(Slip Opinion)
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2015
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`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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` Syllabus
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` VOISINE ET AL. v. UNITED STATES
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`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE FIRST CIRCUIT
` No. 14–10154. Argued February 29, 2016—Decided June 27, 2016
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` In an effort to “close [a] dangerous loophole” in the gun control laws,
`United States v. Castleman, 572 U. S. ___, ___, Congress extended the
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`federal prohibition on firearms possession by convicted felons to per-
`sons convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,” 18
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` U. S. C. §922(g)(9). Section 921(a)(33)(A) defines that phrase to in-
`clude a misdemeanor under federal, state, or tribal law, committed
`against a domestic relation that necessarily involves the “use . . . of
`physical force.” In Castleman, this Court held that a knowing or in-
`tentional assault qualifies as such a crime, but left open whether the
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`same was true of a reckless assault.
` Petitioner Stephen Voisine pleaded guilty to assaulting his girl-
`friend in violation of §207 of the Maine Criminal Code, which makes
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`it a misdemeanor to “intentionally, knowingly or recklessly cause[ ]
`bodily injury” to another. When law enforcement officials later inves-
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` tigated Voisine for killing a bald eagle, they learned that he owned a
` rifle. After a background check turned up Voisine’s prior conviction
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` under §207, the Government charged him with violating §922(g)(9).
`Petitioner William Armstrong pleaded guilty to assaulting his wife in
`violation of a Maine domestic violence law making it a misdemeanor
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` to commit an assault prohibited by §207 against a family or house-
`hold member. While searching Armstrong’s home as part of a narcot-
`ics investigation a few years later, law enforcement officers discov-
`ered six guns and a large quantity of ammunition. Armstrong was
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`also charged under §922(g)(9). Both men argued that they were not
`subject to §922(g)(9)’s prohibition because their prior convictions
`could have been based on reckless, rather than knowing or intention-
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`al, conduct and thus did not quality as misdemeanor crimes of do-
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`mestic violence. The District Court rejected those claims, and each
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`VOISINE v. UNITED STATES
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`Syllabus
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`petitioner pleaded guilty. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that
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`“an offense with a mens rea of recklessness may qualify as a ‘misde-
`meanor crime of violence’ under §922(g)(9).” Voisine and Armstrong
`filed a joint petition for certiorari, and their case was remanded for
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`further consideration in light of Castleman. The First Circuit again
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`upheld the convictions on the same ground.
`Held: A reckless domestic assault qualifies as a “misdemeanor crime of
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`domestic violence” under §922(g)(9). Pp. 4–12.
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`(a) That conclusion follows from the statutory text. Nothing in the
`phrase “use. . . of physical force” indicates that §922(g)(9) distin-
`guishes between domestic assaults committed knowingly or inten-
`tionally and those committed recklessly. Dictionaries consistently
`define the word “use” to mean the “act of employing” something. Ac-
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`cordingly, the force involved in a qualifying assault must be volition-
`al; an involuntary motion, even a powerful one, is not naturally de-
`scribed as an active employment of force. See Castleman, 572 U. S.,
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`at ___. But nothing about the definition of “use” demands that the
`person applying force have the purpose or practical certainty that it
`will cause harm, as compared with the understanding that it is sub-
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`stantially likely to do so. Nor does Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U. S. 1,
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`which held that the “use” of force excludes accidents. Reckless con-
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`duct, which requires the conscious disregard of a known risk, is not
`an accident: It involves a deliberate decision to endanger another.
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`The relevant text thus supports prohibiting petitioners, and others
`with similar criminal records, from possessing firearms. Pp. 5–8.
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`(b) So too does the relevant history. Congress enacted §922(g)(9) in
`1996 to bar those domestic abusers convicted of garden-variety as-
`sault or battery misdemeanors—just like those convicted of felonies—
`from owning guns. Then, as now, a significant majority of jurisdic-
`tions—34 States plus the District of Columbia—defined such misde-
`meanor offenses to include the reckless infliction of bodily harm. In
`targeting those laws, Congress thus must have known it was sweep-
`ing in some persons who had engaged in reckless conduct. See, e.g.,
`United States v. Bailey, 9 Pet. 238, 256. Indeed, that was part of the
`point: to apply the federal firearms restriction to those abusers, along
`with all others, covered by the States’ ordinary misdemeanor assault
`laws.
