(Slip Opinion)
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2012
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`Syllabus
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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` Syllabus
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` ARIZONA ET AL. v. INTER TRIBAL COUNCIL OF
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` ARIZONA, INC., ET AL.
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`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
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`THE NINTH CIRCUIT
` No. 12–71. Argued March 18, 2013—Decided June 17, 2013
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`The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) requires States to
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`“accept and use” a uniform federal form to register voters for federal
`elections. 42 U. S. C. §1973gg–4(a)(1). That “Federal Form,” devel-
`oped by the federal Election Assistance Commission (EAC), requires
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`only that an applicant aver, under penalty of perjury, that he is a cit-
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`izen. Arizona law, however, requires voter-registration officials to
`“reject” any application for registration, including a Federal Form,
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`that is not accompanied by documentary evidence of citizenship. Re-
`spondents, a group of individual Arizona residents and a group of
`nonprofit organizations, sought to enjoin that Arizona law. Ultimate-
`ly, the District Court granted Arizona summary judgment on re-
`spondents’ claim that the NVRA pre-empts Arizona’s requirement.
`The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part but reversed as relevant here,
`holding that the state law’s documentary-proof-of-citizenship re-
`quirement is pre-empted by the NVRA.
`Held: Arizona’s evidence-of-citizenship requirement, as applied to Fed-
`eral Form applicants, is pre-empted by the NVRA’s mandate that
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`States “accept and use” the Federal Form. Pp. 4–18.
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`(a) The Elections Clause imposes on States the duty to prescribe
`the time, place, and manner of electing Representatives and Sena-
`tors, but it confers on Congress the power to alter those regulations
`or supplant them altogether. See U. S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
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`Thornton, 514 U. S. 779, 804–805. This Court has said that the
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`terms “Times, Places, and Manner” “embrace authority to provide a
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`complete code for congressional elections,” including regulations re-
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`lating to “registration.” Smiley v. Holm, 285 U. S. 355, 366. Pp. 4–6.
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`(b) Because “accept and use” are words “that can have more than
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`ARIZONA v. INTER TRIBAL COUNCIL OF ARIZ. INC.
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`Syllabus
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`one meaning,” they “are given content . . . by their surroundings.”
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`Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457, 466.
`Reading “accept” merely to denote willing receipt seems out of place
`in the context of an official mandate to accept and use something for
`a given purpose. The implication of such a mandate is that its object
`is to be accepted as sufficient for the requirement it is meant to satis-
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`fy. Arizona’s reading is also difficult to reconcile with neighboring
`NVRA provisions, such as §1973gg–6(a)(1)(B) and §1973gg–4(a)(2).
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`Arizona’s appeal to the presumption against pre-emption invoked
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`in this Court’s Supremacy Clause cases is inapposite. The power the
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`Elections Clause confers is none other than the power to pre-empt.
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`Because Congress, when it acts under this Clause, is always on notice
`that its legislation will displace some element of a pre-existing legal
`regime erected by the States, the reasonable assumption is that the
`text of Elections Clause legislation accurately communicates the
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`scope of Congress’s pre-emptive intent.
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`Nonetheless, while the NVRA forbids States to demand that an ap-
`plicant submit additional information beyond that required by the
`Federal Form, it does not preclude States from “deny[ing] registra-
`tion based on information in their possession establishing the appli-
`cant’s ineligibility.” Pp. 6–13.
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`(c) Arizona is correct that the Elections Clause empowers Congress
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`to regulate how federal elections are held, but not who may vote in
`them. The latter is the province of the States. See U. S. Const., Art.
`I, §2, cl. 1; Amdt. 17. It would raise serious constitutional doubts if a
`federal statute precluded a State from obtaining the information nec-
`essary to enforce its voter qualifications. The NVRA can be read to
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`avoid such a conflict, however. Section 1973gg–7(b)(1) permits the
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`EAC to include on the Federal Form information “necessary to enable
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`the appropriate State election official to assess the eligibility of the
`applicant.” That validly conferred discretionary executive authority
`is properly exercised (as the Government has proposed) to require the
`inclusion of Arizona’s concrete-evidence requirement if such evidence
`is necessary to enable Arizona to enforce its citizenship qualification.
