(Slip Opinion)
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2014
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`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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` Syllabus
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`BANK OF AMERICA, N. A. v. CAULKETT
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
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`THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
` No. 13–1421. Argued March 24, 2015—Decided June 1, 2015*
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`Respondent debtors each filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and each
`owned a house encumbered with a senior mortgage lien and a junior
`mortgage lien, the latter held by petitioner bank. Because the
`amount owed on each senior mortgage is greater than each house’s
`current market value, the bank would receive nothing if the proper-
`ties were sold today. The junior mortgage liens were thus wholly un-
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`derwater. The debtors sought to void their junior mortgage liens un-
`der §506 of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides, “To the extent that
`a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed se-
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`cured claim, such lien is void.” 11 U. S. C. §506(d). In each case, the
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`Bankruptcy Court granted the motion, and both the District Court
`and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
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`Held: A debtor in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding may not void a
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`junior mortgage lien under §506(d) when the debt owed on a senior
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`mortgage lien exceeds the current value of the collateral if the credi-
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`tor’s claim is both secured by a lien and allowed under §502 of the
`Bankruptcy Code. Pp. 2–7.
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`(a) The debtors here prevail only if the bank’s claims are “not . . .
`allowed secured claim[s].” The parties do not dispute that the bank’s
`claims are “allowed” under the Code. Instead, the debtors argue that
`the bank’s claims are not “secured” because §506(a)(1) provides that
`“[a]n allowed claim . . . is a secured claim to the extent of the value of
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`such creditor’s interest in . . . such property” and “an unsecured claim
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`to the extent that the value of such creditor’s interest . . . is less than
`the amount of such allowed claim.” Because the value of the bank’s
`——————
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`*Together with No. 14–163, Bank of America, N. A. v. Toledo-
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`Cardona, also on certiorari to the same court.
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`2
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`BANK OF AMERICA, N. A. v. CAULKETT
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`Syllabus
`interest here is zero, a straightforward reading of the statute would
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`seem to favor the debtors. This Court’s construction of §506(d)’s term
`“secured claim” in Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U. S. 410, however, fore-
`closes that reading and resolves the question presented here. In de-
`clining to permit a Chapter 7 debtor to “strip down” a partially un-
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`derwater lien under §506(d) to the value of the collateral, the Court
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`in Dewsnup concluded that an allowed claim “secured by a lien with
`recourse to the underlying collateral . . . does not come within the
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`scope of §506(d).” Id., at 415. Thus, under Dewsnup, a “secured
`claim” is a claim supported by a security interest in property, regard-
`less of whether the value of that property would be sufficient to cover
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`the claim. Pp. 2–4.
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`(b) This Court declines to limit Dewsnup to partially underwater
`liens. Dewsnup’s definition did not depend on such a distinction. Nor
`is this distinction supported by Nobelman v. American Savings Bank,
`508 U. S. 324, which addressed the interaction between the meaning
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`of the term “secured claim” in §506(a)—a definition that Dewsnup de-
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`clined to use for purposes of §506(d)—and an entirely separate provi-
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`sion, §1322(b)(2). See 508 U. S., at 327–332. Finally, the debtors’
`suggestion that the historical and policy concerns that motivated the
`Court in Dewsnup do not apply in the context of wholly underwater
`liens is an insufficient justification for giving the term “secured
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`claim” a different definition depending on the value of the collateral.
`Ultimately, the debtors’ proposed distinction would do nothing to
`vindicate §506(d)’s original meaning and would leave an odd statuto-
`ry framework in its place. Pp. 5–7.
`No. 13–1421, 566 Fed. Appx. 879, and No. 14–163, 556 Fed. Appx. 911,
`reversed and remanded.
`THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
`C. J., and SCALIA, GINSBURG, ALITO, and KAGAN, JJ., joined, and in
`which KENNEDY, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined except as to the
`footnote.
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`Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015)
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`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`_________________
` Nos. 13–1421 and 14–163
`_________________
` BANK OF AMERICA, N. A., PETITIONER
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`13–1421
` v.
