throbber
(Slip Opinion)
`
`
`
` OCTOBER TERM, 2014
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`1
`
` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`
`
`
` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`
`
`
` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
`
` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
`
` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
` Syllabus
`
` CITY OF LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA v. PATEL ET AL.
`
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE NINTH CIRCUIT
` No. 13–1175. Argued March 3, 2015—Decided June 22, 2015
`
`
` Petitioner, the city of Los Angeles (City), requires hotel operators to
`record and keep specific information about their guests on the prem-
`ises for a 90-day period. Los Angeles Municipal Code §41.49. These
`records “shall be made available to any officer of the Los Angeles Po-
`lice Department for inspection . . . at a time and in a manner that
`minimizes any interference with the operation of the business,”
`§41.49(3)(a), and a hotel operator’s failure to make the records avail-
`able is a criminal misdemeanor, §11.00(m). Respondents, a group of
`motel operators and a lodging association, brought a facial challenge
`to §41.49(3)(a) on Fourth Amendment grounds. The District Court
`entered judgment for the City, finding that respondents lacked a rea-
`sonable expectation of privacy in their records. The Ninth Circuit
`subsequently
`reversed, determining
`that
`inspections under
`§41.49(3)(a) are Fourth Amendment searches and that such searches
`are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment because hotel own-
`
`ers are subjected to punishment for failure to turn over their records
`without first being afforded the opportunity for precompliance re-
`
`view.
`Held:
`
`1. Facial challenges under the Fourth Amendment are not categor-
`
`ically barred or especially disfavored. Pp. 4–8.
`
`
`(a) Facial challenges to statutes—as opposed to challenges to
`particular applications of statutes—have been permitted to proceed
`under a diverse array of constitutional provisions. See, e.g., Sorrell v.
`IMS Health Inc., 564 U. S. ___ (First Amendment); District of Colum-
`bia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570 (Second Amendment). The Fourth
`
`Amendment is no exception. Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, dis-
`
`tinguished. This Court has entertained facial challenges to statutes
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`LOS ANGELES v. PATEL
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`authorizing warrantless searches, declaring them, on several occa-
`
`sions, facially invalid, see, e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U. S. 305,
`
`308–309. Pp. 4–7.
`
`
`(b) Petitioner contends that facial challenges to statutes author-
`izing warrantless searches must fail because they will never be un-
`
`constitutional in all applications, but this Court’s precedents demon-
`
`strate that such challenges can be brought, and can succeed. Under
`the proper facial-challenge analysis, only applications of a statute in
`which the statute actually authorizes or prohibits conduct are consid-
`ered. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505
`U. S. 833. When addressing a facial challenge to a statute authoriz-
`ing warrantless searches, the proper focus is on searches that the law
`actually authorizes and not those that could proceed irrespective of
`
`whether they are authorized by the statute, e.g., where exigent cir-
`
`
`cumstances, a warrant, or consent to search exists. Pp. 7–8.
`
`2. Section 41.49(3)(a) is facially unconstitutional because it fails to
`provide hotel operators with an opportunity for precompliance re-
`view. Pp. 9–17.
`(a) “ ‘[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process . . . are
`per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a
`
`few . . . exceptions.’ ” Arizona v. Gant, 556 U. S. 332, 338. One ex-
`ception is for administrative searches. See Camara v. Municipal
`
`Court of City and County of San Francisco, 387 U. S. 523, 534. To be
`constitutional, the subject of an administrative search must, among
`other things, be afforded an opportunity to obtain precompliance re-
`
`view before a neutral decisionmaker. See See v. Seattle, 387 U. S.
`
`541, 545. Assuming the administrative search exception otherwise
`applies here, §41.49 is facially invalid because it fails to afford hotel
`operators any opportunity for precompliance review. To be clear, a
`
`hotel owner must only be afforded an opportunity for precompliance
`
`review; actual review need occur only when a hotel operator objects to
`turning over the records. This opportunity can be provided without
`imposing onerous burdens on law enforcement. For instance, officers
`in the field can issue administrative subpoenas without probable
`cause that a regulation is being infringed. This narrow holding does
`
`not call into question those parts of §41.49 requiring hotel operators
`to keep records nor does it prevent police from obtaining access to
`those records where a hotel operator consents to the search, where
`the officer has a proper administrative warrant, or where some other
`
`exception to the warrant requirement applies. Pp. 9–13.
