(Slip Opinion)
`
`OCTOBER TERM, 2010
`
`1
`
`Syllabus
`
`NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
`prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
`See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`Syllabus
`
`GOODYEAR DUNLOP TIRES OPERATIONS, S. A.,
`
`ET AL. v. BROWN ET UX., CO-ADMINISTRATORS OF
`
`THE ESTATE OF BROWN, ET AL.
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
`No. 10–76. Argued January 11, 2011 —Decided June 27, 2011
`Respondents, North Carolina residents whose sons died in a bus acci-
`dent outside Paris, France, filed a suit for wrongful-death damages in
`North Carolina state court. Alleging that the accident was caused by
`tire failure, they named as defendants Goodyear USA, an Ohio corpo-
`ration, and petitioners, three Goodyear USA subsidiaries, organized
`and operating, respectively, in Luxembourg, Turkey, and France. Pe-
`titioners’ tires are manufactured primarily for European and Asian
`markets and differ in size and construction from tires ordinarily sold
`in the United States. Petitioners are not registered to do business in
`North Carolina; have no place of business, employees, or bank ac-
`counts in the State; do not design, manufacture, or advertise their
`products in the State; and do not solicit business in the State or sell
`or ship tires to North Carolina customers. Even so, a small percent-
`age of their tires were distributed in North Carolina by other Good-
`year USA affiliates. The trial court denied petitioners’ motion to
`dismiss the claims against them for want of personal jurisdiction.
`The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the
`North Carolina courts had general jurisdiction over petitioners,
`whose tires had reached the State through “the stream of commerce.”
`Held: Petitioners were not amenable to suit in North Carolina on
`claims unrelated to any activity of petitioners in the forum State.
`Pp. 6–14.
`(a) The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause sets the
`outer boundaries of a state tribunal’s authority to proceed against a
`defendant. The pathmarking decision of International Shoe Co. v.
`Washington, 326 U. S. 310, provides that state courts may exercise
`
`

`
`2
`
`GOODYEAR DUNLOP TIRES OPERATIONS, S. A.
`v. BROWN
`Syllabus
`personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant who has “certain
`minimum contacts with [the State] such that the maintenance of the
`suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial
`justice.’ ” Id., at 316. Endeavoring to give specific content to the “fair
`play and substantial justice” concept, the Court in International Shoe
`classified cases involving out-of-state corporate defendants. First,
`the Court recognized that jurisdiction could be asserted where the
`corporation’s in-state activity is “continuous and systematic” and
`gave rise to the episode-in-suit. Id., at 317. It also observed that the
`commission of “single or occasional acts” in a State may be sufficient
`to render a corporation answerable in that State with respect to those
`acts, though not with respect to matters unrelated to the forum con-
`nections. Id., at 318. These two categories compose what is now
`known as “specific jurisdiction.” Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom-
`bia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U. S. 408, 414, n. 8. International Shoe distin-
`guished from cases that fit within the “specific jurisdiction” catego-
`ries, “instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a
`state [are] so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit
`against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct
`from those activities.” 326 U. S., at 318. Adjudicatory authority so
`grounded is now called “general jurisdiction.” Helicopteros, 466 U. S.,
`at 414, n. 9. Since International Shoe, this Court’s decisions have
`elaborated primarily on circumstances that warrant the exercise of
`specific jurisdiction. In only two decisions postdating International
`Shoe has this Court considered whether an out-of-state corporate de-
`fendant’s in-state contacts were sufficiently “continuous and system-
`atic” to justify the exercise of general jurisdiction over claims unre-
`lated to those contacts: Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342
`U. S. 437; and Helicopteros, 466 U. S. 408. Pp. 6–9.
`(b) Petitioners lack “the kind of continuous and systematic general
`business contacts” necessary to allow North Carolina to entertain a
`suit against them unrelated to anything that connects them to the
`State. Helicopteros, 466 U. S., at 416. The stream-of-commerce cases
`on which the North Carolina court relied relate to exercises of specific
`jurisdiction in products liability actions, in which a nonresident de-
`fendant, acting outside the forum, places in the stream of commerce a
`product that ultimately causes harm inside the forum. Many state
`long-arm statutes authorize courts to exercise specific jurisdiction
`over manufacturers when the events in suit, or some of them, oc-
`curred within the forum State. The North Carolina court’s stream-of-
`commerce analysis elided the essential difference between case-
`specific and general jurisdiction. Flow of a manufacturer’s products
`into the forum may bolster an affiliation germane to specific jurisdic-
`tion, see, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. S.
`
`

