throbber
(Slip Opinion)
`
`
`
` OCTOBER TERM, 2015
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`1
`
` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`
`
`
` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`
`
`
` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
`
` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
`
` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
` Syllabus
`
` SIMMONS ET AL. v. HIMMELREICH
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
` No. 15–109. Argued March 22, 2016—Decided June 6, 2016
`
`This case began with two suits filed by respondent Walter Himmel-
`reich, a federal prisoner. He first filed suit against the United States,
`alleging that a severe beating he received from a fellow inmate was
`the result of negligence by prison officials. The Government treated
`the suit as a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which
`allows plaintiffs to seek damages from the United States for certain
`torts committed by federal employees, 28 U. S. C. §1346(b), “[s]ubject
`
`to the provisions of chapter 171” of Title 28. But an “Exceptions” sec-
`tion of the FTCA dictates that “the provisions of [Chapter 171] and
`section 1346(b) of this title . . . shall not apply” to certain categories of
`claims. The Government moved to dismiss the action on the ground
`that the claim fell into the exception for “[a]ny claim based upon . . .
`the exercise or performance . . . [of] a discretionary function,” namely,
`deciding where to house inmates, §2680(a). While the motion was
`pending, Himmelreich filed a second suit: a constitutional tort suit
`
`
`
`against individual Bureau of Prison employees, again alleging that
`
`his beating was the result of prison officials’ negligence. Ordinarily,
`
`the FTCA would have no bearing on that claim. But after the dis-
`missal of Himmelreich’s first suit, the individual employee defend-
`ants argued that Himmelreich’s second suit was foreclosed by the
`FTCA’s judgment bar provision, according to which a judgment in an
`
`FTCA suit forecloses any future suit against individual employees.
`Agreeing, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of
`the individual prison employees. The Sixth Circuit reversed, howev-
`er, holding that the judgment bar provision did not apply to Himmel-
`
`reich’s suit.
`
`
`Held: The judgment bar provision does not apply to the claims dis-
`missed for falling within the “Exceptions” section of the FTCA.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`
`SIMMONS v. HIMMELREICH
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Pp. 3–10.
`
`(a) The FTCA explicitly excepts from its coverage certain categories
`
`of claims, including the one into which Himmelreich’s first suit fell.
`If, as the Government maintains, Chapter 171’s judgment bar provi-
`sion applies to claims in that “Exceptions” category, it applied to
`Himmelreich’s first suit and would preclude any future actions, in-
`cluding his second suit. On Himmelreich’s reading, however, the
`provision does not apply and he may proceed with his second suit.
`Pp. 3–5.
`
`(b) Himmelreich is correct. The FTCA’s “Exceptions” section reads:
`“[T]he provisions of this chapter”—Chapter 171—“shall not apply to
`. . . [a]ny claim based upon . . . the exercise or performance . . . [of] a
`discretionary function or duty.” §2680(a). The judgment bar is a
`provision of Chapter 171. The “Exceptions” section’s plain text thus
`dictates that the judgment bar does “not apply” to cases that, like
`
`Himmelreich’s first suit, are based on the performance of a discre-
`tionary function. Because the judgment bar provision does not apply
`to Himmelreich’s first suit, his second suit—against individual prison
`employees—should be permitted to go forward. Nothing about the
`
`“Exceptions” section or the judgment bar provision gives this Court
`
`any reason to disregard the plain text of the statute. P. 5.
`
`(c) United States v. Smith, 499 U. S. 160, does not require a differ-
`ent result. There, the Court found that the exclusive remedies provi-
`sion of Chapter 171—which prevents a plaintiff from suing an em-
`ployee where the FTCA would allow him to sue the United States
`instead, see §2679(b)(1)—applied to a claim for injuries sustained at
`a hospital in Italy, even though that claim fell within the category of
`“[a]ny claim arising in a foreign country,” one of the “Exceptions” to
`which “the provisions of [Chapter 171] . . . shall not apply,” §2680(k).
`Smith’s outcome, the Government argues, forecloses a literal reading
`of the “Exceptions” provision, but Smith does not control here. First,
`Smith does not even mention the “Exceptions” section’s “shall not ap-
`ply” language. Second, the exclusive remedies provision at issue
`
`there was enacted as part of the Federal Employee Liability Reform
`and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, which also contained a mecha-
`
`nism to convert tort suits against Government employees into FTCA
`
`suits “subject to the limitations and exceptions applicable to those ac-
`
`
`tions.” 499 U. S., at 166 (quoting §2679(d)(4); emphasis in Smith).