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`The NVRA permits a State to request the EAC to include state-
`specific instructions on the Federal Form, see 42 U. S. C. §1973gg–
`7(a)(2), and a State may challenge the EAC’s rejection of that request
`(or failure to act on it) in a suit under the Administrative Procedure
`Act. That alternative means of enforcing its constitutional power to
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`determine voting qualifications remains open to Arizona here.
`Should the EAC reject or decline to act on a renewed request, Arizona
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`would have the opportunity to establish in a reviewing court that a
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`mere oath will not suffice to effectuate its citizenship requirement
`and that the EAC is therefore under a nondiscretionary duty to in-
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` Cite as: 570 U. S. ____ (2013)
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`Syllabus
`clude Arizona’s concrete-evidence requirement on the Federal Form.
`Pp. 13–17.
`677 F. 3d 383, affirmed.
`SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
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`C. J., and GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined, and
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`in which KENNEDY, J., joined in part. KENNEDY, J., filed an opinion con-
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`curring in part and concurring in the judgment. THOMAS, J., and ALITO,
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`J., filed dissenting opinions.
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` Cite as: 570 U. S. ____ (2013)
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`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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` No. 12–71
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` ARIZONA, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. THE INTER
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`TRIBAL COUNCIL OF ARIZONA, INC., ET AL.
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`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
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`APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
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`[June 17, 2013]
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`JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
`The National Voter Registration Act requires States to
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`“accept and use” a uniform federal form to register voters
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`for federal elections. The contents of that form (colloquially
`known as the Federal Form) are prescribed by a federal
`agency, the Election Assistance Commission. The Federal
`Form developed by the EAC does not require documentary
`evidence of citizenship; rather, it requires only that an
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`applicant aver, under penalty of perjury, that he is a
`citizen. Arizona law requires voter-registration officials to
`“reject” any application for registration, including a Fed-
`eral Form, that is not accompanied by concrete evidence of
`citizenship. The question is whether Arizona’s evidence-
`of-citizenship requirement, as applied to Federal Form
`applicants, is pre-empted by the Act’s mandate that States
`“accept and use” the Federal Form.
`I
`Over the past two decades, Congress has erected a
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`complex superstructure of federal regulation atop state
`voter-registration systems. The National Voter Registra-
`tion Act of 1993 (NVRA), 107 Stat. 77, as amended, 42
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`ARIZONA v. INTER TRIBAL COUNCIL OF ARIZ. INC.
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`Opinion of the Court
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` U. S. C. §1973gg et seq., “requires States to provide simpli-
`fied systems for registering to vote in federal elections.”
`Young v. Fordice, 520 U. S. 273, 275 (1997). The Act
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`requires each State to permit prospective voters to “regis-
`ter to vote in elections for Federal office” by any of three
`methods: simultaneously with a driver’s license applica-
`tion, in person, or by mail. §1973gg–2(a).
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`This case concerns registration by mail.
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`1973gg–2(a)(2) of the Act requires a State to establish
`procedures for registering to vote in federal elections “by
`mail application pursuant to section 1973gg–4 of this
`title.” Section 1973gg–4, in turn, requires States to “ac-
`cept and use” a standard federal registration form.
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`§1973gg–4(a)(1). The Election Assistance Commission is
`invested with rulemaking authority to prescribe the con-
`tents of that Federal Form. §1973gg–7(a)(1); see §15329.1
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`The EAC is explicitly instructed, however, to develop the
`Federal Form “in consultation with the chief election
`officers of the States.” §1973gg–7(a)(2). The Federal Form
`thus contains a number of state-specific instructions,
`which tell residents of each State what additional infor-
`mation they must provide and where they must submit
`the form. See National Mail Voter Registration Form, pp.
`3–20, online at http://www.eac.gov (all Internet materials
`as visited June 11, 2013, and available in Clerk of Court’s
`case file); 11 CFR §9428.3 (2012). Each state-specific
`instruction must be approved by the EAC before it is
`included on the Federal Form.
