Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2012)
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`Per Curiam
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`NITRO-LIFT TECHNOLOGIES, L. L. C. v. EDDIE LEE
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`HOWARD ET AL.
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`ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME
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`COURT OF OKLAHOMA
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`No. 11–1377. Decided November 26, 2012
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` PER CURIAM.
`State courts rather than federal courts are most fre­
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`quently called upon to apply the Federal Arbitration Act
`(FAA), 9 U. S. C. §1 et seq., including the Act’s national
`policy favoring arbitration. It is a matter of great im­
`portance, therefore, that state supreme courts adhere to a
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`correct interpretation of the legislation. Here, the Okla­
`homa Supreme Court failed to do so. By declaring the
`noncompetition agreements in two employment contracts
`null and void, rather than leaving that determination to
`the arbitrator in the first instance, the state court ignored
`a basic tenet of the Act’s substantive arbitration law. The
`decision must be vacated.
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`This dispute arises from a contract between petitioner
`Nitro-Lift Technologies, L. L. C., and two of its former
`employees. Nitro-Lift contracts with operators of oil and
`gas wells to provide services that enhance production.
`Respondents Eddie Lee Howard and Shane D. Schneider
`entered a confidentiality and noncompetition agreement
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`with Nitro-Lift that contained the following arbitration
`clause:
`“‘Any dispute, difference or unresolved question be­
`tween Nitro-Lift and the Employee (collectively the
`“Disputing Parties”) shall be settled by arbitration by
`a single arbitrator mutually agreeable to the Disput­
`ing Parties in an arbitration proceeding conducted in
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`NITRO-LIFT TECHNOLOGIES, L. L. C. v. HOWARD
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` Per Curiam
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`Houston, Texas in accordance with the rules existing
`at the date hereof of the American Arbitration Associ­
`ation.’” Pet. for Cert. 5.
`After working for Nitro-Lift on wells in Oklahoma, Texas,
`and Arkansas, respondents quit and began working for
`one of Nitro-Lift’s competitors. Claiming that respondents
`had breached their noncompetition agreements, Nitro-Lift
`served them with a demand for arbitration. Respondents
`then filed suit in the District Court of Johnston County,
`Oklahoma, asking the court to declare the noncompetition
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`agreements null and void and to enjoin their enforcement.
`The court dismissed the complaint, finding that the con­
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`tracts contained valid arbitration clauses under which an
`arbitrator, and not the court, must settle the parties’
`disagreement.
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`The Oklahoma Supreme Court retained respondents’
`appeal and ordered the parties to show cause why the
`matter should not be resolved by application of Okla.
`Stat., Tit. 15, §219A (West 2011), which limits the en­
`forceability of noncompetition agreements. Nitro-Lift
`argued that any dispute as to the contracts’ enforceability
`was a question for the arbitrator. It relied for support—
`as it had done before the trial court—upon several of this
`Court’s cases interpreting the FAA, and noted that under
`Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U. S. 440,
`446 (2006), “this arbitration law applies in both state and
`federal courts.” Record in No. 109,003 (Okla.), p. 273.
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`The Oklahoma Supreme Court was not persuaded. It
`held that despite the “[U. S.] Supreme Court cases on
`which the employers rely,” the “existence of an arbitration
`agreement in an employment contract does not prohibit
`judicial review of the underlying agreement.” 2011 OK 98,
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`¶15, n. 20, ¶16, 273 P. 3d 20, 26, n. 20, 27. For that prop­
`osition, the court relied on the “exhaustive overview of
`the United States Supreme Court decisions construing the
`Federal Arbitration Act” in Bruner v. Timberlane Manor
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` Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2012)
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`Per Curiam
`Ltd. Partnership, 2006 OK 90, 155 P. 3d 16, which found
`Supreme Court jurisprudence “not to inhibit our review
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`of the underlying contract’s validity.” 273 P. 3d, at 26.
`Finding the arbitration clauses no obstacle to its review,
`the court held that the noncompetition agreements were
`“void and unenforceable as against Oklahoma’s public
`policy,” expressed in Okla. Stat., Tit. 15, §219A. 273 P. 3d,
`at 27.
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`The Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that its decision
`rests on adequate and independent state grounds. Id., at
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`23–24, n. 5. If that were so, we would have no jurisdiction
`over this case. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032,
`1037–1044 (1983).
`It is not so, however, because the
`court’s reliance on Oklahoma law was not “independent”—
`it necessarily depended upon a rejection of the federal
`claim, which was both “‘properly presented to’” and “‘ad­
`dressed by’” the state court. Howell v. Mississippi, 543
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`U. S. 440, 443 (2005) (per curiam) (quoting Adams v.
