No. 15-1293
`In the Supreme Court of the United States
`
`
`
`MICHELLE K. LEE, UNDER SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
`FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DIRECTOR, UNITED
`STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PETITIONER
`v.
`SIMON SHIAO TAM
`
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
`TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
`
`
`BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER
`
`
`IAN HEATH GERSHENGORN
`Acting Solicitor General
`Counsel of Record
`BENJAMIN C. MIZER
`Principal Deputy Assistant
`Attorney General
`MALCOLM L. STEWART
`Deputy Solicitor General
`NICOLE A. SAHARSKY
`Assistant to the Solicitor
`General
`DOUGLAS N. LETTER
`MARK R. FREEMAN
`DANIEL TENNY
`JOSHUA M. SALZMAN
`Attorneys
`Department of Justice
`Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
`SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov
`(202) 514-2217
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`SARAH HARRIS
`General Counsel
`NATHAN K. KELLEY
`Solicitor
`THOMAS W. KRAUSE
`Deputy Solicitor
`CHRISTINA J. HIEBER
`THOMAS L. CASAGRANDE
`MOLLY R. SILFEN
`MARY BETH WALKER
`Associate Solicitors
`U.S. Patent and Trademark
` Office
`Alexandria, Va. 22313
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`QUESTION PRESENTED
`Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1052(a),
`provides that no trademark shall be refused registra-
`tion on account of its nature unless, inter alia, it
`“[c]onsists of * * * matter which may disparage * * *
`persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or nation-
`al symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disre-
`pute.” The question presented is as follows:
`Whether the disparagement provision in 15 U.S.C.
`1052(a) is facially invalid under the Free Speech
`Clause of the First Amendment.
`
`
`(I)
`
`

`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`Opinions below .............................................................................. 1
`Jurisdiction .................................................................................... 1
`Constitutional and statutory provisions involved ...................... 2
`Statement ...................................................................................... 2
`Summary of argument ................................................................. 8
`Argument:
`The federal statutory prohibition on the registration of
`disparaging trademarks, 15 U.S.C. 1052(a), is facially
`constitutional under the First Amendment ........................ 13
`A. There is a fundamental constitutional distinction
`between laws that regulate speech and laws that
`define eligibility for a government program ............... 14
`B. Section 1052(a)’s ban on registration of disparag-
`ing marks does not restrict speech .............................. 20
`1. Section 1052(a) establishes criteria for
`government assistance in identifying the
`source of goods and services in commerce .......... 20
`2. Section 1052(a)’s disparagement provision
`does not restrict speech ......................................... 25
`Ineligibility for a government benefit is not
`itself a First Amendment burden......................... 28
`4. Section 1052(a)’s disparagement provision
`does not place an unconstitutional condition
`on mark owners ...................................................... 31
`5. Section 1052(a)’s encouragement to use non-
`disparaging marks does not impermissibly
`chill speech .............................................................. 34
`C. Section 1052 establishes permissible criteria for
`the federal trademark-registration program ............. 35
`1. The federal trademark-registration program,
`including Section 1052(a)’s ban on registration
`of disparaging marks, is similar to programs
`this Court has upheld ............................................ 35
`
`3.
