(Slip Opinion)
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2015
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`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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` Syllabus
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` SIMMONS ET AL. v. HIMMELREICH
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
` No. 15–109. Argued March 22, 2016—Decided June 6, 2016
`
`This case began with two suits filed by respondent Walter Himmel-
`reich, a federal prisoner. He first filed suit against the United States,
`alleging that a severe beating he received from a fellow inmate was
`the result of negligence by prison officials. The Government treated
`the suit as a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which
`allows plaintiffs to seek damages from the United States for certain
`torts committed by federal employees, 28 U. S. C. §1346(b), “[s]ubject
`
`to the provisions of chapter 171” of Title 28. But an “Exceptions” sec-
`tion of the FTCA dictates that “the provisions of [Chapter 171] and
`section 1346(b) of this title . . . shall not apply” to certain categories of
`claims. The Government moved to dismiss the action on the ground
`that the claim fell into the exception for “[a]ny claim based upon . . .
`the exercise or performance . . . [of] a discretionary function,” namely,
`deciding where to house inmates, §2680(a). While the motion was
`pending, Himmelreich filed a second suit: a constitutional tort suit
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`against individual Bureau of Prison employees, again alleging that
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`his beating was the result of prison officials’ negligence. Ordinarily,
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`the FTCA would have no bearing on that claim. But after the dis-
`missal of Himmelreich’s first suit, the individual employee defend-
`ants argued that Himmelreich’s second suit was foreclosed by the
`FTCA’s judgment bar provision, according to which a judgment in an
`
`FTCA suit forecloses any future suit against individual employees.
`Agreeing, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of
`the individual prison employees. The Sixth Circuit reversed, howev-
`er, holding that the judgment bar provision did not apply to Himmel-
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`reich’s suit.
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`Held: The judgment bar provision does not apply to the claims dis-
`missed for falling within the “Exceptions” section of the FTCA.
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`SIMMONS v. HIMMELREICH
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`Syllabus
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`Pp. 3–10.
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`(a) The FTCA explicitly excepts from its coverage certain categories
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`of claims, including the one into which Himmelreich’s first suit fell.
`If, as the Government maintains, Chapter 171’s judgment bar provi-
`sion applies to claims in that “Exceptions” category, it applied to
`Himmelreich’s first suit and would preclude any future actions, in-
`cluding his second suit. On Himmelreich’s reading, however, the
`provision does not apply and he may proceed with his second suit.
`Pp. 3–5.
`
`(b) Himmelreich is correct. The FTCA’s “Exceptions” section reads:
`“[T]he provisions of this chapter”—Chapter 171—“shall not apply to
`. . . [a]ny claim based upon . . . the exercise or performance . . . [of] a
`discretionary function or duty.” §2680(a). The judgment bar is a
`provision of Chapter 171. The “Exceptions” section’s plain text thus
`dictates that the judgment bar does “not apply” to cases that, like
`
`Himmelreich’s first suit, are based on the performance of a discre-
`tionary function. Because the judgment bar provision does not apply
`to Himmelreich’s first suit, his second suit—against individual prison
`employees—should be permitted to go forward. Nothing about the
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`“Exceptions” section or the judgment bar provision gives this Court
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`any reason to disregard the plain text of the statute. P. 5.
`
`(c) United States v. Smith, 499 U. S. 160, does not require a differ-
`ent result. There, the Court found that the exclusive remedies provi-
`sion of Chapter 171—which prevents a plaintiff from suing an em-
`ployee where the FTCA would allow him to sue the United States
`instead, see §2679(b)(1)—applied to a claim for injuries sustained at
`a hospital in Italy, even though that claim fell within the category of
`“[a]ny claim arising in a foreign country,” one of the “Exceptions” to
`which “the provisions of [Chapter 171] . . . shall not apply,” §2680(k).
`Smith’s outcome, the Government argues, forecloses a literal reading
`of the “Exceptions” provision, but Smith does not control here. First,
`Smith does not even mention the “Exceptions” section’s “shall not ap-
`ply” language. Second, the exclusive remedies provision at issue
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`there was enacted as part of the Federal Employee Liability Reform
`and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, which also contained a mecha-
`
`nism to convert tort suits against Government employees into FTCA
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`suits “subject to the limitations and exceptions applicable to those ac-
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`tions.” 499 U. S., at 166 (quoting §2679(d)(4); emphasis in Smith).
