(Slip Opinion)
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2013
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`Syllabus
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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` Syllabus
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`POM WONDERFUL LLC v. COCA-COLA CO.
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE NINTH CIRCUIT
` No. 12–761. Argued April 21, 2014—Decided June 12, 2014
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`This case involves the intersection of two federal statutes. The Lanham
`Act permits one competitor to sue another for unfair competition aris-
`ing from false or misleading product descriptions. 15 U. S. C. §1125.
`The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) prohibits the mis-
`branding of food and drink. 21 U. S. C. §§321(f), 331. To implement
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`the FDCA’s provisions, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has
`promulgated regulations regarding food and beverage labeling, in-
`cluding one concerning juice blends. Unlike the Lanham Act, which,
`relies in large part for its enforcement on private suits brought by in-
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`jured competitors, the FDCA and its regulations give the United
`States nearly exclusive enforcement authority and do not permit pri-
`vate enforcement suits. The FDCA also pre-empts certain state mis-
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`branding laws.
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`Petitioner POM Wonderful LLC, which produces, markets, and
`sells, inter alia, a pomegranate-blueberry juice blend, filed a Lanham
`Act suit against respondent Coca-Cola Company, alleging that the
`name, label, marketing, and advertising of one of Coca-Cola’s juice
`blends mislead consumers into believing the product consists predom-
`inantly of pomegranate and blueberry juice when it in fact consists
`predominantly of less expensive apple and grape juices, and that the
`ensuing confusion causes POM to lose sales. The District Court
`granted partial summary judgment to Coca-Cola, ruling that the
`FDCA and its regulations preclude Lanham Act challenges to the
`name and label of Coca-Cola’s juice blend. The Ninth Circuit af-
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`firmed in relevant part.
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`Held: Competitors may bring Lanham Act claims like POM’s challeng-
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`ing food and beverage labels regulated by the FDCA. Pp. 7–17.
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`(a) This result is based on the following premises. First, this is not
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`POM WONDERFUL LLC v. COCA-COLA CO.
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`Syllabus
`a pre-emption case, for it does not raise the question whether state
`law is pre-empted by a federal law, see Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U. S.
`555, 563, but instead concerns the alleged preclusion of a cause of ac-
`tion under one federal statute by the provisions of another federal
`statute. Pre-emption principles may nonetheless be instructive inso-
`far as they are designed to assess the interaction of laws bearing on
`the same subject. Second, this is a statutory interpretation case; and
`analysis of the statutory text, aided by established interpretation
`rules, controls. See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U. S. 84,
`94. While a principle of interpretation may be countered “by some
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`maxim pointing in a different direction,” Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
`Adams, 532 U. S. 105, 115, this Court need not decide what maxim
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`establishes the proper framework here: Even assuming that Coca-
`Cola is correct that the Court’s task is to reconcile or harmonize the
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`statutes instead of to determine whether one statute is an implied
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`repeal in part of another statute, Coca-Cola is incorrect that the best
`way to do that is to bar POM’s Lanham Act claim. Pp. 7–9.
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`(b) Neither the Lanham Act nor the FDCA, in express terms, for-
`bids or limits Lanham Act claims challenging labels that are regulat-
`ed by the FDCA. The absence of such a textual provision when the
`Lanham Act and the FDCA have coexisted for over 70 years is “pow-
`erful evidence that Congress did not intend FDA oversight to be the
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`exclusive means” of ensuring proper food and beverage labeling. See
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`Wyeth, supra, at 575. In addition, and contrary to Coca-Cola’s argu-
`ment, Congress, by taking care to pre-empt only some state laws, if
`anything indicated it did not intend the FDCA to preclude require-
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`ments arising from other sources. See Setser v. United States, 566
`U. S. ___, ___. The structures of the FDCA and the Lanham Act rein-
`force this conclusion. Where two statutes are complementary, it
`would show disregard for the congressional design to hold that Con-
`gress intended one federal statute nonetheless to preclude the opera-
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`tion of the other. See J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred
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`Int’l, Inc., 534 U. S. 124, 144. The Lanham Act and the FDCA com-
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`plement each other in major respects, for each has its own scope and
`purpose. Both touch on food and beverage labeling, but the Lanham
`Act protects commercial interests against unfair competition, while
`the FDCA protects public health and safety. They also complement
`each other with respect to remedies. The FDCA’s enforcement is
`largely committed to the FDA, while the Lanham Act empowers pri-
`vate parties to sue competitors to protect their interests on a case-by-
`case basis. Allowing Lanham Act suits takes advantage of synergies
`among multiple methods of regulation. A holding that the FDCA
`precludes Lanham Act claims challenging food and beverage labels
`also could lead to a result that Congress likely did not intend. Be-
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`Syllabus
`cause the FDA does not necessarily pursue enforcement measures re-
`garding all objectionable labels, preclusion of Lanham Act claims
`could leave commercial interests—and indirectly the public at large—
`with less effective protection in the food and beverage labeling realm
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`than in other less regulated industries. Pp. 9–12.