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`Petitioners’ reading risks rendering §922(g)(9) broadly inoperative
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`in the 35 jurisdictions with assault laws extending to recklessness.
`Consider Maine’s law, which criminalizes “intentionally, knowingly
`or recklessly” injuring another. Assuming that statute defines a sin-
`gle crime, petitioners’ view that §921(a)(33)(A) requires at least a
`knowing mens rea would mean that no conviction obtained under
`that law could qualify as a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.”
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`Cite as: 579 U. S. ____ (2016)
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`Syllabus
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`Descamps v. United States, 570 U. S. ___, ___. In Castleman, the
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`Court declined to construe §921(a)(33)(A) so as to render §922(g)(9)
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`ineffective in 10 States. All the more so here, where petitioners’ view
`would jeopardize §922(g)(9)’s force in several times that many.
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`Pp. 8–11.
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`778 F. 3d 176, affirmed.
`KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
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`and KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, and ALITO, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J.,
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` filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR, J., joined as to Parts I
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`and II.
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` Cite as: 579 U. S. ____ (2016)
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`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`_________________
` No. 14–10154
`_________________
`STEPHEN L. VOISINE AND WILLIAM E. ARMSTRONG,
`III, PETITIONERS v. UNITED STATES
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`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
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`APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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`[June 27, 2016]
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`JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
`Federal law prohibits any person convicted of a “misde-
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`meanor crime of domestic violence” from possessing a
`firearm. 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(9). That phrase is defined to
`include any misdemeanor committed against a domestic
`relation that necessarily involves the “use . . . of physical
`force.” §921(a)(33)(A). The question presented here is
`whether misdemeanor assault convictions for reckless (as
`contrasted to knowing or intentional) conduct trigger the
`statutory firearms ban. We hold that they do.
`I
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`Congress enacted §922(g)(9) some 20 years ago to “close
`[a] dangerous loophole” in the gun control laws. United
`States v. Castleman, 572 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at
`2) (quoting United States v. Hayes, 555 U. S. 415, 426
`(2009)). An existing provision already barred convicted
`felons from possessing firearms. See §922(g)(1) (1994 ed.).
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`But many perpetrators of domestic violence are charged
`with misdemeanors rather than felonies, notwithstanding
`the harmfulness of their conduct. See Castleman, 572
`U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 2). And “[f]irearms and domestic
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` VOISINE v. UNITED STATES
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`Opinion of the Court
`strife are a potentially deadly combination.” Hayes, 555
`U. S., at 427. Accordingly, Congress added §922(g)(9) to
`prohibit any person convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of
`domestic violence” from possessing any gun or ammuni-
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`tion with a connection to interstate commerce. And it
`defined that phrase, in §921(a)(33)(A), to include a misde-
`meanor under federal, state, or tribal law, committed by a
`person with a specified domestic relationship with the
`victim, that “has, as an element, the use or attempted use
`of physical force.”
`
`Two Terms ago, this Court considered the scope of that
`definition in a case involving a conviction for a knowing or
`intentional assault. See Castleman, 572 U. S., at ___–___
`(slip op., at 4–13). In Castleman, we initially held that the
`word “force” in §921(a)(33)(A) bears its common-law mean-
`ing, and so is broad enough to include offensive touching.
`See id., at ___ (slip op., at 4). We then determined that
`“the knowing or intentional application of [such] force is a
`‘use’ of force.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 13). But we expressly
`left open whether a reckless assault also qualifies as a
`“use” of force—so that a misdemeanor conviction for such
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`conduct would trigger §922(g)(9)’s firearms ban. See id.,
`at ___, n. 8 (slip op., at 11, n. 8). The two cases before us
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`now raise that issue.
`
`Petitioner Stephen Voisine pleaded guilty in 2004 to
`assaulting his girlfriend in violation of §207 of the Maine
`Criminal Code, which makes it a misdemeanor to “inten-
`tionally, knowingly or recklessly cause[ ] bodily injury or
`offensive physical contact to another person.” Me. Rev.