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`To be eligible to vote under Arizona law, a person must
`be a citizen of the United States. Ariz. Const., Art. VII, §2;
`Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §16–101(A) (West 2006). This case
`concerns Arizona’s efforts to enforce that qualification. In
`——————
`1The Help America Vote Act of 2002 transferred this function from
`the Federal Election Commission to the EAC. See §802, 116 Stat. 1726,
`codified at 42 U. S. C. §§15532, 1973gg–7(a).
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`Cite as: 570 U. S. ____ (2013)
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`Opinion of the Court
`2004, Arizona voters adopted Proposition 200, a ballot
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`initiative designed in part “to combat voter fraud by re-
`quiring voters to present proof of citizenship when they
`register to vote and to present identification when they
`vote on election day.” Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U. S. 1, 2
`(2006) (per curiam).2 Proposition 200 amended the State’s
`election code to require county recorders to “reject any
`application for registration that is not accompanied by
`satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship.” Ariz.
`Rev. Stat. Ann. §16–166(F) (West Supp. 2012). The proof-
`of-citizenship requirement is satisfied by (1) a photocopy of
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`the applicant’s passport or birth certificate, (2) a driver’s
`license number, if the license states that the issuing au-
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`thority verified the holder’s U. S. citizenship, (3) evidence
`of naturalization, (4) tribal identification, or (5) “[o]ther
`documents or methods of proof . . . established pursuant to
`the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.” Ibid.
`The EAC did not grant Arizona’s request to include this
`new requirement among the state-specific instructions
`for Arizona on the Federal Form. App. 225. Conse-
`quently, the Federal Form includes a statutorily required
`attestation, subscribed to under penalty of perjury, that
`an Arizona applicant meets the State’s voting require-
`ments
`(including
`the citizenship requirement), see
`§1973gg–7(b)(2), but does not require concrete evidence of
`citizenship.
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`The two groups of plaintiffs represented here—a group
`of individual Arizona residents (dubbed the Gonzalez
`plaintiffs, after lead plaintiff Jesus Gonzalez) and a group
`of nonprofit organizations led by the Inter Tribal Council
`of Arizona (ITCA)—filed separate suits seeking to enjoin
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`the voting provisions of Proposition 200. The District
`——————
` 2In May 2005, the United States Attorney General precleared under
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`§5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 the procedures Arizona adopted to
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` implement Proposition 200. Purcell, 549 U. S., at 3.
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`ARIZONA v. INTER TRIBAL COUNCIL OF ARIZ. INC.
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`Opinion of the Court
`Court consolidated the cases and denied the plaintiffs’
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`motions for a preliminary injunction. App. to Pet. for
`Cert. 1g. A two-judge motions panel of the Court of Ap-
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`peals for the Ninth Circuit then enjoined Proposition 200
`pending appeal. Purcell, 549 U. S., at 3. We vacated that
`order and allowed the impending 2006 election to proceed
`with the new rules in place. Id., at 5–6. On remand, the
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`Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s initial
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`denial of a preliminary injunction as to respondents’ claim
`that the NVRA pre-empts Proposition 200’s registration
`rules. Gonzales v. Arizona, 485 F. 3d 1041, 1050–1051
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`(2007). The District Court then granted Arizona’s motion
`for summary judgment as to that claim. App. to Pet. for
`Cert. 1e, 3e. A panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part
`but reversed as relevant here, holding that “Proposition
`200’s documentary proof of citizenship requirement con-
`flicts with the NVRA’s text, structure, and purpose.”
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`Gonzales v. Arizona, 624 F. 3d 1162, 1181 (2010). The en
`banc Court of Appeals agreed. Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677
`F. 3d 383, 403 (2012). We granted certiorari. 568 U. S.
`___ (2012).
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`II
`The Elections Clause, Art. I, §4, cl. 1, provides:
`“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections
`for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed
`in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the
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`Congress may at any time by Law make or alter
`such Regulations, except as to the places of chusing
`Senators.”
`The Clause empowers Congress to pre-empt state regula-
`tions governing the “Times, Places and Manner” of holding
`congressional elections. The question here is whether the
`federal statutory requirement that States “accept and use”
`the Federal Form pre-empts Arizona’s state-law require-
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`Opinion of the Court
`ment that officials “reject” the application of a prospective
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`voter who submits a completed Federal Form unaccompa-
`nied by documentary evidence of citizenship.