`DAVID B. CAULKETT
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` BANK OF AMERICA, N. A., PETITIONER
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`14–163
`v.
` EDELMIRO TOLEDO-CARDONA
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`ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
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`APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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`[June 1, 2015]
` JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.*
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`Section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor
`to void a lien on his property “[t]o the extent that [the] lien
`secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed
`secured claim.” 11 U. S. C. §506(d). These consolidated
`cases present the question whether a debtor in a Chapter
`7 bankruptcy proceeding may void a junior mortgage
`under §506(d) when the debt owed on a senior mortgage
`exceeds the present value of the property. We hold that a
`debtor may not, and we therefore reverse the judgments of
`the Court of Appeals.
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`I
`The facts in these consolidated cases are largely the
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`——————
`* JUSTICE KENNEDY, JUSTICE BREYER, and JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR join
`this opinion, except as to the footnote.
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`2
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`BANK OF AMERICA, N. A. v. CAULKETT
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`Opinion of the Court
`same. The debtors, respondents David Caulkett and
`Edelmiro Toledo-Cardona, each have two mortgage liens
`on their respective houses. Petitioner Bank of America
`(Bank) holds the junior mortgage lien—i.e., the mortgage
`lien subordinate to the other mortgage lien—on each
`home. The amount owed on each debtor’s senior mortgage
`lien is greater than each home’s current market value.
`The Bank’s junior mortgage liens are thus wholly under-
`water: because each home is worth less than the amount
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`the debtor owes on the senior mortgage, the Bank would
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`receive nothing if the properties were sold today.
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`In 2013, the debtors each filed for Chapter 7 bank-
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`ruptcy. In their respective bankruptcy proceedings, they
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`moved to “strip off ”—or void—the junior mortgage liens
`under §506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code. In each case, the
`Bankruptcy Court granted the motion, and both the Dis-
`trict Court and the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
`Circuit affirmed. In re Caulkett, 566 Fed. Appx. 879
`(2014) (per curiam); In re Toledo-Cardona, 556 Fed. Appx.
`911 (2014) (per curiam). The Eleventh Circuit explained
`that it was bound by Circuit precedent holding that
`§506(d) allows debtors to void a wholly underwater mort-
`gage lien.
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`We granted certiorari, 574 U. S. ___ (2014), and now
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`reverse the judgments of the Eleventh Circuit.
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`II
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`Section 506(d) provides, “To the extent that a lien se-
`cures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed
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`secured claim, such lien is void.”
`(Emphasis added.)
`Accordingly, §506(d) permits the debtors here to strip off
`the Bank’s junior mortgages only if the Bank’s “claim”—
`generally, its right to repayment from the debtors,
`§101(5)—is “not an allowed secured claim.” Subject to
`some exceptions not relevant here, a claim filed by a credi-
`tor is deemed “allowed” under §502 if no interested party
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` Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015)
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`Opinion of the Court
`objects or if, in the case of an objection, the Bankruptcy
`Court determines that the claim should be allowed under
`the Code. §§502(a)–(b). The parties agree that the Bank’s
`claims meet this requirement. They disagree, however,
`over whether the Bank’s claims are “secured” within the
`meaning of §506(d).
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`The Code suggests that the Bank’s claims are not se-
`cured. Section 506(a)(1) provides that “[a]n allowed claim
`of a creditor secured by a lien on property . . . is a secured
`claim to the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest
`in . . . such property,” and “an unsecured claim to the
`extent that the value of such creditor’s interest . . . is less
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`than the amount of such allowed claim.” (Emphasis added.)
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`In other words, if the value of a creditor’s interest in
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`the property is zero—as is the case here—his claim cannot
`be a “secured claim” within the meaning of §506(a). And
`given that these identical words are later used in the same
`section of the same Act—§506(d)—one would think this
`“presents a classic case for application of the normal rule
`of statutory construction that identical words used in
`different parts of the same act are intended to have the
`same meaning.” Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U. S. 90,
`101 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under
`that straightforward reading of the statute, the debtors
`would be able to void the Bank’s claims.
