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` Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014)
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`Per Curiam
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
` ROBERT R. TOLAN v. JEFFREY WAYNE COTTON
`ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
`
`
`STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
`
`
`
` No. 13–551. Decided May 5, 2014
`
` PER CURIAM.
`
`During the early morning hours of New Year’s Eve,
`2008, police sergeant Jeffrey Cotton fired three bullets at
`Robert Tolan; one of those bullets hit its target and punc-
`tured Tolan’s right lung. At the time of the shooting,
`Tolan was unarmed on his parents’ front porch about 15 to
`20 feet away from Cotton. Tolan sued, alleging that Cot-
`ton had exercised excessive force in violation of the Fourth
`Amendment. The District Court granted summary judg-
`ment to Cotton, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, reasoning
`that regardless of whether Cotton used excessive force, he
`was entitled to qualified immunity because he did not
`
`violate any clearly established right. 713 F. 3d 299 (2013).
`In articulating the factual context of the case, the Fifth
`Circuit failed to adhere to the axiom that in ruling on a
`motion for summary judgment, “[t]he evidence of the
`nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences
`
`are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
`Inc., 477 U. S. 242, 255 (1986). For that reason, we vacate
`its decision and remand the case for further proceedings
`consistent with this opinion.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`I
`
`A
`
`
`
`The following facts, which we view in the light most
`
`favorable to Tolan, are taken from the record evidence and
`the opinions below. At around 2:00 on the morning of
`December 31, 2008, John Edwards, a police officer, was on
`patrol in Bellaire, Texas, when he noticed a black Nissan
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`2
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`TOLAN v. COTTON
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` Per Curiam
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`sport utility vehicle turning quickly onto a residential
`
`street. The officer watched the vehicle park on the side of
`the street in front of a house. Two men exited: Tolan and
`his cousin, Anthony Cooper.
`
`
`
`Edwards attempted to enter the license plate number of
`the vehicle into a computer in his squad car. But he keyed
`an incorrect character; instead of entering plate number
`696BGK, he entered 695BGK. That incorrect number
`matched a stolen vehicle of the same color and make. This
`match caused the squad car’s computer to send an auto-
`
`matic message to other police units, informing them that
`Edwards had found a stolen vehicle.
`
`Edwards exited his cruiser, drew his service pistol and
`ordered Tolan and Cooper to the ground. He accused
`Tolan and Cooper of having stolen the car. Cooper re-
`sponded, “That’s not true.” Record 1295. And Tolan ex-
`plained, “That’s my car.” Ibid. Tolan then complied with
`
`the officer’s demand to lie face-down on the home’s front
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`porch.
`
`As it turned out, Tolan and Cooper were at the home
`where Tolan lived with his parents. Hearing the commo-
`tion, Tolan’s parents exited the front door in their paja-
`mas. In an attempt to keep the misunderstanding from
`escalating into something more, Tolan’s father instructed
`Cooper to lie down, and instructed Tolan and Cooper to
`say nothing. Tolan and Cooper then remained facedown.
`
`Edwards told Tolan’s parents that he believed Tolan and
`Cooper had stolen the vehicle. In response, Tolan’s father
`identified Tolan as his son, and Tolan’s mother explained
`that the vehicle belonged to the family and that no crime
`had been committed. Tolan’s father explained, with his
`hands in the air, “[T]his is my nephew. This is my son.
`
`We live here. This is my house.” Id., at 2059. Tolan’s
`mother similarly offered, “[S]ir this is a big mistake. This
`car is not stolen. . . . That’s our car.” Id., at 2075.
`
`
`While Tolan and Cooper continued to lie on the ground
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`Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014)
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`Per Curiam
`in silence, Edwards radioed for assistance. Shortly there-
`after, Sergeant Jeffrey Cotton arrived on the scene and
`drew his pistol. Edwards told Cotton that Cooper and
`Tolan had exited a stolen vehicle. Tolan’s mother reiter-
`ated that she and her husband owned both the car Tolan
`had been driving and the home where these events were
`unfolding. Cotton then ordered her to stand against the
`family’s garage door. In response to Cotton’s order, To-
`
`lan’s mother asked, “[A]re you kidding me? We’ve lived
`her[e] 15 years. We’ve never had anything like this hap-
`
`pen before.” Id., at 2077; see also id., at 1465.
`The parties disagree as to what happened next. Tolan’s
`
`mother and Cooper testified during Cotton’s criminal trial1
`that Cotton grabbed her arm and slammed her against the
`garage door with such force that she fell to the ground.