`
`By taking note of those “limitations and exceptions,” the Smith Court
`reasoned, the Liability Reform Act was intended to apply to the “Ex-
`
`ceptions” categories of claims. Nothing in the text of the judgment
`bar provision compels the same result here. Pp. 5–7.
`
`
`(d) The Government’s remaining counterargument is a parade of
`horribles that it believes will come to pass if every provision of Chap-
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`3
`
`
`Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016)
`
`
`Syllabus
`ter 171 “shall not apply” to the “Exceptions” categories of claims, but
`it raises few concerns about the judgment bar provision itself. If the
`
`Government is right about Chapter 171’s other provisions, the Court
`
`may hold so in the appropriate case, see Smith, 499 U. S., at 175, but
`the reading adopted here yields utterly sensible results. Had the
`District Court in this case issued a judgment dismissing Himmel-
`reich’s first suit because, e.g., the prison employees were not negli-
`
`gent, it would make sense that the judgment bar provision would
`prevent a second suit against the employees. But where an FTCA
`claim is dismissed because it falls within one of the “Exceptions,” the
`dismissal signals merely that the United States cannot be held liable
`
`for a particular claim; it has no logical bearing on whether an em-
`ployee can be liable instead. Pp. 7–9.
`766 F. 3d 576, affirmed and remanded.
`
` SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`1
`
`
` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
`
`
`
` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
`
` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
`
` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
`
`
` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
`
`
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`
` No. 15–109
`_________________
`
` JERMAINE SIMMONS, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
`
` WALTER J. HIMMELREICH
`
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`
`APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
`
`
`[June 6, 2016]
`
` JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
`
`The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) allows plaintiffs to
`seek damages from the United States for certain torts
`committed by federal employees. 28 U. S. C. §§1346(b),
`2674. Many of the FTCA’s procedural provisions are
`contained in a single chapter of the United States Code,
`Chapter 171. See §§2671–2680. But an “Exceptions”
`section of the FTCA dictates that “the provisions of [Chap-
`
`ter 171] . . . shall not apply” to certain categories of claims.
`At issue in this case is whether one of the “provisions of
`[Chapter 171]”—the so-called judgment bar provision,
`§2676—might nonetheless apply to one of the excepted
`
`claims. We conclude it does not.
`I
`
`A
`
`
`This case began with two suits filed by Walter Himmel-
`
`reich.
`In each, Himmelreich alleged that he had been
`severely beaten by a fellow inmate in federal prison and
`that the beating was the result of prison officials’ negli-
`gence. At the time of the beating, Himmelreich was incar-
`
`cerated for producing child pornography. His assailant
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`SIMMONS v. HIMMELREICH
`
`Opinion of the Court
`had warned prison officials that he would “‘smash’” a
`pedophile if given the opportunity but was nonetheless
`
`released into the general prison population, where he
`
`assaulted Himmelreich. App. 46.
`
`
`Himmelreich filed a first suit against the United States.
`
`The Government treated this first suit as a claim under
`
`the FTCA and moved to dismiss the action, arguing that
`the claim fell into one of the “Exceptions” to the FTCA for
`“[a]ny claim based upon . . . the exercise or performance
`. . . [of] a discretionary function,” namely, deciding where
`to house inmates. §2680(a). The District Court granted
`the Government’s motion to dismiss. (Neither party here
`challenges the outcome of that first suit.)
`
`But before the District Court dismissed that first suit,
`Himmelreich filed a second suit, this one a constitutional
`tort suit against individual Bureau of Prison employees
`rather than against the United States. Ordinarily, the
`FTCA would have nothing to say about such claims. But
`after the dismissal of Himmelreich’s first suit, the individ-
`ual employee defendants argued that Himmelreich’s sec-
`ond suit was foreclosed by the FTCA’s judgment bar provi-
`sion, according to which a judgment in an FTCA suit
`
`forecloses any future suit against individual employees.
`See §2676. As relevant here, the District Court agreed
`
`and granted summary judgment in favor of the individual
`
`prison employees.
`
`
`Himmelreich appealed that ruling. The Sixth Circuit
`reversed, holding that the judgment bar provision did not
`apply to Himmelreich’s suit. Himmelreich v. Federal
`
`Bureau of Prisons et al., 766 F. 3d 576 (2014) (per curiam).
`
`
`We granted certiorari to resolve a Circuit split on
`whether the judgment bar provision applies to suits that,
`like Himmelreich’s, are dismissed as falling within an
`“Exceptio[n]” to the FTCA.1 577 U. S. ___ (2015).
