(Slip Opinion)
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2015
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`Syllabus
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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` Syllabus
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`MENOMINEE INDIAN TRIBE OF WISCONSIN v.
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`UNITED STATES ET AL.
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`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
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`THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
` No. 14–510. Argued December 1, 2015—Decided January 25, 2016
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`Pursuant to the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance
`Act (ISDA), petitioner Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin con-
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`tracted with the Indian Health Service (IHS) to operate what would
`otherwise have been a federal program and to receive an amount of
`money equal to what the Government would have spent on operating
`the program itself, including reimbursement for reasonable contract
`support costs. 25 U. S. C. §§450f, 450j–1(a). After other tribal enti-
`ties successfully litigated complaints against the Federal Govern-
`ment for failing to honor its obligation to pay contract support costs,
`the Menominee Tribe presented its own contract support claims to
`the IHS in accordance with the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA),
`which requires contractors to present each claim to a contracting of-
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`ficer for decision, 41 U. S. C. §7103(a)(1). The contracting officer de-
`nied some of the Tribe’s claims because they were not presented with-
`in the CDA’s 6-year limitations period. See §7103(a)(4)(A).
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`The Tribe challenged the denials in Federal District Court, arguing
`that the limitations period should be tolled for the nearly two years
`in which a putative class action, brought by tribes with parallel com-
`plaints, was pending. As relevant here, the District Court eventually
`denied the Tribe’s equitable-tolling claim, and the Court of Appeals
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`affirmed, holding that no extraordinary circumstances beyond the
`Tribe’s control caused the delay.
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`Held: Equitable tolling does not apply to the presentment of petitioner’s
`claims. Pp. 5–9.
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`(a) To be entitled to equitable tolling of a statute of limitations, a
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`litigant must establish “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights dili-
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`gently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his
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` MENOMINEE TRIBE OF WIS. v. UNITED STATES
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`Syllabus
` way and prevented timely filing.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U. S. 631,
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` 649. The Tribe argues that diligence and extraordinary circumstanc-
`es should be considered together as factors in a unitary test, and it
`faults the Court of Appeals for declining to consider the Tribe’s dili-
`gence in connection with its finding that no extraordinary circum-
`stances existed. But this Court has expressly characterized these two
`components as “elements,” not merely factors of indeterminate or
`commensurable weight, Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U. S. 408, 418, and
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` has treated them as such in practice, see Lawrence v. Florida, 549
`U. S. 327, 336–337. The Tribe also objects to the Court of Appeals’
`interpretation of the “extraordinary circumstances” prong as requir-
`ing the showing of an “external obstacle” to timely filing. This Court
`reaffirms that this prong is met only where the circumstances that
`caused a litigant’s delay are both extraordinary and beyond its con-
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`trol. Pp. 5–7.
`(b) None of the Tribe’s excuses satisfy the “extraordinary circum-
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`stances” prong of the test. The Tribe had unilateral authority to pre-
`sent its claims in a timely manner. Its claimed obstacles, namely, a
`mistaken reliance on a putative class action and a belief that pre-
`sentment was futile, were not outside the Tribe’s control. And the
`significant risk and expense associated with presenting and litigating
`its claims are far from extraordinary. Finally, the special relation-
`ship between the United States and Indian tribes, as articulated in
`the ISDA, does not override clear statutory language. Pp. 7–8.
`764 F. 3d 51, affirmed.
`ALITO, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
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` Cite as: 577 U. S. ____ (2016)
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`Opinion of the Court
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`_________________
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` No. 14–510
`_________________
`MENOMINEE INDIAN TRIBE OF WISCONSIN,
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`PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES, ET AL.
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`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
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`APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
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`[January 25, 2016]
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` JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
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`Petitioner Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin (Tribe)
`seeks equitable tolling to preserve contract claims not
`timely presented to a federal contracting officer. Because
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`the Tribe cannot establish extraordinary circumstances
`that stood in the way of timely filing, we hold that equit-
`able tolling does not apply.
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`I
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`Congress enacted the Indian Self-Determination and
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`Education Assistance Act (ISDA), Pub. L. 93–638, 88 Stat.
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`2203, 25 U. S. C. §450 et seq., in 1975 to help Indian tribes
`assume responsibility for aid programs that benefit their
`members. Under the ISDA, tribes may enter into “self-
`determination contracts” with federal agencies to take
`control of a variety of federally funded programs. §450f. A
`contracting tribe is eligible to receive the amount of money
`that the Government would have otherwise spent on the
`program, see §450j–1(a)(1), as well as reimbursement for
`reasonable “contract support costs,” which include admin-
`istrative and overhead costs associated with carrying out
`the contracted programs, §§450j–1(a)(2), (3), (5).
