(Slip Opinion)
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2011
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`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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` Syllabus
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`MOHAMAD, INDIVIDUALLY AND FOR ESTATE OF RAHIM,
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`DECEASED, ET AL. v. PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY
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`
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`ET AL.
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
` No. 11–88. Argued February 28, 2012—Decided April 18, 2012
`
`While visiting the West Bank, Azzam Rahim, a naturalized United
`States citizen, allegedly was arrested by Palestinian Authority intel-
`ligence officers, imprisoned, tortured, and ultimately killed. Rahim’s
`relatives, petitioners here, sued the Palestinian Authority and the
`Palestine Liberation Organization under the Torture Victim Pro-
`tection Act of 1991 (TVPA), which authorizes a cause of action
`
`
` against “[a]n individual” for acts of torture and extrajudicial killing
` committed under authority or color of law of any foreign nation. 106
`
`Stat. 73, note following 28 U. S. C. §1350. The District Court dis-
`
` missed the suit, concluding, as relevant here, that the TVPA’s au-
`thorization of suit against “[a]n individual” extended liability only to
`natural persons. The United States Court of Appeals for the District
`of Columbia Circuit affirmed.
`Held: As used in the TVPA, the term “individual” encompasses only
`natural persons. Consequently, the Act does not impose liability
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`against organizations. Pp. 2–11.
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`(a) The ordinary, everyday meaning of “individual” refers to a hu-
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`man being, not an organization, and Congress in the normal course
`does not employ the word any differently. The Dictionary Act defines
`“person” to include certain artificial entities “as well as individuals,”
`
`1 U. S. C. §1, thereby marking “individual” as distinct from artificial
`entities. Federal statutes routinely distinguish between an “individ-
`ual” and an organizational entity. See, e.g., 7 U. S. C. §§92(k), 511.
`And the very Congress that passed the TVPA defined “person” in a
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`separate Act to include “any individual or entity.” 18 U. S. C.
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`MOHAMAD v. PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY
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`Syllabus
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`§2331(3). Pp. 2–5.
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`(b) Before a word will be assumed to have a meaning broader than
`or different from its ordinary meaning, Congress must give some in-
`dication that it intended such a result. There are no such indications
`in the TVPA. To the contrary, the statutory context confirms that
`Congress in the Act created a cause of action against natural persons
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`alone. The Act’s liability provision uses the word “individual” five
`
`times in the same sentence: once to refer to the perpetrator and four
`times to refer to the victim. See TVPA §2(a). Since only a natural
`person can be a victim of torture or extrajudicial killing, it is difficult
`to conclude that Congress used “individual” four times in the same
`sentence to refer to a natural person and once to refer to a natural
`person and any nonsovereign organization. In addition, the TVPA
`holds perpetrators liable for extrajudicial killing to “any person who
`
`
`may be a claimant in an action for wrongful death.” See TVPA
`§2(a)(2). “Persons” often has a broader meaning in the law than “in-
`dividual,” and frequently includes non-natural persons. Construing
`“individual” in the Act to encompass solely natural persons credits
`Congress’ use of disparate terms. Pp. 5–6.
`
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`(c) Petitioners’ counterarguments are unpersuasive. Pp. 6–11.
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`
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`(1) Petitioners dispute that the plain text of the TVPA requires
`this Court’s result. First, they rely on definitions that frame “indi-
`
`vidual” in nonhuman terms, emphasizing the idea of “oneness,” but
`these definitions make for an awkward fit in the context of the TVPA.
`
`
`Next they claim that federal tort statutes uniformly provide for liabil-
`ity against organizations, a convention they maintain is common to
`the legal systems of other nations. But while “Congress is under-
`stood to legislate against a background of common-law adjudicatory
`
`principles,” Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Solimino, 501 U. S.
`104, 108, Congress plainly evinced its intent in the TVPA not to sub-
`ject organizations to liability. Petitioners next argue that the TVPA’s
`scope of liability should be construed to conform with other federal
`statutes they claim provide civil remedies to victims of torture or ex-
`trajudicial killing. But none of the statutes petitioners cite employs
`the term “individual,” as the TVPA, to describe the covered defend-
`ant. Finally, although petitioners rightly note that the TVPA con-
`templates liability against officers who do not personally execute the
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`torture or extrajudicial killing, it does not follow that the Act em-
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`braces liability against nonsovereign organizations. Pp. 6–8.
