Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012)
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`Per Curiam
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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` BRIAN COLEMAN, SUPERINTENDENT, STATE COR-
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` RECTIONAL INSTITUTION AT FAYETTE, ET AL.
`v. LORENZO JOHNSON
`
`ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
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`STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
`
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`No. 11–1053. Decided May 29, 2012
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` PER CURIAM.
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`Respondent Lorenzo Johnson was convicted as an ac-
`complice and co-conspirator in the murder of Taraja Wil-
`liams, who was killed by a shotgun blast to the chest in
`the early morning hours of December 15, 1995, in Har-
`risburg, Pennsylvania. After his conviction was affirmed
`in state court, Johnson exhausted his state remedies and
`sought a writ of habeas corpus in Federal District Court
`pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penal-
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`ty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U. S. C. §2254. The District
`Court denied habeas relief but the U. S. Court of Appeals
`for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the evidence
`at trial was insufficient to support Johnson’s conviction
`under the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443
`U. S. 307 (1979).
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`We have made clear that Jackson claims face a high bar
`in federal habeas proceedings because they are subject to
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`two layers of judicial deference. First, on direct appeal, “it
`is the responsibility of the jury—not the court—to decide
`what conclusions should be drawn from evidence admitted
`at trial. A reviewing court may set aside the jury’s verdict
`on the ground of insufficient evidence only if no rational
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`trier of fact could have agreed with the jury.” Cavazos v.
`Smith, 565 U. S. 1, ___ (2011) (per curiam) (slip op., at 1).
`And second, on habeas review, “a federal court may not
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`overturn a state court decision rejecting a sufficiency of
`the evidence challenge simply because the federal court
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` COLEMAN v. JOHNSON
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`Per Curiam
`disagrees with the state court. The federal court instead
`may do so only if the state court decision was ‘objectively
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`unreasonable.’” Ibid. (quoting Renico v. Lett, 559 U. S.
`___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 5)).
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`Because the Court of Appeals failed to afford due respect
`to the role of the jury and the state courts of Pennsylvania,
`we now grant certiorari and reverse the judgment below.
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`The parties agree that Williams was shot and killed
`by Corey Walker, who was subsequently convicted of first-
`degree murder. Johnson was with Walker on the night of
`the crime, and the two were tried jointly. Johnson was
`charged as an accomplice and co-conspirator. See 18 Pa.
`Cons. Stat. §2502 (2008) (defining first-degree murder
`as “willful, deliberate and premeditated” killing); §306(c)
`(imposing accomplice liability for anyone who, “with the
`intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of the
`offense . . . aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other
`person in planning or committing it”); Commonwealth v.
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`Montalvo, 598 Pa. 263, 274, 956 A. 2d 926, 932 (2008)
`(criminal conspiracy liability for anyone who takes an
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`overt act in furtherance of a crime he has agreed to abet or
`commit).
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`At trial, the Commonwealth called Victoria Doubs, who
`testified that she, Johnson, and Walker were “close
`friends” who “ran the streets together.” Tr. 213. On the
`morning of December 14, the three of them awoke at the
`same residence, bought marijuana, and then went to a
`Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant, where they encoun-
`tered Williams. Walker announced that he was going to
`“holler at” Williams about a debt Williams owed. Id., at
`217. According to Doubs, Walker and Williams “were
`talking about the money that [Williams] had owed us,”
`with Walker “asking [Williams], confronting him, about
`his money and what’s up with the money and why is it
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`Per Curiam
`taking you so long to give us the money.” Id., at 217–218.
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`Williams was “cussing [Walker] out, telling him he’d
`give it to him when he felt like it and he ain’t scared of
`[Walker].”
`Id., at 218. A fight ensued, which ended
`when Williams beat Walker with a broomstick in front
`of the crowd of people that had gathered.
`After the fight, Doubs testified, Walker “was mad, be-
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`cause he got beat by a crackhead. . . . He was saying, yo,
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`that crackhead beat me. I’m going to kill that crackhead.
`I’m going to kill that kid. . . . He was hot. He was heated.”
