(Slip Opinion)
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2012
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`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`
`
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`
`
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
`
` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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` Syllabus
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` KLOECKNER v. SOLIS, SECRETARY OF LABOR
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
` No. 11–184. Argued October 2, 2012—Decided December 10, 2012
`
`The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA) permits a federal employ-
`ee subjected to a particularly serious personnel action such as a dis-
`
`
`charge or demotion to appeal her agency’s decision to the Merit Sys-
`
`tems Protection Board (MSPB or Board). Such an appeal may allege
`that the agency had insufficient cause for taking the action under the
`CSRA itself; but the appeal may also or instead charge the agency
`with discrimination prohibited by a federal statute. See 5 U. S. C.
`
`
`§7702(a)(1). When an employee alleges that a personnel action ap-
`
`
`pealable to the MSPB was based on discrimination, her case is known
`as a “mixed case.” See 29 CFR §1614.302. Mixed cases are governed
`by special procedures set out in the CSRA and regulations of the
`MSPB and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
`
`Under those procedures, an employee may initiate a mixed case by
`filing a discrimination complaint with the agency. If the agency de-
`cides against the employee, she may either appeal the agency’s deci-
`sion to the MSPB or sue the agency in district court. Alternatively,
`
`the employee can bypass the agency and bring her mixed case direct-
`ly to the MSPB. If the MSPB upholds the personnel action, whether
`in the first instance or after the agency has done so, the employee is
`entitled to seek judicial review.
`
`Section 7703(b)(1) of the CSRA provides that petitions for review of
`MSPB decisions “shall be filed in the . . . Federal Circuit,” except as
`provided in §7703(b)(2). Section 7703(b)(2) instructs that “[c]ases of
`discrimination subject to the provisions of [§7702] shall be filed under
`[the enforcement provision of a listed antidiscrimination statute].”
`Those enforcement provisions all authorize suit in federal district
`court. The “cases of discrimination subject to the provisions of §7702”
`are those in which an employee “(A) has been affected by an action
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`2
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`KLOECKNER v. SOLIS
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`
`Syllabus
`which [she] may appeal to the [MSPB], and (B) alleges that a basis
`for the action was discrimination prohibited by” a listed federal stat-
`
`ute; in other words, “mixed cases.”
`
`In 2005, while an employee of the Department of Labor (DOL or
`agency), petitioner Carolyn Kloeckner filed a complaint with the
`agency’s civil rights office, alleging that DOL had engaged in unlaw-
`ful sex and age discrimination by subjecting her to a hostile work en-
`vironment. Following applicable EEOC regulations, DOL completed
`an internal investigation and report, and Kloeckner requested a
`hearing before an EEOC administrative judge. While the EEOC case
`was pending, Kloeckner was fired. Because Kloeckner believed that
`
`DOL’s decision to fire her was based on unlawful discrimination, she
`now had a “mixed case.” Kloeckner originally brought her mixed case
`directly to the MSPB. Concerned about duplicative discovery ex-
`penses between her EEOC and MSPB cases, she moved to amend her
`EEOC complaint to include her claim of discriminatory removal and
`
`asked the MSPB to dismiss her case without prejudice for four
`
`months to allow the EEOC process to go forward. Both motions were
`granted. In September 2006, the MSPB dismissed her appeal with-
`
`out prejudice to her right to refile by January 18, 2007. The EEOC
`case, however, continued until April 2007, when the EEOC judge
`terminated the proceeding as a sanction for Kloeckner’s bad-faith
`
`discovery conduct and returned the case to DOL for a final decision.
`
`
`In October, DOL ruled against Kloeckner on all of her claims.
`Kloeckner appealed to the Board in November 2007. The Board dis-
`
`missed Kloeckner’s appeal as untimely, viewing it as an effort to reo-
`pen her old MSPB case months after the January 18 deadline.
`
` Kloeckner then brought this action against DOL in Federal District
`Court, alleging unlawful discrimination. The court dismissed the
`complaint for lack of jurisdiction. It held that, because the MSPB
`dismissed Kloeckner’s claims on procedural grounds, she should have
`sought review in the Federal Circuit under §7703(b)(1); in the court’s
`
`view, the only discrimination cases that could go to district court pur-
`suant to §7703(b)(2) were those the MSPB had decided on the merits.
`
`The Eighth Circuit affirmed.
