(Slip Opinion)
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2013
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`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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` Syllabus
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`ALICE CORPORATION PTY. LTD. v. CLS BANK
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`INTERNATIONAL ET AL.
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`
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
` No. 13–298. Argued March 31, 2014—Decided June 19, 2014
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`Petitioner Alice Corporation is the assignee of several patents that dis-
`close a scheme for mitigating “settlement risk,” i.e., the risk that only
`one party to an agreed-upon financial exchange will satisfy its obliga-
`tion. In particular, the patent claims are designed to facilitate the
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` exchange of financial obligations between two parties by using a
`computer system as a third-party intermediary. The patents in suit
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`
` claim (1) a method for exchanging financial obligations, (2) a comput-
`er system configured to carry out the method for exchanging obliga-
`tions, and (3) a computer-readable medium containing program code
`for performing the method of exchanging obligations.
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`Respondents (together, CLS Bank), who operate a global network
`that facilitates currency transactions, filed suit against petitioner,
`arguing that the patent claims at issue are invalid, unenforceable, or
`not infringed. Petitioner counterclaimed, alleging infringement. Af-
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`
`ter Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U. S. 593, was decided, the District Court
`held that all of the claims were ineligible for patent protection under
`35 U. S. C. §101 because they are directed to an abstract idea. The
`en banc Federal Circuit affirmed.
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`Held: Because the claims are drawn to a patent-ineligible abstract idea,
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`they are not patent eligible under §101. Pp. 5–17.
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`(a) The Court has long held that §101, which defines the subject
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`matter eligible for patent protection, contains an implicit exception
`for ‘ “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.’ ” As-
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`sociation for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U. S.
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`___, ___. In applying the §101 exception, this Court must distinguish
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`patents that claim the “ ‘buildin[g] block[s]’ ” of human ingenuity,
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`which are ineligible for patent protection, from those that integrate
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`ALICE CORP. v. CLS BANK INT’L
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`Syllabus
`the building blocks into something more, see Mayo Collaborative Ser-
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`vices v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U. S. ___, ___, thereby
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`“transform[ing]” them into a patent-eligible invention, id., at ___.
`Pp. 5–6.
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`(b) Using this framework, the Court must first determine whether
`the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept. 566
`U. S., at ___. If so, the Court then asks whether the claim’s elements,
`considered both individually and “as an ordered combination,” “trans-
`form the nature of the claim” into a patent-eligible application. Id.,
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`at ___. Pp. 7–17.
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`
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`(1) The claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept:
`the abstract idea of intermediated settlement. Under “the longstand-
`ing rule that ‘[a]n idea of itself is not patentable,’ ” Gottschalk v. Ben-
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`
`son, 409 U. S. 63, 67, this Court has found ineligible patent claims
`involving an algorithm for converting binary-coded decimal numerals
`into pure binary form, id., at 71–72; a mathematical formula for com-
`
`puting “alarm limits” in a catalytic conversion process, Parker v.
`Flook, 437 U. S. 584, 594–595; and, most recently, a method for hedg-
`ing against the financial risk of price fluctuations, Bilski, 561 U. S, at
`599. It follows from these cases, and Bilski in particular, that the
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`claims at issue are directed to an abstract idea. On their face, they
`are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of
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`a third party to mitigate settlement risk. Like the risk hedging in
`Bilski, the concept of intermediated settlement is “ ‘a fundamental
`economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce,’ ” ibid.,
`and the use of a third-party intermediary (or “clearing house”) is a
`building block of the modern economy. Thus, intermediated settle-
`ment, like hedging, is an “abstract idea” beyond §101’s scope. Pp. 7–
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`10.
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`(2) Turning to the second step of Mayo’s framework: The method
`claims, which merely require generic computer implementation, fail
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`to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.
`Pp. 10–16.