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` MENOMINEE TRIBE OF WIS. v. UNITED STATES
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`Opinion of the Court
`In 1988, Congress amended the ISDA to apply the Con-
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` tract Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA), 41 U. S. C. §7101 et seq.,
`to disputes arising under the ISDA. See 25 U. S. C.
`§450m–1(d); Indian Self-Determination and Education
`Assistance Act Amendments of 1988, §206(2), 102 Stat.
`2295. As part of its mandatory administrative process for
`resolving contract disputes, the CDA requires contractors
`to present “[e]ach claim” they may have to a contracting
`officer for decision. 41 U. S. C. §7103(a)(1). Congress later
`amended the CDA to include a 6-year statute of limita-
`tions for presentment of each claim. Federal Acquisition
`Streamlining Act of 1994, 41 U. S. C. §7103(a)(4)(A).
`Under the CDA, the contracting officer’s decision is
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`generally final, unless challenged through one of the
`statutorily authorized routes. §7103(g). A contractor
`dissatisfied with the officer’s decision may either take an
`administrative appeal to a board of contract appeals or file
`an action for breach of contract in the United States Court
`of Federal Claims. §§7104(a), (b)(1), 7105(b). Both routes
`then lead to the United States Court of Appeals for the
`Federal Circuit for any further review.
`28 U. S. C.
`§1295(a)(3); 41 U. S. C. §7107(a)(1); see 25 U. S. C.
`§450m–1(d). Under the ISDA, tribal contractors have a
`third option. They may file a claim for money damages in
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`federal district court, §§450m–1(a), (d), and if they lose,
`they may pursue an appeal in one of the regional courts of
`appeals, 28 U. S. C. §1291.
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`Tribal contractors have repeatedly complained that the
`Federal Government has not fully honored its obligations
`to pay contract support costs. Three lawsuits making such
`claims are relevant here.
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`The first was a class action filed by the Ramah Navajo
`Chapter alleging that the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
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`systematically underpaid certain contract support costs.
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`Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Lujan, No. 1:90–cv–0957
`(D NM) (filed Oct. 4, 1990). In 1993, Ramah successfully
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` Cite as: 577 U. S. ____ (2016)
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`Opinion of the Court
`moved for certification of a nationwide class of all tribes
`that had contracted with the BIA under the ISDA. See
`Order and Memorandum Opinion in Ramah Navajo Chap-
`ter v. Lujan, No. 1:90–cv–0957 (D NM, Oct. 1, 1993), App.
`35–40. The Government argued that each tribe needed to
`present its claims to a contracting officer before it could
`participate in the class. Id., at 37–38. But the trial court
`held that tribal contractors could participate in the class
`without presentment, because the suit alleged systemwide
`flaws in the BIA’s contracting scheme, not merely breaches
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`of individual contracts. Id., at 39. The Government did
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`not appeal the certification order, and the Ramah class
`action proceeded to further litigation and settlement.
`The second relevant ISDA suit raised similar claims
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`about contract support costs but arose from contracts with
`the Indian Health Service (IHS). Cherokee Nation of Okla.
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`v. United States, No. 6:99–cv–0092 (ED Okla.) (filed Mar.
`5, 1999). In Cherokee Nation, two tribes filed a putative
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`class action against IHS. On February 9, 2001, the Dis-
`trict Court denied class certification without addressing
`whether tribes would need to present claims to join the
`class. Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. United States, 199
`F. R. D. 357, 363–366 (ED Okla.). The two plaintiff tribes
`did not appeal the denial of class certification but proceeded
`to the merits on their own, eventually prevailing before
`this Court in a parallel suit. See Cherokee Nation of Okla.
`v. Leavitt, 543 U. S. 631 (2005).
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`The third relevant case is the one now before us. In this
`case, the Tribe presented its contract support claims (for
`contract years 1995 through 2004) to IHS on September 7,
`2005, shortly after our Cherokee Nation ruling. As rele-
`vant here, the contracting officer denied the Tribe’s claims
`based on its 1996, 1997, and 1998 contracts because, inter
`alia, those claims were barred by the CDA’s 6-year statute
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`MENOMINEE TRIBE OF WIS. v. UNITED STATES
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`Opinion of the Court
`of limitations.1 The Tribe challenged the denials in the
`United States District Court for the District of Columbia,
`arguing, based on theories of class-action and equitable
`tolling, that the limitations period should be tolled for the
`707 days that the putative Cherokee Nation class had been
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`pending. See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414
`U. S. 538 (1974) (class-action tolling); Holland v. Florida,
`560 U. S. 631 (2010) (equitable tolling).