`
`Held: A federal employee who claims that an agency action appealable
`
`to the MSPB violates an antidiscrimination statute listed in
`§7702(a)(1) should seek judicial review in district court, not the Fed-
`eral Circuit, regardless whether the MSPB decided her case on pro-
`cedural grounds or on the merits. Pp. 7–14.
`
`(a) Two sections of the CSRA, read naturally, direct employees like
`Kloeckner to district court. Begin with § 7703, which governs judicial
`review of MSPB rulings. Section 7703(b)(1) provides that petitions to
`review the Board’s final decisions should be filed in the Federal Cir-
`
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`

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` Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2012)
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`Syllabus
`cuit—“[e]xcept as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection.” Sec-
`tion 7703(b)(2) then provides that “[c]ases of discrimination subject to
`the provisions of [§7702]” “shall be filed under” the enforcement pro-
`vision of a listed antidiscrimination statute. Each of the referenced
`enforcement provisions authorizes an action in federal district court.
`Thus, “[c]ases of discrimination subject to the provisions of [§7702]”
`shall be filed in district court. Turn next to §7702, which provides
`
`
` that the cases “subject to [its] provisions” are cases in which a federal
`employee “has been affected by an action which [she] may appeal to
`the [MSPB],” and “alleges that a basis for the action was discrimina-
`tion prohibited by” a listed federal statute. The “cases of discrimina-
`tion subject to” §7702 are therefore mixed cases. Putting §7703 and
`§7702 together, mixed cases shall be filed in district court. That is
`where Kloeckner’s case should have been, and indeed was, filed. Re-
`gardless whether the MSPB dismissed her claim on the merits or
`threw it out as untimely, she brought the kind of case that the CSRA
`
`routes to district court. Pp. 7–8.
`
`
`(b) The Government’s alternative view—that the CSRA directs the
`
`
`MSPB’s merits decisions to district court, while channeling its proce-
`
`dural rulings to the Federal Circuit—is not supported by the statute.
`
`According to the Government, that bifurcated scheme, though not
`
`specifically prescribed in the CSRA, lies hidden in the statute’s tim-
`ing requirements. But the Government cannot explain why Congress
`would have constructed such an obscure path to such a simple result.
`And taking the Government’s analysis one step at a time makes it no
`more plausible. Pp. 8–13.
`639 F. 3d 834, reversed and remanded.
`
` KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
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`3
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`

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` Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2012)
`
`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`
`
`
`
`_________________
`
` No. 11–184
`_________________
` CAROLYN M. KLOECKNER, PETITIONER v. HILDA L.
`SOLIS, SECRETARY OF LABOR
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
`
`
`[December 10, 2012]
`
` JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
`
`A federal employee subjected to an adverse personnel
`action such as a discharge or demotion may appeal her
`agency’s decision to the Merit Systems Protection Board
`(MSPB or Board). See 5 U. S. C. §§7512, 7701. In that
`challenge, the employee may claim, among other things,
`that the agency discriminated against her in violation of a
`federal statute. See §7702(a)(1). The question presented
`
`in this case arises when the MSPB dismisses an appeal
`alleging discrimination not on the merits, but on proce-
`dural grounds. Should an employee seeking judicial re-
`view then file a petition in the Court of Appeals for the
`Federal Circuit, or instead bring a suit in district court
`under the applicable antidiscrimination law? We hold she
`
`should go to district court.
`
`
`
`
`
`I
`
`A
`
`
`The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), 5 U. S. C.
`§1101 et seq., establishes a framework for evaluating per-
`sonnel actions taken against federal employees. That
`statutory framework provides graduated procedural pro-
`
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`

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`2
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`KLOECKNER v. SOLIS
`
`Opinion of the Court
`tections depending on an action’s severity. If (but only if )
`the action is particularly serious—involving, for example,
`a removal from employment or a reduction in grade or
`pay—the affected employee has a right to appeal the
`agency’s decision to the MSPB, an independent adjudica-
`tor of federal employment disputes.1 See §§1204, 7512,
`7701. Such an appeal may merely allege that the agency
`had insufficient cause for taking the action under the
`CSRA; but the appeal may also or instead charge the
`agency with discrimination prohibited by another federal
`statute, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
`42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq., or the Age Discrimination in
`
`Employment Act of 1967, 29 U. S. C. §621 et seq. See 5
`U. S. C. §7702(a)(1). When an employee complains of
`a personnel action serious enough to appeal to the MSPB
`and alleges that the action was based on discrimination,
`she is said (by pertinent regulation) to have brought a
`“mixed case.” See 29 CFR §1614.302 (2012). The CSRA
`and regulations of the MSPB and Equal Employment
`Opportunity Commission (EEOC) set out special proce-
`
`dures to govern such a case—different from those used
`when the employee either challenges a serious personnel
`action under the CSRA alone or attacks a less serious
`action as discriminatory. See 5 U. S. C. §§7702, 7703(b)(2)
`
`(2006 ed. and Supp. V); 5 CFR pt. 1201, subpt. E (2012);
`29 CFR pt. 1614, subpt. C.