`
`
`(b) Petitioner’s argument that the ordinance is facially valid un-
`der the more relaxed standard for closely regulated industries is re-
`
`
`jected. See Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U. S. 307, 313. This Court
`has only recognized four such industries, and nothing inherent in the
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`
`
`

`
`3
`
`
`Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`operation of hotels poses a comparable clear and significant risk to
`the public welfare. Additionally, because the majority of regulations
`applicable to hotels apply to many businesses, to classify hotels as
`
`closely regulated would permit what has always been a narrow ex-
`ception to swallow the rule. But even if hotels were closely regulated,
`§41.49 would still contravene the Fourth Amendment as it fails to
`
`satisfy the additional criteria that must be met for searches of closely
`
`regulated industries to be reasonable. See New York v. Burger, 482
`
`U. S. 691, 702–703. Pp. 13–17.
`738 F. 3d 1058, affirmed.
`SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNE-
`DY, GINSBURG, BREYER, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a dis-
`senting opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, J., joined.
`
`
`ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`1
`
`
` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
`
`
`
` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
`
` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
`
` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
`
`
` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
`
`
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`
` No. 13–1175
`_________________
`CITY OF LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, PETITIONER
`
` v. NARANJIBHAI PATEL, ET AL.
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`
`APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`
`[June 22, 2015]
`
`JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
`Respondents brought a Fourth Amendment challenge to
`
`a provision of the Los Angeles Municipal Code that com-
`pels “[e]very operator of a hotel to keep a record” contain-
`ing specified information concerning guests and to make
`
`this record “available to any officer of the Los Angeles
`Police Department for inspection” on demand. Los Ange-
`les Municipal Code §§41.49(2), (3)(a), (4) (2015). The
`questions presented are whether facial challenges to stat-
`utes can be brought under the Fourth Amendment and, if
`so, whether this provision of the Los Angeles Municipal
`Code is facially invalid. We hold facial challenges can be
`brought under the Fourth Amendment. We further hold
`that the provision of the Los Angeles Municipal Code that
`requires hotel operators to make their registries available
`to the police on demand is facially unconstitutional be-
`cause it penalizes them for declining to turn over their
`records without affording them any opportunity for pre-
`compliance review.
`
`

`
`LOS ANGELES v. PATEL
`
`Opinion of the Court
`I
`
`A
`
`Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC) §41.49 requires
`
`hotel operators to record information about their guests,
`including: the guest’s name and address; the number of
`people in each guest’s party; the make, model, and license
`plate number of any guest’s vehicle parked on hotel prop-
`erty; the guest’s date and time of arrival and scheduled
`departure date; the room number assigned to the guest;
`the rate charged and amount collected for the room; and
`the method of payment. §41.49(2). Guests without reser-
`vations, those who pay for their rooms with cash, and any
`guests who rent a room for less than 12 hours must pre-
`sent photographic identification at the time of check-in,
`and hotel operators are required to record the number and
`expiration date of that document. §41.49(4). For those
`guests who check in using an electronic kiosk, the hotel’s
`records must also contain the guest’s credit card infor-
`mation. §41.49(2)(b). This information can be maintained
`in either electronic or paper form, but it must be “kept on
`the hotel premises in the guest reception or guest check-in
`area or in an office adjacent” thereto for a period of 90
`
`
`days. §41.49(3)(a).