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`(2) Petitioners also contend that legislative history supports their
`broad reading of “individual,” but “reliance on legislative history is
`unnecessary in light of the statute’s unambiguous language.” Mila-
`
`vetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P. A. v. United States, 559 U. S. ___, ___. In
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`any event, the history supports this Court’s interpretation. Pp. 8–10.
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` Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012)
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`Syllabus
`(3) Finally, petitioners argue that precluding organizational lia-
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`bility may foreclose effective remedies for victims and their relatives.
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` This purposive argument simply cannot overcome the force of the
`plain text. Moreover, Congress appeared well aware of the limited
`nature of the cause of action it established in the TVPA. Pp. 10–11.
`634 F. 3d 604, affirmed.
`SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
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`C. J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, GINSBURG, BREYER, ALITO, and KAGAN,
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` JJ., joined, and in which SCALIA, J., joined except as to Part III–B.
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`BREYER, J., filed a concurring opinion.
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`Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012)
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`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`_________________
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` No. 11–88
`_________________
`ASID MOHAMAD, INDIVIDUALLY AND FOR THE ESTATE OF
`
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`AZZAM RAHIM, DECEASED, ET AL., PETITIONERS
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`v. PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY ET AL.
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`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
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`APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
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`[April 18, 2012]
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` JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.*
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`The Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA or
`
`Act), 106 Stat. 73, note following 28 U. S. C. §1350, au-
`thorizes a cause of action against “[a]n individual” for acts
`of torture and extrajudicial killing committed under au-
`thority or color of law of any foreign nation. We hold that
`the term “individual” as used in the Act encompasses only
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`natural persons. Consequently, the Act does not impose
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`liability against organizations.
`I
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`Because this case arises from a motion to dismiss, we ac-
`cept as true the allegations of the complaint. Ashcroft v.
`al-Kidd, 563 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 1). Petition-
`ers are the relatives of Azzam Rahim, who immigrated to
`the United States in the 1970’s and became a naturalized
`citizen. In 1995, while on a visit to the West Bank, Rahim
`was arrested by Palestinian Authority intelligence officers.
`He was taken to a prison in Jericho, where he was impris-
`——————
` * JUSTICE SCALIA joins this opinion except as to Part III–B.
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`Opinion of the Court
`oned, tortured, and ultimately killed. The following year,
`the U. S. Department of State issued a report concluding
`that Rahim “died in the custody of [Palestinian Authority]
`intelligence officers in Jericho.” Dept. of State, Occupied
`Territories Human Rights Practices, 1995 (Mar. 1996).
`
`
`In 2005, petitioners filed this action against respond-
`ents, the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liber-
`
`ation Organization, asserting, inter alia, claims of torture
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`and extrajudicial killing under the TVPA. The District
`Court granted respondents’ motion to dismiss, concluding,
`as relevant, that the Act’s authorization of suit against
`“[a]n individual” extended liability only to natural per-
`sons. Mohamad v. Rajoub, 664 F. Supp. 2d 20, 22 (DC
`2009). The United States Court of Appeals for the District
`of Columbia Circuit affirmed on the same ground. See
`Mohamad v. Rajoub, 634 F. 3d 604, 608 (2011) (“Congress
`used the word ‘individual’ to denote only natural per-
`
`sons”).1 We granted certiorari, 565 U. S. ___ (2011), to
`resolve a split among the Circuits with respect to whether
`the TVPA authorizes actions against defendants that are
`not natural persons,2 and now affirm.
`
`II
`
`The TVPA imposes liability on individuals for certain
`acts of torture and extrajudicial killing. The Act provides:
`“An individual who, under actual or apparent author-
`ity, or color of law, of any foreign nation—
`——————
`1Respondents also argued before the District Court that the TVPA’s
`requirement that acts be committed under authority or color of law of
`a foreign nation was not met. Neither the District Court nor Court of
`
`Appeals addressed the argument, and we offer no opinion on its merits.
`2Compare Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F. 3d 388 (CA4 2011) (TVPA ex-
`cludes corporate defendants from liability); Mohamad v. Rajoub, 634
`F. 3d 604 (CADC 2011) (TVPA liability limited to natural persons);
`
`Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F. 3d 1116 (CA9 2010) (same as Aziz),
`
`
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`with Sinaltrainal v. Coca Cola Co., 578 F. 3d 1252, 1264, n. 13 (CA11
`2009) (TVPA liability extends to corporate defendants).
