(Slip Opinion)
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2012
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`
`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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`
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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`
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`
` Syllabus
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` ALREADY, LLC, DBA YUMS v. NIKE, INC.
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE SECOND CIRCUIT
`No. 11–982. Argued November 7, 2012—Decided January 9, 2013
`Nike filed this suit, alleging that two of Already’s athletic shoes violat-
`ed Nike’s Air Force 1 trademark. Already denied the allegations and
`
`
`filed a counterclaim challenging the validity of Nike’s Air Force 1
`
`
`trademark. While the suit was pending, Nike issued a “Covenant
`Not to Sue,” promising not to raise any trademark or unfair competi-
`tion claims against Already or any affiliated entity based on Al-
`
`ready’s existing footwear designs, or any future Already designs that
`constituted a “colorable imitation” of Already’s current products.
`
`Nike then moved to dismiss its claims with prejudice, and to dismiss
`Already’s counterclaim without prejudice on the ground that the cov-
`enant had extinguished the case or controversy. Already opposed
`dismissal of its counterclaim, contending that Nike had not estab-
`lished that its covenant had mooted the case. In support, Already
`presented an affidavit from its president, stating that Already
`
`
`planned to introduce new versions of its lines into the market; affida-
`vits from three potential investors, asserting that they would not
`consider investing in Already until Nike’s trademark was invalidat-
`ed; and an affidavit from an Already executive, stating that Nike had
`intimidated retailers into refusing to carry Already’s shoes. The Dis-
`
`
`
`
`trict Court dismissed Already’s counterclaim, concluding that there
`was no longer a justiciable controversy. The Second Circuit affirmed.
`
`It explained that the covenant was broadly drafted; that the court
`could not conceive of a shoe that would infringe Nike’s trademark yet
`not fall within the covenant; and that Already had not asserted any
`intent to market such a shoe.
`Held: This case is moot. Pp. 3–15.
`(a) A case becomes moot—and therefore no longer a “Case” or “Con-
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`troversy” for Article III purposes—“when the issues presented are no
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`

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`ALREADY, LLC v. NIKE, INC.
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`
`Syllabus
`
`longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the
`
`outcome.” Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U. S. 478, 481. A defendant cannot,
`
`
`however, automatically moot a case simply by ending its unlawful
`
`conduct once sued. City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455
`U. S. 283, 289. Instead, “a defendant claiming that its voluntary
`compliance moots a case bears the formidable burden of showing that
`it is absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not rea-
`
`
`sonably be expected to recur.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
`Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U. S. 167, 190. Pp. 3–4.
`
`
`(b) Nike has the burden to show that it “could not reasonably be
`
`expected” to resume its enforcement efforts against Already. The
`voluntary cessation doctrine was not disavowed in Deakins v. Mona-
`ghan, 484 U. S. 193. There, the Court employed precisely the analy-
`sis the test requires, finding a case moot because the challenged ac-
`
`tion—pursuing a claim in court—could not be resumed in “this or any
`
`subsequent action” and because it was entirely “ ‘speculative’ ” that
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`
`any similar claim would arise in the future. Id., at 201, n. 4. Pp. 5–6.
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`(c) Application of the voluntary cessation doctrine shows that this
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`case is moot. Pp. 6–14.
`
`
`(1) The breadth of the covenant suffices to meet the burden im-
`posed by the doctrine. The covenant is unconditional and irrevocable.
`It prohibits Nike from filing suit or making any claim or demand;
`
`
`protects both Already and Already’s distributors and customers; and
`covers not just current or previous designs, but also colorable imita-
`
`tions. Once Nike demonstrated that the covenant encompasses all of
`Already’s allegedly unlawful conduct, it became incumbent on Al-
`ready to indicate that it engages in or has sufficiently concrete plans
`
`
`to engage in activities that would arguably infringe Nike’s trademark
`yet not be covered by the covenant. But Already failed to do so in the
`courts below or in this Court. The case is thus moot because the chal-
`
`lenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to recur. Cardinal
`Chemical Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U. S. 83, and Altvater v. Free-
`man, 319 U. S. 359, distinguished. Pp. 6–9.