`
`Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)
`
`3
`
`Syllabus
`286, 297; but ties serving to bolster the exercise of specific jurisdic-
`tion do not warrant a determination that, based on those ties, the fo-
`rum has general jurisdiction over a defendant. A corporation’s “con-
`tinuous activity of some sorts within a state,” International Shoe
`instructed, “is not enough to support the demand that the corporation
`be amenable to suits unrelated to that activity.” 326 U. S., at 318.
` Measured against Helicopteros and Perkins, North Carolina is not
`a forum in which it would be permissible to subject petitioners to
`general jurisdiction. In the 1952 Perkins case, general jurisdiction
`was appropriately exercised over a Philippine corporation sued in
`Ohio, where the company’s affairs were overseen during World War
`II. In Helicopteros, however, the survivors of U. S. citizens killed
`when a helicopter owned by a Colombian corporation crashed in Peru
`could not maintain wrongful-death actions against that corporation
`in Texas, where the company’s contacts “consisted of sending its chief
`executive officer to Houston for a contract-negotiation session; accept-
`ing into its New York bank account checks drawn on a Houston bank;
`purchasing helicopters, equipment, and training services from [a
`Texas enterprise]; and sending personnel to [Texas] for training.”
`466 U. S., at 416. These links to Texas did not “constitute the kind of
`continuous and systematic general business contacts . . . found to ex-
`ist in Perkins,” and were insufficient to support the exercise of juris-
`diction over a claim that neither “ ‘ar[o]se out of’ . . . no[r] related to”
`the defendant’s activities in Texas. Id., at 415–416. This Court sees
`no reason to differentiate from the ties to Texas held insufficient in
`Helicopteros, the sales of petitioners’ tires sporadically made in North
`Carolina through intermediaries. Pp. 9–13.
`(c) Neither below nor in their brief in opposition to the petition for
`certiorari did respondents urge disregard of petitioners’ discrete
`status as subsidiaries and treatment of all Goodyear entities as a
`“unitary business,” so that jurisdiction over the parent would draw in
`the subsidiaries as well. Respondents have therefore forfeited this
`contention. Pp. 13–14.
`199 N. C. App. 50, 681 S. E. 2d 382, reversed.
`GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
`
`

`
`Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)
`
`1
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
`preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
`notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
`ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
`that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`No. 10–76
`_________________
`GOODYEAR DUNLOP TIRES OPERATIONS, S. A.,
`
`ET AL., PETITIONERS v. EDGAR D. BROWN,
`
`ET UX., CO-ADMINISTRATORS OF THE ESTATE
`
`OF JULIAN DAVID BROWN, ET AL.
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
`
`NORTH CAROLINA
`
`[June 27, 2011]
`
`JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.
`This case concerns the jurisdiction of state courts over
`corporations organized and operating abroad. We address,
`in particular, this question: Are foreign subsidiaries of a
`United States parent corporation amenable to suit in state
`court on claims unrelated to any activity of the subsidiar-
`ies in the forum State?
`A bus accident outside Paris that took the lives of two
`13-year-old boys from North Carolina gave rise to the liti-
`gation we here consider. Attributing the accident to a
`defective tire manufactured in Turkey at the plant of a
`foreign subsidiary of The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Com-
`pany (Goodyear USA), the boys’ parents commenced an
`action for damages in a North Carolina state court; they
`named as defendants Goodyear USA, an Ohio corporation,
`and three of its subsidiaries, organized and operating,
`respectively, in Turkey, France, and Luxembourg. Good-
`year USA, which had plants in North Carolina and regu-
`larly engaged in commercial activity there, did not contest
`
`