`
`A federal employee bringing a mixed case may pro-
`
`ceed in a variety of ways. She may first file a discrim-
`ination complaint with the agency itself, much as an
`employee challenging a personnel practice not appealable to
`the MSPB could do. See 5 CFR §1201.154(a); 29 CFR
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`——————
`1The actions entitling an employee to appeal a case to the MSPB
`
`include “(1) a removal; (2) a suspension for more than 14 days; (3) a
`
` reduction in grade; (4) a reduction in pay; and (5) a furlough.” 5
`U. S. C. §7512.
`
`
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`

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` Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2012)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`§1614.302(b). If the agency decides against her, the em-
`ployee may then either take the matter to the MSPB or
`bypass further administrative review by suing the agency
`in district court. See 5 CFR §1201.154(b); 29 CFR
`§1614.302(d)(1)(i). Alternatively, the employee may initi-
`ate the process by bringing her case directly to the MSPB,
`forgoing the agency’s own system for evaluating discrimi-
`nation charges.
`See 5 CFR §1201.154(a); 29 CFR
`§1614.302(b). If the MSPB upholds the personnel action
`(whether in the first instance or after the agency has done
`so), the employee again has a choice: She may request
`additional administrative process, this time with the
`EEOC, or else she may seek judicial review. See 5 U. S. C.
`
`§§7702(a)(3), (b); 5 CFR §1201.161; 29 CFR §1614.303.
`
`The question in this case concerns where that judicial
`
`review should take place.
`
`Section 7703 of the CSRA governs judicial review of the
`MSPB’s decisions. Section 7703(b)(1) gives the basic rule:
`“Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, a
`petition to review a . . . final decision of the Board shall be
`filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
`Circuit.” Section 7703(b)(2) then spells out the exception:
`“Cases of discrimination subject to the provisions of
`section 7702 of this title shall be filed under [the
`enforcement sections of the Civil Rights Act, Age
`Discrimination in Employment Act, and Fair Labor
`Standards Act], as applicable. Notwithstanding any
`other provision of law, any such case filed under any
`
`such section must be filed within 30 days after the
`date the individual filing the case received notice of
`the judicially reviewable action under such section
`7702.”
`The enforcement provisions of the antidiscrimination
`statutes listed in this exception all authorize suit in fed-
`eral district court. See 42 U. S. C. §§2000e–16(c), 2000e–
`
`
`
`
`
`3
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`4
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`KLOECKNER v. SOLIS
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`Opinion of the Court
` 5(f ); 29 U. S. C. §633a(c); §216(b); see also Elgin v. De-
`
` partment of Treasury, 567 U. S. ___, ___ (2012) (slip op., at
`
`9–10).
`Section 7702 describes and provides for the “cases of
`
`
`discrimination” referenced in §7703(b)(2)’s exception. In
`
`relevant part, §7702(a)(1) states:
`“[I]n the case of any employee . . . who—
`“(A) has been affected by an action which the em-
`ployee . . . may appeal to the Merit Systems Protec-
`tion Board, and
`“(B) alleges that a basis for the action was discrimi-
`nation prohibited by [specified antidiscrimination
`statutes],
`“the Board shall, within 120 days of the filing of the
`appeal, decide both the issue of discrimination and
`the appealable action in accordance with the Board’s
`appellate procedures.”
`The “cases of discrimination” in §7703(b)(2)’s exception, in
`other words, are mixed cases, in which an employee chal-
`lenges as discriminatory a personnel action appealable to
`
` the MSPB.
