`
`Statement of ALITO, J.
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`MOUNT SOLEDAD MEMORIAL ASSOCIATION
`11–998
`
`v.
`STEVE TRUNK ET AL.
`
`
`1
`
`
`
`
`
`11–1115
`
`UNITED STATES ET AL.
`
`
`
`v.
`STEVE TRUNK ET AL.
`
`
`ON PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
`
`
`STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`
`
`
` Nos. 11–998 and 11–1115. Decided June 25, 2012
`
` The petitions for writs of certiorari are denied.
`
`
` Statement of JUSTICE ALITO respecting the denial of the
`petitions for writs of certiorari.
`
`A large white cross has stood atop Mount Soledad in
`San Diego, California, since 1954 as a memorial to our
`Nation’s war veterans. The city of San Diego was pre-
`viously enjoined under the California Constitution from
`displaying the cross or transferring, for the purpose of
`protecting the cross, the property on which the Mount
`Soledad Veterans Memorial stands. See Trunk v. San
`Diego, 629 F. 3d 1099, 11031104 (CA9 2011) (describ-
`ing prior litigation); see also San Diegans for Mt. Soledad
`
`Nat. War Memorial v. Paulson, 548 U. S. 1301, 1302 (2006)
` (KENNEDY, J., in chambers) (same). In 2006, Congress
`
`
`
`exercised its power of eminent domain and took title to the
`property in order to “preserve a historically significant
`war memorial.” Act of Aug. 14, §2(a), 120 Stat. 770. After
`the Federal Government took possession, the Ninth Cir-
`cuit held in the decision below that “the Memorial, pres-
`ently configured and as a whole, primarily conveys a
`message of government endorsement of religion that vio-
`lates the Establishment Clause.” 629 F. 3d, at 1125.
`
`
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`
`
`MOUNT SOLEDAD MEMORIAL ASSOCIATION v.
`
`
` TRUNK
`
`Statement of ALITO, J.
`
`
`This Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence is un-
`
`
` doubtedly in need of clarity, see Utah Highway Patrol
`Assn. v. American Atheists, Inc., 565 U. S. __, __ (2011)
`(THOMAS, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (slip op.,
`
`
`at 17), and the constitutionality of the Mount Soledad
`Veterans Memorial is a question of substantial impor-
`tance. We considered a related question two Terms ago
`in Salazar v. Buono, 559 U. S. __ (2010), which concerned
`a large white cross that was originally erected on public
`land. Although “[t]he cross is of course the preeminent
`symbol of Christianity,” id., at __ (ALITO, J., concurring in
`part and concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 3), we noted
`that “[t]he goal of avoiding governmental endorsement
`[of religion] does not require eradication of all religious
`symbols in the public realm. . . . The Constitution does not
`oblige government to avoid any public acknowledgment of
`religion’s role in society,” id., at ____ (plurality opinion of
`KENNEDY, J., joined in full by ROBERTS, C. J., and in part
`
`
`
`
`by ALITO, J.) (slip op., at 1415). The demolition of the
`
`
`cross at issue in that case would have been “interpreted by
`
` some as an arresting symbol of a Government that is not
`neutral but hostile on matters of religion and is bent on
`eliminating from all public places and symbols any trace
`of our country’s religious heritage.” Id., at __ (opinion of
`ALITO, J.) (slip op., at 4).
`
`
`In that case, we were not required to decide whether the
`Establishment Clause would have required the demolition
`of the cross if the land on which it was built had remained
`in government hands. Instead, Congress was ultimately
`able to devise a solution that was “true to the spirit of
`
`practical accommodation that has made the United States
`a Nation of unparalleled pluralism and religious toler-
`ance.” Id., at __ (slip op., at 1).
`
`The current petitions come to us in an interlocutory
`posture. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the
`District Court to fashion an appropriate remedy, and, in
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` Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012)
`
`Statement of ALITO, J.
`
`doing so, the Court of Appeals emphasized that its deci-
`sion “d[id] not mean that the Memorial could not be modi-
`fied to pass constitutional muster [or] that no cross can be
`part of [the Memorial].” 629 F. 3d, at 1125. Because no
`final judgment has been rendered and it remains unclear
`precisely what action the Federal Government will be
`required to take, I agree with the Court’s decision to deny
`the petitions for certiorari. See, e.g., Locomotive Firemen
`
`v. Bangor & Aroostook R. Co., 389 U. S. 327, 328 (1967)
`(per curiam) (denying petition for certiorari because “the
`Court of Appeals [had] remanded the case” and thus it was
`“not yet ripe for review by this Court”); see also E. Gress-
`man, K. Geller, S. Shapiro, T. Bishop, & E. Hartnett,
`Supreme Court Practice 280 (9th ed. 2007) (hereinaf-
`ter Stern & Gressman). Our denial, of course, does not
`amount to a ruling on the merits, and the Federal Gov-
`ernment is free to raise the same issue in a later petition
`following entry of a final judgment. See, e.g., Hughes Tool
`
`
`Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U. S. 363, 365366,
`n. 1 (1973); see also Stern & Gressman 283.
`
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`
`3