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` Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015)
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`Per Curiam
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`JEFFREY WOODS, WARDEN v. CORY DONALD
`ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
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`STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
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`No. 14–618. Decided March 30, 2015
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` PER CURIAM.
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`Federal courts may grant habeas corpus relief if the
`underlying state-court decision was “contrary to, or in­
`volved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
`Federal law, as determined by” this Court. 28 U. S. C.
`§2254(d)(1). Here, the Sixth Circuit held that respondent
`Cory Donald’s attorney provided per se ineffective assis­
`tance of counsel under United States v. Cronic, 466 U. S.
`648 (1984), when he was briefly absent during testimony
`concerning other defendants. Because no decision from
`this Court clearly establishes that Donald is entitled to
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`relief under Cronic, we reverse.
`I
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`After a day of drinking and smoking marijuana, Cory
`Donald and four others—Seante Liggins, Rashad Moore,
`Dewayne Saine, and Fawzi Zaya—decided to rob a drug
`dealer named Mohammed Makki. Donald, Moore, and
`Liggins drove to Makki’s home in Dearborn, Michigan,
`wearing black skull caps and coats. Moore and Donald
`entered the house, while Liggins waited in the car.
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`Michael McGinnis, one of Makki’s drug runners, was in
`the house at the time. When Donald and Moore came
`through the door, McGinnis raised his hands and dropped
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`face-down to the floor. He heard a scuffle in the kitchen
`and two gunshots as someone said, “‘[L]et it go.’” Donald
`v. Rapelje, 580 Fed. Appx. 277, 279 (CA6 2014). After
`that, McGinnnis felt a gun on the back of his head while
`someone rifled through his pockets saying, “‘[W]hat you
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` WOODS v. DONALD
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`Per Curiam
`got, what you got?’” Donald v. Rapelje, 2012 WL 6047130,
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`*3 (ED Mich., Dec. 5, 2012). He also heard one of the two
`men whisper to the other, “‘I got shot, I got shot.’” 580
`Fed. Appx., at 279. After Moore and Donald left, McGin­
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`nis found Makki slumped against the refrigerator dying.
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`About seven minutes after they entered the house,
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`Moore and Donald returned, guns in hand, to Liggins’ car.
`Donald told the others that he had stolen $320 and that
`Moore had accidentally shot him during the crime. That
`night, Donald checked into a hospital for a gunshot wound
`to his foot. Police arrested him about three weeks later.
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`The State charged Donald with one count of first-degree
`felony murder and two counts of armed robbery. Liggins
`and Zaya pleaded guilty, and Donald was tried with Moore
`and Saine. His defense theory was that he was present at
`the scene of the crime but he did not participate. At trial,
`the government sought to admit a chart chronicling phone
`calls from the day of the crime among Moore, Saine, and
`Zaya. Moore and Saine’s attorneys objected, but Donald’s
`attorney declined, saying: “‘I don’t have a dog in this race.
`It does not affect me at all.’” Id., at 280. The court admit­
`ted the exhibit and took a short recess.
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`When the trial resumed, Donald’s counsel was not in the
`courtroom. At first, the judge indicated that he would
`wait for the attorney. But he then decided to proceed
`because Donald’s counsel had already indicated that the
`exhibit and testimony did not apply to his client. About 10
`minutes later, the lawyer returned. The judge informed
`him that “‘up until that point we only were discussing the
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`telephone chart,’” to which the attorney replied, “‘[Y]es,
`your Honor, and as I had indicated on the record, I had no
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`dog in the race and no interest in that.’” Ibid.
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`The jury found Donald guilty on all three counts. He
`was sentenced to life imprisonment for the felony-murder
`count and to concurrent prison terms of 10½ to 20 years
`for each of the armed robbery counts. On appeal, Donald
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` Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015)
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`Per Curiam
`argued that he was entitled to a new trial because his
`attorney’s absence during the phone call testimony denied
`him his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
`counsel. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected his
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`claim, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied review.