`
`2
`
`GOODYEAR DUNLOP TIRES OPERATIONS, S. A.
`v. BROWN
`Opinion of the Court
`the North Carolina court’s jurisdiction over it; Goodyear
`USA’s foreign subsidiaries, however, maintained that
`North Carolina lacked adjudicatory authority over them.
`A state court’s assertion of jurisdiction exposes defen-
`dants to the State’s coercive power, and is therefore sub-
`ject to review for compatibility with the Fourteenth
`Amendment’s Due Process Clause. International Shoe
`Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 316 (1945) (assertion of
`jurisdiction over out-of-state corporation must comply with
`“‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’”
`(quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457, 463 (1940))).
`Opinions in the wake of the pathmarking International
`Shoe decision have differentiated between general or all-
`purpose jurisdiction, and specific or case-linked jurisdic-
`tion. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall,
`466 U. S. 408, 414, nn. 8, 9 (1984).
`A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign
`(sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear any
`and all claims against them when their affiliations with
`the State are so “continuous and systematic” as to render
`them essentially at home in the forum State. See Interna-
`tional Shoe, 326 U. S., at 317. Specific jurisdiction, on the
`other hand, depends on an “affiliatio[n] between the forum
`and the underlying controversy,” principally, activity or an
`occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is
`therefore subject to the State’s regulation. von Mehren &
`Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analy-
`sis, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1121, 1136 (1966) (hereinafter von
`Mehren & Trautman); see Brilmayer et al., A General
`Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 Texas L. Rev. 721, 782
`(1988) (hereinafter Brilmayer). In contrast to general, all-
`purpose jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction is confined to
`adjudication of “issues deriving from, or connected with,
`the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.” von
`Mehren & Trautman 1136.
`Because the episode-in-suit, the bus accident, occurred
`
`

`
`Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)
`
`3
`
`Opinion of the Court
`in France, and the tire alleged to have caused the accident
`was manufactured and sold abroad, North Carolina courts
`lacked specific jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy.
`The North Carolina Court of Appeals so acknowledged.
`Brown v. Meter, 199 N. C. App. 50, 57–58, 681 S. E. 2d
`382, 388 (2009). Were the foreign subsidiaries nonetheless
`amenable to general jurisdiction in North Carolina courts?
`Confusing or blending general and specific jurisdictional
`inquiries, the North Carolina courts answered yes. Some
`of the tires made abroad by Goodyear’s foreign subsidiar-
`ies, the North Carolina Court of Appeals stressed, had
`reached North Carolina through “the stream of com-
`merce”; that connection, the Court of Appeals believed,
`gave North Carolina courts the handle needed for the
`exercise of general jurisdiction over the foreign corpora-
`tions. Id., at 67–68, 681 S. E. 2d, at 394–395.
`A connection so limited between the forum and the for-
`eign corporation, we hold, is an inadequate basis for the
`exercise of general jurisdiction. Such a connection does
`not establish the “continuous and systematic” affiliation
`necessary to empower North Carolina courts to entertain
`claims unrelated to the foreign corporation’s contacts with
`the State.
`
`I
`On April 18, 2004, a bus destined for Charles de Gaulle
`Airport overturned on a road outside Paris, France. Pas-
`sengers on the bus were young soccer players from North
`Carolina beginning their journey home. Two 13-year-olds,
`Julian Brown and Matthew Helms, sustained fatal inju-
`ries. The boys’ parents, respondents in this Court, filed a
`suit for wrongful-death damages in the Superior Court of
`Onslow County, North Carolina, in their capacity as ad-
`ministrators of the boys’ estates. Attributing the accident
`to a tire that failed when its plies separated, the parents
`alleged negligence in the “design, construction, testing,
`
`

