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` OCTOBER TERM, 2014
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`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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` Syllabus
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`WALKER, CHAIRMAN, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF
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`MOTOR VEHICLES BOARD, ET AL. v. TEXAS
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`DIVISION, SONS OF CONFEDERATE VETERANS,
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`INC., ET AL.
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`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
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`THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
` No. 14–144. Argued March 23, 2015—Decided June 18, 2015
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`Texas offers automobile owners a choice between general-issue and
`specialty license plates. Those who want the State to issue a particu-
`lar specialty plate may propose a plate design, comprising a slogan, a
`graphic, or both. If the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles Board
`approves the design, the State will make it available for display on
`vehicles registered in Texas. Here, the Texas Division of the Sons of
`Confederate Veterans and its officers (collectively SCV) filed suit
`against the Chairman and members of the Board (collectively Board),
`arguing that the Board’s rejection of SCV’s proposal for a specialty
`plate design featuring a Confederate battle flag violated the Free
`Speech Clause. The District Court entered judgment for the Board,
`but the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Texas’s specialty license
`plate designs are private speech and that the Board engaged in con-
`stitutionally forbidden viewpoint discrimination when it refused to
`approve SCV’s design.
`Held: Texas’s specialty license plate designs constitute government
`speech, and thus Texas was entitled to refuse to issue plates featur-
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`ing SCV’s proposed design. Pp. 5–18.
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`(a) When government speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech
`Clause from determining the content of what it says. Pleasant Grove
`City v. Summum, 555 U. S. 460, 467–468. A government is generally
`entitled to promote a program, espouse a policy, or take a position.
`Were the Free Speech Clause interpreted otherwise, “it is not easy to
`imagine how government would function.” Id., at 468. That is not to
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`WALKER v. TEXAS DIV., SONS OF
`CONFEDERATE VETERANS, INC.
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`Syllabus
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`2
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`say that a government’s ability to express itself is without restriction.
`Constitutional and statutory provisions outside of the Free Speech
`Clause may limit government speech, and the Free Speech Clause it-
`self may constrain the government’s speech if, for example, the gov-
`ernment seeks to compel private persons to convey the government’s
`speech. Pp. 5–6.
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`(b) This Court’s precedents regarding government speech provide
`the appropriate framework through which to approach the case.
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`Pp. 6–17.
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`(1) The same analysis the Court used in Summum—to conclude
`that a city “accepting a privately donated monument and placing it
`on city property” was engaging in government speech, 555 U. S., at
`464—leads to the conclusion that government speech is at issue here.
`First, history shows that States, including Texas, have long used li-
`cense plates to convey government speech, e.g., slogans urging action,
`promoting tourism, and touting local industries. Cf. id., at 470. Se-
`cond, Texas license plate designs “are often closely identified in the
`public mind with the [State].” Id., at 472. Each plate is a govern-
`ment article serving the governmental purposes of vehicle registra-
`tion and identification. The governmental nature of the plates is
`clear from their faces: the State places the name “TEXAS” in large
`letters across the top of every plate. Texas also requires Texas vehi-
`cle owners to display license plates, issues every Texas plate, and
`owns all of the designs on its plates. The plates are, essentially, gov-
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`ernment IDs, and ID issuers “typically do not permit” their IDs to
`contain “message[s] with which they do not wish to be associated,”
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`id., at 471. Third, Texas maintains direct control over the messages
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`conveyed on its specialty plates, by giving the Board final approval
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`over each design. Like the city government in Summum, Texas “has
`effectively controlled the messages [conveyed] by exercising final ap-
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`proval authority over their selection.” Id., at 473. These considera-
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`tions, taken together, show that Texas’s specialty plates are similar
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`enough to the monuments in Summum to call for the same result.
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`Pp. 7–12.
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`(2) Forum analysis, which applies to government restrictions on
`purely private speech occurring on government property, Cornelius v.
`NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788, 800, is not
`appropriate when the State is speaking on its own behalf. The par-
`ties agree that Texas’s specialty license plates are not a traditional
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`public forum. Further, Texas’s policies and the nature of its license
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`plates indicate that the State did not intend its specialty plates to
`serve as either a designated public forum—where “government prop-
`erty . . . not traditionally . . . a public forum is intentionally opened
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`Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)
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`Syllabus
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`up for that purpose,” Summum, supra, at 469—or a limited public fo-
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`rum—where a government “reserv[es a forum] for certain groups or
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`for the discussion of certain topics,” Rosenberger v. Rector and Visi-
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`tors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 829. The State exercises final au-
`thority over the messages that may be conveyed by its specialty
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`plates, it takes ownership of each specialty plate design, and it has
`traditionally used its plates for government speech. These features of
`Texas specialty plates militate against a determination that Texas
`has created a public forum. Finally, the plates are not a nonpublic
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`forum, where the “government is . . . a proprietor, managing its in-
`ternal operations.” International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.
`v. Lee, 505 U. S. 672, 678–679. The fact that private parties take
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`part in the design and propagation of a message does not extinguish
`the governmental nature of the message or transform the govern-
`ment’s role into that of a mere forum provider. See Summum, supra,
`at 470–471. Nor does Texas’s requirement that vehicle owners pay
`annual fees for specialty plates mean that the plates are a forum for
`private speech. And this case does not resemble other nonpublic fo-
`rum cases. Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U. S.
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`37, 48–49; Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U. S. 298; and Cornelius,
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`supra, at 804–806, distinguished. Pp. 13–17.
`(c) The determination that Texas’s specialty license plate designs
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`are government speech does not mean that the designs do not also
`implicate the free speech rights of private persons. The Court has
`acknowledged that drivers who display a State’s selected license
`plate designs convey the messages communicated through those de-
`signs. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705, 717, n. 15. The Court
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`has also recognized that the First Amendment stringently limits a
`State’s authority to compel a private party to express a view with
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`which the private party disagrees. Just as Texas cannot require SCV
`to convey “the State’s ideological message,” id., at 715, SCV cannot
`force Texas to include a Confederate battle flag on its specialty li-
`cense plates. Pp. 17–18.
`759 F. 3d 388, reversed.
`BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS,
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`GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed a dis-
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`senting opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SCALIA and KENNEDY, JJ.,
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`joined.
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` Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)
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`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`_________________
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` No. 14–144
`_________________
`JOHN WALKER, III, CHAIRMAN, TEXAS DEPARTMENT
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` OF MOTOR VEHICLES BOARD, ET AL., PETITIONERS
`v. TEXAS DIVISION, SONS OF CONFEDERATE
`VETERANS, INC., ET AL.
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`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
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`APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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`[June 18, 2015]
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` JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.
`Texas offers automobile owners a choice between ordi-
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`nary and specialty license plates. Those who want the
`State to issue a particular specialty plate may propose a
`plate design, comprising a slogan, a graphic, or (most
`commonly) both. If the Texas Department of Motor Vehi-
`cles Board approves the design, the State will make it
`available for display on vehicles registered in Texas.
`In this case, the Texas Division of the Sons of Confeder-
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`ate Veterans proposed a specialty license plate design
`featuring a Confederate battle flag. The Board rejected
`the proposal. We must decide whether that rejection
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`violated the Constitution’s free speech guarantees. See
`Amdts. 1, 14. We conclude that it did not.
`I
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`A
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`Texas law requires all motor vehicles operating on the
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`State’s roads to display valid license plates. See Tex.
`Transp. Code Ann. §§502.001 (West Supp. 2014), 504.001
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`WALKER v. TEXAS DIV., SONS OF
`CONFEDERATE VETERANS, INC.