`(2) Already’s alternative theories of Article III injuries do not
`save the case from mootness, because none of those injuries suffices
`to support Article III standing in the first place. Already argues that
`
`as long as Nike is free to assert its trademark, investors will hesitate
`
`to invest in Already. But once it is “absolutely clear” that challenged
`
`conduct cannot “reasonably be expected to recur,” Friends of the
`
`Earth, supra, at 190, the fact that some individuals may base deci-
`sions on conjectural or hypothetical speculation does not give rise to
`the sort of concrete and actual injury necessary to establish Article
`
`III standing, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560. Al-
`
`ready worries about its retailers, but even if a plaintiff may bring an
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`2
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`

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` Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013)
`
`
`Syllabus
`invalidity claim based on a reasonable expectation that a trademark
`holder will take action against the plaintiff ’s retailers, the covenant
`here extends protection to Already’s distributors and customers. Al-
`ready also complains that Nike’s decision to sue in the first place has
`led Already to fear another suit. But, since Nike has met its burden
`to demonstrate that there is no reasonable risk of such a suit, this
`concern is unfounded. Already falls back on the sweeping argument
`that, as one of Nike’s competitors, it inherently has standing because
`
`no covenant can eradicate the effects of a registered but invalid
`trademark. The logical conclusion of this theory seems to be that a
`market participant is injured for Article III purposes whenever a
`competitor benefits from something allegedly unlawful—e.g., a
`trademark or the awarding of a contract—but this Court has never
`accepted such a boundless theory of standing.
`
`Already’s policy objection that dismissing this case allows Nike to
`
`
`bully small innovators does not support adoption of this broad theory.
`
`Granting covenants not to sue may be a risky long-term strategy for a
`trademark holder. And while accepting Already’s theory may benefit
`the small competitor in this case, it also lowers the gates for larger
`companies with more resources, who may challenge the intellectual
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`property portfolios of more humble rivals simply because they are
`
`competitors in the same market. This would further encourage par-
`ties to employ litigation as a weapon against their competitors rather
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`than as a last resort for settling disputes. Pp. 9–14.
`
`(d) No purpose would be served by remanding the case. Already
`
`has had every opportunity and incentive to submit evidence in the
`proceedings below. It has refused, at every stage of the proceedings,
`to suggest that it has any plans to design a shoe that violates the Air
`Force 1 trademark yet falls outside the covenant. And while the
`courts below did not expressly invoke the voluntary cessation stand-
`ard, their analysis addressed the same questions this Court address-
`es here under that standard. Pp. 14–15.
`
`
`663 F. 3d 89, affirmed.
`
` ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. KEN-
`
`NEDY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which THOMAS, ALITO, and SO-
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`TOMAYOR, JJ., joined.
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`3
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`

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` Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013)
`
`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`
` No. 11–982
`_________________
` ALREADY, LLC, DBA YUMS, PETITIONER v. NIKE,
`
`INC.
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`
`APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
`
`
`[January 9, 2013]
`
` CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the
`
`Court.
`
`The question is whether a covenant not to enforce a
`
`trademark against a competitor’s existing products and
`any future “colorable imitations” moots the competitor’s
`action to have the trademark declared invalid.
`I
`
`Respondent Nike designs, manufactures, and sells ath-
`letic footwear, including a line of shoes known as Air
`Force 1s. Petitioner Already also designs and markets
`athletic footwear, including shoe lines known as “Sugars”
`and “Soulja Boys.” Nike, alleging that the Soulja Boys in-
`fringed and diluted the Air Force 1 trademark, demanded
`
`that Already cease and desist its sale of those shoes.
`When Already refused, Nike filed suit in federal court
`alleging that the Soulja Boys as well as the Sugars in-
`fringed and diluted its Air Force 1 trademark. Already
`denied these allegations and filed a counterclaim contend-
`ing that the Air Force 1 trademark is invalid.
`
`In March 2010, eight months after Nike filed its com-
`
`plaint, and four months after Already counterclaimed,
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`

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`ALREADY, LLC v. NIKE, INC.
