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` Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015)
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` THOMAS, J., dissenting
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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` COUNTY OF MARICOPA, ARIZONA, ET AL. v.
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` ANGEL LOPEZ-VALENZUELA, ET AL.
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`ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
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`STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
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` No. 14–825. Decided June 1, 2015
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`The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. JUSTICE
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`ALITO dissents.
`JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA joins,
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`dissenting from denial of certiorari.
`The Court’s refusal to hear this case shows insufficient
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`respect to the State of Arizona, its voters, and its Consti-
`tution. And it suggests to the lower courts that they have
`free rein to strike down state laws on the basis of dubious
`constitutional analysis. I respectfully dissent.
`In 2006, Arizona voters amended their State Constitu-
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`tion to render ineligible for bail those individuals charged
`with “serious felony offenses” who have “entered or re-
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`mained in the United States illegally and if the proof is
`evident or the presumption great as to the present
`charge.” Ariz. Const., Art. II, §22(A)(4). A divided en banc
`panel of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
`held this provision unconstitutional under two theories
`based on the “substantive component of the Due Process
`Clause.” Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 770 F. 3d 772, 775
`(2014). It first reasoned that the amendment implicates a
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`fundamental interest “‘in liberty’” and is not narrowly
`tailored to serve Arizona’s interest in ensuring that per-
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`sons accused of crimes are available for trial. Id., at 780–
`786. Second, the court held that the amendment “vio-
`late[s] substantive due process by imposing punishment
`before trial.” Id., at 791.
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`Shortly after that decision, Arizona sought a stay of the
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` COUNTY OF MARICOPA v. LOPEZ-VALENZUELA
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` THOMAS, J., dissenting
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`judgment from this Court. In a statement respecting
`denial of the stay application, I noted the unfortunate
`reality that there “appeare[d] to be no reasonable probabil-
`ity that four Justices [would] consider the issue suffi-
`ciently meritorious to grant certiorari.” Maricopa County v.
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`Lopez-Valenzuela, 574 U. S. ___ (2014) (slip op., at 1)
`(internal quotation marks omitted). Though I had hoped
`my prediction would prove wrong, today’s denial confirms
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`that there was “little reason to be optimistic.” Id., at ___
`(slip op., at 2).
`It is disheartening that there are not four Members of
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`this Court who would even review the decision below. As I
`previously explained, States deserve our careful considera-
`tion when lower courts invalidate their constitutional
`provisions. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 1). After all, that is the
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`approach we take when lower courts hold federal statutes
`unconstitutional. See, e.g., Department of Transportation
`v. Association of American Railroads, 573 U. S. ___ (2014)
`(granting review when a federal statutory provision was
`held unconstitutional, notwithstanding absence of a circuit
`split). In fact, Congress historically required this Court to
`review any decision of a federal court of appeals holding
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` that a state statute violated the Federal Constitution. 28
`U. S. C. §1254(2) (1982 ed.). It was not until 1988 that
`Congress eliminated that mandatory jurisdiction and gave
`this Court discretion to review such cases by writ of certio-
`rari. See Pub. Law 100-352, §2, 102 Stat. 662. In my
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`view, that discretion should be exercised with a strong
`dose of respect for state laws. In exercising that discre-
`tion, we should show at least as much respect for state
`laws as we show for federal laws.
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`Our indifference to cases such as this one will only
`embolden the lower courts to reject state laws on ques-
`tionable constitutional grounds. This Court once empha-
`sized the need for judicial restraint when asked to review
`the constitutionality of state laws. See, e.g., Ferguson v.
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` Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015)
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` THOMAS, J., dissenting
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`Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726, 729 (1963) (noting that this Court
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`should refuse to use the Due Process Clause “to strike
`down laws which were thought unreasonable, that is,
`unwise or incompatible with some particular economic or
`social philosophy”); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
`U. S. 379, 391 (1937) (refusing to strike down a state
`regulation on the basis of substantive due process because
`“the Constitution does not recognize an absolute and
`uncontrollable liberty”); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S.
`502, 537–538 (1934) (“Times without number we have said
`that the legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity
`of [a regulation], that every possible presumption is in
`favor of its validity, and that though the court may hold
`views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may not
`be annulled unless palpably in excess of legislative power”);
`Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 446 (1927)
`(Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[A] state legislature can do
`whatever it sees fit to do unless it is restrained by some
`express prohibition in the Constitution . . . , and that
`Courts should be careful not to extend such prohibitions
`beyond their obvious meaning by reading into them con-
`ceptions of public policy that the particular Court may
`happen to entertain”). But for reasons that escape me,
`state statutes have encountered closer scrutiny under the
`Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment than
`federal statutes have under the sister Clause in the Fifth
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`Amendment. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 103–
`104 (1878) (declining to overturn a state tax assessment
`on due process grounds, and noting the “remarkable” fact
`that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause had been
`invoked very rarely since the founding, but that in the
`short time since the Fourteenth Amendment had been
`ratified, “the docket [had become] crowded with cases in
`which [the Court was] asked to hold that State courts and
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`State legislatures have deprived their own citizens of life,
`liberty, or property without due process of law”). This
`Court’s previous admonitions are all too rare today, and
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` COUNTY OF MARICOPA v. LOPEZ-VALENZUELA
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` THOMAS, J., dissenting
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`our steadfast refusal to review decisions straying from
`them only undercuts their influence.
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`For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the
`Court’s denial of certiorari.