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`(i) “Simply appending conventional steps, specified at a high
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`level of generality,” to a method already “well known in the art” is not
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`“enough” to supply the “ ‘inventive concept’ ” needed to make this
`transformation. Mayo, supra, at ___, ___. The introduction of a com-
`puter into the claims does not alter the analysis. Neither stating an
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`abstract idea “while adding the words ‘apply it,’ ” Mayo, supra, at ___,
`nor limiting the use of an abstract idea “ ‘to a particular technological
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`environment,’ ” Bilski, supra, at 610–611, is enough for patent eligi-
`bility. Stating an abstract idea while adding the words “apply it with
`a computer” simply combines those two steps, with the same deficient
`result. Wholly generic computer implementation is not generally the
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` Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014)
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`Syllabus
`sort of “additional featur[e]” that provides any “practical assurance
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`that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize
`the [abstract idea] itself.” Mayo, supra, at ___. Pp. 11–14.
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`(ii) Here, the representative method claim does no more than
`simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea of in-
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` termediated settlement on a generic computer. Taking the claim el-
`ements separately, the function performed by the computer at each
`step—creating and maintaining “shadow” accounts, obtaining data,
`adjusting account balances, and issuing automated instructions—is
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`“[p]urely ‘conventional. ’ ” Mayo, 566 U. S., at ___. Considered “as an
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`ordered combination,” these computer components “ad[d] nothing . . .
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`that is not already present when the steps are considered separate-
`ly.” Id., at ___. Viewed as a whole, these method claims simply recite
`the concept of intermediated settlement as performed by a generic
`computer. They do not, for example, purport to improve the function-
`ing of the computer itself or effect an improvement in any other tech-
`nology or technical field. An instruction to apply the abstract idea of
`intermediated settlement using some unspecified, generic computer
`is not “enough” to transform the abstract idea into a patent-eligible
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`invention. Id., at ___. Pp. 14–16.
`(3) Because petitioner’s system and media claims add nothing of
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`substance to the underlying abstract idea, they too are patent ineligi-
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`ble under §101. Petitioner conceded below that its media claims rise
`or fall with its method claims. And the system claims are no differ-
`ent in substance from the method claims. The method claims recite
`the abstract idea implemented on a generic computer; the system
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`claims recite a handful of generic computer components configured to
`implement the same idea. This Court has long “warn[ed] . . . against”
`interpreting §101 “in ways that make patent eligibility ‘depend simp-
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`ly on the draftsman’s art.’ ” Mayo, supra, at ___. Holding that the
`system claims are patent eligible would have exactly that result.
`Pp. 16–17.
`717 F. 3d 1269, affirmed.
`THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. SO-
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`TOMAYOR, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which GINSBURG and BREYER,
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`JJ., joined.
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`Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014)
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`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`_________________
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` No. 13–298
`_________________
` ALICE CORPORATION PTY. LTD, PETITIONER v. CLS
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` BANK INTERNATIONAL ET AL.
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`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`
`APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
`
`[June 19, 2014]
`
`JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
`The patents at issue in this case disclose a computer-
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`implemented scheme for mitigating “settlement risk” (i.e.,
`the risk that only one party to a financial transaction will
`pay what it owes) by using a third-party intermediary.
`The question presented is whether these claims are patent
`eligible under 35 U. S. C. §101, or are instead drawn to a
`patent-ineligible abstract idea. We hold that the claims at
`issue are drawn to the abstract idea of intermediated
`settlement, and that merely requiring generic computer
`implementation fails to transform that abstract idea into a
`patent-eligible invention. We therefore affirm the judg-
`ment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
`Circuit.
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`I
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`A
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`Petitioner Alice Corporation is the assignee of several
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`patents that disclose schemes to manage certain forms of
`financial risk.1 According to the specification largely
`——————
` 1The patents at issue are United States Patent Nos. 5,970,479 (the
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` ALICE CORP. v. CLS BANK INT’L
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`Opinion of the Court
`shared by the patents, the invention “enabl[es] the man-
`agement of risk relating to specified, yet unknown, future
`events.” App. 248. The specification further explains that
`the “invention relates to methods and apparatus, includ-
`ing electrical computers and data processing systems
`applied to financial matters and risk management.” Id.,
`at 243.