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
` Nike issued a “Covenant Not to Sue.” Its preamble stated
`that “Already’s actions . . . no longer infringe or dilute
`
`the NIKE Mark at a level sufficient to warrant the substan-
`tial time and expense of continued litigation.” App. 96a.
`The covenant promised that Nike would not raise against
`Already or any affiliated entity any trademark or unfair
`competition claim based on any of Already’s existing foot-
`wear designs, or any future Already designs that consti-
`tuted a “colorable imitation” of Already’s current products.
`Id., at 96a–97a.
`After issuing this covenant, Nike moved to dismiss its
`
`claims with prejudice, and to dismiss Already’s invalid-
`ity counterclaim without prejudice on the ground that the
`covenant had extinguished the case or controversy. Al-
`ready opposed dismissal of its counterclaim, arguing that
`Nike had not established that its voluntary cessation had
`mooted the case. In support, Already presented an affi-
`davit from its president, stating that Already had plans to
`introduce new versions of its shoe lines into the market;
`affidavits from three potential investors, asserting that
`they would not consider investing in Already until Nike’s
`trademark was invalidated; and an affidavit from one of
`
`Already’s executives, stating that Nike had intimidated
`
` retailers into refusing to carry Already’s shoes.
`The District Court dismissed Already’s counterclaim,
`
`
`stating that because Already sought “to invoke the Court’s
`declaratory judgment jurisdiction, it bears the burden of
`demonstrating that the Court has subject matter jurisdic-
`tion over its counterclaim[ ].” Civ. No. 09–6366 (SDNY,
`Jan. 20, 2011), App. to Pet. for Cert. 25a.
` The Court
`read the covenant “broad[ly],” concluding that “any of [Al-
`ready’s] future products that arguably infringed the Nike
`Mark would be ‘colorable imitations’ ” of Already’s current
`footwear and therefore protected by the covenant. Id., at
`29a, n. 2. Finding no evidence that Already sought to
`
` develop any shoes not covered by the covenant, the Court
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`2
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`3
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` Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`held there was no longer “a substantial controversy . . . of
`sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance
`of a declaratory judgment.” Id., at 34a (quoting Med-
`Immune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U. S. 118, 127 (2007)
`
`(internal quotation marks omitted)).
`
`The Second Circuit affirmed. It held that in determin-
`ing whether a covenant not to sue “eliminates a justiciable
`
`case or controversy,” courts should look to the totality
`of the circumstances, including “(1) the language of the
`covenant, (2) whether the covenant covers future, as well
`as past, activity and products, and (3) evidence of inten-
`tion . . . on the part of the party asserting jurisdiction” to
`engage in conduct not covered by the covenant. 663 F. 3d
`89, 96 (2011) (footnote omitted). Noting that the covenant
`covers “both past sales and future sales of both existing
`products and colorable imitations,” the Second Circuit
`found it hard to conceive of a shoe that would infringe the
`
`Air Force 1 trademark yet not fall within the covenant.
`Id., at 97. Given that Already “ha[d] not asserted any
`intention to market any such shoe,” the court concluded
`
`that Already could not show any continuing injury, and
`that therefore no justiciable controversy remained. Ibid.
`
`We granted certiorari. 567 U. S. ___ (2012).
`
`II
`
`
`Article III of the Constitution grants the Judicial
`Branch authority to adjudicate “Cases” and “Controver-
`sies.” In our system of government, courts have “no busi-
`ness” deciding legal disputes or expounding on law in the
`absence of such a case or controversy. DaimlerChrysler
`Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U. S. 332, 341 (2006). That limitation
`requires those who invoke the power of a federal court to
`demonstrate standing—a “personal injury fairly traceable
`to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to
`be redressed by the requested relief.” Allen v. Wright, 468
`U. S. 737, 751 (1984). We have repeatedly held that an
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`

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`ALREADY, LLC v. NIKE, INC.
`
`Opinion of the Court
`“actual controversy” must exist not only “at the time the
`complaint is filed,” but through “all stages” of the litiga-
`tion. Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U. S. 87, 92 (2009) (internal
`quotation marks omitted); Arizonans for Official English
`v. Arizona, 520 U. S. 43, 67 (1997) (“To qualify as a case
`fit for federal-court adjudication, ‘an actual controversy
`must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the
`time the complaint is filed’” (quoting Preiser v. Newkirk, 422
`U. S. 395, 401 (1975))).
