Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015)
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`Per Curiam
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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` TORREY DALE GRADY v. NORTH CAROLINA
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`ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
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` SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
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`No. 14–593. Decided March 30, 2015
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` PER CURIAM.
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`Petitioner Torrey Dale Grady was convicted in North
`Carolina trial courts of a second degree sexual offense in
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`1997 and of taking indecent liberties with a child in 2006.
`After serving his sentence for the latter crime, Grady was
`ordered to appear in New Hanover County Superior Court
`for a hearing to determine whether he should be subjected
`to satellite-based monitoring (SBM) as a recidivist sex
`offender. See N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§14–208.40(a)(1), 14–
`208.40B (2013). Grady did not dispute that his prior
`convictions rendered him a recidivist under the relevant
`North Carolina statutes. He argued, however, that the
`monitoring program—under which he would be forced to
`wear tracking devices at all times—would violate his
`Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
`searches and seizures. Unpersuaded, the trial court or-
`dered Grady to enroll in the program and be monitored for
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`the rest of his life. Record in No. COA13-958 (N. C. App.),
`pp. 3–4, 18–22.
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`Grady renewed his Fourth Amendment challenge on
`appeal, relying on this Court’s decision in United States v.
`Jones, 565 U. S. ___ (2012). In that case, this Court held
`that police officers had engaged in a “search” within the
`meaning of the Fourth Amendment when they installed
`and monitored a Global Positioning System (GPS) track-
`ing device on a suspect’s car. The North Carolina Court of
`Appeals rejected Grady’s argument, concluding that it was
`foreclosed by one of its earlier decisions. App. to Pet. for
`Cert. 5a–7a. In that decision, coincidentally named State
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`GRADY v. NORTH CAROLINA
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`Per Curiam
`v. Jones, the court had said:
`“Defendant essentially argues that if affixing a GPS to
`an individual’s vehicle constitutes a search of the in-
`dividual, then the arguably more intrusive act of affix-
`ing an ankle bracelet to an individual must constitute
`a search of the individual as well. We disagree. The
`context presented in the instant case—which involves
`a civil SBM proceeding—is readily distinguishable
`from that presented in [United States v.] Jones, where
`the Court considered the propriety of a search in the
`context of a motion to suppress evidence. We con-
`clude, therefore, that the specific holding in [United
`States v.] Jones does not control in the case sub ju-
`dice.” ___ N. C. App. ___, ___, 750 S. E. 2d 883, 886
`(2013).
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`The court in Grady’s case held itself bound by this rea-
`soning and accordingly rejected his Fourth Amendment
`challenge. App. to Pet. for Cert. 6a–7a. The North Caro-
`lina Supreme Court in turn summarily dismissed Grady’s
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`appeal and denied his petition for discretionary review.
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`367 N. C. 523, 762 S. E. 2d 460 (2014). Grady now asks us
`to reverse these decisions.*
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`The only explanation provided below for the rejection of
`Grady’s challenge is the quoted passage from State v.
`Jones. And the only theory we discern in that passage is
`that the State’s system of nonconsensual satellite-based
`monitoring does not entail a search within the meaning of
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`the Fourth Amendment. That theory is inconsistent with
`——————
`*Grady aims his petition at the decisions of both North Carolina
`appellate courts. See Pet. for Cert. 1. Because we treat the North
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`Carolina Supreme Court’s dismissal of an appeal for lack of a substan-
`tial constitutional question as a decision on the merits, it is that court’s
`judgment, rather than the judgment of the Court of Appeals, that is
`subject to our review under 28 U. S. C. §1257(a). See R. J. Reynolds
`Tobacco Co. v. Durham County, 479 U. S. 130, 138–139 (1986).
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`Per Curiam
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`this Court’s precedents.
`In United States v. Jones, we held that “the Govern-
`ment’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle,
`and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s move-
`ments, constitutes a ‘search.’” 565 U. S., at ___ (slip op.,
`at 3) (footnote omitted). We stressed the importance of the
`fact that the Government had “physically occupied private
`property for the purpose of obtaining information.” Id., at
`___ (slip op., at 4). Under such circumstances, it was not
`necessary to inquire about the target’s expectation of
`privacy in his vehicle’s movements in order to determine if
`a Fourth Amendment search had occurred. “Where, as
`here, the Government obtains information by physically
`intruding on a constitutionally protected area, such a
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`search has undoubtedly occurred.” Id., at ___, n. 3 (slip
`op., at 6, n. 3).