`——————
` 1See Hallock v. Bonner, 387 F. 3d 147 (CA2 2004), vacated on other
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`B
`
`The FTCA’s provisions are contained in two areas of the
`United States Code. One, 28 U. S. C. §1346(b), gives
`
`federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction over tort
`claims against the United States for the acts of its em-
`ployees “[s]ubject to the provisions of chapter 171” of Title
`28.2 Chapter 171, in turn, is labeled “Tort Claims Proce-
`dure” and comprises the remaining provisions of the
`FTCA. §§2671–2680.
`
`Chapter 171 contains an array of provisions. Some
`provisions govern how FTCA claims are to be adjudicated.
`See, e.g., §2674 (specifying scope of United States’ liabil-
`
`ity); §2675(a) (exhaustion requirement); §2678 (restricting
`attorney’s fees). Other provisions limit plaintiffs’ remedies
`outside the FTCA. See, e.g., §2679(a) (cannot sue agency
`for claims within scope of FTCA); §2679(d)(1) (suit against
`federal employee acting within scope of employment au-
`tomatically converted to FTCA action).
`
`The District Court in this case relied on one such
`remedies-limiting provision of Chapter 171, the judgment bar
`provision.3 See §2676. Under the judgment bar provision,
`once a plaintiff receives a judgment (favorable or not) in
`——————
`grounds sub nom. Will v. Hallock, 546 U. S. 345 (2006); Pesnell v.
`Arsenault, 543 F. 3d 1038 (CA9 2008); Williams v. Fleming, 597 F. 3d
`
`
`820, 823–824 (CA7 2010).
`
`2The precise claims at issue are “claims against the United States,
`for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury
`or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent
`or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while
`acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circum-
`
`stances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to
`the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
`omission occurred.” 28 U. S. C. §1346(b).
`3It reads in full: “The judgment in an action under section 1346(b) of
`this title shall constitute a complete bar to any action by the claimant,
`by reason of the same subject matter, against the employee of the
`
` Government whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.” §2676.
`
`
`
`3
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
` SIMMONS v. HIMMELREICH
`
`Opinion of the Court
`an FTCA suit, he generally cannot proceed with a suit
`against an individual employee based on the same under-
`lying facts. The District Court below held that Himmel-
`reich had received a judgment in the first suit (the FTCA
`
`suit against the United States) and so could not proceed
`with the second suit (the individual employee suit based
`on the same underlying facts).
`The FTCA explicitly excepts from its coverage certain
`
`
`categories of claims, including the one into which Himmel-
`reich’s first suit fell:
`
`“Exceptions
`“The provisions of this chapter and section
`
`
`1346(b) of this title shall not apply to—
`“(a) Any claim based upon . . . the exercise or per-
`
`
`formance or the failure to exercise or perform a discre-
`tionary function or duty . . . whether or not the discre-
`tion involved be abused. . . .” §2680.
`“The provisions of this chapter” referenced in the first
`
`line are the provisions of Chapter 171. “[S]ection 1346(b)
`of this title” is the provision giving district courts FTCA
`jurisdiction. And the “Exceptions” to which those portions
`of the FTCA “shall not apply” are 13 categories of claims,
`
`such as any claim that—like Himmelreich’s first suit—
`arises from the performance of a “discretionary function,”
`§2680(a); “[a]ny claim arising in a foreign country,”
`§2680(k); and “[a]ny claim arising from the activities of
`the Tennessee Valley Authority,” §2680(l).
`Both parties agree that district courts do not have juris-
`
`diction over claims that fall into one of the 13 categories of
`“Exceptions” because “section 1346(b) of this title”—the
`provision conferring jurisdiction on district courts—does
`“not apply” to such claims. Both parties also agree that
`at least one of “[t]he provisions of [Chapter 171]”—the
`provision delimiting the United States’ liability, §2674—
`need “not apply” to claims in the “Exceptions” categories
`
`
`
`
`
`4
`
`
`
`
`

`
` Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`because no court will have jurisdiction to hold the United
`States liable on such claims in any event.
`
`The parties disagree, however, about whether the judg-
`
`ment bar provision of Chapter 171 “shall not apply” to
`claims in one of the “Exceptions” categories. The Govern-
`ment maintains that the judgment bar provision does
`apply to such claims. In that case, it applied to Himmel-
`reich’s first suit and would preclude any future actions,
`including his second suit. Himmelreich urges that it does
`not apply. On that reading, there is no reason he cannot
`proceed with his second suit.
