(Slip Opinion)
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2012
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`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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`
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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` Syllabus
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` UNITED STATES v. BORMES
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
` No. 11–192. Argued October 2, 2012—Decided November 13, 2012
`
`Respondent Bormes, an attorney, filed suit against the Federal Gov-
`ernment, alleging that the electronic receipt he received when paying
`
`
`his client’s federal-court filing fee on Pay.gov included the last four
`digits of his credit card number and the card’s expiration date, in
`willful violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U. S. C.
`
`§1681 et seq. He sought damages under §1681n and asserted juris-
`
`diction under §1681p, as well as under the Little Tucker Act, which
`grants district courts “original jurisdiction, concurrent with the Unit-
`
`ed States Court of Federal Claims, of . . . [a]ny. . . civil action or claim
`against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded
`
`. . . upon . . . any Act of Congress,” 28 U. S. C. §1346(a)(2). In dis-
`missing the suit, the District Court held that FCRA did not explicitly
`waive the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity. Bormes ap-
`pealed to the Federal Circuit, which vacated the District Court’s deci-
`sion, holding that the Little Tucker Act provided the Government’s
`consent to suit because the underlying statute—FCRA—could fairly
`
`be interpreted as mandating a right of recovery in damages.
`Held: The Little Tucker Act does not waive the Government’s sovereign
`
`immunity with respect to FCRA damages actions. Pp. 4–11.
`
`(a) The Little Tucker Act and its companion statute, the Tucker
`Act, provide the Federal Government’s consent to suit for certain
`money-damages claims “premised on other sources of law,” United
`
`States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U. S. 287, 290. The general terms of the
`Tucker Acts are displaced, however, when a law imposing monetary
`liability has its own judicial remedies. In that event, the specific re-
`medial scheme establishes the exclusive framework for determining
`
`the scope of liability under the statute. See, e.g., Hinck v. United
`States, 550 U. S. 501. Pp. 4–7.
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`

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`UNITED STATES v. BORMES
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`
`Syllabus
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`(b) FCRA is such a statute. Its detailed remedial scheme sets “out
`a carefully circumscribed, time-limited, plaintiff-specific” cause of ac-
`tion, and “also precisely define[s] the appropriate forum,” 550 U. S.,
`at 507. FCRA authorizes aggrieved consumers to hold “any person”
`who “willfully” or “negligent[ly]” fails to comply with the Act’s re-
`quirements liable for specified damages, 15 U. S. C. §§1681n(a),
`1681o; requires enforcement claims to be brought within a specified
`limitations period, §1681p; and provides that jurisdiction will lie “in
`any appropriate United States district court, without regard to the
`
`
`amount in controversy,” ibid. Because FCRA enables claimants to
`pursue monetary relief in court without resort to the Tucker Act, only
`its own text can determine whether Congress unequivocally intended
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`to impose the statute’s damages liability on the Federal Government.
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`Pp. 7–10.
`626 F. 3d 574, vacated and remanded.
` SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
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` Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2012)
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`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`_________________
`
` No. 11–192
`_________________
` UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. JAMES X. BORMES
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
`
`[November 13, 2012]
` JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
`The Little Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. §1346(a)(2), provides
`
`that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction,
`concurrent with the United States Court of Federal
`Claims, of . . . [a]ny. . . civil action or claim against the
`United States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded
`. . . upon . . . any Act of Congress.” We consider whether
`the Little Tucker Act waives the sovereign immunity of
`the United States with respect to damages actions for
`
`violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15
`U. S. C. §1681 et seq.
`
`
`
`
`I
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`The Fair Credit Reporting Act has as one of its purposes
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`to “protect consumer privacy.” Safeco Ins. Co. of America
`v. Burr, 551 U. S. 47, 52 (2007); see 84 Stat. 1128, 15
`U. S. C. §1681. To that end, FCRA provides, among other
`things, that “no person that accepts credit cards or debit
`cards for the transaction of business shall print more than
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`the last 5 digits of the card number or the expiration date
`upon any receipt provided to the cardholder at the point of
`the sale or transaction.” §1681c(g)(1) (emphasis added).
`The Act defines “person” as “any individual, partnership,
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` UNITED STATES v. BORMES
`
`Opinion of the Court
`corporation, trust, estate, cooperative, association, gov-
`ernment or governmental subdivision or agency, or other
`entity.” §1681a(b).