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`Unfortunately for the debtors, this Court has already
`adopted a construction of the term “secured claim” in
`§506(d) that forecloses this textual analysis. See Dewsnup
`v. Timm, 502 U. S. 410 (1992). In Dewsnup, the Court
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`confronted a situation in which a Chapter 7 debtor wanted
`to “‘strip down’”—or reduce—a partially underwater lien
`under §506(d) to the value of the collateral. Id., at 412–
`413. Specifically, she sought, under §506(d), to reduce her
`debt of approximately $120,000 to the value of the collat-
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`eral securing her debt at that time ($39,000). Id., at 413.
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`Relying on the statutory definition of “‘allowed secured
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`BANK OF AMERICA, N. A. v. CAULKETT
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`Opinion of the Court
`claim’” in §506(a), she contended that her creditors’ claim
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`was “secured only to the extent of the judicially deter-
`mined value of the real property on which the lien [wa]s
`fixed.” Id., at 414.
`The Court rejected her argument. Rather than apply
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`the statutory definition of “secured claim” in §506(a), the
`Court reasoned that the term “secured” in §506(d) con-
`tained an ambiguity because the self-interested parties
`before it disagreed over the term’s meaning. Id., at 416,
`420. Relying on policy considerations and its understand-
`ing of pre-Code practice, the Court concluded that if a
`claim “has been ‘allowed’ pursuant to §502 of the Code and
`is secured by a lien with recourse to the underlying collat-
`eral, it does not come within the scope of §506(d).” Id., at
`415; see id., at 417–420. It therefore held that the debtor
`could not strip down the creditors’ lien to the value of the
`property under §506(d) “because [the creditors’] claim
`[wa]s secured by a lien and ha[d] been fully allowed pur-
`suant to §502.” Id., at 417. In other words, Dewsnup
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`defined the term “secured claim” in §506(d) to mean a
`claim supported by a security interest in property, regard-
`less of whether the value of that property would be suffi-
`cient to cover the claim. Under this definition, §506(d)’s
`function is reduced to “voiding a lien whenever a claim
`secured by the lien itself has not been allowed.” Id., at
`416.
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`Dewsnup’s construction of “secured claim” resolves the
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` question presented here. Dewsnup construed the term
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`“secured claim” in §506(d) to include any claim “secured by
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`a lien and . . . fully allowed pursuant to §502.” Id., at 417.
`Because the Bank’s claims here are both secured by liens
`and allowed under §502, they cannot be voided under the
`definition given to the term “allowed secured claim” by
`Dewsnup.
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`Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015)
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`Opinion of the Court
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` III
`The debtors do not ask us to overrule Dewsnup,† but
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`instead request that we limit that decision to partially—as
`opposed to wholly—underwater liens. We decline to adopt
`this distinction. The debtors offer several reasons why we
`should cabin Dewsnup in this manner, but none of them is
`compelling.
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`To start, the debtors rely on language in Dewsnup stat-
`ing that the Court was not addressing “all possible fact
`situations,” but was instead “allow[ing] other facts to
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`await their legal resolution on another day.” Id., at 416–
`417. But this disclaimer provides an insufficient founda-
`tion for the debtors’ proposed distinction. Dewsnup con-
`sidered several possible definitions of the term “secured
`claim” in §506(d). See id., at 414–416. The definition it
`settled on—that a claim is “secured” if it is “secured by a
`lien” and “has been fully allowed pursuant to §502,” id., at
`417—does not depend on whether a lien is partially or
`wholly underwater. Whatever the Court’s hedging lan-
`guage meant, it does not provide a reason to limit
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`Dewsnup in the manner the debtors propose.
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`The debtors next contend that the term “secured claim”
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` † From its inception, Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U. S. 410 (1992), has
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`been the target of criticism. See, e.g., id., at 420–436 (SCALIA, J.,
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` dissenting); In re Woolsey, 696 F. 3d 1266, 1273–1274, 1278 (CA10
` 2012); In re Dever, 164 B. R. 132, 138, 145 (Bkrtcy. Ct. CD Cal. 1994);
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`Carlson, Bifurcation of Undersecured Claims in Bankruptcy, 70 Am.