`
`II
`
`Himmelreich is correct. The “Exceptions” section of the
`FTCA reads: “[T]he provisions of this chapter”—Chapter
`171—“shall not apply to . . . [a]ny claim based upon . . . the
`exercise or performance . . . [of] a discretionary function or
`duty.” §2680(a). The judgment bar is a provision of Chap-
`ter 171; the plain text of the “Exceptions” section therefore
`
`dictates that it does “not apply” to cases that, like Him-
`melreich’s first suit, are based on the performance of a
`discretionary function. Because the judgment bar provi-
`sion does not apply to Himmelreich’s first suit, Himmel-
`reich’s second suit—the one against individual prison
`employees—should be permitted to go forward.
`
`Absent persuasive indications to the contrary, we pre-
`sume Congress says what it means and means what it
`says. Nothing about the “Exceptions” section or the judg-
`ment bar provision gives us any reason to doubt the plain-
`text result in this case.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`III
`
`A
`
`
`Given the clarity of the “Exceptions” section’s command,
`a reader might be forgiven for wondering how there could
`be any confusion about the statute’s operation. The main
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`5
`
`

`
`6
`
`
`
`SIMMONS v. HIMMELREICH
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
` source of uncertainty on this score, the Government sub-
`mits, is United States v. Smith, 499 U. S. 160 (1991). In
`Smith, we considered another provision of Chapter 171,
`the exclusive remedies provision. Id., at 162. Under the
`exclusive remedies provision, a plaintiff generally cannot
`sue an employee where the FTCA would allow him to sue
`the United States instead. See §2679(b)(1).4
`
` The Smith Court held that this exclusive remedies
`provision applied to a claim for injuries sustained at an
`
`Army hospital in Italy, even though that claim fell within
`the category of “[a]ny claim arising in a foreign country,”
`one of the “Exceptions” to which “the provisions of [Chap-
`ter 171] . . . shall not apply.” §2680(k). The Government
`argues that our literal reading of the “Exceptions” provi-
`sion would foreclose Smith’s outcome because the Smith
`Court applied a provision of Chapter 171 (the exclusive
`remedies provision) to a claim falling within one of the
`“Exceptions” categories (a claim arising in a foreign coun-
`try). Smith, the Government argues, thus establishes that
`we cannot read the command of the “Exceptions” section
`literally and that the judgment bar provision therefore
`should apply to Himmelreich’s discretionary function
`claim.
`The Government’s position has some force. Nonethe-
`
`less, Smith does not control this case. First, Smith does
`
`
`not even cite, let alone discuss, the “shall not apply” lan-
`guage “Exceptions” provision. Second, the exclusive reme-
`dies provision at issue in Smith was enacted as part of the
`Federal Employee Liability Reform and Tort Compensa-
`tion Act of 1988, which contained a mechanism to reduce
`
`the number of tort suits against Government employees.
`
`——————
`4There is an exception to this provision for suits alleging constitu-
`tional violations. See §2679(b)(2)(A). Himmelreich’s second suit—the
`one against individual prison employees—alleged a violation of the
`
`Constitution and so was not foreclosed by the exclusive remedies
`provision.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`7
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`As the Smith Court explained, if “the Attorney General . . .
`certif[ies] that a Government employee named as defend-
`ant was acting within the scope of his employment when
`he committed the alleged tort,” the Liability Reform Act
`dictates that the United States be substituted as the sole
`defendant, and that the action “‘shall proceed in the same
`manner’” as an FTCA action “‘and shall be subject to the
`limitations and exceptions applicable to those actions.’”
`499 U. S., at 166 (quoting §2679(d)(4)); (emphasis in
`Smith). The Smith Court held that the Liability Reform
`
`Act’s reference to “limitations and exceptions” was most
`naturally read to refer to the “Exceptions” section of the
`FTCA. And by taking note of the “Exceptions” section, the
`Smith court reasoned, the Liability Reform Act was in-
`tended to apply to those “Exceptions.”
`
`In light of the unique language of the Liability Reform
`
`
`Act, Smith is distinguishable from this case. Nothing in
`the text of the judgment bar provision compels the same
`result.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`B
`
`The Government’s remaining counterargument amounts
`to a parade of horribles that it believes will come to pass if
`every provision of Chapter 171 “shall not apply” to the
`“Exceptions” categories of claims. See Brief for Petitioners
`52. If the Government is right about the other provisions
`of Chapter 171, the Court may hold so in the appropriate
`case. See Smith, 499 U. S., at 175. But this case deals
`only with the judgment bar provision, and, aside from a
`passing concern about duplicative litigation, the Govern-
`ment does not argue that any such cavalcade would follow
`if that provision does not apply to the excepted claims. It
`is enough for our purposes that the statute’s clear di-
`rective would not lead to hard-to-explain results when
`applied to the judgment bar provision in particular.
