No. 15-1293
`IN THE
`Supreme Court of the United States
`__________
` MICHELLE K. LEE, UNDER SECRETARY OF
`COMMERCE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
`DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES PATENT AND
`TRADEMARK OFFICE,
`
`
`Petitioner,
`
`
`
`
`
`v.
`
`SIMON SHIAO TAM,
`
`Respondent,
`__________
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
`TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
`__________
`BRIEF FOR AMANDA BLACKHORSE, MARCUS
`BRIGGS-CLOUD, PHILLIP GOVER, JILLIAN
`PAPPAN AND COURTNEY TSOTIGH AS AMICI
`CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
`__________
`JESSE A. WITTEN
` Counsel of Record
`TORE T. DEBELLA
`PATRICK H. THOMPSON
`DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP
`1500 K Street NW
`Washington, DC 20005
`(202) 842-8800
`Jesse.Witten@dbr.com
`Counsel for Amici Curiae
`
`ADAM G. YOFFIE
`DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP
`105 College Road East
`Princeton, NJ 08542
`(609) 716-6500
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`i
`
`QUESTIONS PRESENTED
`Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act provides that a
`mark is not eligible for federal registration if it
`“[c]onsists of or comprises . . . matter which may
`disparage . . . persons, living or dead . . . or bring
`them into contempt, or disrepute.” 15 U.S.C. §
`1052(a).
`1. Does the disparagement provision of Section
`2(a) violate the First Amendment?
`2. Is the disparagement provision void
`vagueness under the Due Process Clause?
`3. Should
`the disparagement provision be
`interpreted according to its plain language?*
`
`
`
`for
`
`
`* The Government’s Petition for a Writ of Certiorari presented
`the first question. Respondent Simon Tam’s Opposition raised
`the latter two questions.
`
`

`
`B.
`
`ii
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`QUESTIONS PRESENTED ...................................... i
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... v
`INTEREST OF THE AMICI ..................................... 1
`INTRODUCTION ..................................................... 2
`A.
`Trademark And Service Mark
`Registration Process. ........................... 2
`The Owner Of An Unregistrable
`Mark Has Statutory And
`Common Law Enforcement
`Rights ................................................... 4
`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ................................... 6
`ARGUMENT ............................................................. 9
`I.
`THE DISPARAGEMENT PROVISION
`DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FIRST
`AMENDMENT ............................................... 9
`A.
`Tam’s First Amendment Rights
`Were Not Affected ................................ 9
`1.
`Refusal To Register A
`Mark May Affect The
`Owner’s Ability To Enjoin
`Others From Speaking,
`But The Right To Silence
`Others Is Not A First
`Amendment Right ..................... 9
`
`
`
`

`
`3.
`
`2.
`
`iii
`
`2. Many Federal Trademark
`And Similar Laws
`Discriminate On The Basis
`Of Content And Would
`Fall If The Disparagement
`Provision Is Held
`Unconstitutional ..................... 15
`Unregistrable Marks Are
`Enforceable. Their Owners
`Are Fully Capable Of
`Silencing Others ...................... 18
`Refusing To Register A Mark Is
`An Example Of Government
`Speech ............................................... 19
`1.
`A USPTO Registration
`Certificate And The
`Principal Register Are
`Government Documents ......... 20
`Trademark Registrations
`Are Government Speech ......... 23
`THE DISPARAGEMENT PROVISION
`IS NOT VOID FOR VAGUENESS .............. 26
`A.
`The Standard Of Review Is
`Lenient Because Section 2(a) Of
`The Lanham Act Does Not Make
`Any Conduct Unlawful ...................... 26
`The Term “May Disparage” Is
`Not Unconstitutionally Vague .......... 27
`
`B.
`
`B.
`
`II.
`
`
`
`