`Stat. Ann., Tit. 17–A, §207(1)(A). Several years later,
`Voisine again found himself in legal trouble, this time for
`killing a bald eagle. See 16 U. S. C. §668(a). While inves-
`tigating that crime, law enforcement officers learned that
`Voisine owned a rifle. When a background check turned
`up his prior misdemeanor conviction, the Government
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`Cite as: 579 U. S. ____ (2016)
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`Opinion of the Court
` charged him with violating 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(9).1
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`Petitioner William Armstrong pleaded guilty in 2008 to
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`assaulting his wife in violation of a Maine domestic vio-
`lence law making it a misdemeanor to commit an assault
`prohibited by §207 (the general statute under which
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`Voisine was convicted) against a family or household
`member. See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17–A, §207–
`A(1)(A). A few years later, law enforcement officers
`searched Armstrong’s home as part of a narcotics investi-
`gation. They discovered six guns, plus a large quantity of
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`ammunition. Like Voisine, Armstrong was charged under
`§922(g)(9) for unlawfully possessing firearms.
`Both men argued that they were not subject to
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`§922(g)(9)’s prohibition because their prior convictions (as
`the Government conceded) could have been based on
`reckless, rather than knowing or intentional, conduct.
`The District Court rejected those claims. Each petitioner
`then entered a guilty plea conditioned on the right to
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`appeal the District Court’s ruling.
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`The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the
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`two convictions, holding that “an offense with a mens rea
`of recklessness may qualify as a ‘misdemeanor crime of
`violence’ under §922(g)(9).” United States v. Armstrong,
`706 F. 3d 1, 4 (2013); see United States v. Voisine, 495
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`Fed. Appx. 101, 102 (2013) (per curiam). Voisine and
`Armstrong filed a joint petition for certiorari, and shortly
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`after issuing Castleman, this Court (without opinion)
`vacated the First Circuit’s judgments and remanded the
`cases for further consideration in light of that decision.
`——————
`1In United States v. Hayes, 555 U. S. 415, 418 (2009), this Court held
`that a conviction under a general assault statute like §207 (no less than
`one under a law targeting only domestic assault) can serve as the
`predicate offense for a §922(g)(9) prosecution. When that is so, the
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` Government must prove in the later, gun possession case that the
`perpetrator and the victim of the assault had one of the domestic
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`relationships specified in §921(a)(33)(A). See id., at 426.
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`VOISINE v. UNITED STATES
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`Opinion of the Court
`See Armstrong v. United States, 572 U. S. ___ (2014). On
`remand, the Court of Appeals again upheld the convic-
`tions, on the same ground. See 778 F. 3d 176, 177 (2015).
`We granted certiorari, 577 U. S. ___ (2015), to resolve a
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`Circuit split over whether a misdemeanor conviction for
`recklessly assaulting a domestic relation disqualifies an
`individual from possessing a gun under §922(g)(9).2 We
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`now affirm.
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`II
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`The issue before us is whether §922(g)(9) applies to
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`reckless assaults, as it does to knowing or intentional
`ones. To commit an assault recklessly is to take that
`action with a certain state of mind (or mens rea)—in the
`dominant formulation, to “consciously disregard[ ]” a
`substantial risk that the conduct will cause harm to an-
`other. ALI, Model Penal Code §2.02(2)(c) (1962); Me. Rev.
`Stat. Ann., Tit. 17–A, §35(3) (Supp. 2015) (adopting that
`definition); see Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U. S. 825, 836–837
`(1994) (noting that a person acts recklessly only when he
`disregards a substantial risk of harm “of which he is
`aware”). For purposes of comparison, to commit an as-
`sault knowingly or intentionally (the latter, to add yet
`another adverb, sometimes called “purposefully”) is to act
`with another state of mind respecting that act’s conse-
`quences—in the first case, to be “aware that [harm] is
`practically certain” and, in the second, to have that result
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`as a “conscious object.” Model Penal Code §§2.02 (2)(a)–
`(b); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17–A, §§35(1)–(2).
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`Statutory text and background alike lead us to conclude
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`that a reckless domestic assault qualifies as a “misde-
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`meanor crime of domestic violence” under §922(g)(9).
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`——————
` 2Compare 778 F. 3d 176 (CA1 2015) (case below) with United States
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`v. Nobriga, 474 F. 3d 561 (CA9 2006) (per curiam) (holding that a
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` conviction for a reckless domestic assault does not trigger §922(g)(9)’s
`ban).