`
`A case becomes moot—and therefore no longer a “Case”
`or “Controversy” for purposes of Article III—“when the
`issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack
`a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Murphy v.
`Hunt, 455 U. S. 478, 481 (1982) (per curiam) (some in-
`ternal quotation marks omitted). No matter how vehe-
`
`
`mently the parties continue to dispute the lawfulness of the
`conduct that precipitated the lawsuit, the case is moot if
`the dispute “is no longer embedded in any actual contro-
`versy about the plaintiffs’ particular legal rights.” Alva-
`rez, supra, at 93.
`
`We have recognized, however, that a defendant cannot
`automatically moot a case simply by ending its unlawful
`conduct once sued. City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle,
`
`Inc., 455 U. S. 283, 289 (1982). Otherwise, a defendant
`
`
`could engage in unlawful conduct, stop when sued to have
`the case declared moot, then pick up where he left off,
`repeating this cycle until he achieves all his unlawful
`ends. Given this concern, our cases have explained that
`
`“a defendant claiming that its voluntary compliance moots
`a case bears the formidable burden of showing that it is
`absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not
`
`reasonably be expected to recur.” Friends of the Earth,
`Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528
`U. S. 167, 190 (2000).
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`4
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`5
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` Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
` III
`At the outset of this litigation, both parties had standing
`
`to pursue their competing claims in court. Nike had
`standing to sue because Already’s activity was allegedly
`infringing its rights under trademark law. Already had
`standing to file its counterclaim because Nike was alleg-
`edly pressing an invalid trademark to halt Already’s le-
`gitimate business activity. See MedImmune, supra, at
`126–137 (a genuine threat of enforcement of intellectual prop-
`erty rights that inhibits commercial activity may support
`
`
`standing). But then Nike dismissed its claims with preju-
`dice and issued its covenant, calling into question the
`existence of any continuing case or controversy.
`Under our precedents, it was Nike’s burden to show
`
`that it “could not reasonably be expected” to resume its
`enforcement efforts against Already. Friends of the Earth,
`supra, at 190. Nike makes a halfhearted effort to avoid
`this test. Relying on Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U. S. 193
`(1988), it argues that “when a defendant makes a judicially
`enforceable commitment to avoid the conduct that forms
`the basis for an Article III controversy, there is no reason
`to apply a special rule premised on the defendant’s unfet-
`tered ability to ‘return to [its] old ways.’” Brief for Re-
`spondent 42.
`
`
`
`Nike’s reliance on Deakins is misplaced. In Deakins, the
`Court did not disavow the voluntary cessation doctrine;
`the Court employed precisely the analysis required by that
`test. It found the case was moot because the challenged
`action—pursuing a claim in court—could not be resumed
`in “this or any subsequent action” and because it was
`entirely “speculative” that any similar claim would arise
`in the future. 484 U. S., at 201, n. 4 (internal quotation
`marks omitted). It distinguished that situation from one
`in which a defendant is “free to return to his old ways.”
`Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). That is the
`question the voluntary cessation doctrine poses: Could the
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`6
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`ALREADY, LLC v. NIKE, INC.
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`Opinion of the Court
`allegedly wrongful behavior reasonably be expected to re-
`cur? Nike cannot avoid its “formidable burden” by as-
`suming the answer to that question. Friends of the Earth,
`supra, at 190.
`
`IV
`
`A
`
`Having determined that the voluntary cessation doc-
`
`trine applies, we begin our analysis with the terms of the
`covenant:
`“[Nike] unconditionally and irrevocably covenants to
`refrain from making any claim(s) or demand(s) . . .