`The parties here dispute whether, in light of these in-
`
`terwoven statutory provisions, an employee should go to
`the Federal Circuit (pursuant to the general rule of
`§7703(b)(1)), or instead to a district court (pursuant to the
`exception in §7703(b)(2)), when the MSPB has dismissed
`her mixed case on procedural grounds.
`B
`
`Petitioner Carolyn Kloeckner used to work at the De-
`partment of Labor (DOL or agency). In June 2005, while
`
`still an employee, she filed a complaint with the agency’s
`
`civil rights office, alleging that DOL had engaged in un-
`lawful sex and age discrimination by subjecting her to
`a hostile work environment. At that point, Kloeckner’s
`
`case was not appealable to the MSPB because she had not
`
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`

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`Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2012)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`suffered a sufficiently serious personnel action (e.g., a
`removal or demotion). See supra, at 1–2. Her claim thus
`went forward not under the special procedures for mixed
`cases, but under the EEOC’s regulations for all other
`charges of discrimination. See 29 CFR pt. 1614, subpts.
`A, D. In line with those rules, the agency completed an
`internal investigation and report in June 2006, and
`Kloeckner requested a hearing before an EEOC adminis-
`trative judge.
`
`The next month, DOL fired Kloeckner. A removal from
`
`
`employment is appealable to the MSPB, see supra, at 1–2,
`and Kloeckner believed the agency’s action was discrimi-
`natory; she therefore now had a mixed case. As permitted
`by regulation, see supra, at 3, she initially elected to file
`that case with the MSPB. Her claim of discriminatory
`removal, however, raised issues similar to those in her
`hostile work environment case, now pending before an
`EEOC judge; as a result, she became concerned that she
`would incur duplicative discovery expenses. To address
`that problem, she sought leave to amend her EEOC com-
`plaint to include her claim of discriminatory removal, and
`she asked the MSPB to dismiss her case without prejudice
`
`for four months to allow the EEOC process to go forward.
`
`See App. 13, 50–51. Both of those motions were granted.
`The EEOC judge accepted the amendment,2 and on Sep-
`tember 18, 2006, the MSPB dismissed her appeal “without
`prejudice to [her] right to refile . . . either (A) within 30
`
`
`——————
`2Neither the CSRA nor any regulation explicitly authorizes an EEOC
`
`judge to consider the legality of a removal or other serious personnel
`
`
` action before the Board has done so. See supra, at 2–3. Nonetheless,
`the EEOC has approved that approach when the issues the personnel
`action raises are “firmly enmeshed” in an ongoing EEOC proceeding in
`order to avoid “delay[ing] justice and creat[ing] unnecessary proce-
`dural complications.” Burton v. Espy, Appeal No. 01932449, 1994 WL
`748214, *12 (EEOC, Oct. 28, 1994); see also Myvett v. Poteat, Appeal
`No. 0120103671, 2011 WL 6122516, *2 (EEOC, Nov. 21, 2011). We
`express no view on the propriety of this practice.
`
`
`
`5
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`

`
`6
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`KLOECKNER v. SOLIS
`
`Opinion of the Court
` days after a decision is rendered in her EEOC case; or (B)
`
`
` by January 18, 2007—whichever occurs first.” Id., at 5.
`Discovery continued in the EEOC proceeding well past
`
`the MSPB’s January 18 deadline. In April, the EEOC
`judge found that Kloeckner had engaged in bad-faith
`conduct in connection with discovery. As a sanction, the
`judge terminated the EEOC proceeding and returned
`Kloeckner’s case to DOL for a final decision. Six months
`later, in October 2007, DOL issued a ruling rejecting all of
`Kloeckner’s claims. See id., at 10–49.
` Kloeckner appealed DOL’s decision to the Board in
`November 2007. That appeal was filed within 30 days,
`the usual window for seeking MSPB review of an agency’s
`determination of a mixed case. See 5 CFR §1201.154(a);
`29 CFR §1614.302(d)(1)(ii). But the MSPB declined to
`
`treat Kloeckner’s filing as an ordinary appeal of such an
`agency decision. Instead, the Board viewed it as an effort
`to reopen her old MSPB case—many months after the
`January 18 deadline for doing so had expired. The Board
`therefore dismissed Kloeckner’s appeal as untimely. See
`
`App. 53–57.
`Kloeckner then brought this action against DOL in
`
`Federal District Court, alleging unlawful discrimination.