`
`The claims at issue relate to a computerized scheme for
`mitigating “settlement risk”—i.e., the risk that only one
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`party to an agreed-upon financial exchange will satisfy its
`obligation. In particular, the claims are designed to facili-
`tate the exchange of financial obligations between two
`parties by using a computer system as a third-party in-
`
`
`termediary. Id., at 383–384.2 The intermediary creates
`“shadow” credit and debit records (i.e., account ledgers)
`——————
`’479 patent), 6,912,510, 7,149,720, and 7,725,375.
`2The parties agree that claim 33 of the ’479 patent is representative
`of the method claims. Claim 33 recites:
`
`
` “A method of exchanging obligations as between parties, each party
`holding a credit record and a debit record with an exchange institution,
`the credit records and debit records for exchange of predetermined
`obligations, the method comprising the steps of:
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`“(a) creating a shadow credit record and a shadow debit record for
`each stakeholder party to be held independently by a supervisory
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`institution from the exchange institutions;
`“(b) obtaining from each exchange institution a start-of-day balance
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` for each shadow credit record and shadow debit record;
`“(c) for every transaction resulting in an exchange obligation, the
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`supervisory institution adjusting each respective party’s shadow credit
`record or shadow debit record, allowing only these transactions that do
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`not result in the value of the shadow debit record being less than the
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`value of the shadow credit record at any time, each said adjustment
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`taking place in chronological order, and
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`“(d) at the end-of-day, the supervisory institution instructing on[e] of
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`the exchange institutions to exchange credits or debits to the credit
`record and debit record of the respective parties in accordance with the
`adjustments of the said permitted transactions, the credits and debits
`being irrevocable, time invariant obligations placed on the exchange
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`institutions.” App. 383–384.
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` Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014)
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`Opinion of the Court
`that mirror the balances in the parties’ real-world ac-
`counts at “exchange institutions” (e.g., banks). The inter-
`mediary updates the shadow records in real time as trans-
`actions are entered, allowing “only those transactions for
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`which the parties’ updated shadow records indicate suffi-
`cient resources to satisfy their mutual obligations.” 717
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`F. 3d 1269, 1285 (CA Fed. 2013) (Lourie, J., concurring).
`At the end of the day, the intermediary instructs the
`relevant financial institutions to carry out the “permitted”
`transactions in accordance with the updated shadow
`records, ibid., thus mitigating the risk that only one party
`will perform the agreed-upon exchange.
`
`In sum, the patents in suit claim (1) the foregoing method
`for exchanging obligations (the method claims), (2) a
`computer system configured to carry out the method for
`exchanging obligations (the system claims), and (3) a
`computer-readable medium containing program code for
`performing the method of exchanging obligations (the
`media claims). All of the claims are implemented using a
`computer; the system and media claims expressly recite a
`computer, and the parties have stipulated that the method
`claims require a computer as well.
`
`B
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`Respondents CLS Bank International and CLS Services
`Ltd. (together, CLS Bank) operate a global network that
`facilitates currency transactions. In 2007, CLS Bank filed
`suit against petitioner, seeking a declaratory judgment
`that the claims at issue are invalid, unenforceable, or not
`infringed. Petitioner counterclaimed, alleging infringe-
`ment. Following this Court’s decision in Bilski v. Kappos,
`561 U. S. 593 (2010), the parties filed cross-motions for
`summary judgment on whether the asserted claims are
`eligible for patent protection under 35 U. S. C. §101. The
`District Court held that all of the claims are patent ineli-
`gible because they are directed to the abstract idea of
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` ALICE CORP. v. CLS BANK INT’L
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`Opinion of the Court
`“employing a neutral intermediary to facilitate simultane-
`ous exchange of obligations in order to minimize risk.”
`768 F. Supp. 2d 221, 252 (DC 2011).
`
`A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals
`for the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that it was not
`“manifestly evident” that petitioner’s claims are directed
`to an abstract idea. 685 F. 3d 1341, 1352, 1356 (2012).