`against Already or any of its . . . related business enti-
`ties . . . [including] distributors . . . and employees of
`such entities and all customers . . . on account of any
`possible cause of action based on or involving trade-
`mark infringement, unfair competition, or dilution,
`under state or federal law . . . relating to the NIKE
`Mark based on the appearance of any of Already’s cur-
`rent and/or previous footwear product designs, and any
`
`
`
`
`
`colorable imitations thereof, regardless of whether
`that footwear is produced . . . or otherwise used in
`commerce before or after the Effective Date of this
`Covenant.” App. 96a–97a (emphasis added).
`The breadth of this covenant suffices to meet the burden
`
`imposed by the voluntary cessation test. The covenant is
`
`unconditional and irrevocable. Beyond simply prohibiting
`Nike from filing suit, it prohibits Nike from making any
`claim or any demand. It reaches beyond Already to pro-
`tect Already’s distributors and customers. And it covers
`not just current or previous designs, but any colorable
`imitations.
`
`In addition, Nike originally argued that the Sugars and
`
`Soulja Boys infringed its trademark; in other words, Nike
`believed those shoes were “colorable imitations” of the Air
`
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`7
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`Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Force 1s. See Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), §32,
`60 Stat. 437, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §1114. Nike’s cov-
`enant now allows Already to produce all of its existing
`footwear designs—including the Sugar and Soulja Boy—
`and any “colorable imitation” of those designs. We agree
`with the Court of Appeals that “it is hard to imagine a
`scenario that would potentially infringe [Nike’s trade-
`mark] and yet not fall under the Covenant.”* 663 F. 3d, at
`97. Nike, having taken the position in court that there
`is no prospect of such a shoe, would be hard pressed to as-
`sert the contrary down the road. See New Hampshire v.
`Maine, 532 U. S. 742, 749 (2001) (“‘[W]here a party as-
`sumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and suc-
`ceeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter,
`simply because his interests have changed, assume a
`contrary position, especially if it be to the prejudice of the
`party who has acquiesced in the position formerly taken
`
`by him’” (quoting Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U. S. 680, 689
`(1895))). If such a shoe exists, the parties have not pointed
`
`to it, there is no evidence that Already has dreamt of it,
`and we cannot conceive of it. It sits, as far as we can tell,
`
`on a shelf between Dorothy’s ruby slippers and Perseus’s
`winged sandals.
`
`Given Nike’s demonstration that the covenant encom-
`passes all of its allegedly unlawful conduct, it was incum-
`——————
`*Nike has “acknowledged that if [Already] were to manufacture an
`exact copy of the Air Force 1 shoe . . . Nike could claim that the Cov-
`enant permits an infringement suit on the ground that a counterfeit
`differs from a colorable imitation under the Lanham Act.” 663 F. 3d, at
`97, n. 5. Already, however, has never asserted any intent to make
`
`
`
`counterfeit Air Force 1s. Ibid. Moreover, because a counterfeit would
`
`presumably include Nike’s swoosh, an independently registered trade-
`mark not at issue here, invalidating the Air Force 1 trademark may
`not be sufficient to allow Already to proceed to make counterfeits. See
`15 U. S. C. §1127 (defining a counterfeit as a “spurious mark which is
`identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a registered
`mark”).
`
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`

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`8
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`ALREADY, LLC v. NIKE, INC.
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`Opinion of the Court
`bent on Already to indicate that it engages in or has suffi-
`ciently concrete plans to engage in activities not covered
`
`by the covenant. After all, information about Already’s
`business activities and plans is uniquely within its posses-
`sion. The case is moot if the court, considering the cove-
`nant’s language and the plaintiff ’s anticipated future
`activities, is satisfied that it is “absolutely clear” that the
`allegedly unlawful activity cannot reasonably be expected
`
`to recur.
`
`But when given the opportunity before the District
`Court, Already did not assert any intent to design or
`market a shoe that would expose it to any prospect of in-
`fringement liability. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 31a (find-
`ing that there was “no indication” of any such intent);
`663 F. 3d, at 97, n. 5 (noting the “absence of record evi-
`dence that [Already] intends to make any arguably in-
`fringing shoe that is not unambiguously covered by the
`Covenant”). The only affidavit it submitted to the District
`Court on that question was from its president, saying little
`more than that Already currently has plans to introduce
`new shoe lines and make modifications to existing shoe
`lines. It never stated that these shoes would arguably
`
`
`infringe Nike’s trademark yet fall outside the scope of the
`
`covenant. Nor did it do so on appeal to the Second Circuit.