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`We reaffirmed this principle in Florida v. Jardines, 569
`U. S. ___, ___–___ (2013) (slip op., at 3–4), where we held
`that having a drug-sniffing dog nose around a suspect’s
`front porch was a search, because police had “gathered . . .
`information by physically entering and occupying the
`[curtilage of the house] to engage in conduct not explicitly
`or implicitly permitted by the homeowner.” See also id., at
`___ (slip op., at 9) (a search occurs “when the government
`gains evidence by physically intruding on constitutionally
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`protected areas”). In light of these decisions, it follows
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`that a State also conducts a search when it attaches a
`device to a person’s body, without consent, for the purpose
`of tracking that individual’s movements.
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`In concluding otherwise, the North Carolina Court of
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`Appeals apparently placed decisive weight on the fact that
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`the State’s monitoring program is civil in nature. See
`Jones, ___ N. C. App., at ___, 750 S. E. 2d, at 886 (“the
`instant case . . . involves a civil SBM proceeding”). “It is
`well settled,” however, “that the Fourth Amendment’s
`protection extends beyond the sphere of criminal investi-
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` GRADY v. NORTH CAROLINA
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`Per Curiam
`gations,” Ontario v. Quon, 560 U. S. 746, 755 (2010), and
`the government’s purpose in collecting information does
`not control whether the method of collection constitutes a
`search. A building inspector who enters a home simply to
`ensure compliance with civil safety regulations has un-
`doubtedly conducted a search under the Fourth Amend-
`ment. See Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County
`of San Francisco, 387 U. S. 523, 534 (1967) (housing in-
`spections are “administrative searches” that must comply
`with the Fourth Amendment).
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`In its brief in opposition to certiorari, the State faults
`Grady for failing to introduce “evidence about the State’s
`implementation of the SBM program or what information,
`if any, it currently obtains through the monitoring pro-
`cess.” Brief in Opposition 11. Without evidence that it is
`acting to obtain information, the State argues, “there is no
`basis upon which this Court can determine whether North
`Carolina conducts a ‘search’ of an offender enrolled in its
`SBM program.” Ibid. (citing Jones, 565 U. S., at ___, n. 5
`(slip op., at 7, n. 5) (noting that a government intrusion is
`not a search unless “done to obtain information”)). In
`other words, the State argues that we cannot be sure its
`program for satellite-based monitoring of sex offenders
`collects any information. If the very name of the program
`does not suffice to rebut this contention, the text of the
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`statute surely does:
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`“The satellite-based monitoring program shall use a
`system that provides all of the following:
`“(1) Time-correlated and continuous tracking of the
`geographic location of the subject . . . .
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`“(2) Reporting of subject’s violations of prescriptive
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`and proscriptive schedule or location requirements.”
`N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §14–208.40(c).
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`The State’s program is plainly designed to obtain infor-
`mation. And since it does so by physically intruding on a
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`Per Curiam
`subject’s body, it effects a Fourth Amendment search.
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`That conclusion, however, does not decide the ultimate
`question of the program’s constitutionality. The Fourth
`Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches. The
`reasonableness of a search depends on the totality of the
`circumstances, including the nature and purpose of the
`search and the extent to which the search intrudes upon
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` See, e.g., Samson v.
`reasonable privacy expectations.
`California, 547 U. S. 843 (2006) (suspicionless search of
`parolee was reasonable); Vernonia School Dist. 47J v.
`Acton, 515 U. S. 646 (1995) (random drug testing of stu-
`dent athletes was reasonable). The North Carolina courts
`did not examine whether the State’s monitoring program
`is reasonable—when properly viewed as a search—and we
`will not do so in the first instance.
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`The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of
`the Supreme Court of North Carolina is vacated, and the
`case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent
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`with this opinion.
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`It is so ordered.
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`5