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`Per Curiam
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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` STANLEY TAYLOR, ET AL. v. KAREN BARKES, ET AL.
`ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
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`STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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` No. 14–939. Decided June 1, 2015
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` PER CURIAM.
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`Christopher Barkes, “a troubled man with a long history
`of mental health and substance abuse problems,” was
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`arrested on November 13, 2004, for violating his proba-
`tion. Barkes v. First Correctional Medical, Inc., 766 F. 3d
`307, 310–311 (CA3 2014). Barkes was taken to the How-
`ard R. Young Correctional Institution in Wilmington,
`Delaware. As part of Barkes’s intake, a nurse who worked
`for the contractor providing healthcare at the Institution
`conducted a medical evaluation. Id., at 311.
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`The evaluation included a mental health screening
`designed in part to assess whether an inmate was suicidal.
`The nurse employed a suicide screening form based on a
`model form developed by the National Commission on
`Correctional Health Care (NCCHC) in 1997. The form
`listed 17 suicide risk factors. If the inmate’s responses
`and nurse’s observations indicated that at least eight were
`present, or if certain serious risk factors were present, the
`nurse would notify a physician and initiate suicide preven-
`tion measures. Id., at 311, 313.
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`Barkes disclosed that he had a history of psychiatric
`treatment and was on medication. He also disclosed that
`he had attempted suicide in 2003, though not—as far as
`the record indicates—that he had also done so on three
`other occasions. And he indicated that he was not cur-
`rently thinking about killing himself. Because only two risk
`factors were apparent, the nurse gave Barkes a “routine”
`referral to mental health services and did not initiate any
`special suicide prevention measures. Id., at 311.
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` TAYLOR v. BARKES
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`Per Curiam
`Barkes was placed in a cell by himself. Despite what he
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`had told the nurse, that evening he called his wife and told
`her that he “can’t live this way anymore” and was going to
`kill himself. Barkes’s wife did not inform anyone at the
`Institution of this call. The next morning, correctional
`officers observed Barkes awake and behaving normally at
`10:45, 10:50, and 11:00 a.m. At 11:35 a.m., however, an
`officer arrived to deliver lunch and discovered that Barkes
`had hanged himself with a sheet. Id., at 311–312.
`Barkes’s wife and children, respondents here, brought
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`suit under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, against
`various entities and individuals connected with the Insti-
`tution, who they claimed had violated Barkes’s civil rights
`in failing to prevent his suicide. At issue here is a claim
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`against petitioners Stanley Taylor, Commissioner of the
`Delaware Department of Correction (DOC), and Raphael
`Williams, the Institution’s warden. Although it is undis-
`puted that neither petitioner had personally interacted
`with Barkes or knew of his condition before his death,
`respondents alleged that Taylor and Williams had violated
`Barkes’s constitutional right to be free from cruel and
`unusual punishment. Barkes v. First Correctional Medi-
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`cal, Inc., 2008 WL 523216, *7 (D Del., Feb. 27, 2008).
`They did so, according to respondents, by failing to super-
`vise and monitor the private contractor that provided the
`medical treatment—including the intake screening—at
`the Institution. Petitioners moved for summary judgment
`on the ground that they were entitled to qualified immu-
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`nity, but the District Court denied the motion. Barkes v.
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`First Correctional Medical, Inc., 2012 WL 2914915, *8–*12
`(D Del., July 17, 2012).
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`A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third
`Circuit affirmed. The majority first determined that
`respondents had alleged a cognizable theory of supervisory
`liability (a decision upon which we express no view). 766
`F. 3d, at 316–325. The majority then turned to the two-
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` Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015)
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`Per Curiam
`step qualified immunity inquiry, asking “first, whether the
`plaintiff suffered a deprivation of a constitutional or stat-
`utory right; and second, if so, whether that right was
`‘clearly established’ at the time of the alleged misconduct.”
`Id., at 326.
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`Taking these questions in reverse order, the Third
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`Circuit held that it was clearly established at the time of
`Barkes’s death that an incarcerated individual had an
`Eighth Amendment “right to the proper implementation of
`adequate suicide prevention protocols.” Id., at 327. The
`panel majority then concluded there were material factual
`disputes about whether petitioners had violated this right
`by failing to adequately supervise the contractor providing
`medical services at the prison. There was evidence, the
`majority noted, that the medical contractor’s suicide
`screening process did not comply with NCCHC’s latest
`standards, as required by the contract. Those standards
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`allegedly called for a revised screening form and for
`screening by a qualified mental health professional, not a
`nurse. There was also evidence that the contractor did not
`have access to Barkes’s probation records (which would
`have shed light on his mental health history), and that the
`contractor had been short-staffing to increase profits. Id.,
`at 330–331.
`Judge Hardiman dissented. As relevant here, he con-
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`cluded that petitioners were entitled to qualified immu-
`nity because the right on which the majority relied was “a
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`departure from Eighth Amendment case law that had
`never been established before today.” Id., at 345.