`Id., at 220–221. Johnson was present when Walker made
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`these statements. Later that afternoon, Doubs recounted
`the beating to others, who laughed at Walker. Walker
`“repeated it for a while that I’m going to kill that kid.
`That kid must think I’m some type of joke. I’m going to
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`kill that kid. Who he think he is[?]” Id., at 222. Once
`again, Johnson was present for these statements.
`Another witness was Carla Brown, a friend of the victim,
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`who testified that she was at the Midnight Special Bar
`on the night of December 14–15, where she saw Walker,
`Johnson, and Williams engaged in a heated argument.
`Although she could not hear what they were saying, she
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`could tell they were arguing because they were making “a
`lot of arm movements.” Id., at 104. The bouncer soon told
`them to leave, and Brown followed them into the street
`because she “wanted to know what was going on.” Ibid.
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`Brown observed the three men walking in a single-file
`line, with Walker in front, Williams in the middle, and
`Johnson in the back. Walker was wearing a long leather
`coat, walking as if he had something concealed under-
`neath it. Brown followed the three men to an alleyway, at
`which point Williams recognized Brown and told her to “go
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`ahead” and pass. Id., at 107. Walker then entered the
`alleyway, followed by Williams, while Johnson remained
`standing at the entrance. As Brown walked past the alley,
`she heard a loud “boom,” causing her to run away. Id., at
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` COLEMAN v. JOHNSON
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`Per Curiam
`143. On cross-examination, Brown stated: “They walked
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`[Williams] in that alley. He stood inside the alley. He
`walked him in the alley. I heard a boom.” Ibid.
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`The Commonwealth also called Aaron Dews, who testi-
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`fied that he was in a building bordering the alleyway at
`12:45 a.m. on the morning of December 15. He heard a
`loud boom that caused him to look out into the alley from
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`his second-story window, where he saw two silhouettes
`fleeing.
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`After Dews the Commonwealth called Brian Ramsey,
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`who had been selling cocaine on a nearby street corner at
`the time of the murder. He testified that he saw Williams
`walking toward an alleyway with two males and a female,
`and he heard a loud boom shortly after Williams entered
`the alley. When pressed on cross-examination, he stated:
`“I would say that [Williams] was forced in that alley.” Id.,
`at 189.
`The jury also heard testimony from police who searched
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`the alley shortly after the murder and found a shotgun
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`with the barrel missing. A medical examiner who exam-
`ined Williams’ body testified that the cause of death was a
`shotgun wound to the chest.
`After the jury convicted Johnson, he filed a post-trial
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`motion arguing that the evidence was insufficient to sup-
`port his conviction. The court denied his motion, and
`the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the conviction
`on direct appeal. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 726
`A. 2d 1079 (1998). After the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
`denied his petition for review, Johnson unsuccessfully
`sought state postconviction relief. He then filed a habeas
`petition in Federal District Court, which denied his
`claims. See Johnson v. Mechling, 541 F. Supp. 2d 651
`(MD Pa. 2008). Finally, Johnson appealed to the Third
`Circuit, which reversed the District Court and ordered his
`conviction overturned.
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` Under Jackson, evidence is sufficient to support a con-
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` Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012)
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`Per Curiam
`viction if, “after viewing the evidence in the light most
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`favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
`could have found the essential elements of the crime be-
`yond a reasonable doubt.” 443 U. S., at 319.
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`In light of the testimony at Johnson’s trial, the Court of
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`Appeals acknowledged that “[a] trier of fact could reason-
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`ably infer . . . that Johnson and Walker shared a common
`intent to confront, threaten or harass Williams.” Johnson
`v. Mechling, 446 Fed. Appx. 531, 540 (CA3 2011). As for
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`the notion that “Johnson shared Walker’s intent to kill
`Williams,” however, the court concluded that was “mere
`speculation” that no rational factfinder could accept as
`true. Ibid. The court stated that “a reasonable inference
`is one where the fact inferred is ‘more likely than not to
`flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend.’”