`
`Id., at 2035, 2078–2080. Tolan similarly testified that
`Cotton pushed his mother against the garage door. Id., at
`2479. In addition, Tolan offered testimony from his mother
`and photographic evidence to demonstrate that Cotton
`used enough force to leave bruises on her arms and back
`that lasted for days. Id., at 2078–2079, 2089–2091. By
`contrast, Cotton testified in his deposition that when he
`was escorting the mother to the garage, she flipped her
`arm up and told him to get his hands off her. Id., at 1043.
`He also testified that he did not know whether he left
`bruises but believed that he had not. Id., at 1044.
`
`The parties also dispute the manner in which Tolan
`responded. Tolan testified in his deposition and during
`the criminal trial that upon seeing his mother being
`
`pushed, id., at 1249, he rose to his knees, id., at 1928.
`
`Edwards and Cotton testified that Tolan rose to his feet.
`——————
` 1The events described here led to Cotton’s criminal indictment in
`
`
` Harris County, Texas, for aggravated assault by a public servant. 713
`F. 3d 299, 303 (CA5 2013). He was acquitted. Ibid. The testimony of
`Tolan’s mother during Cotton’s trial is a part of the record in this civil
`action. Record 2066–2087.
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`3
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`TOLAN v. COTTON
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`Per Curiam
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`Id., at 1051–1052, 1121.
`
`
`Both parties agree that Tolan then exclaimed, from
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`roughly 15 to 20 feet away, 713 F. 3d, at 303, “[G]et your
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`fucking hands off my mom.” Record 1928. The parties
`
`also agree that Cotton then drew his pistol and fired three
`
`
`shots at Tolan. Tolan and his mother testified that these
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`shots came with no verbal warning. Id., at 2019, 2080.
`One of the bullets entered Tolan’s chest, collapsing his
`right lung and piercing his liver. While Tolan survived, he
`
`suffered a life-altering injury that disrupted his budding
`professional baseball career and causes him to experience
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`pain on a daily basis.
`
`
`
`B
`
`In May 2009, Cooper, Tolan, and Tolan’s parents filed
`this suit in the Southern District of Texas, alleging claims
`
`under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983. Tolan claimed,
`among other things, that Cotton had used excessive force
`against him in violation of the Fourth Amendment.2 After
`discovery, Cotton moved for summary judgment, arguing
`that the doctrine of qualified immunity barred the suit.
`That doctrine immunizes government officials from dam-
`ages suits unless their conduct has violated a clearly
`established right.
`
`The District Court granted summary judgment to Cot-
`
`ton. 854 F. Supp. 2d 444 (SD Tex. 2012). It reasoned that
`Cotton’s use of force was not unreasonable and therefore
`
`did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id., at 477–478.
`
`The Fifth Circuit affirmed, but on a different basis. 713
`F. 3d 299. It declined to decide whether Cotton’s actions
`——————
`2The complaint also alleged that the officers’ actions violated the
`
`Equal Protection Clause to the extent they were motivated by Tolan’s
`and Cooper’s race. 854 F. Supp. 2d 444, 465 (SD Tex. 2012). In addi-
`tion, the complaint alleged that Cotton used excessive force against
`Tolan’s mother. Id., at 468. Those claims, which were dismissed, id., at
`465, 470, are not before this Court.
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`Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014)
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`Per Curiam
`violated the Fourth Amendment. Instead, it held that
`even if Cotton’s conduct did violate the Fourth Amend-
`ment, Cotton was entitled to qualified immunity because
`he did not violate a clearly established right. Id., at 306.
`
`
`In reaching this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit began by
`noting that at the time Cotton shot Tolan, “it was . . .
`clearly established that an officer had the right to use
`deadly force if that officer harbored an objective and rea-
`sonable belief that a suspect presented an ‘immediate
`threat to [his] safety.’” Id., at 306 (quoting Deville v.
`
`Marcantel, 567 F. 3d 156, 167 (CA5 2009)). The Court
`
`of Appeals reasoned that Tolan failed to overcome the
`qualified-immunity bar because “an objectively-reasonable
`officer in Sergeant Cotton’s position could have . . . be-
`lieved” that Tolan “presented an ‘immediate threat to the
`safety of the officers.’” 713 F. 3d, at 307.3 In support of
`this conclusion, the court relied on the following facts: the
`front porch had been “dimly-lit”; Tolan’s mother had “re-
` fus[ed] orders to remain quiet and calm”; and Tolan’s
`
`
`
`words had amounted to a “verba[l] threa[t].” Ibid. Most
`critically, the court also relied on the purported fact that
`
`Tolan was “moving to intervene in” Cotton’s handling of
`his mother, id., at 305, and that Cotton therefore could
`reasonably have feared for his life, id., at 307. Accord-
`ingly, the court held, Cotton did not violate clearly estab-
`lished law in shooting Tolan.