`FCRA imposes civil liability for willful or negligent
`
`noncompliance with its requirements: “Any person who
`willfully fails to comply” with the Act “with respect to any
`consumer,” “is liable to that consumer” for actual damages
`or damages “of not less than $100 and not more than
`$1,000,” as well as punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and
`
`costs. §1681n(a); see also §1681o (civil liability for negli-
`gent noncompliance). The Act includes a jurisdictional
`provision, which provides that “[a]n action to enforce any
`liability created under this subchapter may be brought
`in any appropriate United States district court, without
`regard to the amount in controversy, or in any other court
`of competent jurisdiction” within the earlier of “2 years
`after the date of discovery by the plaintiff of the violation
`that is the basis for such liability” or “5 years after the
`date on which the violation that is the basis for such liabil-
`ity occurs.” §1681p.
`
`Respondent James X. Bormes is an attorney who filed
`a putative class action against the United States in the
`United States District Court for the Northern District of
`Illinois seeking damages under FCRA. Bormes alleged
`that he paid a $350 federal-court filing fee for a client
`using his own credit card on Pay.gov, an Internet-based
`system used by federal courts and dozens of federal agen-
`cies to process online payment transactions. According
`to Bormes, his Pay.gov electronic receipt included the last
`four digits of his credit card, in addition to its expiration
`date, in willful violation of §1681c(g)(1). He claimed that
`he and thousands of similarly situated persons were enti-
`tled to recover damages under §1681n, and asserted juris-
`diction under §1681p, as well as under the Little Tucker
`Act, 28 U. S. C. §1346(a)(2).
`
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`The District Court dismissed the suit, holding that
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` Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2012)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`FCRA does not contain the explicit waiver of sovereign
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`immunity necessary to permit a damages suit against the
`United States. 638 F. Supp. 2d 958, 962 (ND Ill. 2009).
`
`The court did not address the Little Tucker Act as an
`asserted basis for jurisdiction. Respondent appealed to
`the Federal Circuit, which has exclusive jurisdiction “of an
`appeal from a final decision of a district court of the
`United States . . . if the jurisdiction of that court was
`based, in whole or in part, on” the Little Tucker Act. 28
`U. S. C. §1295(a)(2). Arguing that the Little Tucker Act’s
`jurisdictional grant did not apply to respondent’s suit,
`the Government moved to transfer the appeal to the
`Seventh Circuit.
`The Federal Circuit denied the transfer motion and
`
`went on to vacate the District Court’s decision. Without
`deciding whether FCRA itself contained the requisite
`waiver of sovereign immunity, the court held that the
`Little Tucker Act provided the Government’s consent to
`suit for violation of FCRA. The court explained that the
`
`Little Tucker Act applied because FCRA “‘can fairly be
`interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal
`Government for the damage sustained.’” 626 F. 3d 574,
`578 (2010) (quoting United States v. White Mountain
`Apache Tribe, 537 U. S. 465, 472 (2003)). This “fair inter-
`pretation” rule, the court explained, “demands a showing
`‘demonstrably lower’ than the initial waiver of sovereign
`immunity” contained in the Little Tucker Act itself. 626
`F. 3d, at 578. The court reasoned that FCRA satisfied the
`“fair interpretation” rule because its damages provision
`applies to “any person” who willfully violates its require-
`ments, 15 U. S. C. §1681n(a), and the Act elsewhere de-
`fines “person” to include “any . . . government,” §1681a(b).
`
`626 F. 3d, at 580. The Federal Circuit remanded to the
`District Court for further proceedings. We granted certio-
`rari, 565 U. S. ___ (2012).
`
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`

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`UNITED STATES v. BORMES
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`
` II
`
`Sovereign immunity shields the United States from suit
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`absent a consent to be sued that is “‘unequivocally ex-
`pressed.’” United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S.
`
`
`30, 33–34 (1992) (quoting Irwin v. Department of Veterans
`
`Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 95 (1990); some internal quotation
`marks omitted). The Little Tucker Act is one statute that
`unequivocally provides the Federal Government’s consent
`to suit for certain money-damages claims. United States v.
`Mitchell, 463 U. S. 206, 216 (1983) (Mitchell II ). Subject
`to exceptions not relevant here, the Little Tucker Act
`provides that “district courts shall have original jurisdic-
`tion, concurrent with the United States Court of Federal
`Claims,” of a “civil action or claim against the United
`States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded either
`upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any
`regulation of an executive department, or upon any ex-
`press or implied contract with the United States, or for
`liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding
`in tort.” 28 U. S. C. §1346(a)(2).1 The Little Tucker Act
`and its companion statute, the Tucker Act, §1491(a)(1),2
`
`do not themselves “creat[e] substantive rights,” but “are
`simply jurisdictional provisions that operate to waive
`——————
`
`
`
`
` 1It is undisputed that this class action satisfied the Little Tucker
`
` Act’s amount-in-controversy limitation. We have held that to require
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`only that the “claims of individual members of the clas[s] do not exceed
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` $10,000.” United States v. Will, 449 U. S. 200, 211, n. 10 (1980).