`Id., at 539–540 (quoting Commonwealth v. McFarland,
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`452 Pa. 435, 439, 308 A. 2d 592, 594 (1973)). In order for a
`jury’s inferences to be permissible, the court reasoned,
`they must “‘flow from facts and circumstances proven in
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`the record’” that are “‘of such volume and quality as to
`overcome the presumption of innocence.’” 446 Fed. Appx.,
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`at 539 (quoting Commonwealth v. Bostick, 958 A. 2d 543,
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`560 (Pa. Super. 2008)).
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`At the outset, we note that it was error for the Court of
`Appeals to look to Pennsylvania law in determining what
`distinguishes a reasoned inference from “mere specula-
`tion.” Under Jackson, federal courts must look to state
`law for “the substantive elements of the criminal offense,”
`443 U. S., at 324, n. 16, but the minimum amount of evi-
`dence that the Due Process Clause requires to prove the
`offense is purely a matter of federal law.
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`Under the deferential federal standard, the approach
`taken by the Court of Appeals was flawed because it un-
`duly impinged on the jury’s role as factfinder. Jackson
`leaves juries broad discretion in deciding what inferences
`to draw from the evidence presented at trial, requiring
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` COLEMAN v. JOHNSON
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`Per Curiam
`only that jurors “draw reasonable inferences from basic
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`facts to ultimate facts.” Id., at 319. This deferential
`standard does not permit the type of fine-grained factual
`parsing in which the Court of Appeals engaged. For ex-
`ample, in addressing Brown and Ramsey’s testimony that
`Williams was “walked” and “forced” into the alleyway, the
`court objected that the witnesses did not describe any
`“physical action” supporting the conclusion that force was
`used. 446 Fed. Appx., at 541. Absent some specific testi-
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`mony that “Johnson actively pushed, shoved, ordered or
`otherwise forced the victim into the alley, or prevented
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`him from leaving it,” ibid., the court could see no reason-
`able basis for the jury’s conclusion that Johnson had a
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`specific intent to help kill Williams.
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`That analysis is flawed for two reasons. First, the coer-
`cive nature of Johnson and Walker’s behavior could be
`inferred from other circumstances not involving the direct
`use of force: Walker was noticeably concealing a weapon,
`and he had been heatedly threatening to kill Williams
`after a violent confrontation earlier in the day. Johnson
`and Walker kept Williams between them in a single-file
`line on the way to the alley, where Johnson stood at the
`entrance while the other two entered, suggesting that
`Johnson may have been prepared to prevent Williams
`from fleeing. And second, even if Williams was not co-
`erced into the alley, the jury still could have concluded
`that Johnson helped lead or lure him there to facilitate the
`murder.
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`Taken in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the
`trial testimony revealed that Johnson and Walker “ran
`the streets together,” and had attempted to collect a debt
`from Williams earlier on the day of the murder. Williams
`resisted the collection, managing to humiliate Walker in
`the process by giving him a public thrashing with a
`broomstick. This enraged Walker to the point that he
`repeatedly declared over the course of the day in Johnson’s
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`It is so ordered.
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` Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012)
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`Per Curiam
` presence that he intended to kill Williams. Then, while
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`Walker was noticeably concealing a bulky object under his
`trenchcoat, Johnson helped escort Williams into an alley,
`where Johnson stood at the entryway while Walker pulled
`out a shotgun and shot Williams in the chest.
`On the basis of these facts, a rational jury could infer
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`that Johnson knew that Walker was armed with a shot-
`gun; knew that he intended to kill Williams; and helped
`usher Williams into the alleyway to meet his fate. The
`jury in this case was convinced, and the only question
`under Jackson is whether that finding was so insupporta-
`ble as to fall below the threshold of bare rationality. The
`state court of last review did not think so, and that deter-
`mination in turn is entitled to considerable deference
`under AEDPA, 28 U. S. C. §2254(d).
`Affording due respect to the role of the jury and the
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`state courts, we conclude that the evidence at Johnson’s
`trial was not nearly sparse enough to sustain a due pro-
`cess challenge under Jackson. The evidence was sufficient
`to convict Johnson as an accomplice and a co-conspirator
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` in the murder of Taraja Williams. The Commonwealth’s
`petition for certiorari and the motion to proceed in forma
`pauperis are granted, the judgment of the Court of Ap-
`peals for the Third Circuit is reversed, and the case is
`remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
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`opinion.