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`Per Curiam
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`MIKE STANTON, PETITIONER v. DRENDOLYN SIMS
`ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
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`STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
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`No. 12–1217. Decided November 4, 2013
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` PER CURIAM.
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`Around one o’clock in the morning on May 27, 2008,
`Officer Mike Stanton and his partner responded to a call
`about an “unknown disturbance” involving a person with a
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`baseball bat in La Mesa, California. App. to Pet. for
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`Cert. 6. Stanton was familiar with the neighborhood, known
`for “violence associated with the area gangs.” Ibid. The
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`officers—wearing uniforms and driving a marked police
`vehicle—approached the place where the disturbance had
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`been reported and noticed three men walking in the street.
`Upon seeing the police car, two of the men turned into a
`nearby apartment complex. The third, Nicholas Patrick,
`crossed the street about 25 yards in front of Stanton’s car
`and ran or quickly walked toward a residence. Id., at 7,
`17. Nothing in the record shows that Stanton knew at the
`time whether that residence belonged to Patrick or some-
`one else; in fact, it belonged to Drendolyn Sims.
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`Stanton did not see Patrick with a baseball bat, but
`he considered Patrick’s behavior suspicious and decided
`to detain him in order to investigate. Ibid.; see Terry v.
`Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968). Stanton exited his patrol car,
`called out “police,” and ordered Patrick to stop in a voice
`loud enough for all in the area to hear. App. to Pet. for
`Cert. 7. But Patrick did not stop. Instead, he “looked
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`directly at Stanton, ignored his lawful orders[,] and quickly
`went through [the] front gate” of a fence enclosing Sims’
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`front yard. Id., at 17 (alterations omitted). When the gate
`closed behind Patrick, the fence—which was more than six
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`feet tall and made of wood—blocked Stanton’s view of the
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`STANTON v. SIMS
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`Per Curiam
`yard. Stanton believed that Patrick had committed a
`jailable misdemeanor under California Penal Code §148 by
`disobeying his order to stop;* Stanton also “fear[ed] for
`[his] safety.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 7. He accordingly
`made the “split-second decision” to kick open the gate in
`pursuit of Patrick. Ibid. Unfortunately, and unbeknownst
`to Stanton, Sims herself was standing behind the gate
`when it flew open. The swinging gate struck Sims, cutting
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`her forehead and injuring her shoulder.
`Sims filed suit against Stanton in Federal District Court
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`under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, alleging that
`Stanton unreasonably searched her home without a war-
`rant in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The District
`Court granted summary judgment to Stanton, finding
`that: (1) Stanton’s entry was justified by the potentially
`dangerous situation, by the need to pursue Patrick as he
`fled, and by Sims’ lesser expectation of privacy in the
`curtilage of her home; and (2) even if a constitutional
`violation had occurred, Stanton was entitled to qualified
`immunity because no clearly established law put him on
`notice that his conduct was unconstitutional.
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`Sims appealed, and a panel of the Court of Appeals for
`the Ninth Circuit reversed. 706 F. 3d 954 (2013). The
`court held that Stanton’s warrantless entry into Sims’
`yard was unconstitutional because Sims was entitled to
`the same expectation of privacy in her curtilage as in her
`home itself, because there was no immediate danger, and
`because Patrick had committed only the minor offense of
`disobeying a police officer. Id., at 959–963. The court also
`found the law to be clearly established that Stanton’s
`——————
`*“Every person who willfully resists, delays, or obstructs any . . .
`peace officer . . . in the discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of
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`his or her office or employment . . . shall be punished by a fine not
`exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in a
`county jail not to exceed one year, or by both that fine and imprison-
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`ment.” Cal. Penal Code Ann. §148(a)(1) (2013 West Cum. Supp.).
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`Per Curiam
`pursuit of Patrick did not justify his warrantless entry,
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`given that Patrick was suspected of only a misdemeanor.
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`Id., at 963–964. The court accordingly held that Stanton
`was not entitled to qualified immunity. Id., at 964–965.
`We address only the latter holding here, and now reverse.
`“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects govern-
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`ment officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as
`their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
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`or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
`would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U. S. 223,
`231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800,
`818 (1982)). “Qualified immunity gives government offi-
`cials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken
`judgments,” and “protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent
`or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Ashcroft v. al-
`Kidd, 563 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 12) (quoting
`Malley v. Briggs, 475 U. S. 335, 341 (1986)). “We do not
`require a case directly on point” before concluding that the
`law is clearly established, “but existing precedent must
`have placed the statutory or constitutional question be-
`yond debate.” al-Kidd, 563 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9).
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`There is no suggestion in this case that Officer Stanton
`knowingly violated the Constitution; the question is
`whether, in light of precedent existing at the time, he was
`“plainly incompetent” in entering Sims’ yard to pursue the
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`fleeing Patrick. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 12). The Ninth
`Circuit concluded that he was. It did so despite the fact
`that federal and state courts nationwide are sharply di-
`vided on the question whether an officer with probable
`cause to arrest a suspect for a misdemeanor may enter a
`home without a warrant while in hot pursuit of that sus-
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`pect. Compare, e.g., Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.