`And again, it failed to do so here, even when counsel for
`Already was asked at oral argument whether his client
`had any intention to design or market a shoe that would
`even arguably fall outside the covenant. Tr. of Oral Arg.
`6–8. Given the covenant’s broad language, and given that
`Already has asserted no concrete plans to engage in con-
`duct not covered by the covenant, we can conclude the case
`is moot because the challenged conduct cannot reasonably
`
`be expected to recur.
`
`
`The authorities on which Already relies are not on point.
`In Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., we affirmed
`
`the unremarkable proposition that a court’s “decision to
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`9
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` Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`rely on one of two possible alternative grounds (nonin-
`fringement rather than invalidity) did not strip it of power
`to decide the second question, particularly when its decree
`was subject to review by this Court.” 508 U. S. 83, 98
`(1993). In essence, when a court has jurisdiction to review
`a case, and decides the issue on two independent grounds,
`the first half of its opinion does not moot the second half,
`or vice versa. Here the issue is whether the District Court
`had jurisdiction to consider the claim in the first place.
`
`This case is also unlike Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U. S.
`359 (1943). There, patent holders brought suit against
`licensees for specific performance of a license. The licen-
`sees counterclaimed, seeking a declaratory judgment that
`the patents were invalid. The Court of Appeals, after
`finding that the license was no longer in force and the
`devices at issue did not infringe, dismissed the licensees’
`counterclaim as moot. We reversed, finding the contro-
`versy still live because the licensees continued to “manu-
`factur[e] and sell[ ] additional articles claimed to fall under
`the patents,” and the patent holders continued to “de-
`
`mand[ ] . . . royalties” for those products. Id., at 364–365.
`
`Here of course the whole point is that Already is free to
`
`sell its shoes without any fear of a trademark claim.
`B
`
`Already argues, however, that there are alternative
`theories of Article III injuries that save the case from
`mootness. First, it argues that so long as Nike remains
`free to assert its trademark, investors will be apprehen-
`sive about investing in Already. Second, it argues that
`given Nike’s decision to sue in the first place, Nike’s
`trademarks will now hang over Already’s operations like a
`Damoclean sword. Finally, and relatedly, Already argues
`that, as one of Nike’s competitors, it inherently has stand-
`ing to challenge Nike’s intellectual property.
`
`The problem for Already is that none of these injuries
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`ALREADY, LLC v. NIKE, INC.
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`Opinion of the Court
`suffices to support Article III standing. Although the
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`voluntary cessation standard requires the defendant to
`show that the challenged behavior cannot reasonably be
`expected to recur, we have never held that the doctrine—
`by imposing this burden on the defendant—allows the
`
`plaintiff to rely on theories of Article III injury that would
`fail to establish standing in the first place.
`We begin with Already’s argument that Nike’s trade-
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`mark registration “gives false color to state and federal
`trademark claims which expose [Already’s] business to
`substantial and unpredictable risks,” deterring investors.
`Brief for Petitioner 31. To demonstrate this, Already
`presented affidavits from potential investors stating that
`Nike’s lawsuit dissuaded them from investing in Already
`or prompted them to withdraw prior investments, and
`that they would “consider” investing in Already only if
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`Nike’s trademark were struck down. App. to Pet. for Cert.
`33a. Already argues that like the plaintiffs in Village
`of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926)—
`who had standing to challenge an ordinance because it re-
`duced their property value—Already should have standing to
`challenge the trademark because its mere existence ham-
`
`pers its ability to attract capital.
`But once it is “absolutely clear” that challenged conduct
`
`cannot “reasonably be expected to recur,” Friends of the
`Earth, 528 U. S., at 190, the fact that some individuals
`may base decisions on “conjectural or hypothetical” specu-
`lation does not give rise to the sort of “concrete” and “ac-
`tual” injury necessary to establish Article III standing,
`Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560 (1992)
`(internal quotation marks omitted). In Euclid, we rea-
`soned that, assuming the merits of plaintiff ’s claim, “the
`ordinance, in effect, constitutes a present invasion of
`[plaintiff ’s] property rights.” 272 U. S., at 386. Here
`there is no such present invasion; in fact there is a cove-
`nant promising no invasion. In addition, unlike the plain-
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` Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013)
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`Opinion of the Court
`tiffs in Euclid, Already does not claim that Nike’s Air
`
`Force 1 infringes any of its property rights.