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`Opinion of the Court
`“(1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil
`action, be liable for damages to that individual; or
`“(2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing
`shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to the in-
`dividual’s legal representative, or to any person who
`may be a claimant in an action for wrongful death.”
`§2(a).
`The Act defines “torture” and “extrajudicial killing,” §3,
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`and imposes a statute of limitations and an exhaustion
`requirement, §§2(b), (c). It does not define “individual.”
`
`Petitioners concede that foreign states may not be sued
`under the Act—namely, that the Act does not create an
`exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
`1976, 28 U. S. C. §1602 et seq., which renders foreign
`
`sovereigns largely immune from suits in U. S. courts.
`They argue, however, that the TVPA does not similarly
`restrict liability against other juridical entities. In peti-
`tioners’ view, by permitting suit against “[a]n individual,”
`the TVPA contemplates liability against natural persons
`and nonsovereign organizations (a category that, petition-
`ers assert, includes respondents). We decline to read
`“individual” so unnaturally. The ordinary meaning of the
`word, fortified by its statutory context, persuades us that
`
`the Act authorizes suit against natural persons alone.
`A
`
`Because the TVPA does not define the term “individual,”
`we look first to the word’s ordinary meaning. See FCC v.
`AT&T Inc., 562 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 5) (“When
`a statute does not define a term, we typically give the
`phrase its ordinary meaning” (internal quotation marks
`omitted)). As a noun, “individual” ordinarily means “[a]
`human being, a person.” 7 Oxford English Dictionary 880
`(2d ed. 1989); see also, e.g., Random House Dictionary
`of the English Language 974 (2d ed. 1987) (“a person”);
`Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1152 (1986)
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`MOHAMAD v. PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY
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`Opinion of the Court
`(“a particular person”) (hereinafter Webster’s). After all,
`that is how we use the word in everyday parlance. We say
`
`“the individual went to the store,” “the individual left
`the room,” and “the individual took the car,” each time re-
`ferring unmistakably to a natural person. And no one, we
`hazard to guess, refers in normal parlance to an organiza-
`
`tion as an “individual.” Evidencing that common usage,
`this Court routinely uses “individual” to denote a natural
`person, and in particular to distinguish between a natural
`person and a corporation. See, e.g., Goodyear Dunlop
`Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U. S. __, __ (2011)
`(slip op., at 7) (“For an individual, the paradigm forum
`for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s
`domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in
`which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home”).
`
`Congress does not, in the ordinary course, employ the
`word any differently. The Dictionary Act instructs that
`“[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress,
`unless the context indicates otherwise . . . the wor[d]
`‘person’ . . . include[s] corporations, companies, associa-
`tions, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock com-
`panies, as well as individuals.” 1 U. S. C. §1 (emphasis
`added). With the phrase “as well as,” the definition marks
`“individual” as distinct from the list of artificial entities
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`that precedes it.
`
`
`In a like manner, federal statutes routinely distinguish
`between an “individual” and an organizational entity of
`some kind. See, e.g., 7 U. S. C. §92(k) (“‘Person’ includes
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`partnerships, associations, and corporations, as well as
`
`individuals”); §511 (same); 15 U. S. C. §717a (“‘Person’
`includes an individual or a corporation”); 16 U. S. C. §796
`(“‘[P]erson’ means an individual or a corporation”); 8
`U. S. C. §1101(b)(3) (“‘[P]erson’ means an individual or an
`organization”).
`Indeed, the very same Congress that
`enacted the TVPA also established a cause of action for
`U. S. nationals injured “by reason of an act of interna-
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`Opinion of the Court
`tional terrorism” and defined “person” as it appears in
`
`the statute to include “any individual or entity capable of
`holding a legal or beneficial interest in property.” Federal
`Courts Administration Act of 1992, 18 U. S. C. §§2333(a),
`
`
`2331(3) (emphasis added)).
`
`5
`
`B
`
`This is not to say that the word “individual” invariably
`means “natural person” when used in a statute. Congress
`remains free, as always, to give the word a broader or
`different meaning. But before we will assume it has done
`so, there must be some indication Congress intended such
`a result. Perhaps it is the rare statute (petitioners point
`to only one such example, located in the Internal Revenue
`Code) in which Congress expressly defines “individual” to
`include corporate entities. See 26 U. S. C. §542(a)(2). Or
`perhaps, as was the case in Clinton v. City of New York,
`524 U. S. 417, 429 (1998), the statutory context makes
`that intention clear, because any other reading of “indi-
`vidual” would lead to an “‘absurd’” result Congress could
`not plausibly have intended.