`
`
`
`(III)
`
`

`
`IV
`
`Table of Contents—Continued: Page
`2. Section 1052(a)’s disparagement provision
`furthers government interests analogous to
`those implicated in Walker ................................... 37
`3. The court of appeals erred in failing to recog-
`nize that this is a government-program case ...... 41
`4. Section 1052(a)’s disparagement provision is
`not a viewpoint-based restriction on speech ....... 43
`5. Limiting federal trademark registration to
`marks that are not disparaging furthers leg-
`itimate government interests ............................... 48
`6. The court of appeals’ concern about inconsist-
`ent enforcement does not justify facial invali-
`dation of Section 1052(a)’s disparagement
`provision .................................................................. 50
`Conclusion ................................................................................... 54
`Appendix — Constitutional and statutory provisions .......... 1a
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases:
`
`
`
`Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l,
`Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013) .......................... 11, 31, 32, 33, 34
`American Freedom Def. Initiative v. Massachusetts
`Bay Transp. Auth., 781 F.3d 571 (1st Cir. 2015),
`cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 793 (2016) ............................... 45, 46
`B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc.,
`135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015) ........................................... 2, 3, 20, 35
`Boulevard Entm’ t, Inc., In re, 334 F.3d 1336
`(Fed. Cir. 2003) ............................................................. 25, 51
`Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) ...................... 51
`Brunetti, In re, Serial No. 85310960, 2014 WL
`3976439 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 1, 2014), appeal pending,
`No. 15-1109 (Fed. Cir. docketed Oct. 28, 2014)................ 23
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`V
`
`
`
`Page
`Cases—Continued:
`Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 311 (1872) ............... 47
`Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
`Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) ............................................. 48
`Davenport v. Washington Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177
`(2007) ............................................................... 9, 17, 35, 41, 44
`Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) ............................... 47
`Geller, In re, 751 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014),
`cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 944 (2015) ..................................... 53
`Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403
`(1916) .................................................................................... 20
`Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) ................................. 29
`Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
`379 U.S. 241 (1964).............................................................. 49
`Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) ..................... 49
`Lebanese Arak Corp., In re, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d 1215
`(T.T.A.B. 2010) .................................................................... 25
`Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533
`(2001) .............................................................................. 33, 43
`Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) ....................................... 14
`McGinley, In re, 660 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1981) .............. 6, 25
`Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418
`(2003) .................................................................................... 47
`National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S.
`569 (1998) .................................................................... passim
`Old Glory Condom Corp., In re, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216
`(T.T.A.B. 1993) .................................................................... 50
`Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc.,
`469 U.S. 189 (1985).......................................................... 2, 28
`Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460
`(2009) .............................................................................. 19, 42
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`VI
`
`Page
`
`Cases—Continued:
`Pro-Football Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439
`(E.D. Va. 2015), appeal pending, No. 15-1874
`(4th Cir. docketed Aug. 6, 2015) .................................. 39, 50
`Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159
`(1995) .................................................................................... 47
`R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) ................... 45
`Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash.,
`461 U.S. 540 (1983)..................................................... passim
`Ridley v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth.,
`390 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2004) ........................................... 45, 46
`Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va.,
`515 U.S. 819 (1995).............................................................. 46
`Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) ......................... passim
`San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United
`States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987) ................... 48
`Shinnecock Smoke Shop, In re, 571 F.3d 1171
`(Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1149 (2010) ........ 51
`Trade-Mark Cases, In re, 100 U.S. 82 (1879) ........... 2, 20, 35
`Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763
`(1992) .................................................................................... 20
`United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S.
`90 (1918) ............................................................................... 20
`United States v. American Library Ass’n, 539 U.S.
`194 (2003) ........................................................... 16, 17, 30, 49
`Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc.,
`529 U.S. 205 (2000).............................................................. 47
`Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans,
`Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015) ........................................ passim
`Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705
`(1977) .................................................................. 19, 38, 40, 43
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`VII
`
`Case—Continued:
`Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353
`(2009) ........................................................................... passim
`
`Page
`
`Constitution, treaties and statutes:
`
`
`U.S. Const. Amend. I .............................................. passim, 1a
`General Inter-American Convention for Trade Mark
`and Commercial Protection, Feb. 20, 1929, Art.
`3(4), 46 Stat. 2916, T.S. No. 833 ......................................... 24
`Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
`Property, Mar. 20, 1883, Art. 6, 25 Stat. 1376 ............ 24, 50
`Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
`Property, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583,
`828 U.N.T.S. 305:
`Art. 6quinquies, 21 U.S.T. 1643-1645, 828 U.N.T.S.
`331, 333 ....................................................................... 22
`Art. 6quinquies(A)(1), 21 U.S.T. 1643, 828 U.N.T.S.
`331 ............................................................................... 50
`Art. 6quinquies(B)(3), 21 U.S.T. 1644, 828 U.N.T.S.