`Taylor and Williams petitioned for certiorari. We grant
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`the petition and reverse on the ground that there was no
`violation of clearly established law.
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`“Qualified immunity shields government officials from
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`civil damages liability unless the official violated a statu-
`tory or constitutional right that was clearly established at
`the time of the challenged conduct.” Reichle v. Howards,
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`Per Curiam
`566 U. S. ___, ___ (2012) (slip op., at 5). “To be clearly
`established, a right must be sufficiently clear that every
`reasonable official would have understood that what he is
`doing violates that right.” Ibid. (brackets and internal
`quotation marks omitted). “When properly applied, [quali-
`fied immunity] protects all but the plainly incompetent or
`those who knowingly violate the law.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,
`563 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 12) (internal quota-
`tion marks omitted). “We do not require a case directly on
`point, but existing precedent must have placed the statu-
`tory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Id., at ___
`(slip op., at 9).
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`The Third Circuit concluded that the right at issue was
`best defined as “an incarcerated person’s right to the
`proper implementation of adequate suicide prevention
`protocols.” 766 F. 3d, at 327. This purported right, how-
`ever, was not clearly established in November 2004 in a
`way that placed beyond debate the unconstitutionality of
`the Institution’s procedures, as implemented by the medi-
`cal contractor.
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`No decision of this Court establishes a right to the
`proper implementation of adequate suicide prevention pro-
`tocols. No decision of this Court even discusses suicide
`screening or prevention protocols. And “to the extent that
`a ‘robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority’” in
`the Courts of Appeals “could itself clearly establish the
`federal right respondent alleges,” City and County of San
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`Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (slip op., at
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`16), the weight of that authority at the time of Barkes’s
`death suggested that such a right did not exist. See, e.g.,
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`Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F. 3d 693, 702 (CA6 2001) (“the
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`right to medical care for serious medical needs does not
`encompass the right to be screened correctly for suicidal
`tendencies” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Tittle v.
`Jefferson Cty. Comm’n, 10 F. 3d 1535, 1540 (CA11 1994)
`(alleged “weaknesses in the [suicide] screening process,
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`Per Curiam
`the training of deputies[,] and the supervision of prison-
`ers” did not “amount to a showing of deliberate indiffer-
`ence toward the rights of prisoners”); Burns v. Galveston,
`905 F. 2d 100, 104 (CA5 1990) (rejecting the proposition
`that “the right of detainees to adequate medical care
`includes an absolute right to psychological screening”);
`Belcher v. Oliver, 898 F. 2d 32, 34–35 (CA4 1990) (“The
`general right of pretrial detainees to receive basic medical
`care does not place upon jail officials the responsibility to
`screen every detainee for suicidal tendencies.”).
`The Third Circuit nonetheless found this right clearly
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`established by two of its own decisions, both stemming
`from the same case. Assuming for the sake of argument
`that a right can be “clearly established” by circuit prece-
`dent despite disagreement in the courts of appeals, neither
`of the Third Circuit decisions relied upon clearly estab-
`lished the right at issue. The first, Colburn I, said that if
`officials “know or should know of the particular vulner-
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`ability to suicide of an inmate,” they have an obligation “not
`to act with reckless indifference to that vulnerability.”
`Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 838 F. 2d 663, 669 (1988).
`The decision did not say, however, that detention facilities
`must implement procedures to identify such vulnerable
`inmates, let alone specify what procedures would suffice.
`And the Third Circuit later acknowledged that Colburn I’s
`use of the phrase “or should know”—which might seem to
`nod toward a screening requirement of some kind—was
`erroneous in light of Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U. S. 825
`(1994), which held that Eighth Amendment liability re-
`quires actual awareness of risk. See Serafin v. Johnstown,
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`53 Fed. Appx. 211, 213 (CA3 2002).
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` Nor would Colburn II have put petitioners on notice of
`any possible constitutional violation. Colburn II reiter-
`ated that officials who know of an inmate’s particular vul-
`nerability to suicide must not be recklessly indifferent to
`that vulnerability. Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946
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` TAYLOR v. BARKES
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`Per Curiam
`F. 2d 1017, 1023 (1991). But it did not identify any mini-
`mum screening procedures or prevention protocols that
`facilities must use. In fact, Colburn II revealed that the
`booking process of the jail at issue “include[d] no formal
`physical or mental health screening,” ibid., and yet the
`Third Circuit ruled for the defendants on all claims, see
`id., at 1025–1031.
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`In short, even if the Institution’s suicide screening and
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`prevention measures contained the shortcomings that
`respondents allege, no precedent on the books in Novem-
`ber 2004 would have made clear to petitioners that they
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`were overseeing a system that violated the Constitution.
`Because, at the very least, petitioners were not contraven-
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`ing clearly established law, they are entitled to qualified
`immunity. The judgment of the Third Circuit is reversed.
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`It is so ordered.