`The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of
`jurisdiction. See Kloeckner v. Solis, Civ. Action No.
`4:09CV804 (ED Mo., Feb. 18, 2010). Relying on the
`Eighth Circuit’s ruling in Brumley v. Levinson, 991 F. 2d
`801 (1993) (per curiam), the court held that because the
`MSPB had dismissed Kloeckner’s claims on procedural
`grounds, she should have sought review in the Federal
`Circuit under §7703(b)(1); in the court’s view, the only
`discrimination cases that could go to district court pursu-
`ant to §7703(b)(2) were those the MSPB had decided on
`
`the merits. The Eighth Circuit affirmed on the same
`reasoning. See 639 F. 3d 834 (2011).
`We granted certiorari, 565 U. S. ___ (2012), to resolve a
`
`
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`

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`Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2012)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Circuit split on whether an employee seeking judicial
`review should proceed in the Federal Circuit or in a dis-
`
`trict court when the MSPB has dismissed her mixed case
`on procedural grounds.3 We now reverse the Eighth Cir-
`cuit’s decision.
`
`7
`
`
`II
`
`As the above account reveals, the intersection of fed-
`eral civil rights statutes and civil service law has produced
`a complicated, at times confusing, process for resolving
`claims of discrimination in the federal workplace. But
`even within the most intricate and complex systems, some
`things are plain. So it is in this case, where two sections
`of the CSRA, read naturally, direct employees like Kloeck-
`
`ner to district court.
`
`
`Begin with §7703, which governs judicial review of the
`
`MSPB’s rulings. As already noted, see supra, at 3–4,
`
`§7703(b)(1) provides that petitions to review the Board’s
`final decisions should be filed in the Federal Circuit—
`
`“[e]xcept as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection.”
`Paragraph (2), i.e., §7703(b)(2), then sets out a different
`rule for one category of cases—“[c]ases of discrimination
`
`subject to the provisions of section 7702 of this title.” Such
`a case, paragraph (2) instructs, “shall be filed under” the
`enforcement provision of an enumerated antidiscrimina-
`tion statute. And each of those enforcement provisions
`
`authorizes an action in federal district court. See supra,
`at 3–4. So “[c]ases of discrimination subject to the provi-
`sions of section 7702” shall be filed in district court.
`
`Turn next to §7702, which identifies the cases “subject
`to [its] provisions.” As also stated earlier, §7702(a)(1) de-
`scribes cases in which a federal employee “(A) has been
`——————
`3Compare 639 F. 3d 834 (CA8 2011) (case below) (Federal Circuit);
`
`
`
`Ballentine v. MSPB, 738 F. 2d 1244 (CA Fed. 1984) (same), with Harms
`
`v. IRS, 321 F. 3d 1001 (CA10 2003) (district court); Downey v. Runyon,
`160 F. 3d 139 (CA2 1998) (same).
`
`
`
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`
`
`
`

`
`8
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`KLOECKNER v. SOLIS
`
`Opinion of the Court
`affected by an action which [she] may appeal to the Merit
`Systems Protection Board, and (B) alleges that a basis
`for the action was discrimination prohibited by” a listed
`federal statute. The subsection thus describes what we
`(adopting the lingo of the applicable regulations) have
`called “mixed cases.” See 29 CFR §1614.302. Those are
`the “cases of discrimination subject to” the rest of §7702’s
`provisions.
`
`Now just put §7703 and §7702 together—say, in the
`form of a syllogism, to make the point obvious. Under
`§7703(b)(2), “cases of discrimination subject to [§7702]”
`shall be filed in district court. Under §7702(a)(1), the
`“cases of discrimination subject to [§7702]” are mixed
`cases—those appealable to the MSPB and alleging dis-
`crimination. Ergo, mixed cases shall be filed in district
`
`court.
`
`And so that is where Kloeckner’s case should have been
`filed (as indeed it was). No one here contests that Kloeck-
`
`ner brought a mixed case—that she was affected by an
`action (i.e., removal) appealable to the MSPB and that she
`
`alleged discrimination prohibited by an enumerated fed-
`
`eral law. And under the CSRA’s terms, that is all that
`matters. Regardless whether the MSPB dismissed her
`claim on the merits or instead threw it out as untimely,
`Kloeckner brought the kind of case that the CSRA routes,
`in crystalline fashion, to district court.