`331 ............................................................................... 50
`Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 5, 33 Stat. 725..................... 24
`Act of July 5, 1946 (Lanham Act), ch. 540, 60 Stat.
`427 (15 U.S.C. 1051 et seq.) .................................................. 3
`§ 2(a), 60 Stat. 428 ........................................................... 23
`15 U.S.C. 1051(a) ......................................................... 4, 1a
`15 U.S.C. 1051(a)(1) ......................................... 3, 10, 22, 1a
`15 U.S.C. 1052 .................................................... passim, 7a
`15 U.S.C. 1052(a) ............................................... passim, 7a
`15 U.S.C. 1052(b) ................................................... 4, 23, 7a
`15 U.S.C. 1052(c) ................................................... 4, 23, 8a
`15 U.S.C. 1052(d) ............................................. 4, 23, 44, 8a
`15 U.S.C. 1052(e)(1) ..................................................... 4, 9a
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`VIII
`
`Page
`Statutes—Continued:
`15 U.S.C. 1052(e)(1)-(3) ............................................. 23, 9a
`15 U.S.C. 1052(e)(5) ............................................... 4, 23, 9a
`15 U.S.C. 1053 .................................................. 3, 4, 20, 10a
`15 U.S.C. 1057(a) ............................................. 3, 10, 22, 49
`15 U.S.C. 1057(b) ............................................. 3, 10, 22, 27
`15 U.S.C. 1062 ........................................................ 3, 10, 22
`15 U.S.C. 1063 .................................................................. 52
`15 U.S.C. 1064 .................................................................. 52
`15 U.S.C. 1065 ................................................ 3, 22, 28, 10a
`15 U.S.C. 1067 .................................................................. 52
`15 U.S.C. 1070 .................................................................. 52
`15 U.S.C. 1071 .................................................................. 52
`15 U.S.C. 1072 .................................................. 3, 10, 22, 27
`15 U.S.C. 1091 ........................................................ 3, 10, 22
`15 U.S.C. 1111 ............................................................ 22, 49
`15 U.S.C. 1115 .......................................................... 40, 14a
`15 U.S.C. 1115(a) ................................................. 3, 27, 14a
`15 U.S.C. 1115(b) ...................................... 3, 10, 22, 28, 14a
`15 U.S.C. 1117(a) ............................................................. 21
`15 U.S.C. 1124 .................................................................. 27
`15 U.S.C. 1125 ...................................................... 3, 21, 16a
`15 U.S.C. 1125(a) ................................................. 2, 26, 16a
`15 U.S.C. 1125(a)(1) ................................................. 20, 16a
`15 U.S.C. 1125(b) ................................................. 2, 21, 18a
`15 U.S.C. 1125(d) ................................................. 2, 21, 22a
`15 U.S.C. 1127 .................................................. 2, 3, 21, 28a
`15 U.S.C. 1141b ................................................................ 22
`18 U.S.C. 871 .......................................................................... 45
`20 U.S.C. 954(d)(1) ................................................................. 16
`22 U.S.C. 7631(f ) .................................................................... 33
`
`
`
`

`
`IX
`
`Page
`Statutes—Continued:
`35 U.S.C. 42(c)(1) ................................................................... 42
`35 U.S.C. 42(c)(2) ................................................................... 42
`Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 504.801(c) (West Supp.
`2015) ..................................................................................... 18
`
`Miscellaneous:
`
`
`
`William Henry Browne, A Treatise on the Law of
`Trade-Marks (1873) ........................................................... 26
`H.R. Rep. No. 219, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945) ................. 24
`1 Anne Gilson LaLonde, Gilson on Trademarks
`(2016) .................................................................................... 20
`Anne Gilson LaLonde & Jerome Gilson, Trademarks
`Laid Bare: Marks That May Be Scandalous Or
`Immoral, 101 Trademark Rep. 1476 (2011) ..................... 24
`3 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks
`and Unfair Competition (4th ed. 2016) ............................ 24
`Thomas Sheridan, A Complete Dictionary of the
`English Language (6th ed. 1796) ...................................... 29
` U.S. Patent and Trademark Office:
`Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure
`(TMEP) (Oct. 2016), https://mpep.uspto.gov/
`RDMS/TMEP/current .............................................. 53
`Trademark Official Gazette, https://www.uspto.