`
`The Fifth Circuit denied rehearing en banc. 538 Fed.
`
`Appx. 374 (2013). Three judges voted to grant rehearing.
`Judge Dennis filed a dissent, contending that the panel
`opinion “fail[ed] to address evidence that, when viewed in
`——————
`3Tolan argues that the Fifth Circuit incorrectly analyzed the reason-
`ableness of Sergeant Cotton’s beliefs under the second prong of the
`
`qualified-immunity analysis rather than the first. See Pet. for Cert. 12,
`
`20. Because we rule in Tolan’s favor on the narrow ground that the
`Fifth Circuit erred in its application of the summary judgment stand-
`ard, we express no view as to Tolan’s additional argument.
`
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`6
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`TOLAN v. COTTON
`
` Per Curiam
`
`the light most favorable to the plaintiff, creates genuine
`issues of material fact as to whether an objective officer in
`Cotton’s position could have reasonably and objectively
`believed that [Tolan] posed an immediate, significant
`threat of substantial injury to him.” Id., at 377.
`
`II
`
`A
`
`
`In resolving questions of qualified immunity at sum-
`mary judgment, courts engage in a two-pronged inquiry.
`The first asks whether the facts, “[t]aken in the light most
`
`favorable to the party asserting the injury, . . . show the
`officer’s conduct violated a [federal] right[.]” Saucier v.
`
`
`Katz, 533 U. S. 194, 201 (2001). When a plaintiff alleges
`excessive force during an investigation or arrest, the
`federal right at issue is the Fourth Amendment right
`
`against unreasonable seizures. Graham v. Connor, 490
`U. S. 386, 394 (1989). The inquiry into whether this right
`was violated requires a balancing of “ ‘the nature and
`
`quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth
`Amendment interests against the importance of the gov-
`ernmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.’”
`Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1, 8 (1985); see Graham,
`
`supra, at 396.
`
`The second prong of the qualified-immunity analysis
`asks whether the right in question was “clearly estab-
`
`
`lished” at the time of the violation. Hope v. Pelzer, 536
`U. S. 730, 739 (2002). Governmental actors are “shielded
`
`from liability for civil damages if their actions did not
`violate ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional
`rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”
`Ibid. “[T]he salient question . . . is whether the state of
`
`the law” at the time of an incident provided “fair warning”
`to the defendants “that their alleged [conduct] was uncon-
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`stitutional.” Id., at 741.
`
`
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`Courts have discretion to decide the order in which to
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`Per Curiam
`engage these two prongs. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U. S.
`223, 236 (2009). But under either prong, courts may not
`resolve genuine disputes of fact in favor of the party seek-
`ing summary judgment. See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543
`U. S. 194, 195, n. 2 (2004) (per curiam); Saucier, supra, at
`201; Hope, supra, at 733, n. 1. This is not a rule specific to
`qualified immunity; it is simply an application of the more
`general rule that a “judge’s function” at summary judg-
`ment is not “to weigh the evidence and determine the
`truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a
`
`genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U. S., at 249.
`Summary judgment is appropriate only if “the movant
`shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material
`fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
`law.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(a). In making that determi-
`nation, a court must view the evidence “in the light most
`favorable to the opposing party.” Adickes v. S. H. Kress &
`Co., 398 U. S. 144, 157 (1970); see also Anderson, supra, at
`255.
`
`Our qualified-immunity cases illustrate the importance
`of drawing inferences in favor of the nonmovant, even
`
`when, as here, a court decides only the clearly-established
`prong of the standard.
`In cases alleging unreasonable
`searches or seizures, we have instructed that courts
`should define the “clearly established” right at issue on
`the basis of the “specific context of the case.” Saucier,
`
`supra, at 201; see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S.
`635, 640–641 (1987). Accordingly, courts must take care
`
`not to define a case’s “context” in a manner that imports
`genuinely disputed factual propositions. See Brosseau,
`
`
`
`supra, at 195, 198 (inquiring as to whether conduct violated
`clearly established law “‘in light of the specific context
`
`of the case’” and construing “facts . . . in a light most
`
`favorable to” the nonmovant).