`
`III
`
`The Government offers an alternative view (as did the
`Eighth Circuit)—that the CSRA directs the MSPB’s merits
`decisions to district court, while channeling its procedural
`rulings to the Federal Circuit. According to the Govern-
`ment, that bifurcated scheme, though not prescribed in
`the CSRA in so many words, lies hidden in the statute’s
`timing requirements. But we return from the Govern-
`ment’s mazelike tour of the CSRA persuaded only that the
`
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`

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` Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2012)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`merits-procedure distinction is a contrivance, found no-
`where in the statute’s provisions on judicial review.
`
`The Government’s argument has two necessary steps.
`First, the Government claims that §7703(b)(2)’s exception
`to Federal Circuit jurisdiction applies only when the
`MSPB’s decision in a mixed case is a “judicially review-
`able action” under §7702. Second, the Government asserts
`that the Board’s dismissal of a mixed case on procedural
`grounds does not qualify as such a “judicially reviewable
`action.” We describe in turn the way the Government
`arrives at each of these conclusions.
`
`The first step of the Government’s argument derives
`from §7703(b)(2)’s second sentence. Right after stating
`that “cases of discrimination subject to [§7702]” shall be
`filed under specified antidiscrimination statutes (i.e., shall
`be filed in district court), §7703(b)(2) provides: “Notwith-
`standing any other provision of law, any such case filed
`under any such [statute] must be filed within 30 days
`after the date the individual filing the case received notice
`of the judicially reviewable action under section 7702.”
`The Government reads that sentence to establish an ad-
`ditional prerequisite for taking a case to district court,
`instead of to the Federal Circuit. To fall within the
`§7703(b)(2) exception, the Government says, it is not
`enough that a case qualify as a “case of discrimination
`subject to [§7702]”; in addition, the MSPB’s decision must
`count as a “judicially reviewable action.” See Brief for
`
`If the MSPB’s decision is not a
`United States 20–21.
`“judicially reviewable action”—a phrase the Government
`characterizes as a “term of art in this context,” Tr. of Oral
`Arg. 28—the ruling still may be subject to judicial review
`(i.e., “judicially reviewable” in the ordinary sense), but
`only in the Federal Circuit.
`
`The Government’s second step—that the Board’s pro-
`cedural rulings are not “judicially reviewable actions”—
`begins with the language of §7702(a)(3). That provision,
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`KLOECKNER v. SOLIS
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`Opinion of the Court
` the Government states, “defines for the most part which
`
`MSPB decisions qualify as
`‘judicially reviewable ac-
`
`tions[s]’” by “providing that ‘[a]ny decision of the Board
`under paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be a judicially
`reviewable action as of’ the date of the decision.” Brief
`for Respondent 21 (quoting §7702(a)(3); emphasis and
`brackets added by Government). From there, the Govern-
`ment moves on to the cross-referenced paragraph—
`§7702(a)(1)—which states, among other things, that the
`Board “shall, within 120 days of [the employee’s filing],
`decide both the issue of discrimination and the appealable
`action in accordance with the Board’s appellate proce-
`dures.” According to the Government, the Board only
`“decide[s] . . . the issue of discrimination” when it rules on
`the merits, rather than on procedural grounds. On that
`view, a procedural decision is not in fact a “decision of the
`Board under paragraph (1),” which means that it also is
`not a “judicially reviewable action” under §7702(a)(3). See
`Brief for Respondent 21–22. And so (returning now to the
`first step of the Government’s argument), judicial review
`of a procedural decision can occur only in the Federal
`
`Circuit, and not in district court.
`
`
`If you need to take a deep breath after all that, you’re
`
`not alone. It would be hard to dream up a more round-
`about way of bifurcating judicial review of the MSPB’s
`rulings in mixed cases. If Congress had wanted to send
`
`merits decisions to district court and procedural dismis-
`sals to the Federal Circuit, it could just have said so. The
`
`Government has offered no reason for Congress to have
`constructed such an obscure path to such a simple result.