` (c) Coca-Cola’s arguments do not support its claim that preclusion
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`is proper because Congress intended national uniformity in food and
`beverage labeling. First, the FDCA’s delegation of enforcement au-
`thority to the Federal Government does not indicate that Congress
`intended to foreclose private enforcement of other federal statutes.
`Second, the FDCA’s express pre-emption provision applies by its
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` terms to state, not federal, law. Even if it were proper to stray from
`that text, it not clear that Coca-Cola’s national uniformity assertions
`reflect the congressional design. Finally, the FDCA and its imple-
`menting regulations may address food and beverage labeling with
`more specificity than the Lanham Act, but this specificity would mat-
`ter only if the two Acts cannot be implemented in full at the same
`time. Here, neither the statutory structure nor the empirical evi-
`dence of which the Court is aware indicates there will be any difficul-
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` ty in fully enforcing each statute according to its terms. Pp. 13–15.
`(d) The Government’s intermediate position—that a Lanham Act
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`claim is precluded “to the extent the FDCA or FDA regulations spe-
`cifically require or authorize the challenged aspects of [the] label,”
`and that this rule precludes POM’s challenge to the name of Coca-
`Cola’s product—is flawed, for the Government assumes that the
`FDCA and its regulations are a ceiling on the regulation of food and
`beverage labeling when Congress intended the Lanham Act and the
`FDCA to complement each other with respect to labeling. Though
`the FDA’s rulemaking alludes at one point to a balance of interests, it
`neither discusses nor cites the Lanham Act; and the Government
`points to no other statement suggesting that the FDA considered the
`full scope of interests protected by the Lanham Act. Even if agency
`regulations with the force of law that purport to bar other legal rem-
`edies may do so, it is a bridge too far to accept an agency’s after-the-
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` fact statement to justify that result here. An agency may not reorder
`federal statutory rights without congressional authorization. Pp. 15–
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` 17.
`679 F. 3d 1170, reversed and remanded.
`KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other
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`Members joined, except BREYER, J., who took no part in the considera-
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`tion or decision of the case.
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` Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014)
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`Opinion of the Court
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`_________________
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` No. 12–761
`_________________
`POM WONDERFUL LLC, PETITIONER v. THE
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`COCA-COLA COMPANY
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`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
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`APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
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`[June 12, 2014]
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`JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
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`POM Wonderful LLC makes and sells pomegranate
`juice products, including a pomegranate-blueberry juice
`blend. App. 23a. One of POM’s competitors is the Coca-
`Cola Company. Coca-Cola’s Minute Maid Division makes
`a juice blend sold with a label that, in describing the con-
`tents, displays the words “pomegranate blueberry” with
`far more prominence than other words on the label that
`show the juice to be a blend of five juices. In truth, the
`Coca-Cola product contains but 0.3% pomegranate juice
`and 0.2% blueberry juice.
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`Alleging that the use of that label is deceptive and
`misleading, POM sued Coca-Cola under §43 of the Lan-
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`ham Act. 60 Stat. 441, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §1125.