`
`There are no such indications in the TVPA. As noted,
`
`the Act does not define “individual,” much less do so in a
`manner that extends the term beyond its ordinary usage.
`And the statutory context strengthens—not undermines—
`the conclusion that Congress intended to create a cause of
`action against natural persons alone. The Act’s liability
`provision uses the word “individual” five times in the same
`sentence: once to refer to the perpetrator (i.e., the defend-
`
`ant) and four times to refer to the victim. See §2(a). Only
`a natural person can be a victim of torture or extrajudicial
`killing. “Since there is a presumption that a given term
`is used to mean the same thing throughout a statute, a
`presumption surely at its most vigorous when a term is
`repeated within a given sentence,” Brown v. Gardner, 513
`U. S. 115, 118 (1994) (citation omitted), it is difficult in-
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`Opinion of the Court
`deed to conclude that Congress employed the term “in-
`
`dividual” four times in one sentence to refer to a natural
`person and once to refer to a natural person and any
`nonsovereign organization. See also §3(b)(1) (using term
`
`“individual” six times in referring to victims of torture).
`
`It is also revealing that the Act holds perpetrators lia-
`ble for extrajudicial killing to “any person who may be a
`claimant in an action for wrongful death.” §2(a)(2) (em-
`phasis added). “Person,” we have recognized, often has a
`broader meaning in the law than “individual,” see Clinton,
`524 U. S., at 428, n. 13, and frequently includes nonnatu-
`ral persons, see, e.g., 1 U. S. C. §1. We generally seek
`to respect Congress’ decision to use different terms to de-
`scribe different categories of people or things. See Sosa v.
`Alvarez-Machain, 542 U. S. 692, 711, n. 9 (2004). Our
`construction of “individual” to encompass solely natural
`
`persons credits Congress’ use of the disparate terms;
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`petitioners’ construction does not.3
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`In sum, the text of the statute persuades us that the Act
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`authorizes liability solely against natural persons.
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`III
`
` Petitioners’ counterarguments are unpersuasive.
`
`A
`
`Petitioners first dispute that the plain text of the TVPA
`requires today’s result. Although they concede that an
`ordinary meaning of “individual” is “human being,” peti-
`tioners point to definitions of “individual” that “frame the
`term . . . in distinctly non-human terms, instead placing
`
`their emphases on the oneness of something.” Brief for
`——————
` 3The parties debate whether estates, or other nonnatural persons, in
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`fact may be claimants in a wrongful-death action. We think the debate
`largely immaterial. Regardless of whether jurisdictions today allow for
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`such actions, Congress’ use of the broader term evidences an intent to
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`accommodate that possibility.
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`Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012)
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`Opinion of the Court
`Petitioners 18 (citing, e.g., Webster’s 1152 (defining “indi-
`
`vidual” as “a single or particular being or thing or group
`of being or things”)). Those definitions, however, do not
`
`account even for petitioners’ preferred interpretation of “in-
`dividual” in the Act, for foreign states—which petition-
`ers concede are not liable under the Act—do not differ
`from nonsovereign organizations in their degree of “one-
`ness.” Moreover, “[w]ords that can have more than one
`meaning are given content . . . by their surroundings,”
`
`Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457,
`
`466 (2001), and for the reasons explained supra, petition-
`ers’ definition makes for an awkward fit in the context of
`
`the TVPA.
`
`Petitioners next claim that federal tort statutes uni-
`formly provide for liability against organizations, a con-
`vention they maintain is common to the legal systems of
`other nations. We are not convinced, however, that any
`such “domestic and international presumption of organi-
`zational liability” in tort actions overcomes the ordi-
`nary meaning of “individual.” Brief for Petitioners 16. It
`is true that “Congress is understood to legislate against
`
`a background of common-law adjudicatory principles.”