`gov/learning-and-resources/official-gazette/
`trademark-official-gazette-tmog (last visited
`Nov. 9, 2016) ............................................................... 22
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`In the Supreme Court of the United States
`
`
`
`No. 15-1293
`MICHELLE K. LEE, UNDER SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
`FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DIRECTOR, UNITED
`STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PETITIONER
`v.
`SIMON SHIAO TAM
`
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
`TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
`
`
`BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER
`
`
`OPINIONS BELOW
`The opinion of the en banc court of appeals (Pet.
`App. 1a-122a) is reported at 808 F.3d 1321. The opin-
`ion of a panel of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 123a-
`161a) is reported at 785 F.3d 567. The opinion of the
`Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (Pet. App. 162a-
`182a) is reported at 108 U.S.P.Q.2d 1305.
`JURISDICTION
`The judgment of the court of appeals was entered
`on December 22, 2015. On March 10, 2016, the Chief
`Justice extended the time within which to file a peti-
`tion for a writ of certiorari to and including April 20,
`2016, and the petition was filed on that date. The
`petition for a writ of certiorari was granted on Sep-
`tember 29, 2016. The jurisdiction of this Court rests
`on 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
`
`(1)
`
`

`
`2
`
`CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
`PROVISIONS INVOLVED
`Relevant constitutional and statutory provisions
`are reprinted in an appendix to this brief. App., infra,
`1a-29a.
`
`STATEMENT
`1. A trademark is a “word, name, symbol, or de-
`vice” used by a person “to identify and distinguish his
`or her goods” in commerce and “to indicate the source
`of the goods.” 15 U.S.C. 1127. “[T]rademarks desira-
`bly promote competition and the maintenance of
`product quality.” Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park &
`Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 193 (1985). Trademark law
`also protects the public by preventing competing mer-
`chants from using similar marks to confuse or mislead
`consumers. See, e.g., B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Har-
`gis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1299 (2015).
`Trademark rights are not created by federal law,
`but rather arise through use of a mark in commerce in
`connection with particular goods and services. See,
`e.g., B & B Hardware, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 1299; In re
`Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879). Those
`common-law rights include the right to prevent others
`from using the mark and the right to sue for infringe-
`ment. See ibid.
`Certain federal remedies for infringement, dilution,
`and unfair competition are available to owners of all
`marks used in interstate or foreign commerce, regard-
`less of whether a mark is registered. See 15 U.S.C.
`1125(a), (b), and (d); see also B & B Hardware, 135
`S. Ct. at 1301 (federal cause of action for infringe-
`
`
`
`

`
`3
`
`ment applies to all mark owners).1 Congress has also
`created a system of federal registration that confers
`additional benefits upon the owners of registered marks.
`See B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1300; see general-
`ly Act of July 5, 1946 (Lanham Act), ch. 540, 60 Stat.
`427 (15 U.S.C. 1051 et seq.). For example, registration
`provides prima facie evidence of the owner’s exclusive
`right to use the mark in commerce in connection with
`the goods or services listed in the registration. 15
`U.S.C. 1057(b), 1115(a). Registration also provides con-
`structive notice of the registrant’s claim of ownership
`of the mark. 15 U.S.C. 1072. After five years of regis-
`tration, an owner’s right to use a trademark can be-
`come “incontestable,” so that it may be challenged only
`on limited grounds. 15 U.S.C. 1065, 1115(b). In order
`to facilitate the mark owner’s ability to invoke these
`protections, the government issues to the owner a cer-
`tificate of registration “in the name of the United States
`of America,” 15 U.S.C. 1057(a); publishes the mark in
`the PTO’s Trademark Official Gazette, 15 U.S.C.