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`Opinion of the Court
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` (2013), 504.943 (Supp. 2014). And Texas makes available
`several kinds of plates. Drivers may choose to display the
`State’s general-issue license plates. See Texas Dept. of
`Motor Vehicles, Motor Vehicle Registration Manual 9.1
`(Apr. 2015). Each of these plates contains the word
`“Texas,” a license plate number, a silhouette of the
`State, a graphic of the Lone Star, and the slogan
`“The Lone Star State.” Texas Dept. of Motor Vehicles, The
`Texas Classic FAQs
`(July 16, 2012), online at
`http://www.txdmv.gov/motorists/license-plates (all Inter-
`net materials as visited June 16, 2015, and available in
`Clerk of Court’s case file). In the alternative, drivers may
`choose from an assortment of specialty license plates.
`§504.008(b) (West 2013). Each of these plates contains the
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`word “Texas,” a license plate number, and one of a selec-
`tion of designs prepared by the State. See ibid.; Specialty
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`License Plates, http://www.txdmv.gov/motorists/license-
`plates/specialty-license-plates (displaying available Texas
`specialty plates); Create a Plate: Your Design,
`http://www.myplates.com/BackgroundOnly (same). Finally,
`Texas law provides for personalized plates (also known
`as vanity plates). 43 Tex. Admin. Code §217.45(c)(7)
`(2015). Pursuant to the personalization program, a vehi-
`cle owner may request a particular alphanumeric pattern
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`for use as a plate number, such as “BOB” or “TEXPL8.”
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`Here we are concerned only with the second category of
`plates, namely specialty license plates, not with the per-
`sonalization program. Texas offers vehicle owners a va-
`riety of specialty plates, generally for an annual fee. See
`§217.45(b)(2). And Texas selects the designs for specialty
`plates through three distinct processes.
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`First, the state legislature may specifically call for the
`development of a specialty license plate. See Tex. Transp.
`Code §§504.602–504.663 (West 2013 and Supp. 2014). The
`legislature has enacted statutes authorizing, for example,
`plates that say “Keep Texas Beautiful” and “Mothers
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` Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)
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`Opinion of the Court
`Against Drunk Driving,” plates that “honor” the Texas
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`citrus industry, and plates that feature an image of the
`World Trade Center towers and the words “Fight Terror-
`ism.” See §§504.602, 504.608, 504.626, 504.647.
`Second, the Board may approve a specialty plate design
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`proposal that a state-designated private vendor has
`created at the request of an individual or organization.
`See §§504.6011(a), 504.851(a); 43 Tex. Admin. Code
`§217.52(b). Among the plates created through the private-
`vendor process are plates promoting the “Keller Indians”
`and plates with the slogan “Get it Sold with RE/MAX.”
`Third, the Board “may create new specialty license
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`plates on its own initiative or on receipt of an application
`from a” nonprofit entity seeking to sponsor a specialty
`plate. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§504.801(a), (b). A non-
`profit must include in its application “a draft design of the
`specialty
`license plate.” 43 Tex. Admin. Code
`§217.45(i)(2)(C). And Texas law vests in the Board author-
`ity to approve or to disapprove an application. See
`§217.45(i)(7). The relevant statute says that the Board
`“may refuse to create a new specialty license plate” for a
`number of reasons, for example “if the design might be
`offensive to any member of the public . . . or for any other
`reason established by rule.” Tex. Transp. Code Ann.
`§504.801(c). Specialty plates that the Board has sanc-
`tioned through this process include plates featuring the
`words “The Gator Nation,” together with the Florida
`Gators logo, and plates featuring the logo of Rotary Inter-
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`national and the words “SERVICE ABOVE SELF.”
`B
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`In 2009, the Sons of Confederate Veterans, Texas Divi-
`sion (a nonprofit entity), applied to sponsor a specialty
`license plate through this last-mentioned process. SCV’s
`application included a draft plate design. See Appendix,
`infra. At the bottom of the proposed plate were the words
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`WALKER v. TEXAS DIV., SONS OF
`CONFEDERATE VETERANS, INC.
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`Opinion of the Court
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`“SONS OF CONFEDERATE VETERANS.” At the side
`was the organization’s logo, a square Confederate battle
`flag framed by the words “Sons of Confederate Veterans
`1896.” A faint Confederate battle flag appeared in the back-
`ground on the lower portion of the plate. Additionally,
`in the middle of the plate was the license plate number,
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`and at the top was the State’s name and silhouette. The
`Board’s predecessor denied this application.