`
`Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Solimino, 501 U. S. 104,
`108 (1991). But Congress plainly can override those prin-
`
`
`ciples, see, e.g., id., at 108–109, and, as explained supra,
`the TVPA’s text evinces a clear intent not to subject non-
`
`sovereign organizations to liability.4
`——————
`4Petitioners’ separate contention that the TVPA must be construed
`in light of international agreements prohibiting torture and extrajudi-
`cial killing fails for similar reasons. Whatever the scope of those agree-
`ments, the TVPA does not define “individual” by reference to them,
`and principles they elucidate cannot overcome the statute’s text. The
`same is true of petitioners’ suggestion that Congress in the TVPA
`imported a “specialized usage” of the word “individual” in international
`law. Brief for Petitioners 6. There is no indication in the text of the
`statute or legislative history that Congress knew of any such special-
`ized usage of the term, much less intended to import it into the Act.
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`MOHAMAD v. PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY
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`Opinion of the Court
`We also decline petitioners’ suggestion to construe the
`
`TVPA’s scope of liability to conform with other federal
`statutes that petitioners contend provide civil remedies to
`victims of torture or extrajudicial killing. None of the
`three statutes petitioners identify employs the term “in-
`dividual” to describe the covered defendant, and so none
`assists in the interpretive task we face today. See 42
`U. S. C. §1983; 28 U. S. C. §§1603(a), 1605A(c) (2006 ed.,
`Supp. IV); 18 U. S. C. §§2333, 2334(a)–(b), 2337. The
`
`same is true of the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U. S. C. §1350, so
`it offers no comparative value here regardless of whether
`corporate entities can be held liable in a federal common-
`law action brought under that statute. Compare Doe v.
`
`Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F. 3d 11 (CADC 2011), with
`Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F. 3d 111 (CA2
`2010), cert. granted, 565 U. S. ___ (2011). Finally, al-
`
`though petitioners rightly note that the TVPA contem-
`plates liability against officers who do not personally
`execute the torture or extrajudicial killing, see, e.g.,
`Chavez v. Carranza, 559 F. 3d 486 (CA6 2009), it does not
`follow (as petitioners argue) that the Act embraces liabil-
`ity against nonsovereign organizations. An officer who
`gives an order to torture or kill is an “individual” in that
`
` word’s ordinary usage; an organization is not.
`B
`
`Petitioners also contend that legislative history supports
`their broad reading of “individual.” But “reliance on legis-
`lative history is unnecessary in light of the statute’s un-
`ambiguous language.” Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P. A.
`
`v. United States, 559 U. S. ___, ___, n. 3 (2010) (slip op., at
`6, n. 3). In any event, the excerpts petitioners cite do not
`help their cause. Petitioners note that the Senate Report
`states that “[t]he legislation uses the term ‘individual’ to
`make crystal clear that foreign states or their entities
`cannot be sued under this bill under any circumstances.”
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`Opinion of the Court
`S. Rep. No. 102–249, p. 7 (1991) (S. Rep.); see also H. R.
`Rep. No. 102–367, pt. 1, p. 4 (1991) (H. R. Rep.) (“Only
`‘individuals,’ not foreign states, can be sued”). Yet that
`statement, while clarifying that the Act does not encom-
`pass liability against foreign states, says nothing about
`liability against nonsovereign organizations. The other
`excerpts petitioners cite likewise are not probative of the
`meaning of “individual,” for they signal only that the Act
`does not impose liability on perpetrators who act without
`authority or color of law of a foreign state. See, e.g., H. R.
`Rep., at 5 (“The bill does not attempt to deal with torture
`or killing by purely private groups”); S. Rep., at 8 (The bill
`“does not cover purely private criminal acts by individuals
`or nongovernmental organizations”).
`Indeed, although we need not rely on legislative history
`
`given the text’s clarity, we note that the history only sup-
`ports our interpretation of “individual.” The version of the
`TVPA that was introduced in the 100th Congress estab-
`lished liability against a “person.” Hearing and Markup
`on H. R. 1417 before the House Committee on Foreign
`Affairs and Its Subcommittee on Human Rights and
`International Organizations, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 82
`(1988). During the markup session of the House Foreign
`Affairs Committee, one of the bill’s sponsors proposed an
`amendment “to make it clear we are applying it to indi-
`viduals and not to corporations.” Id., at 81, 87. Counsel
`explained that it was a “fairly simple” matter “of changing
`the word ‘person’ to ‘individuals’ in several places in the
`bill.” Id., at 87–88. The amendment was unanimously
`adopted, and the version of the bill reported out of Com-
`mittee reflected the change. Id., at 88; H. R. Rep. No. 693,
`pt. 1, p. 1 (1988). A materially identical version of the bill
`was enacted as the TVPA by the 102d Congress. Although
`we are cognizant of the limitations of this drafting history,
`cf. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545
`U. S. 546, 568 (2005), we nevertheless find it telling that
`
`
`
`
`
`9
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`10
`
`
`MOHAMAD v. PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY
`
`Opinion of the Court
`the sole explanation for substituting “individual” for “per-
`son” confirms what we have concluded from the text alone.