`
`4
`
`GOODYEAR DUNLOP TIRES OPERATIONS, S. A.
`v. BROWN
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`and inspection” of the tire. 199 N. C. App., at 51, 681 S. E.
`2d, at 384 (internal quotation marks omitted).
`Goodyear Luxembourg Tires, SA (Goodyear Luxem-
`bourg), Goodyear Lastikleri T. A. S. (Goodyear Turkey),
`and Goodyear Dunlop Tires France, SA
`(Goodyear
`France), petitioners here, were named as defendants.
`Incorporated in Luxembourg, Turkey, and France, respec-
`tively, petitioners are indirect subsidiaries of Goodyear
`USA, an Ohio corporation also named as a defendant in
`the suit. Petitioners manufacture tires primarily for sale
`in European and Asian markets. Their tires differ in size
`and construction from tires ordinarily sold in the United
`States. They are designed to carry significantly heavier
`loads, and to serve under road conditions and speed limits
`in the manufacturers’ primary markets.1
`In contrast to the parent company, Goodyear USA,
`which does not contest the North Carolina courts’ personal
`jurisdiction over it, petitioners are not registered to do
`business in North Carolina. They have no place of busi-
`ness, employees, or bank accounts in North Carolina.
`They do not design, manufacture, or advertise their prod-
`ucts in North Carolina. And they do not solicit business in
`North Carolina or themselves sell or ship tires to North
`Carolina customers. Even so, a small percentage of peti-
`tioners’ tires (tens of thousands out of tens of millions
`manufactured between 2004 and 2007) were distributed
`within North Carolina by other Goodyear USA affiliates.
`These tires were typically custom ordered to equip special-
`ized vehicles such as cement mixers, waste haulers, and
`boat and horse trailers. Petitioners state, and respondents
`——————
`1Respondents portray Goodyear USA’s structure as a reprehensible
`effort to “outsource” all manufacturing, and correspondingly, tort
`litigation, to foreign jurisdictions. See Brief for Respondents 51–53.
`Yet Turkey, where the tire alleged to have caused the accident-in-suit
`was made, is hardly a strange location for a facility that primarily
`supplies markets in Europe and Asia.
`
`

`
`Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)
`
`5
`
`Opinion of the Court
`do not here deny, that the type of tire involved in the
`accident, a Goodyear Regional RHS tire manufactured
`by Goodyear Turkey, was never distributed in North
`Carolina.
`Petitioners moved to dismiss the claims against them
`for want of personal jurisdiction. The trial court denied
`the motion, and the North Carolina Court of Appeals af-
`firmed. Acknowledging that the claims neither “related
`to, nor . . . ar[o]se from, [petitioners’] contacts with North
`Carolina,” the Court of Appeals confined its analysis to
`“general rather than specific jurisdiction,” which the court
`recognized required a “higher threshold” showing: A de-
`fendant must have “continuous and systematic contacts”
`with the forum. Id., at 58, 681 S. E. 2d, at 388 (internal
`quotation marks omitted). That threshold was crossed,
`the court determined, when petitioners placed their tires
`“in the stream of interstate commerce without any limita-
`tion on the extent to which those tires could be sold in
`North Carolina.” Id., at 67, 681 S. E. 2d, at 394.
`Nothing in the record, the court observed, indicated
`that petitioners “took any affirmative action to cause tires
`which they had manufactured to be shipped into North
`Carolina.” Id., at 64, 681 S. E. 2d, at 392. The court
`found, however, that tires made by petitioners reached
`North Carolina as a consequence of a “highly-organized
`distribution process” involving other Goodyear USA sub-
`sidiaries. Id., at 67, 681 S. E. 2d, at 394. Petitioners, the
`court noted, made “no attempt to keep these tires from
`reaching the North Carolina market.” Id., at 66, 681 S. E.
`2d, at 393. Indeed, the very tire involved in the accident,
`the court observed, conformed to tire standards estab-
`lished by the U. S. Department of Transportation and bore
`markings required for sale in the United States. Ibid.2 As
`——————
`2Such markings do not necessarily show that any of the tires were
`destined for sale in the United States. To facilitate trade, the Solicitor
`
`