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`The United States District Court for the Eastern Dis­
`trict of Michigan granted federal habeas relief, and the
`Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Sixth Circuit held that the
`Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision was both contrary to
`and involved an unreasonable application of this Court’s
`decision in Cronic.
`In the normal course, defendants
`claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must satisfy the
`familiar framework of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S.
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`668, 687 (1984), which requires a showing that “counsel’s
`performance was deficient” and “that the deficient perfor­
`mance prejudiced the defense.” And when reviewing an
`ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, “a court must
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`indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls
`within the wide range of reasonable professional assis­
`tance.” Id., at 689.
`In Cronic, however, we held that courts may presume
`that a defendant has suffered unconstitutional prejudice if
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`he “is denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial.” 466
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`U. S., at 659. And in Bell v. Cone, 535 U. S. 685, 696
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`(2002), we characterized a “critical stage” as one that “held
`significant consequences for the accused.” According to
`the Sixth Circuit, these statements should have compelled
`the Michigan court to hold that the phone call testimony
`was a “critical stage” and that counsel’s absence consti­
`tuted per se ineffective assistance. Without identifying any
`decision from this Court directly in point, the Sixth Circuit
`concluded that the relevant testimony in this case was
`“similar to” our cases applying Cronic. 580 Fed. Appx., at
`284.
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` WOODS v. DONALD
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`Per Curiam
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` II
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`A
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`Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
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`Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat. 1214, a federal court may
`grant habeas relief only when a state court’s decision on
`the merits was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
`application of, clearly established Federal law, as deter­
`mined by” decisions from this Court, or was “based on an
`unreasonable determination of the facts.” 28 U. S. C.
`§2254(d). Donald does not argue that the state-court
`decision in his case was factually erroneous. Instead, he
`argues that the decision was both contrary to and involved
`an unreasonable application of this Court’s ineffective-
`assistance-of-counsel cases.
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`“‘“difficult
`intentionally
`to
`AEDPA’s standard
`is
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`meet.”’” White v. Woodall, 572 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip
`op., at 3) (quoting Metrish v. Lancaster, 569 U. S. ___, ___
`(2013) (slip op., at 5)). We have explained that “‘clearly
`established Federal law’ for purposes of §2254(d)(1) in­
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`cludes only the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this
`Court’s decisions.” White, 572 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3)
`(some internal quotation marks omitted). “And an ‘unrea­
`sonable application of ’ those holdings must be objectively
`unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error will not
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`suffice.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 3–4) (same). To satisfy this
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`high bar, a habeas petitioner is required to “show that the
`state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal
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`court was so lacking in justification that there was an
`error well understood and comprehended in existing law
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`beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.”
`Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. 83, 103 (2011).
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`Adherence to these principles serves important interests
`of federalism and comity. AEDPA’s requirements reflect a
`“presumption that state courts know and follow the law.”
`Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U. S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam).
`When reviewing state criminal convictions on collateral
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` Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015)
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`Per Curiam
`review, federal judges are required to afford state courts
`due respect by overturning their decisions only when there
`could be no reasonable dispute that they were wrong.
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`Federal habeas review thus exists as “a guard against
`extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice sys­
`tems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction
`through appeal.” Harrington, supra, at 102–103 (internal
`quotation marks omitted). This is especially true for
`claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, where AEDPA
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`review must be “‘“doubly deferential”’” in order to afford
`“both the state court and the defense attorney the benefit
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`of the doubt.” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U. S. ___, ___ (2013)
`(slip op., at 1) (quoting Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U. S. 170,
`___ (2011) (slip op., at 17)).