`2Whereas the Little Tucker Act creates jurisdiction in the district
`courts concurrent with the Court of Federal Claims for covered claims
`
` of $10,000 or less, the Tucker Act assigns jurisdiction to the Court of
`Federal Claims regardless of monetary amount. As relevant here, the
`scope of the two statutes is otherwise the same. The third statute in
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` the Tucker Act trio, the Indian Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. §1505, “confers a
`like waiver for Indian tribal claims that ‘otherwise would be cognizable
`in the Court of Federal Claims if the claimant were not an Indian
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`tribe.’ ” United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U. S. 465,
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`472 (2003) (quoting §1505).
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`Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2012)
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`
`Opinion of the Court
`sovereign immunity for claims premised on other sources
`of law.” United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U. S. 287,
`290 (2009).
`Bormes argues that whether or not FCRA itself unam-
`
`biguously waives sovereign immunity, the Little Tucker Act
`authorizes his FCRA damages claim against the United
`States. The question, then, is whether a damages claim
`under FCRA “falls within the terms of the Tucker Act,” so
`that “the United States has presumptively consented to
`suit.” Mitchell II, supra, at 216. It does not. Where, as in
`FCRA, a statute contains its own self-executing remedial
`scheme, we look only to that statute to determine whether
`Congress intended to subject the United States to dam-
`ages liability.
`
`5
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`
`
`
`
`A
`The Court of Claims was established, and the Tucker
`
`Act enacted, to open a judicial avenue for certain mone-
`tary claims against the United States. Before the creation
`of the Court of Claims in 1855, see Act of Feb. 24, 1855
`(1855 Act), ch. 122, §1, 10 Stat. 612, it was not uncommon
`for statutes to impose monetary obligations on the United
`States without specifying a means of judicial enforce-
`ment.3 As a result, claimants routinely petitioned Con-
`gress for private bills to recover money owed by the Federal
`Government. See Mitchell II, supra, at 212 (citing P.
`Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro & H. Wechsler, Hart and
`——————
`3For example, the Act of March 30, 1814, provided that every non-
`commissioned U. S. army officer who “may be captured by the enemy,
`shall be entitled to receive during his captivity . . . the same pay,
`subsistence, and allowance to which he may be entitled whilst in the
`actual service of the United States.” §14, 3 Stat. 115, repealed in 1962
`by Pub. L. 87–649, §14, 76 Stat. 498. The 1814 Act clearly “com-
`mand[ed] the payment of a specified amount of money by the United
`States,” Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U. S. 879, 923 (1988) (SCALIA, J.,
`dissenting), but did not designate a means of judicial relief in the event
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`the Government failed to pay.
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`6
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`UNITED STATES v. BORMES
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`Opinion of the Court
`Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 98
`(2d ed. 1973)). As this individualized legislative process
`became increasingly burdensome for Congress, the Court
`of Claims was created “to relieve the pressure on Congress
`caused by the volume of private bills.” Glidden Co. v.
`
`Zdanok, 370 U. S. 530, 552 (1962) (plurality opinion). The
`1855 Act authorized the Court of Claims to hear claims
`against the United States “founded upon any law of Con-
`gress,” §1, 10 Stat. 612, and thus allowed claimants to
`sue the Federal Government for monetary relief premised
`on other sources of law. (Specialized legislation remained
`necessary to authorize the payments approved by the
`Court of Claims until 1863, when Congress empowered the
`court to enter final judgments. See Act of Mar. 3, 1863
`
`(1863 Act), ch. 92, 12 Stat. 765; Mitchell II, supra, at 212–
`214 (recounting the history of the Court of Claims)).
`
`Enacted in 1887, the Tucker Act was the successor
`statute to the 1855 and 1863 Acts and replaced most of
`their provisions. See Act of Mar. 3, 1887 (1887 Act), ch.