`
`By taking note of those “limitations and exceptions,” the Smith Court
`reasoned, the Liability Reform Act was intended to apply to the “Ex-
`
`ceptions” categories of claims. Nothing in the text of the judgment
`bar provision compels the same result here. Pp. 5–7.
`
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`(d) The Government’s remaining counterargument is a parade of
`horribles that it believes will come to pass if every provision of Chap-
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`Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016)
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`Syllabus
`ter 171 “shall not apply” to the “Exceptions” categories of claims, but
`it raises few concerns about the judgment bar provision itself. If the
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`Government is right about Chapter 171’s other provisions, the Court
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`may hold so in the appropriate case, see Smith, 499 U. S., at 175, but
`the reading adopted here yields utterly sensible results. Had the
`District Court in this case issued a judgment dismissing Himmel-
`reich’s first suit because, e.g., the prison employees were not negli-
`
`gent, it would make sense that the judgment bar provision would
`prevent a second suit against the employees. But where an FTCA
`claim is dismissed because it falls within one of the “Exceptions,” the
`dismissal signals merely that the United States cannot be held liable
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`for a particular claim; it has no logical bearing on whether an em-
`ployee can be liable instead. Pp. 7–9.
`766 F. 3d 576, affirmed and remanded.
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` SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
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` Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016)
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`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`_________________
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` No. 15–109
`_________________
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` JERMAINE SIMMONS, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
`
` WALTER J. HIMMELREICH
`
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`
`APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
`
`
`[June 6, 2016]
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` JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
`
`The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) allows plaintiffs to
`seek damages from the United States for certain torts
`committed by federal employees. 28 U. S. C. §§1346(b),
`2674. Many of the FTCA’s procedural provisions are
`contained in a single chapter of the United States Code,
`Chapter 171. See §§2671–2680. But an “Exceptions”
`section of the FTCA dictates that “the provisions of [Chap-
`
`ter 171] . . . shall not apply” to certain categories of claims.
`At issue in this case is whether one of the “provisions of
`[Chapter 171]”—the so-called judgment bar provision,
`§2676—might nonetheless apply to one of the excepted
`
`claims. We conclude it does not.
`I
`
`A
`
`
`This case began with two suits filed by Walter Himmel-
`
`reich.
`In each, Himmelreich alleged that he had been
`severely beaten by a fellow inmate in federal prison and
`that the beating was the result of prison officials’ negli-
`gence. At the time of the beating, Himmelreich was incar-
`
`cerated for producing child pornography. His assailant
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`SIMMONS v. HIMMELREICH
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`Opinion of the Court
`had warned prison officials that he would “‘smash’” a
`pedophile if given the opportunity but was nonetheless
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`released into the general prison population, where he
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`assaulted Himmelreich. App. 46.
`
`
`Himmelreich filed a first suit against the United States.
`
`The Government treated this first suit as a claim under
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`the FTCA and moved to dismiss the action, arguing that
`the claim fell into one of the “Exceptions” to the FTCA for
`“[a]ny claim based upon . . . the exercise or performance
`. . . [of] a discretionary function,” namely, deciding where
`to house inmates. §2680(a). The District Court granted
`the Government’s motion to dismiss. (Neither party here
`challenges the outcome of that first suit.)
`
`But before the District Court dismissed that first suit,
`Himmelreich filed a second suit, this one a constitutional
`tort suit against individual Bureau of Prison employees
`rather than against the United States. Ordinarily, the
`FTCA would have nothing to say about such claims. But
`after the dismissal of Himmelreich’s first suit, the individ-
`ual employee defendants argued that Himmelreich’s sec-
`ond suit was foreclosed by the FTCA’s judgment bar provi-
`sion, according to which a judgment in an FTCA suit
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`forecloses any future suit against individual employees.
`See §2676. As relevant here, the District Court agreed
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`and granted summary judgment in favor of the individual
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`prison employees.
`
`
`Himmelreich appealed that ruling. The Sixth Circuit
`reversed, holding that the judgment bar provision did not
`apply to Himmelreich’s suit. Himmelreich v. Federal
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`Bureau of Prisons et al., 766 F. 3d 576 (2014) (per curiam).
`
`
`We granted certiorari to resolve a Circuit split on
`whether the judgment bar provision applies to suits that,
`like Himmelreich’s, are dismissed as falling within an
`“Exceptio[n]” to the FTCA.1 577 U. S. ___ (2015).