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`A
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`The Elections Clause has two functions. Upon the
`States it imposes the duty (“shall be prescribed”) to pre-
`scribe the time, place, and manner of electing Representa-
`tives and Senators; upon Congress it confers the power to
`alter those regulations or supplant them altogether. See
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`U. S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U. S. 779, 804–
`805 (1995); id., at 862 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). This
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`grant of congressional power was the Framers’ insurance
`against the possibility that a State would refuse to provide
`for the election of representatives to the Federal Congress.
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`“[E]very government ought to contain in itself the means
`of its own preservation,” and “an exclusive power of regu-
`lating elections for the national government, in the hands
`of the State legislatures, would leave the existence of the
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`Union entirely at their mercy. They could at any moment
`annihilate it by neglecting to provide for the choice of
`persons to administer its affairs.” The Federalist No. 59,
`pp. 362–363 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton) (empha-
`sis deleted). That prospect seems fanciful today, but the
`widespread, vociferous opposition to the proposed Consti-
`tution made it a very real concern in the founding era.
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`The Clause’s substantive scope is broad. “Times, Places,
`and Manner,” we have written, are “comprehensive
`words,” which “embrace authority to provide a complete
`code for congressional elections,” including, as relevant
`here and as petitioners do not contest, regulations relat-
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`ing to “registration.” Smiley v. Holm, 285 U. S. 355, 366
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`(1932); see also Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U. S. 15, 24–25
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`(1972) (recounts); United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299,
`320 (1941) (primaries). In practice, the Clause functions
`as “a default provision; it invests the States with responsi-
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`ARIZONA v. INTER TRIBAL COUNCIL OF ARIZ. INC.
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`Opinion of the Court
`bility for the mechanics of congressional elections, but only
`so far as Congress declines to pre-empt state legislative
`choices.” Foster v. Love, 522 U. S. 67, 69 (1997) (citation
`omitted). The power of Congress over the “Times, Places
`and Manner” of congressional elections “is paramount, and
`may be exercised at any time, and to any extent which it
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`deems expedient; and so far as it is exercised, and no
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`farther, the regulations effected supersede those of the
`State which are inconsistent therewith.” Ex parte Siebold,
`100 U. S. 371, 392 (1880).
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`B
`The straightforward textual question here is whether
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`Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §16–166(F), which requires state
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`officials to “reject” a Federal Form unaccompanied by
`documentary evidence of citizenship, conflicts with the
`NVRA’s mandate that Arizona “accept and use” the Fed-
`eral Form. If so, the state law, “so far as the conflict ex-
`tends, ceases to be operative.” Siebold, supra, at 384. In
`Arizona’s view, these seemingly incompatible obligations
`can be read to operate harmoniously: The NVRA, it con-
`tends, requires merely that a State receive the Federal
`Form willingly and use that form as one element in its
`(perhaps lengthy) transaction with a prospective voter.
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`Taken in isolation, the mandate that a State “accept and
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`use” the Federal Form is fairly susceptible of two inter-
`pretations. It might mean that a State must accept the
`Federal Form as a complete and sufficient registration ap-
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` plication; or it might mean that the State is merely required
`to receive the form willingly and use it somehow in its
`voter registration process. Both readings—“receive will-
`ingly” and “accept as sufficient”—are compatible with the
`plain meaning of the word “accept.” See 1 Oxford English
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`Dictionary 70 (2d ed. 1989) (“To take or receive (a thing
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`offered) willingly”; “To receive as sufficient or adequate”);
`Webster’s New International Dictionary 14 (2d ed. 1954)
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`Opinion of the Court
`(“To receive (a thing offered to or thrust upon one) with a
`consenting mind”; “To receive with favor; to approve”).
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`And we take it as self-evident that the “elastic” verb “use,”
`read in isolation, is broad enough to encompass Arizona’s
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`preferred construction. Smith v. United States, 508 U. S.
`223, 241 (1993) (SCALIA, J., dissenting). In common par-
`lance, one might say that a restaurant accepts and uses
`credit cards even though it requires customers to show
`matching identification when making a purchase. See
`also Brief for State Petitioners 40 (“An airline may adver-
`tise that it ‘accepts and uses’ e-tickets . . . , yet may still
`require photo identification before one could board the
`airplane”).