`
`1.
`
`iv
`
`The Disparagement
`Provision Gives Fair
`Warning ................................... 28
`
`2.
`
`The Disparagement
`Provision Does Not
`Authorize Arbitrary And
`Discriminatory
`Enforcement ............................ 31
`III. SECTION 2(A) SHOULD BE
`INTERPRETED ACCORDING TO ITS
`PLAIN MEANING ....................................... 35
`A.
`The Inclusion Of “May” In “May
`Disparage” Means That Proof Of
`Actual Disparagement Is Not
`Required For A Mark To Be
`Unregistrable ..................................... 35
`Intent To Disparage Is Not
`Required ............................................. 37
`Evidence Of A “Substantial
`Composite” Is One Way To
`Demonstrate That A Mark
`Contains Matter That “May
`Disparage,” But Is Not The Only
`Way ..................................................... 38
`
`CONCLUSION ........................................................ 41
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`
`
`v
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`CASES
`
`Accuride Int’l, Inc. v. Accuride Corp.,
`871 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1989) ................................ 5
`Am. Legion v. Matthew,
`144 F.3d 498 (7th Cir. 1998) ................................ 17
`Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns,
`28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994) .................................. 10
`B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus.,
`135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015) ...................................... 2, 19
`Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine,
`318 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 2003) ................................ 10
`City of Chicago v. Morales,
`527 U.S. 41 (1999) .......................................... 27, 28
`In re City of Houston,
`731 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2013) .............................. 4
`Doe v. Chao,
`540 U.S. 614 (2004) .............................................. 36
`F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.,
`799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015) ........................... 26, 27
`FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc.,
`132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012) .......................................... 27
`Flowers v. State,
`220 S.W.3d 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) .............. 39
`FTC v. Morton Salt Co.,
`334 U.S. 37 (1948) ................................................ 36
`In re Geller,
`751 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ...................... 38, 39
`George Nelson Found. v. Modernica,
`12 F. Supp. 3d 635 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) ...................... 9
`
`
`
`

`
`vi
`
`
`Golan v. Holder,
`132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) ............................................ 14
`Grayned v. City of Rockford,
`408 U.S. 104 (1972) ........................................ 26, 27
`Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc.,
`308 F.3d 1156 (Fed. Cir. 2002) .......................... 4, 5
`Hershey’s Co. v. Art Van Furniture, Inc.,
`2008 WL 4724756 (E.D. Mich. Oct.
`24, 2008) ............................................................... 10
`Hill v. Colorado,
`530 U.S. 703 (2000) .............................................. 28
`Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside,
`Hoffman Estates, Inc.,
`455 U.S. 489 (1982) .................................. 26, 27, 34
`Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,
`561 U.S. 1 (2010) .................................................. 34
`Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Assn.,
`544 U.S. 550 (2005) .............................................. 19
`Johnson v. United States,
`135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) .......................................... 34
`The Last Best Beef, LLC v. Dudas,
`506 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 2007) ................................ 16
`Leidersdorf v. Flint,
`7 N.W. 252 (Wis. 1880) .......................................... 5
`Marsh v. Chambers,
`463 U.S. 783 (1983) .......................................... 8, 29
`In re Mavety Media Grp., Ltd.,
`33 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1994) .............................. 40
`McCann v. Anthony,
`21 Mo. App. 83 (1886) ............................................ 5
`In re McGinley,
`660 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1981) .............................. 40
`Mitchell Bros. Film Grp. v. Cinema Adult Theater,
`604 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1979) ................................ 15
`
`
`
`

`
`vii
`
`
`Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,
`524 U.S. 569 (1998) .............................. 6, 13, 27, 30
`Negusie v. Holder,
`555 U.S. 511 (2009) .............................................. 38
`New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc.,
`971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992) ................................ 11
`Park ’N Fly v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc.,
`469 U.S. 189 (1985) .............................................. 24
`Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,
`555 U.S. 460 (2009) .................................... 6, 13, 19
`Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse,
`112 F. Supp. 3d 439 (E.D. Va. 2015) ......... 1, 34, 37
`Radiance Found., Inc. v. NAACP,
`25 F. Supp. 3d 865 (E.D. Va. 2014) ..................... 11
`Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnik,
`559 U.S. 154 (2010) ........................................ 18, 19
`Ridley v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth.,
`390 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2004) .................................. 30
`Rubin v. City of Lancaster,
`710 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2013) .............................. 29
`San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v.
`United States Olympic Comm.,
`483 U.S. 522 (1987) ............................ 10, 11, 16, 17
`Simpson v. Chesterfield Cty. Bd. of Supervisors,
`404 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 2005) .......................... 29, 30
`Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough
`Coffee, Inc.,
`736 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2013) ................................. 11
`Sugar Busters LLC v. Brennan,
`177 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 1999) .................................. 5
`In re Tam,
`785 F.3d 567 (Fed. Cir. 2015) .............................. 39
`In re Tam,
`808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) .... passim
`
`
`
`