`359, 24 Stat. 505; Mitchell II, supra, at 213–214. Like the
`1855 Act before it, the Tucker Act provided the Federal
`Government’s consent to suit in the Court of Claims for
`claims “founded upon . . . any law of Congress.” 1887 Act
`§1, 24 Stat. 505. Section 2 of the 1887 Act created concur-
`rent jurisdiction in the district courts for claims of up to
`$1,000. The Tucker Act’s jurisdictional grant, and accom-
`panying immunity waiver, supplied the missing ingredient
`for an action against the United States for the breach of
`
`monetary obligations not otherwise judicially enforceable.4
`——————
`4For purposes of this case, the current versions of the Tucker Act and
`
`
` Little Tucker Act resemble the 1887 Act. Compare 28 U. S. C. §1491(a)(1)
`(permitting suits “founded . . . upon . . . any Act of Congress”) with
`Tucker Act §1, 24 Stat. 505 (permitting suits “founded upon . . . any law
`of Congress, except for pensions”). The prior functions of the Court of
`Claims are now divided between the Court of Federal Claims at the
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` trial level and the Federal Circuit at the appellate.
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` Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2012)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`B
`
`
`The Tucker Act is displaced, however, when a law as-
`sertedly imposing monetary liability on the United States
`contains its own judicial remedies. In that event, the
`specific remedial scheme establishes the exclusive frame-
`
`work for the liability Congress created under the statute.
`Because a “precisely drawn, detailed statute pre-empts
`
`more general remedies,” Hinck v. United States, 550 U. S.
`501, 506 (2007) (quoting EC Term of Years Trust v. United
`
`
`States, 550 U. S. 429, 434 (2007); internal quotation marks
`omitted), FCRA’s self-executing remedial scheme super-
`sedes the gap-filling role of the Tucker Act.
`
`We have long recognized that an additional remedy in
`the Court of Claims is foreclosed when it contradicts the
`limits of a precise remedial scheme. In Nichols v. United
`
`States, 7 Wall. 122, 131 (1869), the issue was whether the
`1855 Act authorized suit in the Court of Claims for im-
`proper assessment of duties on imported liquor that had
`already been paid without protest. The Court held that it
`did not. The revenue laws already provided a remedy: An
`
`aggrieved merchant could sue to recover the tax, but only
`after paying the duty under protest. Act of Feb. 26, 1845,
`ch. 22, 5 Stat. 727. The Court rejected the supposition
`that “Congress, after having carefully constructed a reve-
`nue system, with ample provisions to redress wrong,
`intended to give to the taxpayer and importer a further
`and different remedy.” 7 Wall., at 131. Permitting suit
`under the 1855 Act, the Court concluded, would frustrate
`congressional intent with respect to the specific remedial
`scheme already in place. The 1855 Act was confined to a
`gap-filling role. As we said in a later case, “the general
`laws which govern the Court of Claims may be resorted
`to for relief ” only because “[n]o special remedy has been
`provided” to enforce a payment to which the claimant was
`entitled. United States v. Kaufman, 96 U. S. 567, 569
`(1878). Where the “liability is one created by statute,” the
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`7
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`UNITED STATES v. BORMES
`
`Opinion of the Court
` “special remedy provided by the same statute is exclusive.”
`
` Ibid.
`Our more recent cases have consistently held that statu-
`
`tory schemes with their own remedial framework exclude
`alternative relief under the general terms of the Tucker
`
` Act. See, e.g., Hinck, supra; United States v. Fausto, 484
`U. S. 439 (1988); United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U. S.
`201 (1982). Respondent contends that in each of those
`cases Congress had unambiguously demonstrated its
`intent to foreclose additional review by the Court of Fed-
`eral Claims—whereas here, no similar intent to preclude
`Tucker Act jurisdiction is apparent. See Brief for Re-
`spondent 27–28. But our precedents collectively stand for
`a more basic proposition: Where a specific statutory
`scheme provides the accoutrements of a judicial action, the
`metes and bounds of the liability Congress intended to
`create can only be divined from the text of the statute
`
`itself.5
` In Hinck, for example, we held that the Tax Court pro-
`vides the exclusive forum for suits under 26 U. S. C.
`§6404(h), which authorizes judicial review of the Secre-
`tary’s decision not to abate interest under §6404(e)(1). We
`relied on “our past recognition that when Congress enacts
`a specific remedy when no remedy was previously recog-
`nized . . . the remedy provided is generally regarded as
`——————
`5We therefore need not resolve the parties’ disagreement about
`
` whether certain inconsistencies between the Little Tucker Act and
`
`
` FCRA can be reconciled. Compare 28 U. S. C. §1346(a)(2) (no claims in
`district court “exceeding $10,000 in amount”) with 15 U. S. C. §1681p
`(claims may be brought in district court “without regard to the amount
`in controversy”); compare 28 U. S. C. §2501 (claims must be filed in the
`Court of Federal Claims within six years of accrual) with 15 U. S. C.