`That provision allows one competitor to sue another if it
`alleges unfair competition arising from false or misleading
`product descriptions. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
`Circuit held that, in the realm of labeling for food and
`beverages, a Lanham Act claim like POM’s is precluded by
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`a second federal statute. The second statute is the Federal
`Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), which forbids the
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`POM WONDERFUL LLC v. COCA-COLA CO.
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`Opinion of the Court
`misbranding of food, including by means of false or mis-
`leading labeling. §§301, 403, 52 Stat. 1042, 1047, as
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`amended, 21 U. S. C. §§331, 343.
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`The ruling that POM’s Lanham Act cause of action is
`precluded by the FDCA was incorrect. There is no statu-
`tory text or established interpretive principle to support
`the contention that the FDCA precludes Lanham Act suits
`like the one brought by POM in this case. Nothing in the
`text, history, or structure of the FDCA or the Lanham Act
`shows the congressional purpose or design to forbid these
`suits. Quite to the contrary, the FDCA and the Lanham
`Act complement each other in the federal regulation of
`misleading food and beverage labels. Competitors, in their
`own interest, may bring Lanham Act claims like POM’s
`that challenge food and beverage labels that are regulated
`by the FDCA.
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`I
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`A
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`This case concerns the intersection and complementar-
`ity of these two federal laws. A proper beginning point is a
`description of the statutes.
`Congress enacted the Lanham Act nearly seven decades
`ago. See 60 Stat. 427 (1946). As the Court explained
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`earlier this Term, it “requires no guesswork” to ascertain
`Congress’ intent regarding this federal law, for Congress
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`included a “detailed statement of the statute’s purposes.”
`Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572
`U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 12). Section 45 of the
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`Lanham Act provides:
`“The intent of this chapter is to regulate commerce
`within the control of Congress by making actionable
`the deceptive and misleading use of marks in such
`commerce; to protect registered marks used in such
`commerce from interference by State, or territorial
`legislation; to protect persons engaged in such com-
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`Opinion of the Court
`merce against unfair competition; to prevent fraud
`and deception in such commerce by the use of repro-
`ductions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable imitations
`of registered marks; and to provide rights and reme-
`dies stipulated by treaties and conventions respecting
`trademarks, trade names, and unfair competition en-
`tered into between the United States and foreign na-
`tions.” 15 U. S. C. §1127.
`The Lanham Act’s trademark provisions are the primary
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`means of achieving these ends. But the Act also creates a
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`federal remedy “that goes beyond trademark protection.”
`Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539
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`U. S. 23, 29 (2003). The broader remedy is at issue here.
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`The Lanham Act creates a cause of action for unfair
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`competition through misleading advertising or labeling.
`Though in the end consumers also benefit from the Act’s
`proper enforcement, the cause of action is for competitors,
`not consumers.
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`The term “competitor” is used in this opinion to indicate
`all those within the class of persons and entities protected
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`by the Lanham Act. Competitors are within the class that
`may invoke the Lanham Act because they may suffer “an
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`injury to a commercial interest in sales or business repu-
`tation proximately caused by [a] defendant’s misrepresen-
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`tations.” Lexmark, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 22). The
`petitioner here asserts injury as a competitor.
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`The cause of action the Act creates imposes civil liability
`on any person who “uses in commerce any word, term,
`name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or
`any false designation of origin, false or misleading descrip-
`tion of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact,
`which . . . misrepresents the nature, characteristics, quali-
`ties, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s
`goods, services, or commercial activities.” 15 U. S. C.
`§1125(a)(1). As the Court held this Term, the private
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`POM WONDERFUL LLC v. COCA-COLA CO.
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`Opinion of the Court
` remedy may be invoked only by those who “allege an
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`injury to a commercial interest in reputation or sales. A
`consumer who is hoodwinked into purchasing a disap-
`pointing product may well have an injury-in-fact cogniza-
`ble under Article III, but he cannot invoke the protection
`of the Lanham Act.” Lexmark, 572 U. S., at ___ (slip op.,
`at 13). This principle reflects the Lanham Act’s purpose of
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`“‘protect[ing] persons engaged in [commerce within the
`control of Congress] against unfair competition.’” Id., at
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`___ (slip op., at 12). POM’s cause of action would be
`straightforward enough but for Coca-Cola’s contention
`that a separate federal statutory regime, the FDCA, al-
`lows it to use the label in question and in fact precludes
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`the Lanham Act claim.