`——————
` 1See Hallock v. Bonner, 387 F. 3d 147 (CA2 2004), vacated on other
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`Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016)
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`Opinion of the Court
`B
`
`The FTCA’s provisions are contained in two areas of the
`United States Code. One, 28 U. S. C. §1346(b), gives
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`federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction over tort
`claims against the United States for the acts of its em-
`ployees “[s]ubject to the provisions of chapter 171” of Title
`28.2 Chapter 171, in turn, is labeled “Tort Claims Proce-
`dure” and comprises the remaining provisions of the
`FTCA. §§2671–2680.
`
`Chapter 171 contains an array of provisions. Some
`provisions govern how FTCA claims are to be adjudicated.
`See, e.g., §2674 (specifying scope of United States’ liabil-
`
`ity); §2675(a) (exhaustion requirement); §2678 (restricting
`attorney’s fees). Other provisions limit plaintiffs’ remedies
`outside the FTCA. See, e.g., §2679(a) (cannot sue agency
`for claims within scope of FTCA); §2679(d)(1) (suit against
`federal employee acting within scope of employment au-
`tomatically converted to FTCA action).
`
`The District Court in this case relied on one such
`remedies-limiting provision of Chapter 171, the judgment bar
`provision.3 See §2676. Under the judgment bar provision,
`once a plaintiff receives a judgment (favorable or not) in
`——————
`grounds sub nom. Will v. Hallock, 546 U. S. 345 (2006); Pesnell v.
`Arsenault, 543 F. 3d 1038 (CA9 2008); Williams v. Fleming, 597 F. 3d
`
`
`820, 823–824 (CA7 2010).
`
`2The precise claims at issue are “claims against the United States,
`for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury
`or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent
`or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while
`acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circum-
`
`stances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to
`the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
`omission occurred.” 28 U. S. C. §1346(b).
`3It reads in full: “The judgment in an action under section 1346(b) of
`this title shall constitute a complete bar to any action by the claimant,
`by reason of the same subject matter, against the employee of the
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` Government whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.” §2676.
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`3
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`

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` SIMMONS v. HIMMELREICH
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`Opinion of the Court
`an FTCA suit, he generally cannot proceed with a suit
`against an individual employee based on the same under-
`lying facts. The District Court below held that Himmel-
`reich had received a judgment in the first suit (the FTCA
`
`suit against the United States) and so could not proceed
`with the second suit (the individual employee suit based
`on the same underlying facts).
`The FTCA explicitly excepts from its coverage certain
`
`
`categories of claims, including the one into which Himmel-
`reich’s first suit fell:
`
`“Exceptions
`“The provisions of this chapter and section
`
`
`1346(b) of this title shall not apply to—
`“(a) Any claim based upon . . . the exercise or per-
`
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`formance or the failure to exercise or perform a discre-
`tionary function or duty . . . whether or not the discre-
`tion involved be abused. . . .” §2680.
`“The provisions of this chapter” referenced in the first
`
`line are the provisions of Chapter 171. “[S]ection 1346(b)
`of this title” is the provision giving district courts FTCA
`jurisdiction. And the “Exceptions” to which those portions
`of the FTCA “shall not apply” are 13 categories of claims,
`
`such as any claim that—like Himmelreich’s first suit—
`arises from the performance of a “discretionary function,”
`§2680(a); “[a]ny claim arising in a foreign country,”
`§2680(k); and “[a]ny claim arising from the activities of
`the Tennessee Valley Authority,” §2680(l).
`Both parties agree that district courts do not have juris-
`
`diction over claims that fall into one of the 13 categories of
`“Exceptions” because “section 1346(b) of this title”—the
`provision conferring jurisdiction on district courts—does
`“not apply” to such claims. Both parties also agree that
`at least one of “[t]he provisions of [Chapter 171]”—the
`provision delimiting the United States’ liability, §2674—
`need “not apply” to claims in the “Exceptions” categories
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` Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016)
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`Opinion of the Court
`because no court will have jurisdiction to hold the United
`States liable on such claims in any event.
`
`The parties disagree, however, about whether the judg-
`
`ment bar provision of Chapter 171 “shall not apply” to
`claims in one of the “Exceptions” categories. The Govern-
`ment maintains that the judgment bar provision does
`apply to such claims. In that case, it applied to Himmel-
`reich’s first suit and would preclude any future actions,
`including his second suit. Himmelreich urges that it does
`not apply. On that reading, there is no reason he cannot
`proceed with his second suit.