`3d 43, 45, 765 N. E. 2d 330, 332 (2002) (“We . . . hold today
`that when officers, having identified themselves, are in
`hot pursuit of a suspect who flees to a house in order to
`avoid arrest, the police may enter without a warrant,
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` STANTON v. SIMS
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`Per Curiam
`regardless of whether the offense for which the suspect is
`being arrested is a misdemeanor”), and State v. Ricci, 144
`N. H. 241, 244, 739 A. 2d 404, 407 (1999) (“the facts of this
`case demonstrate that the police had probable cause to
`arrest the defendant for the misdemeanor offense of dis-
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`obeying a police officer” where the defendant had fled
`into his home with police officers in hot pursuit), with Mas-
`corro v. Billings, 656 F. 3d 1198, 1207 (CA10 2011) (“The
`warrantless entry based on hot pursuit was not justified”
`where “[t]he intended arrest was for a traffic misdemeanor
`committed by a minor, with whom the officer was well
`acquainted, who had fled into his family home from which
`there was only one exit” (footnote omitted)), and Butler v.
`State, 309 Ark. 211, 217, 829 S. W. 2d 412, 415 (1992)
`(“even though Officer Sudduth might have been under the
`impression that he was in continuous pursuit of Butler for
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`what he considered to be the crime of disorderly conduct,
`. . . since the crime is a minor offense, under these circum-
`stances there is no exigent circumstance that would allow
`Officer Sudduth’s warrantless entry into Butler’s home for
`what is concededly, at most, a petty disturbance”).
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`Other courts have concluded that police officers are at
`least entitled to qualified immunity in these circumstances
`because the constitutional violation is not clearly estab-
`lished. E.g., Grenier v. Champlin, 27 F. 3d 1346, 1354
`(CA8 1994) (“Putting firmly to one side the merits of
`whether the home arrests were constitutional, we cannot
`say that only a plainly incompetent policeman could have
`thought them permissible at the time,” where officers
`entered a home without a warrant in hot pursuit of mis-
`demeanor suspects who had defied the officers’ order to
`remain outside (internal quotation marks and citation
`omitted)).
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`Notwithstanding this basic disagreement, the Ninth
`Circuit below denied Stanton qualified immunity. In its
`one-paragraph analysis on the hot pursuit point, the panel
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`Per Curiam
`relied on two cases, one from this Court, Welsh v. Wiscon-
`sin, 466 U. S. 740, 750 (1984), and one from its own, United
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`States v. Johnson, 256 F. 3d 895, 908 (2001) (en banc)
`(per curiam). Neither case clearly establishes that Stan-
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`ton violated Sims’ Fourth Amendment rights.
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`In Welsh, police officers learned from a witness that
`Edward Welsh had driven his car off the road and then
`left the scene, presumably because he was drunk. Acting
`on that tip, the officers went to Welsh’s home without a
`warrant, entered without consent, and arrested him for
`driving while intoxicated—a nonjailable traffic offense
`under state law. 466 U. S., at 742–743. Our opinion first
`noted our precedent holding that hot pursuit of a fleeing
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`felon justifies an officer’s warrantless entry. Id., at 750
`(citing United States v. Santana, 427 U. S. 38, 42–43
`(1976)). But we rejected the suggestion that the hot pur-
`suit exception applied: “there was no immediate or contin-
`uous pursuit of [Welsh] from the scene of a crime.” 466
`U. S., at 753. We went on to conclude that the officers’
`entry violated the Fourth Amendment, finding it “im-
`portant” that “there [was] probable cause to believe that
`only a minor offense . . . ha[d] been committed.” Ibid. In
`those circumstances, we said, “application of the exigent-
`circumstances exception in the context of a home entry
`should rarely be sanctioned.” Ibid. But we did not lay
`down a categorical rule for all cases involving minor of-
`fenses, saying only that a warrant is “usually” required.
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`Id., at 750.
` In Johnson, police officers broke into Michael Johnson’s
`fenced yard in search of another person (Steven Smith)
`whom they were attempting to apprehend on five misde-
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`meanor arrest warrants. 256 F. 3d, at 898–900. The
`Ninth Circuit was clear that this case, like Welsh, did not
`involve hot pursuit: “the facts of this case simply are not
`covered by the ‘hot pursuit’ doctrine” because Smith had
`escaped from the police 30 minutes prior and his where-
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`Per Curiam
`abouts were unknown. 256 F. 3d, at 908. The court held
`that the officers’ entry required a warrant, in part because
`Smith was wanted for only misdemeanor offenses. Then,
`in a footnote, the court said: “In situations where an officer
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`is truly in hot pursuit and the underlying offense is a
`felony, the Fourth Amendment usually yields [to law
`enforcement’s interest in apprehending a fleeing suspect].