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`Cite as: 579 U. S. ____ (2016)
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`Opinion of the Court
`Congress defined that phrase to include crimes that neces-
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`sarily involve the “use . . . of physical force.” §921(a)
`(33)(A). Reckless assaults, no less than the knowing
`or intentional ones we addressed in Castleman, satisfy
`that definition. Further, Congress enacted §922(g)(9) in
`order to prohibit domestic abusers convicted under run-of-
`the-mill misdemeanor assault and battery laws from
`possessing guns. Because fully two-thirds of such state
`laws extend to recklessness, construing §922(g)(9) to ex-
`clude crimes committed with that state of mind would
`substantially undermine the provision’s design.
`A
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`Nothing in the word “use”—which is the only statutory
`language either party thinks relevant—indicates that
`§922(g)(9) applies exclusively to knowing or intentional
`domestic assaults. Recall that under §921(a)(33)(A), an
`offense counts as a “misdemeanor crime of domestic vio-
`lence” only if it has, as an element, the “use” of force.
`Dictionaries consistently define the noun “use” to mean
`the “act of employing” something. Webster’s New Interna-
`tional Dictionary 2806 (2d ed. 1954) (“[a]ct of employing
`anything”); Random House Dictionary of the English
`Language 2097 (2d ed. 1987) (“act of employing, using, or
`putting into service”); Black’s Law Dictionary 1541 (6th
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`ed. 1990) (“[a]ct of employing,” “application”).3 On that
`common understanding, the force involved in a qualifying
`assault must be volitional; an involuntary motion, even a
`powerful one, is not naturally described as an active em-
`——————
`3In cases stretching back over a century, this Court has followed suit,
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`although usually discussing the verb form of the word. See, e.g., Bailey
`v. United States, 516 U. S. 137, 145 (1995) (to use means “ ‘[t]o convert
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`to one’s service,’ ‘to employ,’ [or] ‘to avail oneself of’ ”); Smith v. United
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`States, 508 U. S. 223, 229 (1993) (to use means “ ‘[t]o convert to one’s
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`service’ or ‘to employ’ ”); Astor v. Merritt, 111 U. S. 202, 213 (1884) (to
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`use means “to employ [or] to derive service from”).
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` VOISINE v. UNITED STATES
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`Opinion of the Court
`ployment of force. See Castleman, 572 U. S., at ___ (slip
`op., at 13) (“[T]he word ‘use’ conveys the idea that the
`thing used (here, ‘physical force’) has been made the user’s
`instrument” (some internal quotation marks omitted)).
`But the word “use” does not demand that the person ap-
`plying force have the purpose or practical certainty that it
`will cause harm, as compared with the understanding that
`it is substantially likely to do so. Or, otherwise said, that
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`word is indifferent as to whether the actor has the mental
`state of intention, knowledge, or recklessness with respect
`to the harmful consequences of his volitional conduct.
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`Consider a couple of examples to see the ordinary mean-
`
`ing of the word “use” in this context. If a person with
`soapy hands loses his grip on a plate, which then shatters
`and cuts his wife, the person has not “use[d]” physical
`force in common parlance. But now suppose a person
`throws a plate in anger against the wall near where his
`wife is standing. That hurl counts as a “use” of force even
`if the husband did not know for certain (or have as an
`object), but only recognized a substantial risk, that a
`shard from the plate would ricochet and injure his wife.
`Similarly, to spin out a scenario discussed at oral argu-
`ment, if a person lets slip a door that he is trying to hold
`open for his girlfriend, he has not actively employed
`(“used”) force even though the result is to hurt her. But if
`he slams the door shut with his girlfriend following close
`behind, then he has done so—regardless of whether he
`thinks it absolutely sure or only quite likely that he will
`catch her fingers in the jamb. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 10–11
`(counsel for petitioners acknowledging that this example
`involves “the use of physical force”). Once again, the word
`“use” does not exclude from §922(g)(9)’s compass an act of
`force carried out in conscious disregard of its substantial
`risk of causing harm.
`And contrary to petitioners’ view, nothing in Leocal v.
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`Ashcroft, 543 U. S. 1 (2004), suggests a different conclu-
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`Opinion of the Court
`sion—i.e., that “use” marks a dividing line between reck-
`less and knowing conduct. See Brief for Petitioners 18–22.