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`So the FDCA is the second statute to be discussed. The
`FDCA statutory regime is designed primarily to protect
`the health and safety of the public at large. See 62 Cases
`of Jam v. United States, 340 U. S. 593, 596 (1951); FDCA,
`§401, 52 Stat. 1046, 21 U. S. C. §341 (agency may issue
`certain regulations to “promote honesty and fair dealing in
`the interest of consumers”). The FDCA prohibits the
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`misbranding of food and drink. 21 U. S. C. §§321(f), 331.
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`A food or drink is deemed misbranded if, inter alia, “its
`labeling is false or misleading,” §343(a), information re-
`quired to appear on its label “is not prominently placed
`thereon,” §343(f), or a label does not bear “the common or
`usual name of the food, if any there be,” §343(i). To im-
`plement these provisions, the Food and Drug Administra-
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`tion (FDA) promulgated regulations regarding food and
`beverage labeling, including the labeling of mixes of dif-
`ferent types of juice into one juice blend. See 21 CFR
`§102.33 (2013). One provision of those regulations is
`particularly relevant to this case: If a juice blend does not
`name all the juices it contains and mentions only juices
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`that are not predominant in the blend, then it must either
`declare the percentage content of the named juice or
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`Opinion of the Court
`“[i]ndicate that the named juice is present as a flavor or
`flavoring,” e.g., “raspberry and cranberry flavored juice
`drink.” §102.33(d). The Government represents that the
`FDA does not preapprove juice labels under these regula-
`tions. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in
`Opposition 16. That contrasts with the FDA’s regulation
`of other types of labels, such as drug labels, see 21 U. S. C.
`§355(d), and is consistent with the less extensive role the
`FDA plays in the regulation of food than in the regulation
`of drugs.
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`Unlike the Lanham Act, which relies in substantial part
`for its enforcement on private suits brought by injured
`competitors, the FDCA and its regulations provide the
`United States with nearly exclusive enforcement author-
`ity, including the authority to seek criminal sanctions in
`some circumstances. 21 U. S. C. §§333(a), 337. Private
`parties may not bring enforcement suits. §337. Also
`unlike the Lanham Act, the FDCA contains a provision
`pre-empting certain state laws on misbranding. That
`provision, which Congress added to the FDCA in the
`Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, §6, 104
`Stat. 2362–2364, forecloses a “State or political subdivi-
`sion of a State” from establishing requirements that are of
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`the type but “not identical to” the requirements in some of
`the misbranding provisions of the FDCA. 21 U. S. C.
`§343–1(a). It does not address, or refer to, other federal
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`statutes or the preclusion thereof.
`B
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`POM Wonderful LLC is a grower of pomegranates and
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`a distributor of pomegranate juices. Through its POM
`Wonderful brand, POM produces, markets, and sells a
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`variety of pomegranate products, including a pomegranate-
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`blueberry juice blend. App. 23a.
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`POM competes in the pomegranate-blueberry juice
`market with the Coca-Cola Company. Coca-Cola, under
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`POM WONDERFUL LLC v. COCA-COLA CO.
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`Opinion of the Court
`its Minute Maid brand, created a juice blend containing
`99.4% apple and grape juices, 0.3% pomegranate juice,
`0.2% blueberry juice, and 0.1% raspberry juice. Id., at
`38a; Brief for Respondent 8. Despite the minuscule
`amount of pomegranate and blueberry juices in the blend,
`the front label of the Coca-Cola product displays the words
`“pomegranate blueberry” in all capital letters, on two
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`separate lines. App. 38a. Below those words, Coca-Cola
`placed the phrase “flavored blend of 5 juices” in much
`smaller type. Ibid. And below that phrase, in still smaller
`type, were the words “from concentrate with added ingre-
`dients”—and, with a line break before the final phrase—
`“and other natural flavors.”
`Ibid. The product’s front
`label also displays a vignette of blueberries, grapes, and
`raspberries in front of a halved pomegranate and a halved
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`apple. Ibid.