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`Initially, the District Court held that the limitations
`period was jurisdictional and thus forbade tolling of any
`sort. 539 F. Supp. 2d 152, 154, and n. 2 (DDC 2008). On
`appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
`of Columbia Circuit concluded that the limitations period
`was not jurisdictional and thus did not necessarily bar
`tolling. 614 F. 3d 519, 526 (2010). But the court held that
`the Tribe was ineligible for class-action tolling during the
`pendency of the putative Cherokee Nation class, because
`the Tribe’s failure to present its claims to IHS made it
`“ineligible to participate in the class action at the time
`class certification [was] denied.” 614 F. 3d, at 527 (apply-
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`ing American Pipe). The court then remanded the case to
`the District Court to determine the Tribe’s eligibility for
`equitable tolling.
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`On remand, the District Court concluded that the
`Tribe’s asserted reasons for failing to present its claims
`within the specified time “do not, individually or collec-
`tively, amount to an extraordinary circumstance” that
`could warrant equitable tolling. 841 F. Supp. 2d 99, 107 (DC
`2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). This time, the
`Court of Appeals affirmed. 764 F. 3d 51 (CADC 2014). It
`——————
`1Because the contract claims accrued no later than the end of each
`calendar-year contract, the District Court determined, the statute of
`limitations for the 1996, 1997, and 1998 contracts had run by January
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`1st of the years 2003, 2004, and 2005, respectively. 539 F. Supp. 2d
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`152, 154, n. 1 (DC 2008). The Tribe does not dispute the timing of
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`accrual before this Court.
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`Opinion of the Court
`explained that, “[t]o count as sufficiently ‘extraordinary’ to
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`support equitable tolling, the circumstances that caused a
`litigant’s delay must have been beyond its control,” and
`“cannot be a product of that litigant’s own misunderstand-
`ing of the law or tactical mistakes in litigation.” Id., at 58.
`Because none of the Tribe’s proffered circumstances was
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`beyond its control, the court held, there were no extraor-
`dinary circumstances that could merit equitable tolling.
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`The Court of Appeals’ decision created a split with the
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`Federal Circuit, which granted another tribal entity equi-
`table tolling under similar circumstances. See Arctic
`Slope Native Assn., Ltd. v. Sebelius, 699 F. 3d 1289 (CA
`Fed. 2012). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.
`576 U. S. ___ (2015).
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`II
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`The Court of Appeals denied the Tribe’s request for
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`equitable tolling by applying the test that we articulated
`in Holland v. Florida, 560 U. S. 631. Under Holland, a
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`litigant is entitled to equitable tolling of a statute of limi-
`tations only if the litigant establishes two elements: “(1)
`that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2)
`that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way
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` and prevented timely filing.” Id., at 649 (internal quota-
`tion marks omitted).
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`The Tribe calls this formulation of the equitable tolling
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`test overly rigid, given the doctrine’s equitable nature.
`First, it argues that diligence and extraordinary circum-
`stances should be considered together as two factors in a
`unitary test, and it faults the Court of Appeals for declin-
`ing to consider the Tribe’s diligence in connection with its
`finding that no extraordinary circumstances existed. But
`we have expressly characterized equitable tolling’s two
`components as “elements,” not merely factors of indeter-
`minate or commensurable weight. Pace v. DiGuglielmo,
`544 U. S. 408, 418 (2005) (“Generally, a litigant seeking
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` MENOMINEE TRIBE OF WIS. v. UNITED STATES
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`Opinion of the Court
`equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two
`elements”). And we have treated the two requirements as
`distinct elements in practice, too, rejecting requests for
`equitable tolling where a litigant failed to satisfy one
`without addressing whether he satisfied the other. See,
`e.g., Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U. S. 327, 336–337 (2007)
`(rejecting equitable tolling without addressing diligence
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`because habeas petitioner fell “far short of showing ‘ex-
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`traordinary circumstances’”); Pace, supra, at 418 (holding,
`without resolving litigant’s argument that he had “satis-
`fied the extraordinary circumstance test,” that, “[e]ven if
`we were to accept [his argument], he would not be entitled
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`to relief because he has not established the requisite
`diligence”).
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`Second, the Tribe objects to the Court of Appeals’ inter-
`pretation of the “extraordinary circumstances” prong as
`requiring a litigant seeking tolling to show an “external
`obstacl[e]” to timely filing, i.e., that “the circumstances
`that caused a litigant’s delay must have been beyond its
`control.” 764 F. 3d, at 58–59. The Tribe complains that
`this “external obstacle” formulation amounts to the same
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`kind of “‘overly rigid per se approach’” we rejected in
`Holland. Brief for Petitioner 32 (quoting 560 U. S., at
`653). But in truth, the phrase “external obstacle” merely
`reflects our requirement that a litigant seeking tolling
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`show “that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his
`Id., at 649 (emphasis added; internal quotation
`way.”