`
`
`To the contrary, our holding that the judgment bar
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`SIMMONS v. HIMMELREICH
`
`Opinion of the Court
`provision “shall not apply” to the categories of claims in
`
`the “Exceptions” section in fact allows the statute to oper-
`ate in an utterly sensible manner. Ordinarily, the judg-
`ment bar provision prevents unnecessarily duplicative
`litigation. If the District Court in this case had issued a
`judgment dismissing Himmelreich’s first suit because the
`prison employees were not negligent, because Himmel-
`reich was not harmed, or because Himmelreich simply
`failed to prove his claim, it would make little sense to give
`Himmelreich a second bite at the money-damages apple by
`allowing suit against the employees: Himmelreich’s first
`suit would have given him a fair chance to recover dam-
`ages for his beating.
`Where an FTCA claim is dismissed because it falls
`
`within one of the “Exceptions,” by contrast, the judgment
`bar provision makes much less sense. The dismissal of a
`claim in the “Exceptions” section signals merely that the
`United States cannot be held liable for a particular claim;
`it has no logical bearing on whether an employee can be
`held liable instead.5 To apply the judgment bar so as to
`——————
`5This conclusion is buttressed by analogy to the common-law doctrine
`of claim preclusion, which prevents duplicative litigation by barring one
`party from again suing the other over the same underlying facts. This
`Court has said that the judgment bar provision “functions in much the
`
` same way” as that doctrine. Will, 546 U. S., at 354. (The judgment bar
`provision supplements common-law claim preclusion by closing a
`narrow gap: At the time that the FTCA was passed, common-law claim
`preclusion would have barred a plaintiff from suing the United States
`after having sued an employee but not vice versa. See Restatement of
`Judgments §§99, 96(1)(a), Comments b and d (1942). The judgment bar
`provision applies where a plaintiff first sues the United States and then
`
`sues an employee.)
`
`But claim preclusion principles would not foreclose a second suit
`
`
`where the first suit was dismissed under the “Exceptions” section.
`
`Dismissals for “personal immunity”—defenses that can be asserted by
`one party but not others—do not have claim-preclusive effect. See
`Restatement of Judgments §96, Comment g; Restatement (Second) of
`
`Judgments §51(1)(b), and Comment c (1980). The “Exceptions” section
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`8
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`9
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016)
`
`
`Opinion of the Court
`foreclose a future suit against an employee thus would be
`passing strange.
`The Government’s reading would yield another strange
`
`result. According to the Government, the viability of a
`plaintiff ’s meritorious suit against an individual employee
`should turn on the order in which the suits are filed (or
`the order in which the district court chooses to address
`motions). For example, had the District Court in this case
`addressed the individual employee suit first, there would
`be no FTCA judgment in the picture, and so the judgment
`bar provision would not affect the outcome of the suit. The
`Government’s reading would thus encourage litigants to
`file suit against individual employees before suing the
`United States to avoid being foreclosed from recovery
`altogether. Yet this result is at odds with one of the
`FTCA’s purposes, channeling liability away from individ-
`ual employees and toward the United States. See Dalehite
`
`v. United States, 346 U. S. 15, 25 (1953).
`We decline to ignore the text of the statute to achieve
`
`these imprudently restrictive results. Accordingly, we
`read “[t]he provisions of this chapter . . . shall not apply”
`as it was written. The judgment bar provision—one of the
`“provisions of this chapter”—does not apply to the catego-
`ries of claims in the “Exceptions” sections of the FTCA.
`We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals
`and remand the case for further proceedings consistent
`
` with this opinion.
`
`
`
`It is so ordered.
`
`
`
`——————
`
`reflects the United States’ decision not to accept liability for certain
`
`types of claims; like other “personal immunities,” the “Exceptions”
`
`section is only a defense for—and can only be “taken advantage of” by—
`
`
`the United States. See Restatement of Judgments §96, Comment g. A
`
`dismissal under the “Exceptions” section would not be entitled to claim-
`preclusive effect; just so, the roughly analogous judgment bar should
`
`
`
`not foreclose a second suit against individual employees.

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Try refreshing this document from the court, or go back to the docket to see other documents.

We are unable to display this document.

Go back to the docket to see more.