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`B
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`The Sixth Circuit should not have affirmed the Cronic­
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`based grant of habeas relief in this case. The Michigan
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`Court of Appeals’ decision was not contrary to any clearly
`established holding of this Court. We have never ad­
`dressed whether the rule announced in Cronic applies to
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`testimony regarding codefendants’ actions. In Cronic
`itself, we rejected the defendant’s claim that his counsel’s
`lack of experience and short time for preparation warranted
`a presumption of prejudice, not a claim based on coun-
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`sel’s absence. See 466 U. S., at 663–666. When announc­
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`ing the rule in Cronic, we cited earlier cases finding
`prejudice where “counsel was either totally absent, or
`prevented from assisting the accused during a critical
`stage of the proceeding.” Id., at 659, n. 25. But none of
`those cases dealt with circumstances like those present
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`here. And Bell did not involve the absence of counsel;
`instead, we declined to presume prejudice where a capital
`defendant’s counsel “failed to ‘mount some case for life’
`after the prosecution introduced evidence in the sentenc­
`ing hearing and gave a closing statement.” 535 U. S., at
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` WOODS v. DONALD
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`Per Curiam
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`696.
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`Because none of our cases confront “the specific question
`presented by this case,” the state court’s decision could not
`be “contrary to” any holding from this Court. Lopez v.
`Smith, 574 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (per curiam) (slip op., at
`5). The most that the Sixth Circuit could muster was that
`“[t]he testimony of a government witness is similar to the
`trial events that th[is] Court has deemed to be critical
`stages.” 580 Fed. Appx., at 284. But that conclusion is
`doubly wrong. First, if the circumstances of a case are
`only “similar to” our precedents, then the state court’s
`decision is not “contrary to” the holdings in those cases.
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`See, e.g., Carey v. Musladin, 549 U. S. 70, 76–77, and n. 2
`(2006). Second, the Sixth Circuit framed the issue at too
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`high a level of generality. See, e.g., Lopez, supra, at ___
`(slip op., at 5). The relevant testimony was not merely
`“testimony of a government witness”; it was prosecution
`testimony about other defendants. To be sure, the Sixth
`Circuit considered the testimony relevant to Donald be­
`cause he was being prosecuted on an aiding-and-abetting
`theory for felony murder. But Donald’s position was that
`he had nothing to do with the planning among his code­
`fendants. And none of our holdings address counsel’s
`absence during testimony that is irrelevant within the
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`defendant’s own theory of the case.
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`Nor was the state court’s decision an unreasonable
`application of our cases. The Sixth Circuit stated “that a
`critical stage of trial is a ‘step of a criminal proceeding . . .
`that h[olds] significant consequences for the accused.’”
`580 Fed. Appx., at 284 (quoting Bell, supra, at 696). And
`it held that the Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision was
`“objectively unreasonable” because the phone call evidence
`might have indirectly inculpated Donald in the eyes of the
`jury. But that holding is not correct. Just last Term we
`warned the Sixth Circuit that “where the ‘“precise con­
`tours”’ of [a] right remain ‘“unclear,”’ state courts enjoy
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` Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015)
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`Per Curiam
`‘broad discretion’ in their adjudication of a prisoner’s
`claims.” White, 572 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9) (quoting
`Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U. S. 63, 76 (2003), in turn quot­
`ing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U. S. 957, 998 (1991)
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`(KENNEDY, J., concurring in part and in judgment)).
`Within the contours of Cronic, a fairminded jurist could
`conclude that a presumption of prejudice is not warranted
`by counsel’s short absence during testimony about other
`defendants where that testimony was irrelevant to the
`defendant’s theory of the case.
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`Cronic applies in “circumstances that are so likely to
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`prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect
`in a particular case is unjustified.” 466 U. S., at 658. The
`Michigan Court of Appeals’ refusal to apply it to these
`circumstances was not the “extreme malfunction” required
`for federal habeas relief. Harrington, 562 U. S., at 102.
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`III
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`Because we consider this case only in the narrow con­
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`text of federal habeas review, we “expres[s] no view on the
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`merits of the underlying Sixth Amendment principle.”
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`Marshall v. Rodgers, 569 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (per curiam)
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`(slip op., at 7). All that matters here, and all that should
`have mattered to the Sixth Circuit, is that we have not
`held that Cronic applies to the circumstances presented in
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`this case. For that reason, federal habeas relief based
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`upon Cronic is unavailable.
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`The petition for a writ of certiorari and respondent’s
`motion to proceed in forma pauperis are granted. The
`judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
`Sixth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for
`further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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`It is so ordered.