`The Federal Circuit granted rehearing en banc, vacated
`the panel opinion, and affirmed the judgment of the Dis-
`trict Court in a one-paragraph per curiam opinion. 717
`F. 3d, at 1273. Seven of the ten participating judges
`agreed that petitioner’s method and media claims are
`patent ineligible. See id., at 1274 (Lourie, J., concurring);
`id., at 1312–1313 (Rader, C. J., concurring in part and
`dissenting in part). With respect to petitioner’s system
`claims, the en banc Federal Circuit affirmed the District
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`Court’s judgment by an equally divided vote. Id., at 1273.
`
`Writing for a five-member plurality, Judge Lourie con-
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`cluded that all of the claims at issue are patent ineligible.
`In the plurality’s view, under this Court’s decision in Mayo
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`Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,
`566 U. S. ___ (2012), a court must first “identif[y] the
`abstract idea represented in the claim,” and then deter-
`mine “whether the balance of the claim adds ‘significantly
`more.’” 717 F. 3d, at 1286. The plurality concluded that
`petitioner’s claims “draw on the abstract idea of reducing
`settlement risk by effecting trades through a third-party
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`intermediary,” and that the use of a computer to maintain,
`adjust, and reconcile shadow accounts added nothing of
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`substance to that abstract idea. Ibid.
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`Chief Judge Rader concurred in part and dissented in
`part. In a part of the opinion joined only by Judge Moore,
`Chief Judge Rader agreed with the plurality that petition-
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`er’s method and media claims are drawn to an abstract
`idea. Id., at 1312–1313. In a part of the opinion joined by
`Judges Linn, Moore, and O’Malley, Chief Judge Rader
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`Opinion of the Court
`would have held that the system claims are patent eligible
`because they involve computer “hardware” that is “specifi-
`cally programmed to solve a complex problem.” Id., at
`1307. Judge Moore wrote a separate opinion dissenting in
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`part, arguing that the system claims are patent eligible.
`Id., at 1313–1314. Judge Newman filed an opinion con-
`curring in part and dissenting in part, arguing that all of
`petitioner’s claims are patent eligible. Id., at 1327. Judges
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`Linn and O’Malley filed a separate dissenting opinion
`reaching that same conclusion. Ibid.
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`We granted certiorari, 571 U. S. ___ (2013), and now
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`affirm.
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`II
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`Section 101 of the Patent Act defines the subject matter
`eligible for patent protection. It provides:
`“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
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`process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
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`matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
`may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions
`and requirements of this title.” 35 U. S. C. §101.
`“We have long held that this provision contains an im-
`portant implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural phe-
`nomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” Associa-
`tion for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569
`U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 11) (internal quotation
`
`marks and brackets omitted). We have interpreted §101
`and its predecessors in light of this exception for more
`than 150 years. Bilski, supra, at 601–602; see also
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`O’Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62, 112–120 (1854); Le Roy v.
`Tatham, 14 How. 156, 174–175 (1853).
`
`We have described the concern that drives this exclu-
`sionary principle as one of pre-emption. See, e.g., Bilski,
`supra, at 611–612 (upholding the patent “would pre-empt
`use of this approach in all fields, and would effectively
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` ALICE CORP. v. CLS BANK INT’L
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`Opinion of the Court
` grant a monopoly over an abstract idea”). Laws of nature,
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`natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are “ ‘“the basic
`tools of scientific and technological work.”’” Myriad,
`supra, at ___ (slip op., at 11). “[M]onopolization of those
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`tools through the grant of a patent might tend to impede
`innovation more than it would tend to promote it,” thereby
`thwarting the primary object of the patent laws. Mayo,
`supra, at ___ (slip op., at 2); see U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl.
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`8 (Congress “shall have Power . . . To promote the Pro-
`gress of Science and useful Arts”). We have “repeatedly
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`emphasized this . . . concern that patent law not inhibit
`further discovery by improperly tying up the future use
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`of ” these building blocks of human ingenuity. Mayo,
`supra, at ___ (slip op., at 16) (citing Morse, supra, at 113).