`Section 41.49(3)(a)—the only provision at issue here—
`
`states, in pertinent part, that hotel guest records “shall be
`made available to any officer of the Los Angeles Police
`Department for inspection,” provided that “[w]henever
`possible, the inspection shall be conducted at a time and in
`a manner that minimizes any interference with the opera-
`tion of the business.” A hotel operator’s failure to make
`his or her guest records available for police inspection is a
`misdemeanor punishable by up to six months in jail and a
`$1,000 fine. §11.00(m) (general provision applicable to
`entire LAMC).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`

`
`
`
` Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`B
`
`
`In 2003, respondents, a group of motel operators along
`with a lodging association, sued the city of Los Angeles
`(City or petitioner) in three consolidated cases challenging
`the constitutionality of §41.49(3)(a). They sought declara-
`tory and injunctive relief. The parties “agree[d] that the
`
`sole issue in the . . . action [would be] a facial constitu-
`tional challenge” to §41.49(3)(a) under the Fourth Amend-
`ment. App. 195. They further stipulated that respondents
`have been subjected to mandatory record inspections
`under the ordinance without consent or a warrant. Id., at
`194–195.
`
`
`Following a bench trial, the District Court entered
`judgment in favor of the City, holding that respondents’
`facial challenge failed because they lacked a reasonable
`
`expectation of privacy in the records subject to inspection.
`A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed on the same
`grounds. 686 F. 3d 1085 (2012). On rehearing en banc,
`however, the Court of Appeals reversed. 738 F. 3d 1058,
`1065 (2013).
`
`The en banc court first determined that a police officer’s
`nonconsensual inspection of hotel records under §41.49 is
`
`a Fourth Amendment “search” because “[t]he business
`
`records covered by §41.49 are the hotel’s private property”
`and the hotel therefore “has the right to exclude others
`
`from prying into the[ir] contents.” Id., at 1061. Next, the
`court assessed “whether the searches authorized by §41.49
`are reasonable.” Id., at 1063. Relying on Donovan v. Lone
`Steer, Inc., 464 U. S. 408 (1984), and See v. Seattle, 387
`U. S. 541 (1967), the court held that §41.49 is facially
`unconstitutional “as it authorizes inspections” of hotel
`records “without affording an opportunity to ‘obtain judi-
`cial review of the reasonableness of the demand prior to
`suffering penalties for refusing to comply.’” 738 F. 3d, at
`1065 (quoting See, 387 U. S., at 545).
`
`Two dissenting opinions were filed. The first dissent
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`3
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`4
`
`
`LOS ANGELES v. PATEL
`
`Opinion of the Court
`argued that facial relief should rarely be available for
`Fourth Amendment challenges, and was inappropriate
`here because the ordinance would be constitutional in
`those circumstances where police officers demand access
`to hotel records with a warrant in hand or exigent circum-
`stances justify the search. 738 F. 3d, at 1065–1070 (opin-
`ion of Tallman, J.). The second dissent conceded that
`inspections under §41.49 constitute Fourth Amendment
`searches, but faulted the majority for assessing the rea-
`sonableness of these searches without accounting for the
`weakness of the hotel operators’ privacy interest in the
`content of their guest registries. Id., at 1070–1074 (opin-
`ion of Clifton, J.).
` We granted certiorari, 574 U. S. ___ (2014), and now
`affirm.
`
`II
` We first clarify that facial challenges under the Fourth
`Amendment are not categorically barred or especially
`disfavored.
`
`A
` A facial challenge is an attack on a statute itself as
`opposed to a particular application. While such challenges
`are “the most difficult . . . to mount successfully,” United
`States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 745 (1987), the Court
`has never held that these claims cannot be brought
`under any otherwise enforceable provision of the Constitu-
`tion. Cf. Fallon, Fact and Fiction About Facial Chal-
`lenges, 99 Cal. L. Rev. 915, 918 (2011) (pointing to several
`Terms in which “the Court adjudicated more facial chal-
`lenges on the merits than it did as-applied challenges”).
`Instead, the Court has allowed such challenges to proceed
`under a diverse array of constitutional provisions. See,
`e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U. S. ___ (2011) (First
`Amendment); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570
`
`

`
`
`
` Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`(2008) (Second Amendment); Chicago v. Morales, 527 U. S.
`41 (1999) (Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
`ment); Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dept. of Revenue and
`Finance, 505 U. S. 71 (1992) (Foreign Commerce Clause).