`
`II
`
`Himmelreich is correct. The “Exceptions” section of the
`FTCA reads: “[T]he provisions of this chapter”—Chapter
`171—“shall not apply to . . . [a]ny claim based upon . . . the
`exercise or performance . . . [of] a discretionary function or
`duty.” §2680(a). The judgment bar is a provision of Chap-
`ter 171; the plain text of the “Exceptions” section therefore
`
`dictates that it does “not apply” to cases that, like Him-
`melreich’s first suit, are based on the performance of a
`discretionary function. Because the judgment bar provi-
`sion does not apply to Himmelreich’s first suit, Himmel-
`reich’s second suit—the one against individual prison
`employees—should be permitted to go forward.
`
`Absent persuasive indications to the contrary, we pre-
`sume Congress says what it means and means what it
`says. Nothing about the “Exceptions” section or the judg-
`ment bar provision gives us any reason to doubt the plain-
`text result in this case.
`
`
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`
`III
`
`A
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`Given the clarity of the “Exceptions” section’s command,
`a reader might be forgiven for wondering how there could
`be any confusion about the statute’s operation. The main
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`SIMMONS v. HIMMELREICH
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`Opinion of the Court
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` source of uncertainty on this score, the Government sub-
`mits, is United States v. Smith, 499 U. S. 160 (1991). In
`Smith, we considered another provision of Chapter 171,
`the exclusive remedies provision. Id., at 162. Under the
`exclusive remedies provision, a plaintiff generally cannot
`sue an employee where the FTCA would allow him to sue
`the United States instead. See §2679(b)(1).4
`
` The Smith Court held that this exclusive remedies
`provision applied to a claim for injuries sustained at an
`
`Army hospital in Italy, even though that claim fell within
`the category of “[a]ny claim arising in a foreign country,”
`one of the “Exceptions” to which “the provisions of [Chap-
`ter 171] . . . shall not apply.” §2680(k). The Government
`argues that our literal reading of the “Exceptions” provi-
`sion would foreclose Smith’s outcome because the Smith
`Court applied a provision of Chapter 171 (the exclusive
`remedies provision) to a claim falling within one of the
`“Exceptions” categories (a claim arising in a foreign coun-
`try). Smith, the Government argues, thus establishes that
`we cannot read the command of the “Exceptions” section
`literally and that the judgment bar provision therefore
`should apply to Himmelreich’s discretionary function
`claim.
`The Government’s position has some force. Nonethe-
`
`less, Smith does not control this case. First, Smith does
`
`
`not even cite, let alone discuss, the “shall not apply” lan-
`guage “Exceptions” provision. Second, the exclusive reme-
`dies provision at issue in Smith was enacted as part of the
`Federal Employee Liability Reform and Tort Compensa-
`tion Act of 1988, which contained a mechanism to reduce
`
`the number of tort suits against Government employees.
`
`——————
`4There is an exception to this provision for suits alleging constitu-
`tional violations. See §2679(b)(2)(A). Himmelreich’s second suit—the
`one against individual prison employees—alleged a violation of the
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`Constitution and so was not foreclosed by the exclusive remedies
`provision.
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` Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016)
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`Opinion of the Court
`As the Smith Court explained, if “the Attorney General . . .
`certif[ies] that a Government employee named as defend-
`ant was acting within the scope of his employment when
`he committed the alleged tort,” the Liability Reform Act
`dictates that the United States be substituted as the sole
`defendant, and that the action “‘shall proceed in the same
`manner’” as an FTCA action “‘and shall be subject to the
`limitations and exceptions applicable to those actions.’”
`499 U. S., at 166 (quoting §2679(d)(4)); (emphasis in
`Smith). The Smith Court held that the Liability Reform
`
`Act’s reference to “limitations and exceptions” was most
`naturally read to refer to the “Exceptions” section of the
`FTCA. And by taking note of the “Exceptions” section, the
`Smith court reasoned, the Liability Reform Act was in-
`tended to apply to those “Exceptions.”
`
`In light of the unique language of the Liability Reform
`
`
`Act, Smith is distinguishable from this case. Nothing in
`the text of the judgment bar provision compels the same
`result.