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`At the same time, we tread carefully in construing this
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`exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of patent law.
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`Mayo, 566 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 2). At some level, “all
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`inventions . . . embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply
`laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.”
`
`Id., at ___ (slip op., at 2). Thus, an invention is not ren-
`dered ineligible for patent simply because it involves an
`abstract concept. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U. S. 175,
`187 (1981). “[A]pplication[s]” of such concepts “‘to a new
`and useful end,’” we have said, remain eligible for patent
`protection. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U. S. 63, 67 (1972).
`
`
`Accordingly, in applying the §101 exception, we must
`distinguish between patents that claim the “‘buildin[g]
`block[s]’” of human ingenuity and those that integrate the
`building blocks into something more, Mayo, 566 U. S., at
`___ (slip op., at 20), thereby “transform[ing]” them into a
`patent-eligible invention, id., at ___ (slip op., at 3). The
`former “would risk disproportionately tying up the use of
`the underlying” ideas, id., at ___ (slip op., at 4), and are
`therefore ineligible for patent protection. The latter pose
`no comparable risk of pre-emption, and therefore remain
`eligible for the monopoly granted under our patent laws.
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`Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014)
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`Opinion of the Court
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` III
`
` In Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laborato-
`ries, Inc., 566 U. S. ___ (2012), we set forth a framework
`for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natu-
`ral phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim
`patent-eligible applications of those concepts. First, we
`determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one
`of those patent-ineligible concepts. Id., at ___ (slip op., at
`8). If so, we then ask, “[w]hat else is there in the claims
`before us?” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 9). To answer that
`question, we consider the elements of each claim both
`individually and “as an ordered combination” to determine
`
`whether the additional elements “transform the nature of
`the claim” into a patent-eligible application. Id., at ___
`
`(slip op., at 10, 9). We have described step two of this
`analysis as a search for an “ ‘inventive concept’”—i.e., an
`element or combination of elements that is “sufficient to
`ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly
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`more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.”
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`Id., at ___ (slip op., at 3).3
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`A
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`We must first determine whether the claims at issue are
`directed to a patent-ineligible concept. We conclude that
`they are: These claims are drawn to the abstract idea of
`intermediated settlement.
`
`The “abstract ideas” category embodies “the longstand-
`ing rule that ‘[a]n idea of itself is not patentable.’ ” Ben-
`
`son, supra, at 67 (quoting Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. How-
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`ard, 20 Wall. 498, 507 (1874)); see also Le Roy, supra, at
`——————
` 3Because the approach we made explicit in Mayo considers all claim
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`elements, both individually and in combination, it is consistent with the
` general rule that patent claims “must be considered as a whole.”
`
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`Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U. S. 175, 188 (1981); see Parker v. Flook, 437
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`U. S. 584, 594 (1978) (“Our approach . . . is . . . not at all inconsistent
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`with the view that a patent claim must be considered as a whole”).
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` ALICE CORP. v. CLS BANK INT’L
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`Opinion of the Court
`175 (“A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth;
`an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as
`no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right ”). In
`Benson, for example, this Court rejected as ineligible
`patent claims involving an algorithm for converting binary-
`coded decimal numerals into pure binary form, holding
`that the claimed patent was “in practical effect . . . a pat-
`ent on the algorithm itself.” 409 U. S., at 71–72. And in
`Parker v. Flook, 437 U. S. 584, 594–595 (1978), we held
`that a mathematical formula for computing “alarm limits”
`in a catalytic conversion process was also a patent-
`ineligible abstract idea.