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`marks omitted). This phrasing in Holland (and in Pace
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`before that) would make little sense if equitable tolling
`were available when a litigant was responsible for its own
`delay. Indeed, the diligence prong already covers those
`affairs within the litigant’s control; the extraordinary-
`circumstances prong, by contrast, is meant to cover mat-
`ters outside its control. We therefore reaffirm that the
`second prong of the equitable tolling test is met only
`where the circumstances that caused a litigant’s delay are
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`Cite as: 577 U. S. ____ (2016)
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`Opinion of the Court
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` both extraordinary and beyond its control.2
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`III
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`The Tribe offers no circumstances that meet this stand-
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`ard.
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`Its mistaken reliance on the putative Cherokee Nation
`class action was not an obstacle beyond its control.3 As
`the Tribe conceded below, see 614 F. 3d, at 526–527, it
`could not have been a member of the putative Cherokee
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`Nation class because it did not present its claims to an
`IHS contracting officer before class certification was de-
`nied. Before then, the Tribe had unilateral authority to
`present its claims and to join the putative class. Present-
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`ment was blocked not by an obstacle outside its control,
`but by the Tribe’s mistaken belief that presentment was
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`unneeded.
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`The Tribe’s mistake, in essence, was its inference that
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`the reasoning of the Ramah class certification decision
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`(allowing tribes to participate—without presentment—in
`the class challenging underpayment of BIA contract sup-
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`port costs) applied to the putative Cherokee Nation class.
`This mistake was fundamentally no different from “a
`garden variety claim of excusable neglect,” Irwin v. De-
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`partment of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 96 (1990), “such
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`as a simple ‘miscalculation’ that leads a lawyer to miss a
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`filing deadline,” Holland, supra, at 651 (quoting Lawrence,
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`supra, at 336). And it is quite different from relying on
`——————
` 2 Holland v. Florida, 560 U. S. 631 (2010), is a habeas case, and we
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`have never held that its equitable-tolling test necessarily applies
`outside the habeas context. Nevertheless, because we agree that the
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` Tribe cannot meet Holland’s test, we have no occasion to decide whether
` an even stricter test might apply to a nonhabeas case. Nor does the
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` Tribe argue that a more generous test than Holland’s should apply
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` here.
`3Because we conclude that the Tribe’s mistake of law was not outside
`its control, we need not decide whether a mistake of law, however
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` reasonable, could ever be extraordinary.
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`MENOMINEE TRIBE OF WIS. v. UNITED STATES
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`Opinion of the Court
` actually binding precedent that is subsequently reversed.4
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`The Tribe’s other excuses are even less compelling. Its
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`belief that presentment was futile was not an obstacle
`beyond its control but a species of the same mistake that
`kept it out of the putative Cherokee Nation class. And the
`fact that there may have been significant risk and expense
`associated with presenting and litigating its claims is far
`from extraordinary. As the District Court noted below, “it
`is common for a litigant to be confronted with significant
`costs to litigation, limited financial resources, an uncer-
`tain outcome based upon an uncertain legal landscape,
`and impending deadlines. These circumstances are not
`‘extraordinary.’” 841 F. Supp. 2d, at 107.
`Finally, the Tribe also urges us to consider the special
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`relationship between the United States and Indian tribes,
`as articulated in the ISDA. See 25 U. S. C. §450a(b)
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`(“Congress declares its commitment to the maintenance of
`the Federal Government’s unique and continuing relation-
`ship with, and responsibility to, individual Indian tribes
`and to the Indian people as a whole”). We do not question
`the “general trust relationship between the United States
`and the Indian tribes,” but any specific obligations the
`Government may have under that relationship are “gov-
`erned by statute rather than the common law.” United
`States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U. S. 162, 165
`(2011). The ISDA and CDA establish a clear procedure for
`the resolution of disputes over ISDA contracts, with an
`unambiguous 6-year deadline for presentment of claims.
`The “general trust relationship” does not override the
`clear language of those statutes.5
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`——————
`4The Court of Appeals speculated, without deciding, that such a de-
`velopment might merit tolling, but like that court we have no occasion
`to decide the question.
`5Because we hold that there were no extraordinary circumstances,
`we need not decide whether the Tribe was diligently pursuing its
`rights. We also need not accept the Tribe’s invitation to assess preju-
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`Cite as: 577 U. S. ____ (2016)
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`Opinion of the Court
`IV
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`For these reasons, the judgment of the United States
`Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is
`affirmed.
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`It is so ordered.
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`dice to the Government, because the absence of prejudice to the oppos-
`ing party “is not an independent basis for invoking the doctrine [of
`equitable tolling] and sanctioning deviations from established proce-
`dures.” Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U. S. 147, 152
`(1984) (per curiam). Rather, the absence of prejudice is “a factor to be
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` considered in determining whether the doctrine of equitable tolling
`should apply once a factor that might justify such tolling is identified.”
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` Ibid. (emphasis added).