`In that decision, this Court addressed a statutory defini-
`tion similar to §921(a)(33)(A): there, “the use . . . of physi-
`cal force against the person or property of another.” 18
`U. S. C. §16. That provision excludes “merely accidental”
`conduct, Leocal held, because “it is [not] natural to say
`that a person actively employs physical force against
`another person by accident.” 543 U. S., at 9. For example,
`the Court stated, one “would not ordinarily say a person
`‘use[s] . . . physical force against’ another by stumbling
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`and falling into him.” Ibid. That reasoning fully accords
`with our analysis here. Conduct like stumbling (or in our
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`hypothetical, dropping a plate) is a true accident, and so
`too the injury arising from it; hence the difficulty of de-
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`scribing that conduct as the “active employment” of force.
`Ibid. But the same is not true of reckless behavior—acts
`undertaken with awareness of their substantial risk of
`causing injury (in our contrasting hypo, hurling the plate).
`The harm such conduct causes is the result of a deliberate
`decision to endanger another—no more an “accident” than
`if the “substantial risk” were “practically certain.” See
`supra, at 4 (comparing reckless and knowing acts). And
`indeed, Leocal itself recognized the distinction between
`accidents and recklessness, specifically reserving the issue
`whether the definition in §16 embraces reckless conduct,
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`see 543 U. S., at 13—as we now hold §921(a)(33)(A) does.4
`——————
`4Like Leocal, our decision today concerning §921(a)(33)(A)’s scope
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`does not resolve whether §16 includes reckless behavior. Courts have
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` sometimes given those two statutory definitions divergent readings in
`light of differences in their contexts and purposes, and we do not
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` foreclose that possibility with respect to their required mental states.
` Cf. United States v. Castleman, 572 U. S. ___, ___, n. 4 (2014) (slip op.,
`
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` at 6, n. 4) (interpreting “force” in §921(a)(33)(A) to encompass any
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`offensive touching, while acknowledging that federal appeals courts
`have usually read the same term in §16 to reach only “violent force”).
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`All we say here is that Leocal’s exclusion of accidental conduct from a
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`VOISINE v. UNITED STATES
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`Opinion of the Court
`In sum, Congress’s definition of a “misdemeanor crime
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`of violence” contains no exclusion for convictions based on
`reckless behavior. A person who assaults another reck-
`lessly “use[s]” force, no less than one who carries out that
`same action knowingly or intentionally. The relevant text
`thus supports prohibiting petitioners, and others with
`similar criminal records, from possessing firearms.
`B
`So too does the relevant history. As explained earlier,
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`Congress enacted §922(g)(9) in 1996 to bar those domestic
`abusers convicted of garden-variety assault or battery
`misdemeanors—just like those convicted of felonies—from
`owning guns. See supra, at 1–2; Castleman, 572 U. S., at
`___, ___ (slip op., at 2, 6); Hayes, 555 U. S., at 426–427.
`
`Then, as now, a significant majority of jurisdictions—34
`States plus the District of Columbia—defined such mis-
`demeanor offenses to include the reckless infliction of
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`bodily harm. See Brief for United States 7a–19a (collect-
`ing statutes). That agreement was no coincidence. Sev-
`eral decades earlier, the Model Penal Code had taken the
`position that a mens rea of recklessness should generally
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`suffice to establish criminal liability, including for assault.
`See §2.02(3), Comments 4–5, at 243–244 (“purpose,
`knowledge, and recklessness are properly the basis for”
`such liability); §211.1 (defining assault to include “pur-
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`posely, knowingly, or recklessly caus[ing] bodily injury”).
`States quickly incorporated that view into their misde-
`meanor assault and battery statutes. So in linking
`§922(g)(9) to those laws, Congress must have known it was
`sweeping in some persons who had engaged in reckless
`conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 9 Pet. 238, 256
`(1835) (Story, J.) (“Congress must be presumed to have
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`——————
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`definition hinging on the “use” of force is in no way inconsistent with
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`our inclusion of reckless conduct in a similarly worded provision.
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`Opinion of the Court
`legislated under this known state of the laws”). And
`indeed, that was part of the point: to apply firearms re-
`strictions to those abusers, along with all others, whom
`the States’ ordinary misdemeanor assault laws covered.