`§1681p (claims under FCRA must be filed within the earlier of two
`years after discovery or five years after the alleged violation). Recon-
`cilable or not, FCRA governs. The Government also contends that the
`Tucker Act does not apply because §§1681n and 1681o sound in tort.
`We do not decide the merits of that alternative argument.
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`9
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` Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2012)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`exclusive.” 550 U. S., at 506. Section 6404(h), we con-
`cluded, “fits the bill”: it “provides a forum for adjudication,
`a limited class of potential plaintiffs, a statute of limita-
`tions, a standard of review, and authorization for judicial
`
`relief.” Ibid. It did not matter that Congress “fail[ed]
`explicitly to define the Tax Court’s jurisdiction as exclu-
`sive.” Ibid. We found it “quite plain that the terms of
`§6404(h)—a ‘precisely drawn, detailed statute’ filling a
`perceived hole in the law—control all requests for review
`
`of §6404(e)(1) determinations.” Ibid.
`
`Like §6404(h), FCRA creates a detailed remedial
`
`scheme. Its provisions “set out a carefully circumscribed,
`time-limited, plaintiff-specific” cause of action, and “also
`
`precisely define the appropriate forum.” Id., at 507. It
`authorizes aggrieved consumers to hold “any person” who
`“willfully” or “negligent[ly]” fails to comply with the Act’s
`requirements liable for specified damages. 15 U. S. C.
`§§1681n(a), 1681o. Claims to enforce liability must be
`brought within a specified limitations period, §1681p, and
`jurisdiction will lie “in any appropriate United States dis-
`trict court, without regard to the amount in controversy,
`or in any other court of competent jurisdiction.” Ibid.
`
`Without resort to the Tucker Act, FCRA enables claimants
`to pursue in court the monetary relief contemplated by the
`statute.
`
`
`Plaintiffs cannot, therefore, mix and match FCRA’s
`
`provisions with the Little Tucker Act’s immunity waiver to
`create an action against the United States. Since FCRA
`
`is a detailed remedial scheme, only its own text can de-
`termine whether the damages liability Congress crafted
`extends to the Federal Government. To hold otherwise—
`to permit plaintiffs to remedy the absence of a waiver of
`sovereign immunity in specific, detailed statutes by plead-
`ing general Tucker Act jurisdiction—would transform the
`sovereign-immunity landscape.
`
`
`The Federal Circuit was therefore wrong to conclude
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`

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` UNITED STATES v. BORMES
`
`Opinion of the Court
`that the Tucker Act justified applying a “less stringent”
`sovereign-immunity analysis to FCRA than our cases
`require. 626 F. 3d, at 582. It distorted our case law in
`applying to FCRA the immunity-waiver standard we
`expressed in White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U. S., at
`
`472: whether the statute “‘can fairly be interpreted as
`mandating compensation by the Federal Government for
`
`the damage sustained.’ ” 626 F. 3d, at 578. That is the
`test for determining whether a statute that imposes an
`obligation but does not provide the elements of a cause of
`action qualifies for suit under the Tucker Act—more spe-
`cifically, whether the failure to perform an obligation
`undoubtedly imposed on the Federal Government creates
`a right to monetary relief. See White Mountain Apache
`Tribe, supra; Mitchell II, 463 U. S. 206. That test is not
`relevant when a “mandate of compensation” is contained
`in a statute that provides a detailed judicial remedy
`against those who are subject to its requirements. FCRA
`is such a statute. By using the “fair interpretation” test to
`determine whether FCRA’s civil liability provisions apply
`to the United States, the Federal Circuit directed the test
`to a purpose for which it was not designed and leapfrogged
`the threshold concern that the Tucker Act cannot be su-
`
`perimposed on an existing remedial scheme.
`
`
`*
`*
`*
`
`We do not decide here whether FCRA itself waives the
`Federal Government’s immunity to damages actions under
`§1681n. That question is for the Seventh Circuit to con-
`sider once this case is transferred to it on remand. But
`whether or not FCRA contains the necessary waiver of
`immunity, any attempt to append a Tucker Act remedy to
`the statute’s existing remedial scheme interferes with its
`intended scope of liability.
`
`
`The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and
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`the case remanded with instructions to transfer the case to
`
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` It is so ordered.
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` Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2012)
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`Opinion of the Court
`the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
`for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.