`Fourth Amendment challenges to statutes authorizing
`
`warrantless searches are no exception. Any claim to the
`contrary reflects a misunderstanding of our decision in
`Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40 (1968). In Sibron, two
`criminal defendants challenged the constitutionality of a
`statute authorizing police to, among other things, “‘stop
`any person abroad in a public place whom [they] reason-
`ably suspec[t] is committing, has committed or is about to
`commit a felony.” Id., at 43 (quoting then N. Y. Code
`
`Crim. Proc. §180–a). The Court held that the search of
`one of the defendants under the statute violated the
`Fourth Amendment, 392 U. S., at 59, 62, but refused to
`opine more broadly on the statute’s validity, stating that
`“[t]he constitutional validity of a warrantless search is
`pre-eminently the sort of question which can only be de-
`cided in the concrete factual context of the individual
`case.” Id., at 59.
`
`This statement from Sibron—which on its face might
`suggest an intent to foreclose all facial challenges to stat-
`utes authorizing warrantless searches—must be under-
`stood in the broader context of that case. In the same
`section of the opinion, the Court emphasized that the
`“operative categories” of the New York law at issue were
`“susceptible of a wide variety of interpretations,” id., at 60,
`and that “[the law] was passed too recently for the State’s
`highest court to have ruled upon many of the questions
`
`involving potential intersections with federal constitutional
`guarantees,” id., at 60, n. 20. Sibron thus stands for the
`simple proposition that claims for facial relief under the
`Fourth Amendment are unlikely to succeed when there is
`substantial ambiguity as to what conduct a statute au-
`thorizes: Where a statute consists of “extraordinarily
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`5
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`6
`
`
`LOS ANGELES v. PATEL
`
`Opinion of the Court
`elastic categories,” it may be “impossible to tell” whether
`
`and to what extent it deviates from the requirements of
`the Fourth Amendment. Id., at 59, 61, n. 20.
`
`This reading of Sibron is confirmed by subsequent prec-
`
`
`edents. Since Sibron, the Court has entertained facial
`challenges under the Fourth Amendment to statutes
`authorizing warrantless searches. See, e.g., Vernonia
`
`School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U. S. 646, 648 (1995)
`
`(“We granted certiorari to decide whether” petitioner’s
`student athlete drug testing policy “violates the Fourth
`and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Consti-
`tution”); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn., 489
`U. S. 602, 633, n. 10 (1989) (“[R]espondents have chal-
`lenged the administrative scheme on its face. We deal
`therefore with whether the [drug] tests contemplated by
`the regulation can ever be conducted”); cf. Illinois v. Krull,
`480 U. S. 340, 354 (1987) (“[A] person subject to a statute
`authorizing searches without a warrant or probable cause
`may bring an action seeking a declaration that the statute
`is unconstitutional and an injunction barring its imple-
`mentation”). Perhaps more importantly, the Court has on
`numerous occasions declared statutes facially invalid
`under the Fourth Amendment. For instance, in Chandler
`v. Miller, 520 U. S. 305, 308–309 (1997), the Court struck
`down a Georgia statute requiring candidates for certain
`
`state offices to take and pass a drug test, concluding that
`this “requirement . . . [did] not fit within the closely
`guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicion-
`
`less searches.” Similar examples abound. See, e.g., Fer-
`guson v. Charleston, 532 U. S. 67, 86 (2001) (holding that
`a hospital policy authorizing “nonconsensual, warrantless,
`
`and suspicionless searches” contravened the Fourth
`Amendment); Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 574, 576
`(1980) (holding that a New York statute “authoriz[ing]
`police officers to enter a private residence without a war-
`rant and with force, if necessary, to make a routine felony
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`7
`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`arrest” was “not consistent with the Fourth Amendment”);
`Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U. S. 465, 466, 471 (1979) (hold-
`ing that a Puerto Rico statute authorizing “police to search
`the luggage of any person arriving in Puerto Rico from the
`United States” was unconstitutional because it failed to
`require either probable cause or a warrant).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`B
`Petitioner principally contends that facial challenges to
`
`statutes authorizing warrantless searches must fail be-
`cause such searches will never be unconstitutional in all
`applications. Cf. Salerno, 481 U. S., at 745 (to obtain
`facial relief the party seeking it “must establish that no
`set of circumstances exists under which the [statute]
`would be valid”). In particular, the City points to situa-
`tions where police are responding to an emergency, where
`the subject of the search consents to the intrusion, and
`where police are acting under a court-ordered warrant.
