“contrary to,” or “an unreasonable application of, clearly
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`established Federal law.” 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1).
`A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals
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`for the Third Circuit affirmed. Greene v. Palakovich, 606
`F. 3d 85 (2010). The majority held that the “clearly estab-
`lished Federal law” referred to in §2254(d)(1) is the law at
`the time of the state-court adjudication on the merits. Id.,
`at 99. The dissenting judge contended that it is the law at
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` the time the conviction becomes final. Id., at 108. We
`granted certiorari. 563 U. S. ___ (2011).
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`II
`Section 2254(d) of Title 28, U. S. C., as amended by
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`AEDPA, provides:
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`“An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf
`of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
`State court shall not be granted with respect to any
`claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State
`court proceedings unless the adjudication of the
`claim—
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`“(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
`involved an unreasonable application of, clearly estab-
`lished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
`Court of the United States; or
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`“(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an un-
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`Opinion of the Court
`reasonable determination of the facts in light of the
`evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”
`The issue here pertains to the first exception. We have
`said that its standard of “contrary to, or involv[ing] an
`unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
`law” is “difficult to meet,” because the purpose of AEDPA
`is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a
`“‘guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal
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`justice systems,’” and not as a means of error correction.
`Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at
`12–13) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 332,
`n.5 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)).
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`In light of that objective, and relying upon the text of
`the provision, we held last Term, in Cullen v. Pinholster,
`563 U. S. ___ (2011), that review under §2254(d)(1) is
`limited to the record that was before the state court that
`adjudicated the prisoner’s claim on the merits. We said
`that the provision’s “backward-looking language requires
`an examination of the state-court decision at the time it
`was made.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 9). The reasoning of
`Cullen determines the result here. As we explained,
`§2254(d)(1) requires federal courts to “focu[s] on what a
`state court knew and did,” and to measure state-court
`decisions “against this Court’s precedents as of ‘the time
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`the state court renders its decision.’” Id., at __ (slip op., at
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`10) (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U. S. 63, 71–72
`(2003); emphasis added).
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`Greene resists that conclusion by appealing to our deci-
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`sion in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989). Teague held
`that, with two exceptions not pertinent here, a prisoner
`seeking federal habeas relief may rely on new constitu-
`tional rules of criminal procedure announced before the
`prisoner’s conviction became final. Id., at 310 (plurality
`opinion); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302, 313
`(1989) (affirming and applying Teague rule). Finality
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`Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2011)
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`Opinion of the Court
`occurs when direct state appeals have been exhausted and
`a petition for writ of certiorari from this Court has become
`time barred or has been disposed of. Griffith v. Kentucky,
`479 U. S. 314, 321, n. 6 (1987). Greene contends that,
`because finality marks the temporal cutoff for Teague
`purposes, it must mark the temporal cutoff for “clearly
`established Federal law” under AEDPA.
`The analogy has been rejected by our cases. We have
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`explained that AEDPA did not codify Teague, and that
`“the AEDPA and Teague inquiries are distinct.” Horn v.
`Banks, 536 U. S. 266, 272 (2002) (per curiam). The retro-
`activity rules that govern federal habeas review on the
`merits—which include Teague—are quite separate from
`the relitigation bar imposed by AEDPA; neither abrogates
`or qualifies the other. If §2254(d)(1) was, indeed, pegged
`to Teague, it would authorize relief when a state-court
`merits adjudication “resulted in a decision that became
`contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly
`established Federal law, before the conviction became
`final.” The statute says no such thing, and we see no
`reason why Teague should alter AEDPA’s plain meaning.*
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`Greene alternatively contends that the relevant “deci-
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`sion” to which the “clearly established Federal law” crite-
`rion must be applied is the decision of the state supreme
`court that disposes of a direct appeal from a defendant’s
`conviction or sentence, even when (as here) that decision
`does not adjudicate the relevant claim on the merits. This
`is an implausible reading of §2254(d)(1). The text, we
`repeat, provides that habeas relief
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`*Whether §2254(d)(1) would bar a federal habeas petitioner from
`relying on a decision that came after the last state-court adjudication
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`on the merits, but fell within one of the exceptions recognized in
`Teague, 489 U. S., at 311, is a question we need not address to resolve
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`this case.
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`GREENE v. FISHER
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`Opinion of the Court
`“shall not be granted with respect to any claim that
`was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceed-
`ings unless the adjudication of the claim . . . resulted
`in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an un-
`reasonable application of, clearly established Federal
`law . . . .”
`(Emphasis added.)
`The words “the adjudication” in the “unless” clause obvi-
`ously refer back to the “adjudicat[ion] on the merits,” and
`the phrase “resulted in a decision” in the “unless” clause
`obviously refers to the decision produced by that same
`adjudication on the merits. A later affirmance of that
`decision on alternative procedural grounds, for example,
`would not be a decision resulting from the merits adjudica-
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`tion. And much less would be (what is at issue here)
`a decision by the state supreme court not to hear the
`appeal—that is, not to decide at all.
`III
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`The Third Circuit held, and the parties do not dispute,
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`that the last state-court adjudication on the merits of
`Greene’s Confrontation Clause claim occurred on direct
`appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. 606 F. 3d, at
`92, and n. 1. The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s decision
`predated our decision in Gray by nearly three months.
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` The Third Circuit thus correctly held that Gray was not
`“clearly established Federal law” against which it could
`measure the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s decision. 606
`F. 3d, at 99. The panel then concluded (and the parties do
`not dispute) that the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s deci-
`sion neither was “contrary to,” nor “involved an unreason-
`able application of,” any “clearly established Federal law”
`that existed at the time. Id., at 106. Consequently,
`§2254(d)(1) bars the federal courts from granting Greene’s
`application for a writ of habeas corpus.
`We must observe that Greene’s predicament is an unu-
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`sual one of his own creation. Before applying for federal
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`Opinion of the Court
`habeas, he missed two opportunities to obtain relief under
`Gray: After the Pennsylvania Supreme Court dismissed
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`his appeal, he did not file a petition for writ of certiorari
`from this Court, which would almost certainly have pro-
`duced a remand in light of the intervening Gray decision.
`“Where intervening developments . . . reveal a reasonable
`probability that the decision below rests upon a premise
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`that the lower court would reject if given the opportunity
`for further consideration, and where it appears that such a
`redetermination may determine the ultimate outcome of
`the litigation, [an order granting the petition, vacating the
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`judgment below, and remanding the case (GVR)] is, we
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`believe, potentially appropriate.” Lawrence v. Chater, 516
`U. S. 163, 167 (1996) (per curiam). See, e.g., Stanbridge v.
`New York, 395 U. S. 709 (1969) (per curiam) (GVR in light
`of Bruton). Nor did Greene assert his Gray claim in a
`petition for state postconviction relief. Having forgone two
`obvious means of asserting his claim, Greene asks us to
`provide him relief by interpreting AEDPA in a manner
`contrary to both its text and our precedents. We decline to
`do so, and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
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`It is so ordered.