`In 2010, SCV renewed its application before the Board.
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`The Board invited public comment on its website and at
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`an open meeting. After considering the responses, includ-
`ing a number of letters sent by elected officials who op-
`posed the proposal, the Board voted unanimously against
`issuing the plate. The Board explained that it had found
`“it necessary to deny th[e] plate design application, specif-
`ically the confederate flag portion of the design, because
`public comments ha[d] shown that many members of the
`general public find the design offensive, and because such
`comments are reasonable.” App. 64. The Board added
`“that a significant portion of the public associate the con-
`federate flag with organizations advocating expressions of
`hate directed toward people or groups that is demeaning
`to those people or groups.” Id., at 65.
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`In 2012, SCV and two of its officers (collectively SCV)
`brought this lawsuit against the chairman and members
`of the Board (collectively Board). SCV argued that the
`Board’s decision violated the Free Speech Clause of the
`First Amendment, and it sought an injunction requiring
`the Board to approve the proposed plate design. The
`District Court entered judgment for the Board. A divided
`panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re-
`versed. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., v.
`Vandergriff, 759 F. 3d 388 (2014). It held that Texas’s
`specialty license plate designs are private speech and that
`the Board, in refusing to approve SCV’s design, engaged in
`constitutionally forbidden viewpoint discrimination. The
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` Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)
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`Opinion of the Court
`dissenting judge argued that Texas’s specialty license
`plate designs are government speech, the content of which
`the State is free to control.
`We granted the Board’s petition for certiorari, and we
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`now reverse.
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`5
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`II
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`When government speaks, it is not barred by the Free
`Speech Clause from determining the content of what it
`says. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U. S. 460,
`467–468 (2009). That freedom in part reflects the fact
`that it is the democratic electoral process that first and
`foremost provides a check on government speech. See
`Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth,
`529 U. S. 217, 235 (2000). Thus, government statements
`(and government actions and programs that take the form
`of speech) do not normally trigger the First Amendment
`rules designed to protect the marketplace of ideas. See
`Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Assn., 544 U. S. 550, 559
`(2005). Instead, the Free Speech Clause helps produce
`informed opinions among members of the public, who are
`then able to influence the choices of a government that,
`through words and deeds, will reflect its electoral man-
`date. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 369
`(1931) (observing that “our constitutional system” seeks to
`maintain “the opportunity for free political discussion to
`the end that government may be responsive to the will of
`the people”).
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`Were the Free Speech Clause interpreted otherwise,
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`government would not work. How could a city government
`create a successful recycling program if officials, when
`writing householders asking them to recycle cans and
`bottles, had to include in the letter a long plea from the
`local trash disposal enterprise demanding the contrary?
`How could a state government effectively develop pro-
`grams designed to encourage and provide vaccinations, if
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`WALKER v. TEXAS DIV., SONS OF
`CONFEDERATE VETERANS, INC.
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`Opinion of the Court
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`officials also had to voice the perspective of those who
`oppose this type of immunization?
`“[I]t is not easy to
`imagine how government could function if it lacked th[e]
`freedom” to select the messages it wishes to convey.
`
`Summum, supra, at 468.
`We have therefore refused “[t]o hold that the Govern-
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`ment unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of
`viewpoint when it chooses to fund a program dedicated to
`advance certain permissible goals, because the program in
`advancing those goals necessarily discourages alternative
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`goals.” Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U. S. 173, 194 (1991). We
`have pointed out that a contrary holding “would render
`numerous Government programs constitutionally sus-
`pect.” Ibid. Cf. Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U. S. 1, 12–
`13 (1990) (“If every citizen were to have a right to insist
`that no one paid by public funds express a view with
`which he disagreed, debate over issues of great concern to
`the public would be limited to those in the private sector,
`and the process of government as we know it radically
`transformed”). And we have made clear that “the govern-
`ment can speak for itself.” Southworth, supra, at 229.