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`“Words that can have more than one meaning are given
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`content, however, by their surroundings.” Whitman v.
`American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457, 466 (2001);
`see also Smith, supra, at 241 (SCALIA, J., dissenting). And
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`reading “accept” merely to denote willing receipt seems
`out of place in the context of an official mandate to accept
`and use something for a given purpose. The implication of
`such a mandate is that its object is to be accepted as suffi-
`cient for the requirement it is meant to satisfy. For exam-
`ple, a government diktat that “civil servants shall accept
`government IOUs for payment of salaries” does not invite
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`the response, “sure, we’ll accept IOUs—if you pay us a ten
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`percent down payment in cash.” Many federal statutes
`contain similarly phrased commands, and they contem-
`plate more than mere willing receipt. See, e.g., 5 U. S. C.
`§8332(b), (m)(3) (“The Office [of Personnel Management]
`shall accept the certification of ” various officials concern-
`ing creditable service toward civilian-employee retire-
`ment); 12 U. S. C. A. §2605(l)(2) (Supp. 2013) (“A servicer
`of a federally related mortgage shall accept any reasonable
`form of written confirmation from a borrower of existing
`insurance coverage”); 16 U. S. C. §1536(p) (Endangered
`Species Committee “shall accept the determinations of the
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`ARIZONA v. INTER TRIBAL COUNCIL OF ARIZ. INC.
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`Opinion of the Court
`President” with respect to whether a major disaster war-
`rants an exception to the Endangered Species Act’s re-
`quirements); §4026(b)(2), 118 Stat. 3725, note following 22
`U. S. C. §2751, p. 925 (FAA Administrator “shall accept
`the certification of the Department of Homeland Security
`that a missile defense system is effective and functional to
`defend commercial aircraft against” man-portable surface-
`to-air missiles); 25 U. S. C. §1300h–6(a) (“For the purpose
`of proceeding with the per capita distribution” of certain
`funds, “the Secretary of the Interior shall accept the tribe’s
`certification of enrolled membership”); 30 U. S. C. §923(b)
`(the Secretary of Labor “shall accept a board certified or
`board eligible radiologist’s interpretation” of a chest X ray
`used to diagnose black lung disease); 42 U. S. C. §1395w–
`21(e)(6)(A) (“[A] Medicare+Choice organization . . . shall
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`accept elections or changes to elections during” specified
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`periods).3
`Arizona’s reading is also difficult to reconcile with
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`neighboring provisions of the NVRA. Section 1973gg–
`6(a)(1)(B) provides that a State shall “ensure that any
`eligible applicant is registered to vote in an election . . . if
`the valid voter registration form of the applicant is post-
`marked” not later than a specified number of days before
`the election.
`(Emphasis added.) Yet Arizona reads the
`phrase “accept and use” in §1973gg–4(a)(1) as permitting
`it to reject a completed Federal Form if the applicant does
`not submit additional information required by state law.
`That reading can be squared with Arizona’s obligation
`——————
`3The dissent accepts that a State may not impose additional re-
`quirements that render the Federal Form entirely superfluous; it would
`require that the State “us[e] the form as a meaningful part of the
`registration process.” Post, at 7 (opinion of ALITO, J.). The dissent does
`not tell us precisely how large a role for the Federal Form suffices to
`make it “meaningful”: One step out of two? Three? Ten? There is no
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`easy answer, for the dissent’s “meaningful part” standard is as inde-
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`terminate as it is atextual.
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`Cite as: 570 U. S. ____ (2013)
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`Opinion of the Court
`under §1973gg–6(a)(1) only if a completed Federal Form is
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`not a “valid voter registration form,” which seems unlikely.
`The statute empowers the EAC to create the Federal
`Form, §1973gg–7(a), requires the EAC to prescribe its
`contents within specified limits, §1973gg–7(b), and re-
`quires States to “accept and use” it, §1973gg–4(a)(1). It is
`improbable that the statute envisions a completed copy of
`the form it takes such pains to create as being anything
`less than “valid.”
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`The Act also authorizes States, “[i]n addition to accept-
`ing and using the” Federal Form, to create their own,
`state-specific voter-registration forms, which can be used
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`to register voters in both state and federal elections.