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`7
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`

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`TOLAN v. COTTON
`
`
` Per Curiam
`B
`
`In holding that Cotton’s actions did not violate clearly
`established law, the Fifth Circuit failed to view the evi-
`dence at summary judgment in the light most favorable to
`Tolan with respect to the central facts of this case. By
`failing to credit evidence that contradicted some of its key
`factual conclusions, the court improperly “weigh[ed] the
`evidence” and resolved disputed issues in favor of the
`moving party, Anderson, 477 U. S., at 249.
`
`
`First, the court relied on its view that at the time of the
`shooting, the Tolans’ front porch was “dimly-lit.” 713
`F. 3d, at 307. The court appears to have drawn this as-
`sessment from Cotton’s statements in a deposition that
`
`when he fired at Tolan, the porch was “‘fairly dark,’” and
`lit by a gas lamp that was “‘decorative.’” Id., at 302. In
`his own deposition, however, Tolan’s father was asked
`whether the gas lamp was in fact “more decorative than
`
`illuminating.” Record 1552. He said that it was not. Ibid.
`Moreover, Tolan stated in his deposition that two flood-
`lights shone on the driveway during the incident, id.,
`
`at 2496, and Cotton acknowledged that there were two
`
`motion-activated lights in front of the house. Id., at 1034.
`
`And Tolan confirmed that at the time of the shooting, he
`was “not in darkness.” Id., at 2498–2499.
`
`Second, the Fifth Circuit stated that Tolan’s mother
`“refus[ed] orders to remain quiet and calm,” thereby “com-
`pound[ing]” Cotton’s belief that Tolan “presented an im-
`mediate threat to the safety of the officers.” 713 F. 3d, at
`307 (internal quotation marks omitted). But here, too, the
`court did not credit directly contradictory evidence. Al-
`though the parties agree that Tolan’s mother repeatedly
`informed officers that Tolan was her son, that she lived in
`the home in front of which he had parked, and that the
`vehicle he had been driving belonged to her and her hus-
`band, there is a dispute as to how calmly she provided this
`information. Cotton stated during his deposition that
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` Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014)
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`Per Curiam
` Tolan’s mother was “very agitated” when she spoke to the
`
`officers. Record 1032–1033. By contrast, Tolan’s mother
`testified at Cotton’s criminal trial that she was neither
`“aggravated” nor “agitated.” Id., at 2075, 2077.
`
`Third, the Court concluded that Tolan was “shouting,”
`
`713 F. 3d, at 306, 308, and “verbally threatening” the
`officer, id., at 307, in the moments before the shooting.
`
`The court noted, and the parties agree, that while Cotton
`was grabbing the arm of his mother, Tolan told Cotton,
`
`“[G]et your fucking hands off my mom.” Record 1928. But
`Tolan testified that he “was not screaming.” Id., at 2544.
`
`And a jury could reasonably infer that his words, in con-
`text, did not amount to a statement of intent to inflict
`harm. Cf. United States v. White, 258 F. 3d 374, 383 (CA5
`
`2001) (“A threat imports ‘[a] communicated intent to
`inflict physical or other harm’” (quoting Black’s Law
`Dictionary 1480 (6th ed. 1990))); Morris v. Noe, 672 F. 3d
`1185, 1196 (CA10 2012) (inferring that the words “Why
`was you talking to Mama that way” did not constitute an
`“overt threa[t]”). Tolan’s mother testified in Cotton’s
`criminal trial that he slammed her against a garage door
`with enough force to cause bruising that lasted for days.
`Record 2078–2079. A jury could well have concluded that
`
`a reasonable officer would have heard Tolan’s words not as
`a threat, but as a son’s plea not to continue any assault of
`
`his mother.
`
`Fourth, the Fifth Circuit inferred that at the time of the
`shooting, Tolan was “moving to intervene in Sergeant
`Cotton’s” interaction with his mother. 713 F. 3d, at
`305; see also id., at 308 (characterizing Tolan’s behavior
`as “abruptly attempting to approach Sergeant Cotton,”
`thereby “inflam[ing] an already tense situation”). The
`court appears to have credited Edwards’ account that at
`the time of the shooting, Tolan was on both feet “[i]n a
`crouch” or a “charging position” looking as if he was going
`to move forward. Record 1121–1122. Tolan testified at
`
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`9
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`

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`TOLAN v. COTTON
`
` Per Curiam
`
`trial, however, that he was on his knees when Cotton shot
`him, id., at 1928, a fact corroborated by his mother, id., at
`2081. Tolan also testified in his deposition that he “wasn’t
`going anywhere,” id., at 2502, and emphasized that he did
`not “jump up,” id., at 2544.