`1062; and records the mark in the PTO’s Principal Re-
`gister or Supplemental Register, 15 U.S.C. 1051(a)(1),
`1057(a), 1091. 2
`To obtain federal registration, a mark owner sub-
`mits an application to the United States Patent and
`
`
`1 Contrary to the court of appeals’ suggestion (Pet. App. 4a-5a),
`a mark need not be federally registered for the mark owner to
`invoke these remedies. Section 1125 refers to a “mark,” and the
`Lanham Act’s definition of “mark” does not require registration.
`See 15 U.S.C. 1127; p. 21, infra.
`2 These federal registration and remedy provisions apply equally
`to trademarks, which identify goods in commerce, and service
`marks (such as respondent’s mark), which identify services in
`commerce. See 15 U.S.C. 1053, 1127.
`
`
`

`
`4
`
`Trademark Office (PTO). 15 U.S.C. 1051(a). Only
`marks meeting the criteria set out by Congress can
`be registered. As relevant here, Congress has direct-
`ed the PTO to “refuse[] registration” of marks consist-
`ing of or comprising “matter which may disparage
`* * * persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or
`national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or
`disrepute,” even if they are capable of distinguishing
`the owner’s goods or services. 15 U.S.C. 1052(a). 3
`2. Respondent is the lead singer of a dance-rock
`band called “The Slants.” Pet. App. 10a. In 2011, he
`sought to federally register the mark THE SLANTS
`in connection with live performances by his band. Id.
`at 162a & n.1, 166a; see J.A. 12-24. 4 Respondent had
`been using that mark in commerce to identify the
`band since 2006. Pet. App. 10a; J.A. 13.
`A PTO examining attorney refused to register the
`mark on the ground that it is disparaging to persons
`of Asian ancestry. J.A. 25-31, 33-38; see 15 U.S.C.
`1052(a), 1053. The examining attorney relied on evi-
`dence that “[s]lant” is a “negative term regarding the
`shape of the eyes of certain persons of Asian descent,”
`which has a “long history of being used to deride and
`
`3 Congress also has directed the PTO to refuse registration of
`immoral, deceptive, and scandalous marks, 15 U.S.C. 1052(a);
`marks containing a flag, coat of arms, or insignia of the United
`States, a State, or a foreign nation, 15 U.S.C. 1052(b); marks
`including a name, portrait, or signature of a living person without
`his or her consent, 15 U.S.C. 1052(c); marks that so resemble other
`marks that they are likely to cause confusion, 15 U.S.C. 1052(d);
`marks that are merely descriptive, 15 U.S.C. 1052(e)(1); and marks
`that are functional, 15 U.S.C. 1052(e)(5).
`4 Respondent first filed a trademark-registration application for
`THE SLANTS in 2010, but he subsequently abandoned that ap-
`plication. Pet. App. 10a n.2.
`
`
`
`

`
`5
`
`mock a physical feature of those individuals.” J.A. 28.
`The examining attorney noted that the refusal of reg-
`istration “does not mean that [the band] must use a
`different name with its music performances” or “is
`otherwise prohibited from using the wording ‘The
`Slants’ in association with its music.” J.A. 30.
`The PTO’s Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
`(Board) affirmed. Pet. App. 162a-182a. The Board
`concluded that respondent’s mark is used to refer to
`an identifiable group of people—persons of Asian
`ancestry—and that the mark is disparaging to a sub-
`stantial composite of that group. Id. at 173a-174a,
`180a-181a. The Board explained that dictionary defi-
`nitions and other record evidence “unanimously cate-
`gorize[d] the word ‘slant,’ when meaning a person of
`Asian descent, as disparaging,” id. at 180a, and that
`the band itself has characterized its name as “derived
`from an ethnic slur for Asians,” id. at 166a (citation
`omitted). Respondent had argued that he sought to
`“take on * * * stereotypes” about Asians rather than
`to disparage persons of Asian ancestry, ibid., but the
`Board determined that a mark’s status as “disparag-
`ing” does not depend on the applicant’s purpose in
`using the mark, id. at 181a. The Board further con-
`cluded that the PTO’s refusal to register respondent’s
`mark does not violate the First Amendment because
`the denial of registration does not suppress speech or
`proscribe conduct, but simply prevents respondent
`from calling upon the resources of the federal gov-
`ernment to assist him in enforcing the mark. Id. at
`181a-182a.