`
`6
`
`GOODYEAR DUNLOP TIRES OPERATIONS, S. A.
`v. BROWN
`Opinion of the Court
`further support, the court invoked North Carolina’s “inter-
`est in providing a forum in which its citizens are able to
`seek redress for [their] injuries,” and noted the hardship
`North Carolina plaintiffs would experience “[were they]
`required to litigate their claims in France,” a country to
`which they have no ties. Id., at 68, 681 S. E. 2d, at 394.
`The North Carolina Supreme Court denied discretionary
`review. Brown v. Meter, 364 N. C. 128, 695 S. E. 2d 756
`(2010).
`We granted certiorari to decide whether the general
`jurisdiction the North Carolina courts asserted over peti-
`tioners is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the
`Fourteenth Amendment. 561 U. S. ___ (2010).
`II
`
`A
`
`The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
`sets the outer boundaries of a state tribunal’s authority to
`proceed against a defendant. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U. S.
`186, 207 (1977). The canonical opinion in this area re-
`mains International Shoe, 326 U. S. 310, in which we held
`that a State may authorize its courts to exercise personal
`jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant if the defendant
`has “certain minimum contacts with [the State] such that
`the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional
`notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Id., at 316
`(quoting Meyer, 311 U. S., at 463).
`Endeavoring to give specific content to the “fair play and
`substantial justice” concept, the Court in International
`Shoe classified cases involving out-of-state corporate
`defendants. First, as in International Shoe itself, jurisdic-
`tion unquestionably could be asserted where the corpora-
`——————
`General explained, the United States encourages other countries to
`“treat compliance with [Department of Transportation] standards, in-
`cluding through use of DOT markings, as evidence that the products
`are safely manufactured.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 32.
`
`

`
`Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)
`
`7
`
`Opinion of the Court
`tion’s in-state activity is “continuous and systematic” and
`that activity gave rise to the episode-in-suit. 326 U. S., at
`317. Further, the Court observed, the commission of
`certain “single or occasional acts” in a State may be suffi-
`cient to render a corporation answerable in that State
`with respect to those acts, though not with respect to
`matters unrelated to the forum connections. Id., at 318.
`The heading courts today use to encompass these two
`International Shoe categories is “specific jurisdiction.” See
`von Mehren & Trautman 1144–1163. Adjudicatory au-
`thority is “specific” when the suit “aris[es] out of or relate[s]
`to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Helicopteros,
`466 U. S., at 414, n. 8.
` International Shoe distinguished from cases that fit
`within the “specific jurisdiction” categories, “instances in
`which the continuous corporate operations within a state
`[are] so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit
`against it on causes of action arising from dealings en-
`tirely distinct from those activities.” 326 U. S., at 318.
`Adjudicatory authority so grounded is today called “gen-
`eral jurisdiction.” Helicopteros, 466 U. S., at 414, n. 9. For
`an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of
`general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a
`corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the
`corporation is fairly regarded as at home. See Brilmayer
`728 (identifying domicile, place of incorporation, and
`principal place of business as “paradig[m]” bases for the
`exercise of general jurisdiction).
`Since International Shoe, this Court’s decisions have
`elaborated primarily on circumstances that warrant the
`exercise of specific jurisdiction, particularly in cases in-
`volving “single or occasional acts” occurring or having
`their impact within the forum State. As a rule in these
`cases, this Court has inquired whether there was “some
`act by which the defendant purposefully avail[ed] itself of
`the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
`
`

`
`8
`
`GOODYEAR DUNLOP TIRES OPERATIONS, S. A.
`v. BROWN
`Opinion of the Court
`State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
`laws.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U. S. 235, 253 (1958). See,
`e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. S.
`286, 287, 297 (1980) (Oklahoma court may not exercise
`personal jurisdiction “over a nonresident automobile re-
`tailer and its wholesale distributor in a products-liability
`action, when the defendants’ only connection with Okla-
`homa is the fact that an automobile sold in New York to
`New York residents became involved in an accident in
`Oklahoma”); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U. S.
`462, 474–475 (1985) (franchisor headquartered in Florida
`may maintain breach-of-contract action in Florida against
`Michigan franchisees, where agreement contemplated on-
`going interactions between franchisees and franchisor’s
`headquarters); Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court
`of Cal., Solano Cty., 480 U. S. 102, 105 (1987) (Taiwanese
`tire manufacturer settled product liability action brought
`in California and sought indemnification there from Japa-
`nese valve assembly manufacturer; Japanese company’s
`“mere awareness . . . that the components it manufac-
`tured, sold, and delivered outside the United States would
`reach the forum State in the stream of commerce” held
`insufficient to permit California court’s adjudication of
`Taiwanese company’s cross-complaint); id., at 109 (opinion
`of O’Connor, J.); id., at 116–117 (Brennan, J., concurring
`in part and concurring in judgment). See also Twitchell,
`The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 610,
`628 (1988) (in the wake of International Shoe, “specific
`jurisdiction has become the centerpiece of modern jurisdic-
`tion theory, while general jurisdiction plays a reduced
`role”).
`In only two decisions postdating International Shoe,
`discussed infra, at 11–13, has this Court considered
`whether an out-of-state corporate defendant’s in-state
`contacts were sufficiently “continuous and systematic” to
`justify the exercise of general jurisdiction over claims
`
`