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`Bankr. L. J. 1, 12–20 (1996); Ponoroff & Knippenberg, The Immovable
`Object Versus the Irresistible Force: Rethinking the Relationship
`Between Secured Credit and Bankruptcy Policy, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2234,
`2305–2307 (1997); see also Bank of America Nat. Trust and Sav. Assn.
`v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership, 526 U. S. 434, 463, and n. 3
`(1999) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment) (collecting cases and
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`observing that “[t]he methodological confusion created by Dewsnup has
`enshrouded both the Courts of Appeals and . . . Bankruptcy Courts”).
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`Despite this criticism, the debtors have repeatedly insisted that they
`are not asking us to overrule Dewsnup.
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`BANK OF AMERICA, N. A. v. CAULKETT
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`Opinion of the Court
`in §506(d) could be redefined as any claim that is backed
`by collateral with some value. Embracing this reading of
`§506(d), however, would give the term “allowed secured
`claim” in §506(d) a different meaning than its statutory
`definition in §506(a). We refuse to adopt this artificial
`definition.
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`Nor do we think Nobelman v. American Savings Bank,
`508 U. S. 324 (1993), supports the debtors’ proposed dis-
`tinction. Nobelman said nothing about the meaning of the
`term “secured claim” in §506(d). Instead, it addressed the
`interaction between the meaning of the term “secured
`claim” in §506(a) and an entirely separate provision,
`§1322(b)(2). See 508 U. S., at 327–332. Nobelman offers
`no guidance on the question presented in these cases
`because the Court in Dewsnup already declined to apply
`the definition in §506(a) to the phrase “secured claim” in
`§506(d).
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`The debtors alternatively urge us to limit Dewsnup’s
`definition to the facts of that case because the historical
`and policy concerns that motivated the Court do not apply
`in the context of wholly underwater liens. Whether or not
`that proposition is true, it is an insufficient justification
`for giving the term “secured claim” in §506(d) a different
`definition depending on the value of the collateral. We are
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`generally reluctant to give the “same words a different
`meaning” when construing statutes, Pasquantino v.
`United States, 544 U. S. 349, 358 (2005) (internal quota-
`tion marks omitted), and we decline to do so here based on
`policy arguments.
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`Ultimately, embracing the debtors’ distinction would not
`vindicate §506(d)’s original meaning, and it would leave
`an odd statutory framework in its place. Under the debt-
`ors’ approach, if a court valued the collateral at one dollar
`more than the amount of a senior lien, the debtor could
`not strip down a junior lien under Dewsnup, but if it val-
`ued the property at one dollar less, the debtor could strip
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` Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015)
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`Opinion of the Court
`off the entire junior lien. Given the constantly shifting
`value of real property, this reading could lead to arbitrary
`results. To be sure, the Code engages in line-drawing
`elsewhere, and sometimes a dollar’s difference will have a
`significant impact on bankruptcy proceedings. See, e.g.,
`§707(b)(2)(A)(i) (presumption of abuse of provisions of
`Chapter 7 triggered if debtor’s projected disposable income
`over the next five years is $12,475). But these lines were
`set by Congress, not this Court. There is scant support for
`the view that §506(d) applies differently depending on
`whether a lien was partially or wholly underwater. Even
`if Dewsnup were deemed not to reflect the correct meaning
`of §506(d), the debtors’ solution would not either.
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`*
`*
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`The reasoning of Dewsnup dictates that a debtor in a
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`Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding may not void a junior
`mortgage lien under §506(d) when the debt owed on a
`senior mortgage lien exceeds the current value of the
`collateral. The debtors here have not asked us to overrule
`Dewsnup, and we decline to adopt the artificial distinction
`they propose instead. We therefore reverse the judgments
`of the Court of Appeals and remand the cases for further
`proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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`It is so ordered.