`See Brief for Petitioner 19–20. While petitioner frames
`this argument as an objection to respondents’ challenge in
`this case, its logic would preclude facial relief in every
`Fourth Amendment challenge to a statute authorizing
`warrantless searches. For this reason alone, the City’s
`argument must fail: The Court’s precedents demonstrate
`not only that facial challenges to statutes authorizing
`warrantless searches can be brought, but also that they
`can succeed. See Part II–A, supra.
`Moreover, the City’s argument misunderstands how
`
`courts analyze facial challenges. Under the most exacting
`
`standard the Court has prescribed for facial challenges, a
`plaintiff must establish that a “law is unconstitutional in
`all of its applications.” Washington State Grange v. Wash-
`ington State Republican Party, 552 U. S. 442, 449 (2008).
`But when assessing whether a statute meets this stand-
`ard, the Court has considered only applications of the
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`8
`
`
`LOS ANGELES v. PATEL
`
`Opinion of the Court
`statute in which it actually authorizes or prohibits con-
`duct. For instance, in Planned Parenthood of Southeast-
`ern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833 (1992), the Court struck
`
`down a provision of Pennsylvania’s abortion law that
`required a woman to notify her husband before obtaining
`an abortion. Those defending the statute argued that
`facial relief was inappropriate because most women volun-
`tarily notify their husbands about a planned abortion and
`for them the law would not impose an undue burden. The
`
`explaining: The
`Court
`rejected
`this
`argument,
`“[l]egislation is measured for consistency with the Consti-
`tution by its impact on those whose conduct it affects. . . .
`The proper focus of the constitutional inquiry is the group
`for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom
`the law is irrelevant.” Id., at 894.
`
`Similarly, when addressing a facial challenge to a stat-
`
`ute authorizing warrantless searches, the proper focus of
`the constitutional inquiry is searches that the law actually
`authorizes, not those for which it is irrelevant. If exigency
`
`or a warrant justifies an officer’s search, the subject of the
`search must permit it to proceed irrespective of whether it
`is authorized by statute. Statutes authorizing warrantless
`searches also do no work where the subject of a search has
`consented. Accordingly, the constitutional “applications”
`that petitioner claims prevent facial relief here are irrele-
`vant to our analysis because they do not involve actual
`
`applications of the statute.1
`——————
` 1Relatedly, the United States claims that a statute authorizing war-
`
`
`rantless searches may still have independent force if it imposes a
`penalty for failing to cooperate in a search conducted under a warrant
`
` or in an exigency. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19.
`This argument gets things backwards. An otherwise facially unconsti-
`tutional statute cannot be saved from invalidation based solely on the
`existence of a penalty provision that applies when searches are not
`actually authorized by the statute. This argument is especially uncon-
`vincing where, as here, an independent obstruction of justice statute
`imposes a penalty for “willfully, resist[ing], delay[ing], or obstruct[ing]
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
` III
`Turning to the merits of the particular claim before us,
`
`we hold that §41.49(3)(a) is facially unconstitutional be-
`cause it fails to provide hotel operators with an opportu-
`nity for precompliance review.
`A
`
`The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the
`people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
`effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” It
`further provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon
`probable cause.” Based on this constitutional text, the
`Court has repeatedly held that “‘searches conducted out-
`
`side the judicial process, without prior approval by [a]
`
`
`judge or [a] magistrate [judge], are per se unreasonable . . .
`subject only to a few specifically established and well-
`delineated exceptions.’” Arizona v. Gant, 556 U. S. 332,
`
`338 (2009) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347,
`
`357 (1967)). This rule “applies to commercial premises as
`
`
`well as to homes.” Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U. S.
`307, 312 (1978).