`
`Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)
`
`9
`
`Opinion of the Court
`unrelated to those contacts: Perkins v. Benguet Consol.
`Mining Co., 342 U. S. 437 (1952) (general jurisdiction
`appropriately exercised over Philippine corporation sued
`in Ohio, where the company’s affairs were overseen during
`World War II); and Helicopteros, 466 U. S. 408 (helicopter
`owned by Colombian corporation crashed in Peru; survi-
`vors of U. S. citizens who died in the crash, the Court
`held, could not maintain wrongful-death actions against the
`Colombian corporation in Texas, for the corporation’s
`helicopter purchases and purchase-linked activity in
`Texas were insufficient to subject it to Texas court’s gen-
`eral jurisdiction).
`
`B
`To justify the exercise of general jurisdiction over peti-
`tioners, the North Carolina courts relied on the petition-
`ers’ placement of their tires in the “stream of commerce.”
`See supra, at 5. The stream-of-commerce metaphor has
`been invoked frequently in lower court decisions permit-
`ting “jurisdiction in products liability cases in which the
`product has traveled through an extensive chain of distri-
`bution before reaching the ultimate consumer.” 18 W.
`Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations §8640.40,
`p. 133 (rev. ed. 2007). Typically, in such cases, a nonresi-
`dent defendant, acting outside the forum, places in the
`stream of commerce a product that ultimately causes
`harm inside the forum. See generally Dayton, Personal
`Jurisdiction and the Stream of Commerce, 7 Rev. Litiga-
`tion 239, 262–268 (1988) (discussing origins and evolution
`of the stream-of-commerce doctrine).
`Many States have enacted long-arm statutes authoriz-
`ing courts to exercise specific jurisdiction over manufac-
`turers when the events in suit, or some of them, occurred
`within the forum state. For example, the “Local Injury;
`Foreign Act” subsection of North Carolina’s long-arm
`statute authorizes North Carolina courts to exercise per-
`
`

`
`10
`
`GOODYEAR DUNLOP TIRES OPERATIONS, S. A.
`v. BROWN
`Opinion of the Court
`sonal jurisdiction in “any action claiming injury to person
`or property within this State arising out of [the defen-
`dant’s] act or omission outside this State,” if, “in addi-
`tion[,] at or about the time of the injury,” ”[p]roducts . . .
`manufactured by the defendant were used or consumed,
`within this State in the ordinary course of trade.” N. C.
`Gen. Stat. Ann. §1–75.4(4)(b) (Lexis 2009).3 As the North
`Carolina Court of Appeals recognized, this provision of the
`State’s long-arm statute “does not apply to this case,” for
`both the act alleged to have caused injury (the fabrication
`of the allegedly defective tire) and its impact (the accident)
`occurred outside the forum. See 199 N. C. App., at 61,
`n. 6, 681 S. E. 2d, at 390, n. 6.4
`The North Carolina court’s stream-of-commerce analysis
`elided the essential difference between case-specific and
`all-purpose (general) jurisdiction. Flow of a manufac-
`turer’s products into the forum, we have explained, may
`bolster an affiliation germane to specific jurisdiction. See,
`e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U. S., at 297 (where “the
`sale of a product . . . is not simply an isolated occurrence,
`but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or distribu-
`tor to serve . . . the market for its product in [several]
`
`——————
`3Cf. D. C. Code §13–423(a)(4) (2001) (providing for specific jurisdic-
`tion over defendant who “caus[es] tortious injury in the [forum] by an
`act or omission outside the [forum]” when, in addition, the defendant
`“derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed . . . in the
`[forum]”).
`4The court instead relied on N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §1–75.4(1)(d), see
`199 N. C. App., at 57, 681 S. E. 2d, at 388, which provides for jurisdic-
`tion, “whether the claim arises within or without [the] State,” when the
`defendant “[i]s engaged in substantial activity within this State,
`whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise.”
`This provision, the North Carolina Supreme Court has held, was “in-
`tended to make available to the North Carolina courts the full juris-
`dictional powers permissible under federal due process.” Dillon v.
`Numismatic Funding Corp., 291 N. C. 674, 676, 231 S. E. 2d 629, 630
`(1977).
`
`