`
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`We most recently addressed the category of abstract
`ideas in Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U. S. 593 (2010). The claims
`
`at issue in Bilski described a method for hedging against
`the financial risk of price fluctuations. Claim 1 recited a
`series of steps for hedging risk, including: (1) initiating a
`series of financial transactions between providers and
`consumers of a commodity; (2) identifying market partici-
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`pants that have a counterrisk for the same commodity;
`and (3) initiating a series of transactions between those
`market participants and the commodity provider to bal-
`ance the risk position of the first series of consumer trans-
`actions. Id., at 599. Claim 4 “pu[t] the concept articulated
`in claim 1 into a simple mathematical formula.” Ibid. The
`remaining claims were drawn to examples of hedging in
`commodities and energy markets.
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`“[A]ll members of the Court agree[d]” that the patent at
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`
`issue in Bilski claimed an “abstract idea.” Id., at 609; see
`also id., at 619 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
`Specifically, the claims described “the basic concept of
`hedging, or protecting against risk.” Id., at 611. The
`Court explained that “‘[h]edging is a fundamental economic
`practice long prevalent in our system of commerce and
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`taught in any introductory finance class.’” Ibid.
`“The
`concept of hedging” as recited by the claims in suit was
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`Opinion of the Court
`therefore a patent-ineligible “abstract idea, just like the
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`algorithms at issue in Benson and Flook.” Ibid.
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`It follows from our prior cases, and Bilski in particular,
`that the claims at issue here are directed to an abstract
`idea. Petitioner’s claims involve a method of exchanging
`financial obligations between two parties using a third-
`party intermediary to mitigate settlement risk. The in-
`termediary creates and updates “shadow” records to re-
`flect the value of each party’s actual accounts held at
`“exchange institutions,” thereby permitting only those
`transactions for which the parties have sufficient re-
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`sources. At the end of each day, the intermediary issues
`irrevocable instructions to the exchange institutions to
`carry out the permitted transactions.
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`On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the
`concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third
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`party to mitigate settlement risk. Like the risk hedging in
`Bilski, the concept of intermediated settlement is “ ‘a
`fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our
`system of commerce.’” Ibid.; see, e.g., Emery, Speculation
`on the Stock and Produce Exchanges of the United States,
`in 7 Studies in History, Economics and Public Law 283,
`346–356 (1896) (discussing the use of a “clearing-house” as
`an intermediary to reduce settlement risk). The use of a
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`third-party intermediary (or “clearing house”) is also a
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`building block of the modern economy. See, e.g., Yadav,
`The Problematic Case of Clearinghouses in Complex Mar-
`kets, 101 Geo. L. J. 387, 406–412 (2013); J. Hull, Risk
`Management and Financial Institutions 103–104 (3d ed.
`2012). Thus, intermediated settlement, like hedging, is an
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`“abstract idea” beyond the scope of §101.
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`Petitioner acknowledges that its claims describe inter-
`mediated settlement, see Brief for Petitioner 4, but rejects
`the conclusion that its claims recite an “abstract idea.”
`Drawing on the presence of mathematical formulas in
`some of our abstract-ideas precedents, petitioner contends
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`Because the claims at issue are directed to the abstract
`idea of intermediated settlement, we turn to the second
`step in Mayo’s framework. We conclude that the method
`claims, which merely require generic computer implemen-
`tation, fail to transform that abstract idea into a patent-
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`eligible invention.
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` ALICE CORP. v. CLS BANK INT’L
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`Opinion of the Court
`that the abstract-ideas category is confined to “preexist-
`ing, fundamental truth[s]” that “‘exis[t] in principle apart
`from any human action.’” Id., at 23, 26 (quoting Mayo,
`566 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8)).
`Bilski belies petitioner’s assertion. The concept of risk
`hedging we identified as an abstract idea in that case
`cannot be described as a “preexisting, fundamental truth.”
`The patent in Bilski simply involved a “series of steps
`instructing how to hedge risk.” 561 U. S., at 599. Al-
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`though hedging is a longstanding commercial practice, id.,
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`at 599, it is a method of organizing human activity, not a
`“truth” about the natural world “‘that has always existed,’”
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`Brief for Petitioner 22 (quoting Flook, supra, at 593,
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`n. 15). One of the claims in Bilski reduced hedging to a
`mathematical formula, but the Court did not assign any
`special significance to that fact, much less the sort of
`talismanic significance petitioner claims. Instead, the
`Court grounded its conclusion that all of the claims at
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`issue were abstract ideas in the understanding that risk
`hedging was a “‘fundamental economic practice.’” 561
`U. S., at 611.