` Claiming that Coca-Cola’s label tricks and deceives
`consumers, all to POM’s injury as a competitor, POM
`brought suit under the Lanham Act. POM alleged that
`the name, label, marketing, and advertising of Coca-Cola’s
`juice blend mislead consumers into believing the product
`consists predominantly of pomegranate and blueberry
`juice when it in fact consists predominantly of less expen-
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`sive apple and grape juices. Id., at 27a. That confusion,
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`POM complained, causes it to lose sales. Id., at 28a. POM
`sought damages and injunctive relief. Id., at 32a–33a.
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`The District Court granted partial summary judgment
`to Coca-Cola on POM’s Lanham Act claim, ruling that the
`FDCA and its regulations preclude challenges to the name
`and label of Coca-Cola’s juice blend. The District Court
`reasoned that in the juice blend regulations the “FDA has
`directly spoken on the issues that form the basis of Pom’s
`Lanham Act claim against the naming and labeling of ”
`Coca-Cola’s product, but has not prohibited any, and
`indeed expressly has permitted some, aspects of Coca-
`Cola’s label. 727 F. Supp. 2d 849, 871–873 (CD Cal. 2010).
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`Opinion of the Court
`The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in
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`relevant part. Like the District Court, the Court of Ap-
`peals reasoned that Congress decided “to entrust matters
`of juice beverage labeling to the FDA”; the FDA has prom-
`ulgated “comprehensive regulation of that labeling”; and
`the FDA “apparently” has not imposed the requirements
`on Coca-Cola’s label that are sought by POM. 679 F. 3d
`1170, 1178 (2012). “[U]nder [Circuit] precedent,” the
`Court of Appeals explained, “for a court to act when the
`FDA has not—despite regulating extensively in this area—
`would risk undercutting the FDA’s expert judgments and
`authority.” Id., at 1177. For these reasons, and “[o]ut
`of respect for the statutory and regulatory scheme,” the
`Court of Appeals barred POM’s Lanham Act claim. Id., at
`1178.
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`II
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`A
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`This Court granted certiorari to consider whether a
`private party may bring a Lanham Act claim challenging a
`food label that is regulated by the FDCA. 571 U. S. ___
`(2014). The answer to that question is based on the fol-
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`lowing premises.
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`First, this is not a pre-emption case. In pre-emption
`cases, the question is whether state law is pre-empted by a
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`federal statute, or in some instances, a federal agency
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`action. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U. S. 555, 563 (2009).
`This case, however, concerns the alleged preclusion of a
`cause of action under one federal statute by the provisions
`of another federal statute. So the state-federal balance
`does not frame the inquiry. Because this is a preclusion
`case, any “presumption against pre-emption,” id., at 565,
`n. 3, has no force. In addition, the preclusion analysis is
`not governed by the Court’s complex categorization of the
`types of pre-emption. See Crosby v. National Foreign
`Trade Council, 530 U. S. 363, 372–373 (2000). Although
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`POM WONDERFUL LLC v. COCA-COLA CO.
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`Opinion of the Court
`the Court’s pre-emption precedent does not govern preclu-
`sion analysis in this case, its principles are instructive
`insofar as they are designed to assess the interaction of
`laws that bear on the same subject.
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`Second, this is a statutory interpretation case and the
`Court relies on traditional rules of statutory interpreta-
`tion. That does not change because the case involves
`multiple federal statutes. See FDA v. Brown & William-
`son Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 137–139 (2000). Nor
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`does it change because an agency is involved. See ibid.
`Analysis of the statutory text, aided by established princi-
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`ples of interpretation, controls. See Chickasaw Nation v.
`United States, 534 U. S. 84, 94 (2001).
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`A principle of interpretation is “often countered, of
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`course, by some maxim pointing in a different direction.”
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`Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U. S. 105, 115
`(2001). It is thus unsurprising that in this case a thresh-
`old dispute has arisen as to which of two competing max-
`ims establishes the proper framework for decision. POM
`argues that this case concerns whether one statute, the
`FDCA as amended, is an “implied repeal” in part of an-
`other statute, i.e., the Lanham Act. See, e.g., Carcieri v.