`C
`
`Petitioners’ final argument is that the Act would be
`rendered toothless by a construction of “individual” that
`limits liability to natural persons. They contend that pre-
`cluding organizational liability may foreclose effective
`remedies for victims and their relatives for any number of
`reasons. Victims may be unable to identify the men and
`women who subjected them to torture, all the while know-
`ing the organization for whom they work. Personal juris-
`diction may be more easily established over corporate than
`human beings. And natural persons may be more likely
`than organizations to be judgment proof. Indeed, we are
`told that only two TVPA plaintiffs have been able to re-
`cover successfully against a natural person—one only after
`the defendant won the state lottery. See Jean v. Dorelien,
`431 F. 3d 776, 778 (CA11 2005).
`
`We acknowledge petitioners’ concerns about the limita-
`tions on recovery. But they are ones that Congress im-
`posed and that we must respect. “[N]o legislation pursues
`its purposes at all costs,” Rodriguez v. United States, 480
`
`U. S. 522, 525–526 (1987) (per curiam), and petitioners’
`purposive argument simply cannot overcome the force of
`the plain text. We add only that Congress appeared well
`aware of the limited nature of the cause of action it estab-
`lished in the Act. See, e.g., 138 Cong. Rec. 4177 (1992)
`(remarks of Sen. Simpson) (noting that “as a practical
`matter, this legislation will result in a very small number
`of cases”); 137 Cong. Rec. 2671 (1991) (remarks of Sen.
`Specter) (“Let me emphasize that the bill is a limited
`measure. It is estimated that only a few of these lawsuits
`will ever be brought”).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
` 11
`
`
`It is so ordered.
`
`
`
` Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`
`*
`*
`*
`
`The text of the TVPA convinces us that Congress did not
`extend liability to organizations, sovereign or not. There
`are no doubt valid arguments for such an extension. But
`Congress has seen fit to proceed in more modest steps in
`
`the Act, and it is not the province of this Branch to do
`otherwise. The judgment of the United States Court of
`Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is affirmed.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012)
`
` BREYER, J., concurring
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`1
`
`_________________
`
` No. 11–88
`_________________
`ASID MOHAMAD, INDIVIDUALLY AND FOR THE ESTATE OF
`
`
`AZZAM RAHIM, DECEASED, ET AL., PETITIONERS
`
`
`
`
`v. PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY ET AL.
`
`
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`
`APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
`
`[April 18, 2012]
`
`JUSTICE BREYER, concurring.
`
`I join the Court’s opinion with one qualification. The
`
`word “individual” is open to multiple interpretations,
`permitting it, linguistically speaking, to include natural
`persons, corporations, and other entities. Thus, I do not
`believe that word alone is sufficient to decide this case.
`The legislative history of the statute, however, makes
`
`up for whatever interpretive inadequacies remain after con-
`
`sidering language alone. See, e.g., ante, at 9 (describ-
`
`ing markup session in which one of the bill’s sponsors
`proposed an amendment containing the word “individual”
`to “make it clear” that the statute applied to “individuals
`and not to corporations”); Hearing on S. 1629 et al. be-
`fore the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs
`
`of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong.,
`2d Sess., 65 (1990) (witness explaining to committee that
`there would be a “problem” with suing an “independent en-
`tity or a series of entities that are not governments,” such
`as the Palestine Liberation Organization); id., at 75
`
`(allaying concerns that there will be a flood of lawsuits
`“because of the requirement [in the statute] that an indi-
`vidual has to identify his or her precise torture[r] and they
`have to be both in the United States”); see also ante, at 8–
`
`9 (making clear that petitioners’ citations to the legislative
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`2
`
`
`MOHAMAD v. PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY
`
` BREYER, J., concurring
`
`
`history “do not help their cause”). After examining the
`history in detail, and considering it along with the reasons
`that the Court provides, I join the Court’s judgment and
`
`opinion.