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`What is more, petitioners’ reading risks rendering
`§922(g)(9) broadly inoperative in the 35 jurisdictions with
`assault laws extending to recklessness—that is, inapplica-
`ble even to persons who commit that crime knowingly or
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`intentionally. Consider Maine’s statute, which (in typical
`fashion) makes it a misdemeanor to “intentionally, know-
`ingly or recklessly” injure another. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.,
`Tit. 17–A, §207(1)(A). Assuming that provision defines a
`single crime (which happens to list alternative mental
`states)—and accepting petitioners’ view that §921(a)
`(33)(A) requires at least a knowing mens rea—then,
`under Descamps v. United States, 570 U. S. ___ (2013),
`no conviction obtained under Maine’s statute could
`qualify as a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.”
`See id., at ___ (slip op., at 5) (If a state crime “sweeps more
`broadly” than the federally defined one, a conviction for
`the state offense “cannot count” as a predicate, no matter
`
`what mens rea the defendant actually had). So in the 35
`jurisdictions like Maine, petitioners’ reading risks allow-
`ing domestic abusers of all mental states to evade
`§922(g)(9)’s firearms ban. In Castleman, we declined to
`construe §921(a)(33)(A) so as to render §922(g)(9) ineffec-
`tive in 10 States. See 572 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9). All
`the more so here, where petitioners’ view would jeopardize
`
`§922(g)(9)’s force in several times that many.
`
`Petitioners respond that we should ignore the assault
`and battery laws actually on the books when Congress
`enacted §922(g)(9). In construing the statute, they urge,
`we should look instead to how the common law defined
`those crimes in an earlier age. See Brief for Petitioners
`13–15. And that approach, petitioners claim, would neces-
`sitate reversing their convictions because the common law
`
`
`
`
`
`9
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`
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`

`
`10
`
`
`
`VOISINE v. UNITED STATES
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
` “required a mens rea greater than recklessness.” Id., at
`17.
`But we see no reason to wind the clock back so far.
`
`
`Once again: Congress passed §922(g)(9) to take guns out of
`the hands of abusers convicted under the misdemeanor
`assault laws then in general use in the States. See supra,
`at 1–2, 8. And by that time, a substantial majority of
`jurisdictions, following the Model Penal Code’s lead, had
`abandoned the common law’s approach to mens rea in
`
`drafting and interpreting their assault and battery stat-
`utes.
`Indeed, most had gone down that road decades
`before. That was the backdrop against which Congress
`was legislating. Nothing suggests that, in enacting
`§922(g)(9), Congress wished to look beyond that real world
`to a common-law precursor that had largely expired. To
`the contrary, such an approach would have undermined
`Congress’s aim by tying the ban on firearms possession
`not to the laws under which abusers are prosecuted but
`instead to a legal anachronism.5
`
`And anyway, we would not know how to resolve whether
`
`
`recklessness sufficed for a battery conviction at common
`law. Recklessness was not a word in the common law’s
`standard lexicon, nor an idea in its conceptual framework;
`——————
`5As petitioners observe, this Court looked to the common law in Cas-
`tleman to define the term “force” in §921(a)(33)(A). See 572 U. S., at
`___–___ (slip op., at 4–5); Brief for Petitioners 13–15. But we did so for
`reasons not present here. “Force,” we explained, was “a common-law
`term of art” with an “established common-law meaning.” 572 U. S., at
`___ (slip op., at 5) (internal quotation marks omitted). And we thought
`that Congress meant to adhere to that meaning given its “perfect[ ]” fit
`with §922(g)(9)’s goal. Ibid. By contrast, neither party pretends that
`the statutory term “use”—the only one identified as potentially relevant
`here—has any particular common-law definition. And as explained
`above, the watershed change in how state legislatures thought of mens
`rea after the Model Penal Code makes the common law a bad match for
`
`the ordinary misdemeanor assault and battery statutes in Congress’s
`sightline.
`
`
`
`
`
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`

`
`
`11
`
`
`Cite as: 579 U. S. ____ (2016)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`only in the mid- to late-1800’s did courts begin to address
`reckless behavior in those terms. See Hall, Assault and
`Battery by the Reckless Motorist, 31 J. Crim. L. & C. 133,
`138–139 (1940). The common law traditionally used a
`variety of overlapping and, frankly, confusing phrases to
`describe culpable mental states—among them, specific
`intent, general intent, presumed intent, willfulness, and
`malice. See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S.