`3. A panel of the court of appeals affirmed. Pet.
`App. 123a-161a. The court first rejected respondent’s
`argument that the Board had erred in finding his
`
`
`
`

`
`6
`
`mark disparaging under Section 1052(a). The court
`concluded that substantial evidence supports the
`Board’s findings that “the mark THE SLANTS refers
`to people of Asian descent” and that the mark “is
`likely offensive to a substantial composite of people of
`Asian descent.” Id. at 127a-131a. The court noted
`that “the definitions in evidence universally character-
`ize the word ‘slant’ as disparaging, offensive, or an
`ethnic slur when used to refer to a person of Asian
`descent.” Id. at 130a.
`The court of appeals panel rejected respondent’s
`various constitutional challenges, including his facial
`First Amendment challenge to Section 1052(a)’s dis-
`paragement provision. Relying on circuit precedent,
`the court explained that “the PTO’s refusal to register
`[the] mark does not affect [respondent’s] right to use
`it”; that “[n]o conduct is proscribed, and no tangible
`form of expression is suppressed”; and that respond-
`ent’s First Amendment rights therefore are not
`“abridged by the refusal to register his mark.” Pet.
`App. 131a (quoting In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484
`(C.C.P.A. 1981), overruled by Pet. App. 1a-122a); see
`id. at 131a-132a (citing other Federal Circuit decisions
`reaching the same conclusion). The court also reject-
`ed respondent’s vagueness, due process, and equal
`protection challenges. Id. at 132a-134a.
`4. The en banc court of appeals vacated the Board’s
`decision and remanded. Pet. App. 1a-122a. The court
`first reviewed the record evidence and upheld the
`panel’s determination that respondent’s mark is “dis-
`parag[ing]” within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. 1052(a).
`Pet. App. 12a-13a & n.3. The court further held, how-
`ever, that Section 1052(a)’s ban on the registration of
`
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`7
`
`disparaging trademarks is facially unconstitutional.
`Id. at 3a, 19a n.5.
`The en banc court of appeals rejected the govern-
`ment’s argument that Congress may, consistent with
`the First Amendment, create an optional program of
`federal trademark registration without opening that
`program to racial slurs and other disparaging marks.
`Pet. App. 27a-28a. Instead, the court viewed Section
`1052(a)’s ban on registration of disparaging trade-
`marks as a law that “penalize[s] private speech merely
`because [the government] disapproves of the message
`it conveys.” Id. at 2a. Because the court interpreted
`Section 1052(a)’s disparagement provision as a view-
`point-based restriction on speech, it subjected the
`provision to strict scrutiny and found it facially invalid
`under the First Amendment. Id. at 17a-19a, 67a. The
`court also stated that it would find the provision un-
`constitutional even under the more forgiving First
`Amendment standard governing restrictions on com-
`mercial speech because there is no “substantial gov-
`ernment interest justifying” Congress’s decision to
`forbid federal registration of disparaging marks. Id.
`at 61a-67a.
`Judge O’Malley (joined by Judge Wallach) filed a
`concurring opinion, Pet. App. 68a-80a, agreeing with
`the majority’s First Amendment analysis and stating
`the view that Section 1052(a)’s disparagement provi-
`sion also is unconstitutionally vague (an issue the
`majority did not reach), id. at 68a. Judge Dyk (joined
`in part by Judges Lourie and Reyna) concurred in
`part and dissented in part. Id. at 80a-104a. He would
`have held that the ban on registration of disparaging
`marks is facially constitutional because registration is
`a government benefit for commercial speech that rea-
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`8
`
`sonably may be denied to disparaging marks. Id. at
`90a-97a. He would have further held, however, that
`the statute is unconstitutional as applied here because
`respondent’s mark involves “political” speech. Id. at
`103a-104a.
`Judge Lourie dissented, concluding that the dis-
`paragement provision is constitutional because it does
`not prohibit any speech but instead permissibly de-
`fines the boundaries of a federal program. Pet. App.