`
`Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)
`
`11
`
`Opinion of the Court
`States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one
`of those States if its allegedly defective merchandise has
`there been the source of injury to its owner or to others” (em-
`phasis added)). But ties serving to bolster the exercise
`of specific jurisdiction do not warrant a determination
`that, based on those ties, the forum has general jurisdic-
`tion over a defendant. See, e.g., Stabilisierungsfonds Fur
`Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distributors Pty. Ltd., 647 F. 2d
`200, 203, n. 5 (CADC 1981) (defendants’ marketing ar-
`rangements, although “adequate to permit litigation of
`claims relating to [their] introduction of . . . wine into
`the United States stream of commerce, . . . would not be
`adequate to support general, ‘all purpose’ adjudicatory
`authority”).
`A corporation’s “continuous activity of some sorts within
`a state,” International Shoe instructed, “is not enough to
`support the demand that the corporation be amenable to
`suits unrelated to that activity.” 326 U. S., at 318. Our
`1952 decision in Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co.
`remains “[t]he textbook case of general jurisdiction appro-
`priately exercised over a foreign corporation that has not
`consented to suit in the forum.” Donahue v. Far Eastern
`Air Transport Corp., 652 F. 2d 1032, 1037 (CADC 1981).
`Sued in Ohio, the defendant in Perkins was a Philippine
`mining corporation that had ceased activities in the Phil-
`ippines during World War II. To the extent that the com-
`pany was conducting any business during and immedi-
`ately after the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, it
`was doing so in Ohio: the corporation’s president main-
`tained his office there, kept the company files in that
`office, and supervised from the Ohio office “the necessarily
`limited wartime activities of the company.” Perkins, 342
`U. S., at 447–448. Although the claim-in-suit did not arise
`in Ohio, this Court ruled that it would not violate due
`process for Ohio to adjudicate the controversy. Ibid.; see
`Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U. S. 770, 779–780,
`
`

`
`12
`
`GOODYEAR DUNLOP TIRES OPERATIONS, S. A.
`v. BROWN
`Opinion of the Court
`n. 11 (1984) (Ohio’s exercise of general jurisdiction was
`permissible in Perkins because “Ohio was the corporation’s
`principal, if temporary, place of business”).
`We next addressed the exercise of general jurisdiction
`over an out-of-state corporation over three decades later,
`in Helicopteros. In that case, survivors of United States
`citizens who died in a helicopter crash in Peru instituted
`wrongful-death actions in a Texas state court against the
`owner and operator of the helicopter, a Colombian corpo-
`ration. The Colombian corporation had no place of busi-
`ness in Texas and was not licensed to do business there.
`“Basically, [the company’s] contacts with Texas consisted
`of sending its chief executive officer to Houston for a
`contract-negotiation session; accepting into its New York
`bank account checks drawn on a Houston bank; purchas-
`ing helicopters, equipment, and training services from [a
`Texas enterprise] for substantial sums; and sending per-
`sonnel to [Texas] for training.” 466 U. S., at 416. These
`links to Texas, we determined, did not “constitute the kind
`of continuous and systematic general business contacts . . .
`found to exist in Perkins,” and were insufficient to support
`the exercise of jurisdiction over a claim that neither
`“ar[o]se out of . . . no[r] related to” the defendant’s activi-
`ties in Texas. Id., at 415–416 (internal quotation marks
`omitted).
`Helicopteros concluded that “mere purchases [made in
`the forum State], even if occurring at regular intervals,
`are not enough to warrant a State’s assertion of [general]
`jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation in a cause of
`action not related to those purchase transactions.” Id., at
`418. We see no reason to differentiate from the ties to
`Texas held insufficient in Helicopteros, the sales of peti-
`tioners’ tires sporadically made in North Carolina through
`intermediaries. Under the sprawling view of general
`jurisdiction urged by respondents and embraced by the
`North Carolina Court of Appeals, any substantial manu-
`
`

`
`Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011)
`