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`In any event, we need not labor to delimit the precise
`contours of the “abstract ideas” category in this case. It is
`enough to recognize that there is no meaningful distinc-
`tion between the concept of risk hedging in Bilski and the
`concept of intermediated settlement at issue here. Both
`are squarely within the realm of “abstract ideas” as we
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`have used that term.
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` Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014)
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`Opinion of the Court
`1
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`At Mayo step two, we must examine the elements of the
`claim to determine whether it contains an “‘inventive
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`concept’” sufficient to “transform” the claimed abstract
`idea into a patent-eligible application. 566 U. S., at ___,
`___ (slip op., at 3, 11). A claim that recites an abstract
`idea must include “additional features” to ensure “that the
`[claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopo-
`lize the [abstract idea].” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 8–9). Mayo
`
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`made clear that transformation into a patent-eligible
`application requires “more than simply stat[ing] the [ab-
`stract idea] while adding the words ‘apply it.’” Id., at ___
`(slip op., at 3).
`Mayo itself is instructive. The patents at issue in Mayo
`claimed a method for measuring metabolites in the blood-
`stream in order to calibrate the appropriate dosage of
`thiopurine drugs in the treatment of autoimmune dis-
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`eases. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 4–6). The respondent in that
`case contended that the claimed method was a patent-
`eligible application of natural laws that describe the rela-
`tionship between the concentration of certain metabolites
`and the likelihood that the drug dosage will be harmful or
`ineffective. But methods for determining metabolite levels
`were already “well known in the art,” and the process at
`issue amounted to “nothing significantly more than an
`instruction to doctors to apply the applicable laws when
`treating their patients.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 10).
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`“Simply appending conventional steps, specified at a high
`level of generality,” was not “enough” to supply an “‘in-
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`ventive concept.’” Id., at ___, ___, ___ (slip op., at 14, 8, 3).
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`The introduction of a computer into the claims does not
`alter the analysis at Mayo step two. In Benson, for exam-
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`ple, we considered a patent that claimed an algorithm
`implemented on “a general-purpose digital computer.” 409
`U. S., at 64. Because the algorithm was an abstract idea,
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`see supra, at 8, the claim had to supply a “‘new and use-
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` ALICE CORP. v. CLS BANK INT’L
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`Opinion of the Court
`ful’” application of the idea in order to be patent eligible.
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`409 U. S., at 67. But the computer implementation did
`not supply the necessary inventive concept; the process
`could be “carried out in existing computers long in use.”
`Ibid. We accordingly “held that simply implementing a
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`mathematical principle on a physical machine, namely a
`computer, [i]s not a patentable application of that princi-
`ple.” Mayo, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 16) (citing Benson,
`supra, at 64).
`Flook is to the same effect. There, we examined a com-
`puterized method for using a mathematical formula to
`adjust alarm limits for certain operating conditions (e.g.,
`temperature and pressure) that could signal inefficiency or
`danger in a catalytic conversion process. 437 U. S., at
`585–586. Once again, the formula itself was an abstract
`idea, see supra, at 8, and the computer implementation
`was purely conventional. 437 U. S., at 594 (noting that
`the
`“use of computers
`for
`‘automatic monitoring-
`alarming’” was “well known”). In holding that the process
`was patent ineligible, we rejected the argument that
`“implement[ing] a principle in some specific fashion” will
`“automatically fal[l] within the patentable subject matter
`of §101.” Id., at 593. Thus, “Flook stands for the proposi-
`tion that the prohibition against patenting abstract ideas
`cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of
`[the idea] to a particular technological environment.”
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`Bilski, 561 U. S., at 610–611 (internal quotation marks
`omitted).
`In Diehr, 450 U. S. 175, by contrast, we held that a
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