`104a-108a. Judge Reyna also dissented, id. at 108a-
`122a, expressing the view that Section 1052(a)’s dis-
`paragement provision is a permissible regulation of
`commercial speech because it “directly advances the
`government’s substantial interest in the orderly flow
`of commerce,” id. at 108a.
`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
`The prohibition on registration of disparaging marks
`in 15 U.S.C. 1052(a) is facially constitutional under the
`First Amendment. Section 1052(a) defines the marks
`eligible for federal registration and publication and
`for the federal benefits associated with that govern-
`ment program. It does not in any way restrict respon-
`dent’s freedom of speech. Nothing in the First Amend-
`ment requires Congress to encourage the use of racial
`slurs in interstate commerce.
`A. This Court has recognized a fundamental dis-
`tinction between laws that regulate speech and laws
`that selectively fund a government program. “[W]hen
`the Government appropriates public funds to establish
`a program it is entitled to define the limits of that
`program.” Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991).
` Applying that principle, the Court has upheld the
`denial of federal tax-exempt status for non-profit
`organizations’ lobbying activities, see Regan v. Taxa-
`
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`

`
`9
`
`tion With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 546
`(1983), and has sustained federal regulations that
`prohibited use of family-planning funds for abortion-
`related services, Rust, 500 U.S. at 194. In so holding,
`the Court has “reject[ed] the notion that First Amend-
`ment rights are somehow not fully realized unless
`they are subsidized by the State.” Regan, 461 U.S. at
`546 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted);
`see Rust, 500 U.S. at 192-193. The Court has also
`applied the “general rule that the Government may
`choose not to subsidize speech” (id. at 200) in uphold-
`ing conditions on other forms of government assis-
`tance, such as the provision of a payroll-deduction
`mechanism for use by a union in collecting agency-
`shop fees. See Davenport v. Washington Educ. Ass’n,
`551 U.S. 177, 187-188 (2007); see also Ysursa v. Poca-
`tello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 359 (2009). And the
`Court has upheld the State of Texas’s decision not to
`provide a “mobile billboard” for offensive messages on
`state specialty license plates. Walker v. Texas Div.,
`Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239,
`2253 (2015) (citation omitted).
`The common thread running through these deci-
`sions is that the government has significant discretion
`to decide which activities to fund and what criteria to
`use for inclusion in government programs. Because
`the government is not restricting speech, but merely
`declining to provide government assistance, the strict
`scrutiny normally applicable to content- and view-
`point-based distinctions is inappropriate.
`B. Section 1052(a) establishes criteria for participa-
`tion in the government’s trademark-registration pro-
`gram; it does not restrict speech.
`
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`10
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`Trademark rights arise though use of the mark in
`commerce, not by operation of federal law, and a mark
`holder may enforce its mark without registering it.
`But voluntary federal registration provides important
`benefits. Among other things, registration provides
`notice of the registrant’s claim of ownership of the
`mark and prima facie evidence of validity. 15 U.S.C.
`1057(b), 1072, 1115(b). The registrant is issued a cer-
`tificate “in the name of the United States of America”
`and under the seal of the PTO, and the registered mark
`is published in the PTO’s Trademark Official Gazette
`and on its official register. 15 U.S.C. 1051(a)(1), 1057(a),
`1062, 1091.
`A mark is not eligible for federal registration if,
`inter alia, it contains “matter which may disparage
`* * * persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or
`national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or
`disrepute.” 15 U.S.C. 1052(a). Refusal of registration
`does not affect respondent’s ability to use THE
`SLANTS as a trademark or to engage in any other
`speech, but simply renders unavailable the various
`benefits and protections that federal registration pro-
`vides. Those benefits are directly traceable to the
`resources devoted by the federal government to exam-
`ining, publishing, and issuing certificates of registra-
`tion for those marks. Under the court of appeals’
`decision, the federal government would be required to
`register, publish, and transmit to foreign countries
`marks containing crude references to women based on
`parts of their anatomy; the most repellent racial slurs
`and white-sup