`That is not to say that a government’s ability to express
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`itself is without restriction. Constitutional and statutory
`provisions outside of the Free Speech Clause may limit
`government speech. Summum, supra, at 468. And the
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`Free Speech Clause itself may constrain the government’s
`speech if, for example, the government seeks to compel
`private persons to convey the government’s speech. But,
`as a general matter, when the government speaks it is
`entitled to promote a program, to espouse a policy, or to
`take a position. In doing so, it represents its citizens and
`it carries out its duties on their behalf.
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`III
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`In our view, specialty license plates issued pursuant to
`Texas’s statutory scheme convey government speech. Our
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` Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)
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`Opinion of the Court
`reasoning rests primarily on our analysis in Summum, a
`recent case that presented a similar problem. We con-
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`clude here, as we did there, that our precedents regarding
`government speech (and not our precedents regarding
`forums for private speech) provide the appropriate frame-
`work through which to approach the case. See 555 U. S.,
`at 464.
`
`A
`In Summum, we considered a religious organization’s
`request to erect in a 2.5-acre city park a monument setting
`forth the organization’s religious tenets. See id., at 464–
`465. In the park were 15 other permanent displays. Id.,
`at 464. At least 11 of these—including a wishing well, a
`September 11 monument, a historic granary, the city’s
`first fire station, and a Ten Commandments monument—
`had been donated to the city by private entities. Id., at
`464–465. The religious organization argued that the Free
`Speech Clause required the city to display the organiza-
`tion’s proposed monument because, by accepting a broad
`range of permanent exhibitions at the park, the city had
`created a forum for private speech in the form of monu-
`ments. Brief for Respondent in Pleasant Grove City v.
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`Summum, O. T. 2008, No. 07–665, pp. 2–3, 30–36.
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`This Court rejected the organization’s argument. We
`held that the city had not “provid[ed] a forum for private
`speech” with respect to monuments. Summum, 555 U. S.,
`at 470. Rather, the city, even when “accepting a privately
`donated monument and placing it on city property,” had
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`“engage[d] in expressive conduct.” Id., at 476. The speech
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`at issue, this Court decided, was “best viewed as a form of
`government speech” and “therefore [was] not subject to
`scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause.” Id., at 464.
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`We based our conclusion on several factors. First, his-
`tory shows that “[g]overnments have long used monuments
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`to speak to the public.” Id., at 470. Thus, we observed
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`WALKER v. TEXAS DIV., SONS OF
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`CONFEDERATE VETERANS, INC.
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`Opinion of the Court
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`that “[w]hen a government entity arranges for the con-
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`struction of a monument, it does so because it wishes to
`convey some thought or instill some feeling in those who
`see the structure.” Ibid.
`Second, we noted that it “is not common for property
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`owners to open up their property for the installation of
`permanent monuments that convey a message with which
`they do not wish to be associated.” Id., at 471. As a re-
`sult, “persons who observe donated monuments routine-
`ly—and reasonably—interpret them as conveying some
`message on the property owner’s behalf.” Ibid. And “ob-
`servers” of such monuments, as a consequence, ordinarily
`“appreciate the identity of the speaker.” Ibid.
`Third, we found relevant the fact that the city main-
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`tained control over the selection of monuments. We
`thought it “fair to say that throughout our Nation’s his-
`tory, the general government practice with respect to do-
`nated monuments has been one of selective receptivity.”
`Ibid. And we observed that the city government in Sum-
`mum “‘effectively controlled’ the messages sent by the
`monuments in the [p]ark by exercising ‘final approval
`authority’ over their selection.” Id., at 473.
`
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`In light of these and a few other relevant considerations,
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`the Court concluded that the expression at issue was
`government speech. See id., at 470–472. And, in reaching
`that conclusion, the Court rejected the premise that the
`involvement of private parties in designing the monu-
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`ments was sufficient to prevent the government from
`controlling which monuments it placed in its own public
`park. See id., at 470–471. Cf. Rust, supra, at 192–196
`(upholding a federal regulation limiting speech in a
`Government-funded program where the program was
`established and administered by private parties).