`Considered together, these facts lead to the inescapable
`
`conclusion that the court below credited the evidence of
`the party seeking summary judgment and failed properly
`to acknowledge key evidence offered by the party opposing
`that motion. And while “this Court is not equipped to
`correct every perceived error coming from the lower federal
`courts,” Boag v. MacDougall 454 U. S. 364, 366 (1982)
`
`
`(O’Connor, J., concurring), we intervene here because the
`opinion below reflects a clear misapprehension of sum-
`mary judgment standards in light of our precedents. Cf.
`Brosseau, 543 U. S., at 197–198 (summarily reversing
`decision in a Fourth Amendment excessive force case “to
`correct a clear misapprehension of the qualified immunity
`standard”); see also Florida Dept. of Health and Rehabili-
`tative Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S.
`147, 150 (1981) (per curiam) (summarily reversing an
`opinion that could not “be reconciled with the principles
`set out” in this Court’s sovereign immunity jurisprudence).
`
`The witnesses on both sides come to this case with their
`own perceptions, recollections, and even potential biases.
`It is in part for that reason that genuine disputes are
`generally resolved by juries in our adversarial system. By
`weighing the evidence and reaching factual inferences
`contrary to Tolan’s competent evidence, the court below
`
`neglected to adhere to the fundamental principle that at
`judgment stage, reasonable inferences
`the summary
`
`should be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.
`
`Applying that principle here, the court should have
`acknowledged and credited Tolan’s evidence with regard
`to the lighting, his mother’s demeanor, whether he shouted
`words that were an overt threat, and his positioning
`
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` Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014)
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`Per Curiam
`during the shooting. This is not to say, of course, that
`
`these are the only facts that the Fifth Circuit should con-
`sider, or that no other facts might contribute to the rea-
`sonableness of the officer’s actions as a matter of law. Nor
`do we express a view as to whether Cotton’s actions vio-
`lated clearly established law. We instead vacate the Fifth
`Circuit’s judgment so that the court can determine whether,
`when Tolan’s evidence is properly credited and factual
`inferences are reasonably drawn in his favor, Cotton’s
`actions violated clearly established law.
`
`
`*
`*
`*
`The petition for certiorari and the NAACP Legal De-
`
`fense and Educational Fund’s motion to file an amicus
`curiae brief are granted. The judgment of the United
`States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is vacated,
`and the case is remanded for further proceedings con-
`sistent with this opinion.
`
`
`
`It is so ordered.
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`

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`1
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` Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014)
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` ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
` ROBERT R. TOLAN v. JEFFREY WAYNE COTTON
`ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
`
`
`STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
`
`
`
` No. 13–551. Decided May 5, 2014
`
` JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA joins, con-
`curring in the judgment.
`The Court takes two actions. It grants the petition for a
`
`writ of certiorari, and it summarily vacates the judgment
`of the Court of Appeals.
`The granting of a petition for plenary review is not a
`
`decision from which Members of this Court have custom-
`arily registered dissents, and I do not do so here. I note,
`
`however, that the granting of review in this case sets a
`precedent that, if followed in other cases, will very sub-
`stantially alter the Court’s practice. See, e.g., this Court’s
`Rule 10 (“A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted
`
`when the asserted error consists of erroneous factual
`findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of
`law”); S. Shapiro, K. Geller, T. Bishop, E. Hartnett, & D.
`Himmelfarb, Supreme Court Practice §5.12(c)(3), p. 352
`(10th ed. 2013) (“[E]rror correction . . . is outside the
`mainstream of the Court’s functions and . . . not among
`the ‘compelling reasons’ . . . that govern the grant of
`certiorari”).
`
`In my experience, a substantial percentage of the civil
`
`appeals heard each year by the courts of appeals present
`the question whether the evidence in the summary judg-
`ment record is just enough or not quite enough to support
`a grant of summary judgment. The present case falls into
`that very large category. There is no confusion in the
`courts of appeals about the standard to be applied in
`ruling on a summary judgment motion, and the Court of
`Appeals invoked the correct standard here. See 713 F. 3d
`
`
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`

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`2
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`TOLAN v. COTTON
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` ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
`
`
`299, 304 (CA5 2013). Thus, the only issue is whether the
`relevant evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to
`the nonmoving party, is sufficient to support a judgment
`for that party. In the courts of appeals, cases presenting
`this question are utterly routine. There is no question
`that this case is important for the parties, but the same is
`true for a great many other cases that fall into the same
`
`category.
`
`On the merits of the case, while I do not necessarily
`agree in all respects with the Court’s characterization of
`the evidence, I agree that there are genuine issues of
`material fact and that this is a case in which summary
`judgment should not have been granted.
`
`I therefore concur in the judgment.