`§1973gg–4(a)(2) (emphasis added). These state-developed
`forms may require information the Federal Form does not.
`(For example, unlike the Federal Form, Arizona’s registra-
`tion form includes Proposition 200’s proof-of-citizenship
`requirement. See Arizona Voter Registration Form, p. 1,
`online at http://www.azsos.gov.) This permission works in
`tandem with the requirement that States “accept and use”
`the Federal Form. States retain the flexibility to design
`and use their own registration forms, but the Federal
`Form provides a backstop: No matter what procedural
`hurdles a State’s own form imposes, the Federal Form
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`guarantees that a simple means of registering to vote in
`federal elections will be available.4 Arizona’s reading
`——————
` 4In the face of this straightforward explanation, the dissent main-
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`tains that it would be “nonsensical” for a less demanding federal form
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` to exist alongside a more demanding state form. Post, at 9 (opinion of
`ALITO, J.). But it is the dissent’s alternative explanation for §1973gg–
`4(a)(2) that makes no sense. The “purpose” of the Federal Form, it
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`claims, is “to facilitate interstate voter registration drives. Thanks to
`the federal form, volunteers distributing voter registration materials at
`a shopping mall in Yuma can give a copy of the same form to every
`person they meet without attempting to distinguish between residents
`of Arizona and California.” Post, at 9. But in the dissent’s world, a
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`volunteer in Yuma would have to give every prospective voter not only
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`9
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`10
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`ARIZONA v. INTER TRIBAL COUNCIL OF ARIZ. INC.
`
`Opinion of the Court
`would permit a State to demand of Federal Form appli-
`cants every additional piece of information the State
`requires on its state-specific form. If that is so, the Fed-
`eral Form ceases to perform any meaningful function, and
`would be a feeble means of “increas[ing] the number of
`eligible citizens who register to vote in elections for Federal
`
`office.” §1973gg(b).
`
`Finally, Arizona appeals to the presumption against
`pre-emption sometimes invoked in our Supremacy Clause
`cases. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 460–
`461 (1991). Where it applies, “we start with the assump-
`tion that the historic police powers of the States were not
`
`to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the
`clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Rice v. Santa Fe
`Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947). That rule of
`construction rests on an assumption about congressional
`intent: that “Congress does not exercise lightly” the “ex-
`
`traordinary power” to “legislate in areas traditionally
`regulated by the States.” Gregory, supra, at 460. We have
`never mentioned such a principle in our Elections Clause
`cases.5 Siebold, for example, simply said that Elections
`
`
`——————
`a Federal Form, but also a separate set of either Arizona- or California-
`specific instructions detailing the additional information the applicant
`must submit to the State. In ours, every eligible voter can be assured
`that if he does what the Federal Form says, he will be registered. The
`
`dissent therefore provides yet another compelling reason to interpret
`
`the statute our way.
`5 United States v. Gradwell, 243 U. S. 476 (1917), on which the dis-
`
` sent relies, see post, at 3–4 (opinion of ALITO, J.), is not to the contrary—
`indeed, it was not even a pre-emption case. In Gradwell, we held that
`
`a statute making it a federal crime “to defraud the United States”
`
`did not reach election fraud. 243 U. S., at 480, 483. The Court noted
`that the provision at issue was adopted in a tax-enforcement bill, and
`that Congress had enacted but then repealed other criminal statutes
`
`
`specifically covering election fraud. Id., at 481–483.
`
`
`The dissent cherry-picks some language from a sentence in Gradwell,
`
`see post, at 3–4, but the full sentence reveals its irrelevance to our case:
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`11
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`Cite as: 570 U. S. ____ (2013)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Clause legislation, “so far as it extends and conflicts with
`the regulations of the State, necessarily supersedes them.”