`
`
`Search regimes where no warrant is ever required may
`
`be reasonable where “‘special needs . . . make the warrant
`and probable-cause requirement impracticable,’” Skinner,
`489 U. S., at 619 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U. S.
`
`868, 873 (1987) (some internal quotation marks omitted)),
`and where the “primary purpose” of the searches is
`“[d]istinguishable from the general interest in crime con-
`
`trol,” Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U. S. 32, 44 (2000).
`
`Here, we assume that the searches authorized by §41.49
`serve a “special need” other than conducting criminal
`investigations: They ensure compliance with the record-
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`——————
`
`any public officer . . . in the discharge or attempt to discharge any duty
`
`
`of his or her office of employment.” Cal. Penal Code Ann. §148(a)(1)
`
`
`
`(West 2014).
`
`
`
`
`
`9
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`10
`
`
`
`
`
`
`LOS ANGELES v. PATEL
`
`Opinion of the Court
`keeping requirement, which in turn deters criminals from
`
`
` operating on the hotels’ premises.2 The Court has referred
`to this kind of search as an “administrative searc[h].”
`Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San
`
`
`Francisco, 387 U. S. 523, 534 (1967). Thus, we consider
`whether §41.49 falls within the administrative search
`exception to the warrant requirement.
`The Court has held that absent consent, exigent circum-
`
`stances, or the like, in order for an administrative search
`to be constitutional, the subject of the search must be
`afforded an opportunity to obtain precompliance review
`before a neutral decisionmaker. See See, 387 U. S., at 545;
`Lone Steer, 464 U. S., at 415 (noting that an administra-
`tive search may proceed with only a subpoena where the
`subpoenaed party is sufficiently protected by the oppor-
`tunity to “question the reasonableness of the subpoena,
`before suffering any penalties for refusing to comply with
`it, by raising objections in an action in district court”).
`
`And, we see no reason why this minimal requirement is
`inapplicable here. While the Court has never attempted to
`prescribe the exact form an opportunity for precompliance
`review must take, the City does not even attempt to argue
`that §41.49(3)(a) affords hotel operators any opportunity
`whatsoever. Section 41.49(3)(a) is, therefore, facially
`invalid.
`A hotel owner who refuses to give an officer access to his
`
`or her registry can be arrested on the spot. The Court has
`held that business owners cannot reasonably be put to this
`kind of choice. Camara, 387 U. S., at 533 (holding that
`“broad statutory safeguards are no substitute for individ-
`ualized review, particularly when those safeguards may
`——————
` 2Respondents contend that §41.49’s principal purpose instead is to
`
`
`facilitate criminal investigation. Brief for Respondents 44–47. Because
`we find that the searches authorized by §41.49 are unconstitutional
`even if they serve the City’s asserted purpose, we decline to address
`this argument.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
` 11
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`only be invoked at the risk of a criminal penalty”). Absent
`an opportunity for precompliance review, the ordinance
`creates an intolerable risk that searches authorized by it
`will exceed statutory limits, or be used as a pretext to
`harass hotel operators and their guests. Even if a hotel
`has been searched 10 times a day, every day, for three
`months, without any violation being found, the operator
`can only refuse to comply with an officer’s demand to turn
`
`over the registry at his or her own peril.
`To be clear, we hold only that a hotel owner must be
`
`afforded an opportunity to have a neutral decisionmaker
`review an officer’s demand to search the registry before he
`or she faces penalties for failing to comply. Actual review
`need only occur in those rare instances where a hotel
`operator objects to turning over the registry. Moreover,
`this opportunity can be provided without imposing oner-
`ous burdens on those charged with an administrative
`scheme’s enforcement. For instance, respondents accept
`that the searches authorized by §41.49(3)(a) would be
`constitutional if they were performed pursuant to an
`administrative subpoena. Tr. of Oral Arg. 36–37. These
`subpoenas, which are typically a simple form, can be
`issued by the individual seeking the record—here, officers
`in the field—without probable cause that a regulation is
`being infringed. See See, 387 U. S., at 544 (“[T]he demand
`to inspect may be issued by the agency”). Issuing a sub-
`
`poena will usually be the full extent of an officer’s burden
`because “the great majority of businessmen can be ex-
`pected in normal course to consent to inspection without
`warrant.” Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U. S., at 316. Indeed, the
`City has cited no evidence suggesting that without an
`ordinance authorizing on-demand searches, hotel opera-
`
`tors would regularly refuse to cooperate with the police.