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`B
`
`The Government’s remaining counterargument amounts
`to a parade of horribles that it believes will come to pass if
`every provision of Chapter 171 “shall not apply” to the
`“Exceptions” categories of claims. See Brief for Petitioners
`52. If the Government is right about the other provisions
`of Chapter 171, the Court may hold so in the appropriate
`case. See Smith, 499 U. S., at 175. But this case deals
`only with the judgment bar provision, and, aside from a
`passing concern about duplicative litigation, the Govern-
`ment does not argue that any such cavalcade would follow
`if that provision does not apply to the excepted claims. It
`is enough for our purposes that the statute’s clear di-
`rective would not lead to hard-to-explain results when
`applied to the judgment bar provision in particular.
`
`
`To the contrary, our holding that the judgment bar
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`SIMMONS v. HIMMELREICH
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`Opinion of the Court
`provision “shall not apply” to the categories of claims in
`
`the “Exceptions” section in fact allows the statute to oper-
`ate in an utterly sensible manner. Ordinarily, the judg-
`ment bar provision prevents unnecessarily duplicative
`litigation. If the District Court in this case had issued a
`judgment dismissing Himmelreich’s first suit because the
`prison employees were not negligent, because Himmel-
`reich was not harmed, or because Himmelreich simply
`failed to prove his claim, it would make little sense to give
`Himmelreich a second bite at the money-damages apple by
`allowing suit against the employees: Himmelreich’s first
`suit would have given him a fair chance to recover dam-
`ages for his beating.
`Where an FTCA claim is dismissed because it falls
`
`within one of the “Exceptions,” by contrast, the judgment
`bar provision makes much less sense. The dismissal of a
`claim in the “Exceptions” section signals merely that the
`United States cannot be held liable for a particular claim;
`it has no logical bearing on whether an employee can be
`held liable instead.5 To apply the judgment bar so as to
`——————
`5This conclusion is buttressed by analogy to the common-law doctrine
`of claim preclusion, which prevents duplicative litigation by barring one
`party from again suing the other over the same underlying facts. This
`Court has said that the judgment bar provision “functions in much the
`
` same way” as that doctrine. Will, 546 U. S., at 354. (The judgment bar
`provision supplements common-law claim preclusion by closing a
`narrow gap: At the time that the FTCA was passed, common-law claim
`preclusion would have barred a plaintiff from suing the United States
`after having sued an employee but not vice versa. See Restatement of
`Judgments §§99, 96(1)(a), Comments b and d (1942). The judgment bar
`provision applies where a plaintiff first sues the United States and then
`
`sues an employee.)
`
`But claim preclusion principles would not foreclose a second suit
`
`
`where the first suit was dismissed under the “Exceptions” section.
`
`Dismissals for “personal immunity”—defenses that can be asserted by
`one party but not others—do not have claim-preclusive effect. See
`Restatement of Judgments §96, Comment g; Restatement (Second) of
`
`Judgments §51(1)(b), and Comment c (1980). The “Exceptions” section
`
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`Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016)
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`Opinion of the Court
`foreclose a future suit against an employee thus would be
`passing strange.
`The Government’s reading would yield another strange
`
`result. According to the Government, the viability of a
`plaintiff ’s meritorious suit against an individual employee
`should turn on the order in which the suits are filed (or
`the order in which the district court chooses to address
`motions). For example, had the District Court in this case
`addressed the individual employee suit first, there would
`be no FTCA judgment in the picture, and so the judgment
`bar provision would not affect the outcome of the suit. The
`Government’s reading would thus encourage litigants to
`file suit against individual employees before suing the
`United States to avoid being foreclosed from recovery
`altogether. Yet this result is at odds with one of the
`FTCA’s purposes, channeling liability away from individ-
`ual employees and toward the United States. See Dalehite
`
`v. United States, 346 U. S. 15, 25 (1953).
`We decline to ignore the text of the statute to achieve
`
`these imprudently restrictive results. Accordingly, we
`read “[t]he provisions of this chapter . . . shall not apply”
`as it was written. The judgment bar provision—one of the
`“provisions of this chapter”—does not apply to the catego-
`ries of claims in the “Exceptions” sections of the FTCA.
`We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals
`and remand the case for further proceedings consistent
`
` with this opinion.
`
`
`
`It is so ordered.
`
`
`
`——————
`
`reflects the United States’ decision not to accept liability for certain
`
`types of claims; like other “personal immunities,” the “Exceptions”
`
`section is only a defense for—and can only be “taken advantage of” by—
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`the United States. See Restatement of Judgments §96, Comment g. A
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`dismissal under the “Exceptions” section would not be entitled to claim-
`preclusive effect; just so, the roughly analogous judgment bar should
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`not foreclose a second suit against individual employees.