`B
`Our analysis in Summum leads us to the conclusion
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` Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)
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`Opinion of the Court
`that here, too, government speech is at issue. First, the
`history of license plates shows that, insofar as license
`plates have conveyed more than state names and vehicle
`identification numbers, they long have communicated
`messages from the States. Cf. 555 U. S., at 470 (“Govern-
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`ments have long used monuments to speak to the public”).
`In 1917, Arizona became the first State to display a graphic
`on its plates. J. Fox, License Plates of the United States
`15 (1997) (Fox); J. Minard & T. Stentiford, A Moving
`History 56 (2004) (Minard). The State presented a depic-
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`tion of the head of a Hereford steer. Fox 15; Minard 56.
`In the years since, New Hampshire plates have featured
`the profile of the “Old Man of the Mountain,” Massachu-
`setts plates have included a representation of the Com-
`monwealth’s famous codfish, and Wyoming plates have
`displayed a rider atop a bucking bronco. Minard 60, 61,
`66.
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`In 1928, Idaho became the first State to include a slogan
`on its plates. The 1928 Idaho plate proclaimed “Idaho
`Potatoes” and featured an illustration of a brown potato,
`onto which the license plate number was superimposed in
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`green. Id., at 61. The brown potato did not catch on, but
`slogans on license plates did. Over the years, state plates
`have included the phrases “North to the Future” (Alaska),
`“Keep Florida Green” (Florida), “Hoosier Hospitality”
`(Indiana), “The Iodine Products State” (South Carolina),
`“Green Mountains” (Vermont), and “America’s Dairyland”
`(Wisconsin). Fox 13, 29, 39, 91, 101, 109. States have
`used license plate slogans to urge action, to promote tour-
`ism, and to tout local industries.
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`Texas, too, has selected various messages to communi-
`cate through its license plate designs. By 1919, Texas had
`begun to display the Lone Star emblem on its plates.
`Texas Department of Transportation, The History of
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`Texas License Plates 9, 11 (1999).
`In 1936, the State’s
`general-issue plates featured the first slogan on Texas
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`WALKER v. TEXAS DIV., SONS OF
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`CONFEDERATE VETERANS, INC.
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`Opinion of the Court
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` license plates: the word “Centennial.” Id., at 20. In 1968,
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`Texas plates promoted a San Antonio event by including
`the phrase “Hemisfair 68.” Id., at 46. In 1977, Texas
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`replaced the Lone Star with a small silhouette of the
`State. Id., at 63. And in 1995, Texas plates celebrated
`“150 Years of Statehood.” Id., at 101. Additionally, the
`Texas Legislature has specifically authorized specialty
`plate designs stating, among other things, “Read to Suc-
`ceed,” “Houston Livestock Show and Rodeo,” “Texans
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`Conquer Cancer,” and “Girl Scouts.” Tex. Transp. Code
`Ann. §§504.607, 504.613, 504.620, 504.622. This kind of
`state speech has appeared on Texas plates for decades.
`Second, Texas license plate designs “are often closely
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`identified in the public mind with the [State].” Summum,
`supra, at 472. Each Texas license plate is a government
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`article serving the governmental purposes of vehicle regis-
`tration and identification. The governmental nature of the
`plates is clear from their faces: The State places the name
`“TEXAS” in large letters at the top of every plate. More-
`over, the State requires Texas vehicle owners to display
`license plates, and every Texas license plate is issued by
`the State. See §504.943. Texas also owns the designs on
`its license plates, including the designs that Texas adopts
`on the basis of proposals made by private individuals and
`organizations. See §504.002(3). And Texas dictates the
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`manner in which drivers may dispose of unused plates.
`See §504.901(c). See also §504.008(g) (requiring that
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`vehicle owners return unused specialty plates to the
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`State).
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`Texas license plates are, essentially, government IDs.
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`And issuers of ID “typically do not permit” the placement
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`on their IDs of “message[s] with which they do not wish to
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`be associated.” Summum, 555 U. S., at 471. Consequently,
`“persons who observe” designs on IDs “routinely—and
`reasonably—interpret them as conveying some message
`on the [issuer’s] behalf.” Ibid.