`
`viii
`
`
`Town of Greece v. Galloway,
`134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014) .......................................... 29
`Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,
`505 U.S. 763 (1992) ................................................ 5
`United States v. Arias-Espinosa,
`704 F.3d 616 (9th Cir. 2012) ................................ 36
`United States v. Lexington Mill &
`Elevator Co.,
`232 U.S. 399 (1914) .............................................. 36
`United States v. Mead,
`533 U.S. 218 (2001) .............................................. 33
`United States v. Williams,
`553 U.S. 285 (2008) .............................................. 26
`Wag More Dogs, LLC v. Cozart,
`680 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2012) ................................ 28
`Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of
`Confederate Veterans, Inc.,
`135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015) .................................. passim
`Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
`491 U.S. 781 (1989) .............................................. 28
`Welch v. United States,
`136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) .......................................... 34
`Wrenn v. Boy Scouts of Am.,
`2008 WL 4792683 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28,
`2008) ..................................................................... 17
`
`
`DOCKETED CASES
`
`Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, appeal
`docketed, No. 15-1874 (4th Cir. Aug.
`6, 2015) ............................................................... 1, 2
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`ix
`
`
`TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD DECISIONS
`
`Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc.,
`111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1080 (T.T.A.B. 2014) .......... passim
`Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc.,
`50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705 (T.T.A.B. 1999) .............. 28, 40
`In re Heeb Media, LLC,
`89 U.S.P.Q.2d 1071 (T.T.A.B. 2008) .................... 39
`In re Lebanese Arak Corp.,
`94 U.S.P.Q.2d 1215 (T.T.A.B. 2010) .................... 35
`In re Squaw Valley Dev. Corp.,
`80 U.S.P.Q.2d 1264 (T.T.A.B. 2006) .................... 33
`In re Tam,
`108 U.S.P.Q.2d 1305 (T.T.A.B. 2013) .................. 38
`
`
`CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
`
`U.S. Const., art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 ...................................... 15
`U.S. Const. amend. I ......................................... passim
`
`LEGISLATIVE MATERIAL
`
`H.R. Rep. No. 2283 (1942) ........................................ 36
`Hearings on H.R. 82 Before the House
`Comm. on Patents, 78th Cong., 1st
`Sess. (1943) .......................................................... 36
`Hearings on H.R. 82 Before the
`Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
`Patents, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944) ................... 36
`Hearings on H.R. 102, H.R. 5461, S.
`895, Before the Subcomm. on
`Trademarks of the House Comm. on
`Patents, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) .................. 36
`
`
`
`

`
`x
`
`
`Hearings on H.R. 4744 Before the
`Subcomm. on Trademarks of the
`House Comm. on Patents, 76th
`Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) ......................................... 36
`
`
`STATUTES, RULES & REGULATIONS
`
`15 U.S.C. § 1051 ...................................................... 2, 3
`15 U.S.C. § 1052 ................................................ passim
`15 U.S.C. § 1053 .......................................................... 3
`15 U.S.C. § 1057 .......................................................... 3
`15 U.S.C. § 1057(a) .................................................... 20
`15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) .................................................... 23
`15 U.S.C. § 1062 .......................................................... 3
`15 U.S.C. § 1063 .......................................................... 3
`15 U.S.C. § 1067(b) .................................................... 31
`15 U.S.C. § 1070 ................................................ 3, 4, 33
`15 U.S.C. § 1071(b) ...................................................... 1
`15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) ............................................ 4, 7, 18
`15 U.S.C. § 1127 .......................................................... 2
`17 U.S.C. § 411(a) ...................................................... 18
`36 U.S.C. § 20907 ...................................................... 17
`36 U.S.C. § 21702 ...................................................... 17
`36 U.S.C. § 21705 ...................................................... 17
`36 U.S.C. § 21904 ...................................................... 17
`36 U.S.C. § 22306 ...................................................... 17
`36 U.S.C. § 22505 ...................................................... 17
`36 U.S.C. § 22706 ...................................................... 17
`36 U.S.C. § 30106 ...................................................... 17
`36 U.S.C. § 30306 ...................................................... 17
`36 U.S.C. § 30507 ...................................................... 17
`36 U.S.C. § 30706 ...................................................... 17
`36 U.S.C. § 30905 ...................................................... 16
`36 U.S.C. § 40306 ................................................ 16, 17
`
`
`
`