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`Salazar, 555 U. S. 379, 395 (2009). POM contends that in
`such cases courts must give full effect to both statutes
`unless they are in “irreconcilable conflict,” see ibid., and
`that this high standard is not satisfied here. Coca-Cola
`resists this canon and its high standard. Coca-Cola argues
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`that the case concerns whether a more specific law, the
`FDCA, clarifies or narrows the scope of a more general
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`law, the Lanham Act. See, e.g., United States v. Fausto,
`484 U. S. 439, 453 (1988); Brief for Respondent 18. The
`Court’s task, it claims, is to “reconcil[e]” the laws, ibid.,
`and it says the best reconciliation is that the more specific
`provisions of the FDCA bar certain causes of action au-
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`thorized in a general manner by the Lanham Act.
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`The Court does not need to resolve this dispute. Even
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`Opinion of the Court
`assuming that Coca-Cola is correct that the Court’s task is
`to reconcile or harmonize the statutes and not, as POM
`urges, to enforce both statutes in full unless there is a
`genuinely irreconcilable conflict, Coca-Cola is incorrect
`that the best way to harmonize the statutes is to bar
`POM’s Lanham Act claim.
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`B
`Beginning with the text of the two statutes, it must be
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`observed that neither the Lanham Act nor the FDCA, in
`express terms, forbids or limits Lanham Act claims chal-
`lenging labels that are regulated by the FDCA. By its
`terms, the Lanham Act subjects to suit any person who
`“misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or
`geographic origin” of goods or services. 15 U. S. C.
`§1125(a). This comprehensive imposition of liability ex-
`tends, by its own terms, to misrepresentations on labels,
`including food and beverage labels. No other provision in
`the Lanham Act limits that understanding or purports to
`govern the relevant interaction between the Lanham Act
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`and the FDCA. And the FDCA, by its terms, does not
`preclude Lanham Act suits.
`In consequence, food and
`beverage labels regulated by the FDCA are not, under the
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`terms of either statute, off limits to Lanham Act claims.
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`No textual provision in either statute discloses a purpose
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`to bar unfair competition claims like POM’s.
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`This absence is of special significance because the Lan-
`ham Act and the FDCA have coexisted since the passage
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`of the Lanham Act in 1946. 60 Stat. 427 (1946); ch. 675,
`52 Stat. 1040 (1938). If Congress had concluded, in light
`of experience, that Lanham Act suits could interfere with
`the FDCA, it might well have enacted a provision address-
`ing the issue during these 70 years. See Wyeth, supra, at
`574 (“If Congress thought state-law suits posed an obsta-
`cle to its objectives, it surely would have enacted an ex-
`press pre-emption provision at some point during the
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`Opinion of the Court
`FDCA’s 70-year history”). Congress enacted amendments
`to the FDCA and the Lanham Act, see, e.g., Nutrition
`Labeling and Education Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 2353;
`Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, §132, 102 Stat.
`3946, including an amendment that added to the FDCA an
`express pre-emption provision with respect to state laws
`addressing food and beverage misbranding, §6, 104 Stat.
`2362. Yet Congress did not enact a provision addressing
`the preclusion of other federal laws that might bear on
`food and beverage labeling. This is “powerful evidence
`that Congress did not intend FDA oversight to be the
`exclusive means” of ensuring proper food and beverage
`labeling. See Wyeth, 555 U. S., at 575.
`
`Perhaps the closest the statutes come to addressing the
`preclusion of the Lanham Act claim at issue here is the
`pre-emption provision added to the FDCA in 1990 as part
`of the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act. See 21
`U. S. C. §343–1. But, far from expressly precluding suits
`arising under other federal laws, the provision if anything
`suggests that Lanham Act suits are not precluded.