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`See [Santana, supra, at 42–43]. However, in situations
`where the underlying offense is only a misdemeanor, law
`enforcement must yield to the Fourth Amendment in all
`but the ‘rarest’ cases. Welsh, [supra, at 753].” Johnson,
`supra, at 908, n. 6.
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`In concluding—as it must have—that Stanton was
`“plainly incompetent,” al-Kidd, 563 U. S., at ___ (slip op.,
`at 12), the Ninth Circuit below read Welsh and the foot-
`note in Johnson far too broadly. First, both of those cases
`cited Santana with approval, a case that approved an
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`officer’s warrantless entry while in hot pursuit. And
`though Santana involved a felony suspect, we did not
`expressly limit our holding based on that fact. See 427
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`U. S., at 42 (“The only remaining question is whether [the
`suspect’s] act of retreating into her house could thwart an
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`otherwise proper arrest. We hold that it could not”).
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`Second, to repeat, neither Welsh nor Johnson involved hot
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`pursuit. Welsh, supra, at 753; Johnson, supra, at 908.
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`Thus, despite our emphasis in Welsh on the fact that the
`crime at issue was minor—indeed, a mere nonjailable civil
`offense—nothing in the opinion establishes that the seri-
`ousness of the crime is equally important in cases of hot
`pursuit. Third, even in the portion of Welsh cited by the
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`Ninth Circuit below, our opinion is equivocal: We held not
`that warrantless entry to arrest a misdemeanant is never
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`justified, but only that such entry should be rare. 466
`U. S., at 753.
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`That is in fact how two California state courts have read
`Welsh. In both People v. Lloyd, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1425,
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`Per Curiam
`1430, 265 Cal. Rptr. 422, 425 (1989), and In re Lavoyne
`M., 221 Cal. App. 3d 154, 159, 270 Cal. Rptr. 394, 396
`(1990), the California Court of Appeal refused to limit the
`hot pursuit exception to felony suspects. The court stated
`in Lloyd: “Where the pursuit into the home was based on
`an arrest set in motion in a public place, the fact that the
`offenses justifying the initial detention or arrest were
`misdemeanors is of no significance in determining the
`validity of the entry without a warrant.” 216 Cal. App. 3d,
`at 1430, 265 Cal. Rptr., at 425. It is especially troubling
`that the Ninth Circuit would conclude that Stanton was
`plainly incompetent—and subject to personal liability for
`damages—based on actions that were lawful according
`to courts in the jurisdiction where he acted. Cf. al-Kidd,
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`supra, at ___ (KENNEDY, J., concurring) (slip op., at 2–4).
`Finally, our determination that Welsh and Johnson are
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`insufficient to overcome Stanton’s qualified immunity is
`bolstered by the fact that, even after Johnson, two differ-
`ent District Courts in the Ninth Circuit have granted
`qualified immunity precisely because the law regarding
`warrantless entry in hot pursuit of a fleeing misdemean-
`ant is not clearly established. See Kolesnikov v. Sacra-
`mento County, No. S–06–2155, 2008 WL 1806193, *7 (ED
`Cal., Apr. 22, 2008) (“since Welsh, it has not been clearly
`established that there can never be warrantless home
`arrests in the context of a ‘hot pursuit’ of a suspect fleeing
`from the commission of misdemeanor offenses”); Garcia v.
`Imperial, No. 08–2357, 2010 WL 3834020, *6, n. 4 (SD
`Cal., Sept. 28, 2010). In Garcia, a case with facts similar
`to those here, the District Court distinguished Johnson as
`a case where “the officers were not in hot pursuit of the
`suspect, had not seen the suspect enter the neighbor’s
`property, and had no real reason to think the suspect was
`there.” 2010 WL 3834020, *6, n. 4. Precisely the same
`facts distinguish this case from Johnson: Stanton was in
`hot pursuit of Patrick, he did see Patrick enter Sims’
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` STANTON v. SIMS
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`Per Curiam
`property, and he had every reason to believe that Patrick
`was just beyond Sims’ gate. App. to Pet. for Cert. 6–7, 17.
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`To summarize the law at the time Stanton made his
`split-second decision to enter Sims’ yard: Two opinions of
`this Court were equivocal on the lawfulness of his entry;
`two opinions of the State Court of Appeal affirmatively
`authorized that entry; the most relevant opinion of the
`Ninth Circuit was readily distinguishable; two Federal
`District Courts in the Ninth Circuit had granted qualified
`immunity in the wake of that opinion; and the federal and
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`state courts of last resort around the Nation were sharply
`divided.
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`We do not express any view on whether Officer Stan-
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`ton’s entry into Sims’ yard in pursuit of Patrick was con-
`stitutional. But whether or not the constitutional rule
`applied by the court below was correct, it was not “beyond
`debate.” al-Kidd, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 9). Stanton
`may have been mistaken in believing his actions were
`justified, but he was not “plainly incompetent.” Malley,
`475 U. S., at 341.
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`The petition for certiorari and respondent’s motion for
`leave to proceed in forma pauperis are granted, the judg-
`ment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is
`remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
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`opinion.
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`It is so ordered.