`
`xi
`
`
`36 U.S.C. § 50305 ...................................................... 17
`36 U.S.C. § 70506 ...................................................... 17
`36 U.S.C. § 70902 ...................................................... 17
`36 U.S.C. § 70907 ...................................................... 17
`36 U.S.C. § 80305 ...................................................... 16
`36 U.S.C. § 140304 .................................................... 17
`36 U.S.C. § 150707 .................................................... 17
`36 U.S.C. § 152306 .................................................... 18
`36 U.S.C. § 152506 .................................................... 18
`36 U.S.C. § 152907 .................................................... 18
`36 U.S.C. § 153104 .................................................... 18
`36 U.S.C. § 153506 .................................................... 18
`36 U.S.C. § 153706 .................................................... 18
`36 U.S.C. § 154106 .................................................... 18
`36 U.S.C. § 154707 .................................................... 18
`36 U.S.C. § 170105 .................................................... 18
`36 U.S.C. § 170307 .................................................... 18
`36 U.S.C. § 190106 .................................................... 18
`36 U.S.C. § 190307 .................................................... 18
`36 U.S.C. § 200306 .................................................... 18
`36 U.S.C. § 220306 .................................................... 18
`37 C.F.R. § 2.61 ........................................................... 3
`37 C.F.R. § 2.80 ........................................................... 3
`37 C.F.R. § 2.129(a) ................................................... 32
`37 C.F.R. § 2.142(e)(1) ............................................... 32
`37 C.F.R. § 2.151 ......................................................... 3
`Fed. R. Evid. 401 ....................................................... 39
`
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`
`41 U.S. Op. Atty. Gen. 395 (U.S.A.G.
`Dec. 18, 1958) ....................................................... 15
`
`
`
`

`
`xii
`
`
`Amicus Brief for Blackhorse, et. al., In
`re Tam, No. 14-1203 (Fed. Cir. July
`23, 2015), ECF No. 148 ........................................ 22
`Esha Bandari, ‘You’re Not Wrong,
`You’re Just an A**hole,’ ACLU Blog
`of Rights (Mar. 6, 2015, 12:30 PM),
`https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-
`speech/youre-not-wrong-youre-just-
`ahole ..................................................................... 12
`New “Standard” Dictionary of the
`English Language, Funk and
`Wagnalls Company (1947) ................................... 29
`Memorandum in Support of Motion for
`Summary Judgment on
`Constitutional Claims, Pro-Football,
`Inc. v. Blackhorse, No. 14-cv-01043
`(E.D. Va. Feb. 23, 2015), ECF No. 56 .................. 29
`Kimberly A. Pace, The Washington
`Redskins Case and The Doctrine of
`Disparagement: How Politically
`Correct Must a Trademark Be?, 22
`Pepp. L. Rev. 7, 33 (1994) .................................... 37
`USPTO, Trademark Manual of
`Examining Procedure (Oct. 2016) ........... 31, 32, 40
`Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and
`Intellectual Property: Some
`Thoughts After Eldred, 44
`Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 Hous.
`L. Rev. 697 (2003) .......................................... 11, 12
`Webster’s New International Dictionary,
`G. & C. Merriam Company (2nd ed.
`1947) ............................................................... 28, 29
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`1
`
`INTEREST OF THE AMICI1
`Amici curiae Amanda Blackhorse, Marcus
`Briggs-Cloud, Phillip Gover, Jillian Pappan, and
`Courtney Tsotigh are Native American individuals
`who successfully petitioned the Trademark Trial and
`Appeal Board (“TTAB”) to cancel six service mark
`registrations of the Washington NFL football team.
`The TTAB found that the team’s marks were
`ineligible for registration under Section 2(a) of the
`Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a), and thus subject to
`cancellation, because they contain matter that may
`disparage Native Americans (i.e., the term “redskin”
`or a derivation of “redskin”). Blackhorse v. Pro-
`Football, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1080 (T.T.A.B. 2014).
`The team’s owner, Pro-Football, Inc. (“PFI”),
`brought an action in the Eastern District of Virginia,
`under 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b), to overturn the TTAB’s
`decision. The District Court granted summary
`judgment in favor of Blackhorse and the other amici,
`agreeing with the TTAB that PFI’s marks were
`ineligible for registration. Pro-Football, Inc. v.
`Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 467 (E.D. Va.
`2015). The Court also rejected PFI’s Constitutional
`arguments. See id. at 454-464.
`PFI appealed and its appeal is pending. Pro-
`Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, appeal docketed, No. 15-
`
`1 Petitioner’s letter consenting to the filing of this brief, and
`Respondent’s letter consenting to the filing of amicus briefs, are
`on file with the Clerk’s office. No party or counsel for a party
`has authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person or
`entity other than amici and their counsel has made a financial
`contribution to its preparation or submission.
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`2
`
`
`1874 (4th Cir. Aug. 6, 2015). PFI petitioned this
`Court for a writ of certiorari before judgment, which
`was denied.
`Amici have an interest in ensuring that the
`United States Patent and Trademark Office
`(“USPTO”) properly implements Section 2(a) so that
`they can avoid further insult resulting from the
`registration of marks that disparage them and other
`Native Americans.
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Mark
`
`Service
`
`And
`A. Trademark
`Registration Process.
`A “trademark” is a word, name, symbol or
`
`combination thereof, used in commerce to identify
`and distinguish the goods of one entity from those of
`others, while a “service mark” is used to distinguish
`services. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. The term “mark” is a
`general term that covers trademarks and service
`marks. Id. The mark at issue in this case is a
`service mark.
`
`Rights in a mark arise from use of the mark in
`commerce, not due to any Government action. B&B
`Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 135 S. Ct. 1293,
`1300 (2015). The Government does not grant or
`issue marks.
`
`The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq.,
`creates a mechanism for a mark owner to seek a
`registration from the USPTO. This case does not
`concern the refusal of the USPTO to issue a mark
`
`
`
`