`100 U. S., at 384. There is good reason for treating Elec-
`tions Clause legislation differently: The assumption that
`Congress is reluctant to pre-empt does not hold when
`
`Congress acts under that constitutional provision, which
`empowers Congress to “make or alter” state election regu-
`lations. Art. I, §4, cl. 1. When Congress legislates with
`respect to the “Times, Places and Manner” of holding
`congressional elections, it necessarily displaces some
`element of a pre-existing legal regime erected by the
`States.6 Because the power the Elections Clause confers is
`——————
`“With it thus clearly established that the policy of Congress for so
`
`great a part of our constitutional life has been, and now is, to
`
`leave the conduct of the election of its members to state laws, ad-
`ministered by state officers, and that whenever it has assumed to
`regulate such elections it has done so by positive and clear stat-
`
`
`utes, such as were enacted in 1870, it would be a strained and
`unreasonable construction to apply to such elections this §37, orig-
`inally a law for the protection of the revenue and for now fifty
`years confined in its application to ‘Offenses against the Opera-
`
`tions of the Government’ as distinguished from the processes by
`which men are selected to conduct such operations.” 243 U. S., at
`
`485.
`Gradwell says nothing at all about pre-emption, or about how to con-
`
`strue statutes (like the NVRA) in which Congress has indisputably
`
`undertaken “to regulate such elections.” Ibid.
`6The dissent counters that this is so “whenever Congress legislates in
`an area of concurrent state and federal power.” Post, at 5 (opinion of
`ALITO, J.). True, but irrelevant: Elections Clause legislation is unique
`precisely because it always falls within an area of concurrent state and
`
`federal power. Put differently, all action under the Elections Clause
`displaces some element of a pre-existing state regulatory regime,
`because the text of the Clause confers the power to do exactly (and only)
`that. By contrast, even laws enacted under the Commerce Clause
`
`(arguably the other enumerated power whose exercise is most likely to
`trench on state regulatory authority) will not always implicate concur-
`rent state power—a prohibition on the interstate transport of a com-
`modity, for example.
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`12
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`
`ARIZONA v. INTER TRIBAL COUNCIL OF ARIZ. INC.
`
`Opinion of the Court
`none other than the power to pre-empt, the reasonable
`assumption is that the statutory text accurately communi-
`cates the scope of Congress’s pre-emptive intent. More-
`over, the federalism concerns underlying the presumption
`in the Supremacy Clause context are somewhat weaker
`here. Unlike the States’ “historic police powers,” Rice,
`supra, at 230, the States’ role in regulating congressional
`elections—while weighty and worthy of respect—has
`always existed subject to the express qualification that it
`
`“terminates according to federal law.” Buckman Co. v.
`Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U. S. 341, 347 (2001). In
`sum, there is no compelling reason not to read Elections
`Clause legislation simply to mean what it says.
`
`We conclude that the fairest reading of the statute is
`that a state-imposed requirement of evidence of citizen-
`
`ship not required by the Federal Form is “inconsistent
`with” the NVRA’s mandate that States “accept and use”
`the Federal Form. Siebold, supra, at 397. If this reading
`prevails, the Elections Clause requires that Arizona’s rule
`
`give way.
`
`We note, however, that while the NVRA forbids States
`to demand that an applicant submit additional infor-
`mation beyond that required by the Federal Form, it does
`not preclude States from “deny[ing] registration based on
`information in their possession establishing the appli-
`cant’s ineligibility.”7 Brief for United States as Amicus
`Curiae 24. The NVRA clearly contemplates that not every
`submitted Federal Form will result in registration. See
`——————
`7The dissent seems to think this position of ours incompatible with
`our reading of §1973gg–6(a)(1)(B), which requires a State to “ensure
`that any eligible applicant is registered to vote in an election . . . if the
`
` valid voter registration form of the applicant is postmarked” by a
`certain date. See post, at 9–10 (opinion of ALITO, J.). What the dissent
`overlooks is that §1973gg–6(a)(1)(B) only requires a State to register an
`“eligible applicant” who submits a timely Federal Form. (Emphasis
`added.)
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` 13
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` Cite as: 570 U. S. ____ (2013)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`§1973gg–7(b)(1) (Federal Form “may require only” infor-
`mation “necessary to enable the appropriate State election
`official to assess the eligibility of the applicant” (emphasis
`added)); §1973gg–6(a)(2) (States must require election
`officials to “send notice to each applicant of the disposition
`of the application”).
`
`
`
`
`III
`
`
`Arizona contends, however, that its construction of the
`phrase “accept and use” i