`
`246, 252 (1952); Model Penal Code §2.02, Comment 1, at
`230. Whether and where conduct that we would today
`describe as reckless fits into that obscure scheme is any-
`one’s guess: Neither petitioners’ citations, nor the Gov-
`ernment’s competing ones, have succeeded in resolving
`that counterfactual question. And that indeterminacy
`confirms our conclusion that Congress had no thought of
`incorporating the common law’s treatment of mens rea
`into §921(a)(33)(A). That provision instead corresponds to
`the ordinary misdemeanor assault and battery laws used
`to prosecute domestic abuse, regardless of how their men-
`tal state requirements might—or, then again, might not—
`
`conform to the common law’s.6
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`——————
`6Petitioners make two last arguments for reading §921(a)(33)(A)
`their way, but they do not persuade us. First, petitioners contend that
`we should adopt their construction to avoid creating a question about
`whether the Second Amendment permits imposing a lifetime firearms
` ban on a person convicted of a misdemeanor involving reckless conduct.
`
`See Brief for Petitioners 32–36. And second, petitioners assert that the
`
`
` rule of lenity requires accepting their view. See id., at 31–32. But
` neither of those arguments can succeed if the statute is clear. See
`
`Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U. S. 206, 212 (1998)
`(noting that “the doctrine of constitutional doubt . . . enters in only
`where a statute is susceptible of two constructions” (internal quotation
`
`
` marks omitted)); Abramski v. United States, 573 U. S. ___, ___, n. 10
`
` (2014) (slip op., at 18, n. 10) (stating that the rule of lenity applies only
`
`in cases of genuine ambiguity). And as we have shown, §921(a)(33)(A)
`
` plainly encompasses reckless assaults.
`
`
`
`
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`
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`

`
`
`
` VOISINE v. UNITED STATES
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`
` III
`
`The federal ban on firearms possession applies to any
`
`
` person with a prior misdemeanor conviction for the “use
`force” against a domestic relation.
`. . . of physical
`§921(a)(33)(A). That language, naturally read, encom-
`passes acts of force undertaken recklessly—i.e., with
`conscious disregard of a substantial risk of harm. And the
`state-law backdrop to that provision, which included
`misdemeanor assault statutes covering reckless conduct in
`a significant majority of jurisdictions, indicates that Con-
`
`gress meant just what it said. Each petitioner’s possession
`
`
`of a gun, following a conviction under Maine law for abus-
`ing a domestic partner, therefore violates §922(g)(9). We
`accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
`
`
`12
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`
`
`It is so ordered.
`
`
`

`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 579 U. S. ____ (2016)
`
` THOMAS, J., dissenting
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`1
`
`_________________
` No. 14–10154
`_________________
`STEPHEN L. VOISINE AND WILLIAM E. ARMSTRONG,
`III, PETITIONERS v. UNITED STATES
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`
`APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
`
`[June 27, 2016]
`
`JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR joins
`
`as to Parts I and II, dissenting.
`Federal law makes it a crime for anyone previously
`
`convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” to
`possess a firearm “in or affecting commerce.” 18 U. S. C.
`§922(g)(9). A “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence”
`includes “an offense that . . . has, as an element, the use or
`attempted use of physical force . . . committed by [certain
`close family members] of the victim.” §921(a)(33)(A)(ii).
`In this case, petitioners were convicted under §922(g)(9)
`because they possessed firearms and had prior convictions
`for assault under Maine’s statute prohibiting “intention-
`ally, knowingly or recklessly caus[ing] bodily injury or offen-
`sive physical contact to another person.” Me. Rev. Stat.
`Ann., Tit. 17–A, §207(1)(A) (2006). The question presented
`is whether a prior conviction under §207 has, as an
`element, the “use of physical force,” such that the convic-
`tion can strip someone of his right to possess a firearm. In
`my view, §207 does not qualify as such an offense, and the
`majority errs in holding otherwise. I respectfully dissent.
`I
`
`To qualify as a “‘misdemeanor crime of domestic vio-
`lence,’” the Maine assault statute must have as an ele-
`ment the “use of physical force.” §921(a)(33)(A)(ii). Be-
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`
`
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`

`
`
`
` VOISINE v. UNITED STATES
`
` THOMAS, J., dissenting
`
`
`cause mere recklessness is sufficient to sustain a convic-
`tion under