`
`In those instances, however, where a subpoenaed hotel
`operator believes that an attempted search is motivated
`by illicit purposes, respondents suggest it would be suffi-
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`12
`
`
`
`
`LOS ANGELES v. PATEL
`
`Opinion of the Court
`cient if he or she could move to quash the subpoena before
`any search takes place. Tr. of Oral Arg. 38–39. A neutral
`decisionmaker, including an administrative law judge,
`would then review the subpoenaed party’s objections
`before deciding whether the subpoena is enforceable.
`
`Given the limited grounds on which a motion to quash can
`be granted, such challenges will likely be rare. And, in the
`even rarer event that an officer reasonably suspects that a
`hotel operator may tamper with the registry while the
`motion to quash is pending, he or she can guard the regis-
`try until the required hearing can occur, which ought not
`take long. Riley v. California, 573 U. S. ___ (2014) (slip
`op., at 12) (police may seize and hold a cell phone “to
`prevent destruction of evidence while seeking a warrant”);
`Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U. S. 326, 334 (2001) (citing
`cases upholding the constitutionality of “temporary re-
`straints where [they are] needed to preserve evidence until
`police could obtain a warrant”). Cf. Missouri v. McNeely,
`
`569 U. S. ___ (2013) (slip op., at 12) (noting that many
`States have procedures in place for considering warrant
`
`applications telephonically).3
`
`Procedures along these lines are ubiquitous. A 2002
`report by
`the Department of Justice
`“identified
`approximately 335 existing administrative subpoena
`authorities held by various [federal] executive branch
`entities.” Office of Legal Policy, Report to Congress
`on the Use of Administrative Subpoena Authorities by
`Executive Branch Agencies and Entities 3, online
`at http://www.justice.gov/archive/olp/rpt_to_congress.htm
`
`(All Internet materials as visited June 19, 2015, and
`
`available in Clerk of Court’s case file). Their prevalence
`——————
`3 JUSTICE SCALIA professes to be baffled at the idea that we could
`suggest that in certain circumstances, police officers may seize some-
`
`
`thing that they cannot immediately search. Post, at 10–11 (dissenting
`opinion). But that is what this Court’s cases have explicitly endorsed,
`
`
`including Riley just last Term.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`confirms what common sense alone would otherwise lead
`us to conclude: In most contexts, business owners can be
`afforded at least an opportunity to contest an administra-
`tive search’s propriety without unduly compromising the
`government’s ability to achieve its regulatory aims.
`
`Of course administrative subpoenas are only one way in
`
`which an opportunity for precompliance review can be
`made available. But whatever the precise form, the avail-
`ability of precompliance review alters the dynamic be-
`tween the officer and the hotel to be searched, and reduces
`the risk that officers will use these administrative searches
`as a pretext to harass business owners.
`Finally, we underscore the narrow nature of our hold-
`
`ing. Respondents have not challenged and nothing in our
`opinion calls into question those parts of §41.49 that re-
`quire hotel operators to maintain guest registries contain-
`ing certain information. And, even absent legislative
`action to create a procedure along the lines discussed
`above, see supra, at 11, police will not be prevented from
`obtaining access to these documents. As they often do,
`hotel operators remain free to consent to searches of their
`registries and police can compel them to turn them over
`if they have a proper administrative warrant—including
`one that was issued ex parte—or if some other exception
`to the warrant requirement applies, including exigent
`
`circumstances.4
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`13
`
`
`
`
`
`B
`Rather than arguing that §41.49(3)(a) is constitutional
`
`——————
`4In suggesting that our holding today will somehow impede law en-
`
` forcement from achieving its important aims, JUSTICE SCALIA relies on
`instances where hotels were used as “prisons for migrants smuggled
`across the border

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