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` Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)
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`Opinion of the Court
`Indeed, a person who displays a message on a Texas
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`license plate likely intends to convey to the public that the
`State has endorsed that message. If not, the individual
`could simply display the message in question in larger
`letters on a bumper sticker right next to the plate. But
`the individual prefers a license plate design to the purely
`private speech expressed through bumper stickers. That
`may well be because Texas’s license plate designs convey
`government agreement with the message displayed.
`Third, Texas maintains direct control over the messages
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`conveyed on its specialty plates. Texas law provides that
`the State “has sole control over the design, typeface, color,
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`and alphanumeric pattern
`for all
`license plates.”
`§504.005. The Board must approve every specialty plate
`design proposal before the design can appear on a Texas
`plate. 43 Tex. Admin. Code §§217.45(i)(7)–(8), 217.52(b).
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`And the Board and its predecessor have actively exercised
`this authority. Texas asserts, and SCV concedes, that the
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`State has rejected at least a dozen proposed designs.
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`Reply Brief 10; Tr. of Oral Arg. 49–51. Accordingly, like
`the city government in Summum, Texas “has ‘effectively
`controlled’ the messages [conveyed] by exercising ‘final
`approval authority’ over their selection.” 555 U. S., at 473
`(quoting Johanns, 544 U. S., at 560–561).
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`This final approval authority allows Texas to choose
`how to present itself and its constituency. Thus, Texas
`offers plates celebrating the many educational institutions
`attended by its citizens. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann.
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`§504.615. But it need not issue plates deriding schooling.
`Texas offers plates that pay tribute to the Texas citrus
`industry. See §504.626. But it need not issue plates
`praising Florida’s oranges as far better. And Texas offers
`plates that say “Fight Terrorism.” See §504.647. But it
`need not issue plates promoting al Qaeda.
`These considerations, taken together, convince us that
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`the specialty plates here in question are similar enough to
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`WALKER v. TEXAS DIV., SONS OF
`CONFEDERATE VETERANS, INC.
`
`Opinion of the Court
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`the monuments in Summum to call for the same result.
`That is not to say that every element of our discussion in
`Summum is relevant here. For instance, in Summum we
`emphasized that monuments were “permanent” and we
`observed that “public parks can accommodate only a lim-
`ited number of permanent monuments.” 555 U. S., at 464,
`470, 478. We believed that the speech at issue was gov-
`ernment speech rather than private speech in part be-
`cause we found it “hard to imagine how a public park
`could be opened up for the installation of permanent mon-
`uments by every person or group wishing to engage in that
`form of expression.” Id., at 479. Here, a State could theo-
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`retically offer a much larger number of license plate de-
`signs, and those designs need not be available for time
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`immemorial.
`But those characteristics of the speech at issue in Sum-
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`mum were particularly important because the government
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`speech at issue occurred in public parks, which are tradi-
`tional public forums for “the delivery of speeches and the
`holding of marches and demonstrations” by private citi-
`zens. Id., at 478. By contrast, license plates are not tradi-
`tional public forums for private speech.
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`And other features of the designs on Texas’s specialty
`license plates indicate that the message conveyed by those
`designs is conveyed on behalf of the government. Texas,
`through its Board, selects each design featured on the
`State’s specialty license plates. Texas presents these
`designs on government-mandated, government-controlled,
`and government-issued IDs that have traditionally been
`used as a medium for government speech. And it places
`the designs directly below the large letters identifying
`“TEXAS” as the issuer of the IDs. “The [designs] that are
`accepted, therefore, are meant to convey and have the
`effect of conveying a government message, and they thus
`constitute government speech.” Id., at 472.
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` Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)
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`Opinion of the Court
`C
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`SCV believes that Texas’s specialty license plate designs
`are not government speech, at least with respect to the
`designs (comprising slogans and graphics) that were ini-
`tially proposed by private parties. According to SCV, the
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`State does not engage in expressive activity through such
`slogans and g