`Already has also pointed to an affidavit from a vice
`
`president stating that Nike has “suggested” to Already’s
`retailers that they refrain from carrying Already’s shoes,
`lest “Nike . . . cancel its account or take other actions
`against the retailer, e.g., delay shipment of the retailer’s
`Nike order or ‘lose’ the retailer’s Nike order.” App. 177a.
`
`Even if a plaintiff may bring an invalidity claim based
`on a reasonable expectation that a trademark holder will
`take action against the plaintiff ’s retailers, the covenant
`here extends protection to Already’s distributors and
`customers. And even if Nike were engaging in harass-
`ment or unfair trade practices, Already has not explained
`how invalidating Nike’s trademark would do anything to
`stop it.
`
`
` Already also complains that it can no longer “just blithely
`go about its shoe business as if there were no risk of
`being sued again.” Reply Brief 14. As counsel told us at
`oral argument: “once bitten, twice shy.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 8.
`But we have never held that a plaintiff has standing to
`pursue declaratory relief merely on the basis of being
`“once bitten.” Quite the opposite. See, e.g., Los Angeles v.
`Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 109 (1983) (holding there is no justici-
`able controversy where plaintiff had once been subjected
`to a chokehold). Given our conclusion that Nike has met
`its burden of demonstrating there is no reasonable risk
`that Already will be sued again, there is no reason for
`Already to be so shy. It is the only one of Nike’s competi-
`tors with a judicially enforceable covenant protecting it
`from litigation relating to the Air Force 1 trademark.
`Insofar as the injury is a threat of Air Force 1 trademark
`litigation, Already is Nike’s least injured competitor.
`
`
`Already falls back on a sweeping argument: In the
`context of registered trademarks, “[n]o covenant, no mat-
`ter how broad, can eradicate the effects” of a registered
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`ALREADY, LLC v. NIKE, INC.
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`Opinion of the Court
`but invalid trademark. Brief for Petitioner 33–34. Ac-
`cording to Already, allowing Nike to unilaterally moot the
`case “subverts” the important role federal courts play in
`the administration of federal patent and trademark law.
`Id., at 40. It allows companies like Nike to register and
`brandish invalid trademarks to intimidate smaller com-
`petitors, avoiding judicial review by issuing covenants in
`the rare case where the little guy fights back. Already and
`its amici thus contend that Already, “[a]s a company
`engaged in the business of designing and marketing ath-
`letic shoes,” has standing to challenge Nike’s trademark.
`See id., at 21; see also Brief for Intellectual Property Pro-
`fessors as Amici Curiae 3 (suggesting that standing ex-
`
`tends to all “participants in that field”); Brief for Public
`Patent Foundation as Amici Curiae 12 (“[T]he public has
`standing to challenge the validity of any issued patent or
`
`registered trademark in court”).
`
`Under this approach, Nike need not even have threat-
`ened to sue first. Already, even with no plans to make
`anything resembling the Air Force 1, could sue to invali-
`
`date the trademark simply because Already and Nike both
`compete in the athletic footwear market. Taken to its
`logical conclusion, the theory seems to be that a market
`participant is injured for Article III purposes whenever a
`competitor benefits from something allegedly unlawful—
`whether a trademark, the awarding of a contract, a landlord-
`
`tenant arrangement, or so on. We have never accepted
`such a boundless theory of standing. The cases Already
`cites for this remarkable proposition stand for no such
`thing.
`In each of those cases, standing was based on
`an injury more particularized and more concrete than
`the mere assertion that something unlawful benefited the
`plaintiff ’s competitor. Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associ-
`
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`ated Gen. Contractors of America v. Jacksonville, 508 U. S.
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`656 (1993); Super Tire Eng