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`Robertson, 520 U. S. 83, 86 (1997) (per curiam)). Nitro-
`Lift claimed that the arbitrator should decide the con­
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`tract’s validity, and raised a federal-law basis for that
`claim by relying on Supreme Court cases construing the
`FAA. “‘[A] litigant wishing to raise a federal issue can
`easily indicate the federal law basis for his claim in a
`state-court petition or brief . . . by citing in conjunction
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`with the claim the federal source of law on which he relies
`or a case deciding such a claim on federal grounds . . . .’”
`Howell, supra, at 444 (quoting Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U. S.
`27, 32 (2004); emphasis added). The Oklahoma Supreme
`Court acknowledged the cases on which Nitro-Lift relied,
`as well as their relevant holdings, but chose to discount
`these controlling decisions. Its conclusion that, despite
`this Court’s jurisprudence, the underlying contract’s valid­
`ity is purely a matter of state law for state-court deter­
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`mination is all the more reason for this Court to assert
`jurisdiction.
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`NITRO-LIFT TECHNOLOGIES, L. L. C. v. HOWARD
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` Per Curiam
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`The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision disregards this
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`Court’s precedents on the FAA. That Act, which “de­
`clare[s] a national policy favoring arbitration,” Southland
`Corp. v. Keating, 465 U. S. 1, 10 (1984), provides that a
`“written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transac­
`tion involving commerce to settle by arbitration a contro­
`versy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction
`. . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
`such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
`of any contract.” 9 U. S. C. §2. It is well settled that
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`“the substantive law the Act created [is] applicable in state
`and federal courts.” Southland Corp., supra, at 12; see
`also Buckeye, supra, at 446. And when parties commit to
`arbitrate contractual disputes, it is a mainstay of the Act’s
`substantive law that attacks on the validity of the con­
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`tract, as distinct from attacks on the validity of the arbi­
`tration clause itself, are to be resolved “by the arbitrator
`in the first instance, not by a federal or state court.”
`Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U. S. 346, 349 (2008); see also Prima
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`Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U. S. 395
`(1967). For these purposes, an “arbitration provision is
`severable from the remainder of the contract,” Buckeye,
`supra, at 445, and its validity is subject to initial court
`determination; but the validity of the remainder of the
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`contract (if the arbitration provision is valid) is for the
`arbitrator to decide.
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`This principle requires that the decision below be va­
` cated. The trial court found that the contract contained a
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`valid arbitration clause, and the Oklahoma Supreme
`Court did not hold otherwise. It nonetheless assumed the
`arbitrator’s role by declaring the noncompetition agree­
`ments null and void. The state court insisted that its
`“[own] jurisprudence controls this issue” and permits
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`review of a “contract submitted to arbitration where one
`party assert[s] that the underlying agreement [is] void and
`unenforceable.” 273 P. 3d, at 26. But the Oklahoma
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` Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2012)
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`Per Curiam
`Supreme Court must abide by the FAA, which is “the
`supreme Law of the Land,” U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2, and
`by the opinions of this Court interpreting that law. “It
`is this Court’s responsibility to say what a statute means,
`and once the Court has spoken, it is the duty of other
`courts to respect that understanding of the governing rule
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`of law.” Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U. S. 298,
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`312 (1994). Our cases hold that the FAA forecloses pre­
`cisely this type of “judicial hostility towards arbitration.”
`AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U. S. ___, ___
`(2011) (slip op., at 8).
`The state court reasoned that Oklahoma’s statute “ad­
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`dressing the validity of covenants not to compete, must
`govern over the more general statute favoring arbitration.”
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`273 P. 3d, at 26, n. 21. But the ancient interpretive prin­
`ciple that the specific governs the general (generalia spe-
`cialibus non derogant) applies only to conflict between
`laws of equivalent dignity. Where a specific statute, for
`example, conflicts with a general constitutional provision,
`the latter governs. And the same is true where a specific
`state statute conflicts with a general federal statute.
`There is no general-specific exception to the Supremacy
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`Clause, U. S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2. “‘[W]hen state law
`prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of
`claim, the analysis is straightforward: The conflicting rule
`is displaced by the FAA.’” Marmet Health Care Center,
`Inc. v. Brown, 565 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2012) (per curiam)
`(slip op., at 3–4) (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC, supra, at
`___–___ (slip op., at 6–7)). Hence, it is for the arbitrator to
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`decide in the first instance whether the covenants not to
`compete are valid as a matter of applicable state law. See
`Buckeye, 546 U. S., at 445–446.
`For the foregoing reasons, the petition for certiorari is
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`granted. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Oklaho­
`ma is vacated, and the case is remanded for proceedings
`not inconsistent with this opinion.
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`It is so ordered.