`
`This pre-emption provision forbids a “State or political
`subdivision of a State” from imposing requirements that
`are of the type but “not identical to” corresponding FDCA
`
`requirements for food and beverage labeling. Ibid. It is
`significant that the complex pre-emption provision distin-
`guishes among different FDCA requirements. It forbids
`state-law requirements that are of the type but not identi-
`cal to only certain FDCA provisions with respect to food
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`and beverage labeling. See §§343–1(a)(1)–(5) (citing some
`
`but not all of the subsections of §343); §6, 104 Stat. 2362–
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`2364 (codified at 21 U. S. C. §343–1, and note following).
`Just as significant, the provision does not refer to re-
`quirements imposed by other sources of law, such as fed-
`eral statutes. For purposes of deciding whether the FDCA
`displaces a regulatory or liability scheme in another stat-
`ute, it makes a substantial difference whether that other
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`statute is state or federal. By taking care to mandate
`express pre-emption of some state laws, Congress if any-
`
`thing indicated it did not intend the FDCA to preclude
`requirements arising from other sources. See Setser v.
`United States, 566 U. S. ___, ___ (2012) (slip op., at 6–7)
`(applying principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius).
`Pre-emption of some state requirements does not suggest
`an intent to preclude federal claims.
`
`The structures of the FDCA and the Lanham Act rein-
`force the conclusion drawn from the text. When two stat-
`utes complement each other, it would show disregard for
`the congressional design to hold that Congress nonethe-
`less intended one federal statute to preclude the operation
`of the other. See J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-
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`Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U. S. 124, 144 (2001) (“[W]e can plainly
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`regard each statute as effective because of its different
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`requirements and protections”); see also Wyeth, supra, at
`578–579. The Lanham Act and the FDCA complement
`each other in major respects, for each has its own scope
`and purpose. Although both statutes touch on food and
`beverage labeling, the Lanham Act protects commercial
`
`interests against unfair competition, while the FDCA
`protects public health and safety. Compare Lexmark, 572
`U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 12–13), with 62 Cases of Jam, 340
`U. S., at 596. The two statutes impose “different require-
`ments and protections.” J. E. M. Ag Supply, supra, at 144.
`
`The two statutes complement each other with respect to
`remedies in a more fundamental respect. Enforcement of
`the FDCA and the detailed prescriptions of its implement-
`ing regulations is largely committed to the FDA. The
`FDA, however, does not have the same perspective or
`expertise in assessing market dynamics that day-to-day
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`competitors possess. Competitors who manufacture or
`distribute products have detailed knowledge regarding
`how consumers rely upon certain sales and marketing
`strategies. Their awareness of unfair competition prac-
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`Opinion of the Court
`tices may be far more immediate and accurate than that of
`agency rulemakers and regulators. Lanham Act suits
`draw upon this market expertise by empowering private
`parties to sue competitors to protect their interests on a
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`case-by-case basis. By “serv[ing] a distinct compensatory
`function that may motivate injured persons to come for-
`
`ward,” Lanham Act suits, to the extent they touch on the
`
`same subject matter as the FDCA, “provide incentives” for
`manufacturers to behave well. See id., at 579. Allowing
`Lanham Act suits takes advantage of synergies among
`multiple methods of regulation. This is quite consistent
`with the congressional design to enact two different stat-
`utes, each with its own mechanisms to enhance the protec-
`tion of competitors and consumers.
`
`A holding that the FDCA precludes Lanham Act claims
`challenging food and beverage labels would not only ignore
`the distinct functional aspects of the FDCA and the Lan-
`ham Act but also would lead to a result that Congress
`likely did not intend. Unlike other types of labels regu-
`
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`lated by the FDA, such as drug labels, see 21 U. S. C.
`§355(d), it would appear the FDA does not preapprove food
`and beverage labels under its regulations and instead
`relies on enforcement actions, warning letters, and other
`
`measures. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae
`in Opposition 16. Because the FDA acknowledges that it
`does not necessarily pursue enforcement measures regard-
`ing all objectionable labels, ibid., if Lanham Act claims
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`were to be precluded then commercial interests—and
`indirectly the public at large—could be left with less effec-
`tive protection in the food and beverage labeling realm
`than in many other, less regulated industries. It is un-
`likely that Congress intended the FDCA’s protection of
`
`health and safety to result in less policing of misleading
`food and beverage labels than in competitive markets for
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`other products.
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