`
`And taking the Government’s analysis one step at a
`time makes it no more plausible than as a gestalt. The
`Government’s initial move is to read §7703(b)(2)’s second
`sentence as adding a requirement for a case to fall within
`the exception to Federal Circuit jurisdiction. But that
`sentence does no such thing; it is nothing more than a
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` Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2012)
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`Opinion of the Court
`filing deadline. Consider each sentence of §7703(b)(2) in
`
`turn. The first sentence defines which cases should be
`brought in district court, rather than in the Federal Cir-
`cuit; here, the full description is “[c]ases of discrimination
`subject to the provisions of section 7702”—to wit, mixed
`cases. The second sentence then states when those cases
`
`should be brought: “any such case . . . must be filed within
`30 days” of the date the employee “received notice of the
`judicially reviewable action.” The reference to a “judicially
`reviewable action” in that sentence does important work:
`It sets the clock running for when a case that belongs in
`district court must be filed there. What it does not do is
`to further define which timely-brought cases belong in dis-
`trict court instead of in the Federal Circuit. Describing
`those cases is the first sentence’s role.
`
`
`
`
`Proof positive that the Government misreads
`§7703(b)(2) comes from considering what the phrase “ju-
`dicially reviewable action” would mean under its theory.
`In normal legal parlance, to say that an agency action
`is not “judicially reviewable” is to say simply that it is not
`subject to judicial review—that, for one or another reason,
`it cannot be taken to a court. But that ordinary under-
`standing will not work for the Government here, because
`it wants to use the phrase to help determine which of two
`courts should review a decision, rather than whether
`judicial review is available at all. In the Government’s
`alternate universe, then, to say that an agency action is
`
`not “judicially reviewable” is to say that it is subject to
`
`judicial review in the Federal Circuit (even though not in
`district court). Small wonder that the Government must
`call the phrase “judicially reviewable action” a “term of
`art,” supra, at 9: On a natural reading, the phrase defines
`cases amenable to judicial review, rather than routes
`
`those cases as between two courts.
`
`And even were we to indulge the Government that far,
`we could not accept the second step of its analysis. At that
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`KLOECKNER v. SOLIS
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`Opinion of the Court
`stage, remember, the Government contends that under
`§7702 only decisions on the merits qualify as “judicially
`reviewable actions.” The language on which the Govern-
`ment principally relies, stated again, is as follows: “[T]he
`Board shall, within 120 days of [the employee’s filing],
`decide both the issue of discrimination and the appealable
`action.” But that provision, too, is only a timing require-
`ment; it is designed to ensure that the Board act promptly
`on employees’ complaints. We see no reason to think that
`embedded within that directive is a limitation on the class
`of “judicially reviewable actions.” Nor (even were we to
`indulge the Government on that point as well) can we find
`the particular restriction the Government urges. Accord-
`ing to the Government, the MSPB does not “decide . . . the
`issue of discrimination” when it dismisses a mixed case
`
`on procedural grounds. But that phrase cannot bear the
`weight the Government places on it. All the phrase signi-
`fies is that the Board should dispose of the issue in some
`way, whether by actually adjudicating it or by holding that
`it was not properly raised. Indeed, were the Government
`right, §7702(a)’s statement that the Board “shall” decide
`the issue of discrimination would appear to bar procedural
`dismissals, requiring the Board to resolve on the merits
`even untimely complaints. No one (least of all the Gov-
`ernment, which here is defending a procedural ruling)
`thinks that a plausible congressional command.
`
`Another section of the statute—§7702(e)(1)(B)—puts the
`final nail in the coffin bearing the Government’s argu-
`ment. That section states: “[I]f at any time after the 120th
`day following [an employee’s filing] with the Board . . . ,
`there is no judicially reviewable action[,] . . . an employee
`shall be entitled to file a civil action” in district court
`under a listed antidiscrimination statute. That provision,
`as the Government notes, is designed “to save employees
`from being held in perpetual uncertainty by Board inac-
`
`tion.” Brief for Respondent 28. But if, as the Government
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`Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2012)
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`Opinion of the Court
`insists, a procedural ruling is not a “judicially reviewable
`action,” then the provision would have another, surprising
`effect—essentially blowing up the Government’s argument
`from the inside. In that event, an employee whose suit
`the Board had dismissed on procedural grounds could
`bring suit in district court under 7702(e)(1)(B) (so long as
`120 days had elapsed from her Board filing), because she
`would have received “no judicially reviewable action.” And
`what’s more, she could do so even many years later, be-
`cause the statute’s usual 30-day filing deadline begins to
`run only upon “notice of [a] judicially rev