`
`3
`
`
`(which the Government does not issue) but rather its
`refusal to issue a mark registration.
`review
`
`USPTO
`Examining
`Attorneys
`applications to determine whether the mark meets
`statutory
`and
`regulatory
`requirements
`for
`registration. 15 U.S.C. § 1051; 37 C.F.R. § 2.61.
`Section 2 of the Lanham Act provides that a mark is
`ineligible for registration if, among many other
`criteria, it contains or comprises matter that “may
`disparage” persons, institutions, beliefs or national
`symbols.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1053
`(applying § 1052 to service marks).
`
`If the Examining Attorney believes that the
`application satisfies the registration criteria, the
`USPTO publishes the application in the Official
`Gazette, a weekly USPTO periodical. 15 U.S.C. §
`1062; 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.61 & 2.80. One who learns of
`the application from the Official Gazette may object
`by filing an opposition proceeding with the TTAB
`within 30 days of publication. 15 U.S.C. § 1063. The
`TTAB will then determine whether the USPTO
`should issue a registration despite the opposition. If
`there is no objection, and if the application satisfies
`the statutory and regulatory criteria, the USPTO
`will issue a registration certificate to the applicant
`and will list the mark on the Principal Register, the
`official record of all marks registered by the United
`States. 15 U.S.C. § 1057; 37 C.F.R. § 2.151.
`
`On the other hand, if – as occurred with
`Respondent Simon Tam’s application – an
`Examining Attorney
`refuses
`registration,
`the
`applicant may appeal the refusal to the TTAB. 15
`
`
`
`

`
`4
`
`
`U.S.C. § 1070. The TTAB will then decide whether
`the mark is entitled to registration.
`B. The Owner Of An Unregistrable Mark
`Has Statutory And Common Law
`Enforcement Rights.
` Unregistered marks – including unregistrable
`
`marks – are fully enforceable. The owner of an
`unregistrable mark can bring infringement claims
`for an injunction or damages under both Section
`43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), and
`the common law.
`
`The plain language of Section 43(a) permits
`enforcement against any person who “uses in
`commerce any word, term, name, symbol, device, or
`any combination thereof” that is likely to cause
`confusion or mistake regarding the source of that
`person’s goods or services. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A).
`There is nothing in Section 43(a) that limits these
`claims to registered or registrable marks.
`that
`
`Accordingly,
`courts
`have
`held
`unregistrable marks are enforceable under Section
`43(a). See In re City of Houston, 731 F.3d 1326, 1331
`(Fed. Cir. 2013) (stating that a trademark ineligible
`for registration under Section 2(b) of the Lanham
`Act may be enforced under Section 43(a)), cert.
`denied, 134 S. Ct. 1325 (2014). In fact, courts have
`held that Section 43(a) provides for enforcement of
`titles of single literary works and trade names,
`neither of which is eligible for registration under the
`Lanham Act. See Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books,
`Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1163 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (single
`
`
`
`

`
`5
`
`
`book titles); Sugar Busters LLC v. Brennan, 177 F.3d
`258, 269 (5th Cir. 1999) (same); Accuride Int’l, Inc. v.
`Accuride Corp., 871 F.2d 1531, 1534 (9th Cir. 1989)
`(trade names).
`that
`suggestion
`
`The Federal Circuit’s
`unregistrable marks cannot be enforced under
`Section 43(a) is not well-founded. See In re Tam, 808
`F.3d 1321, 1344 n.11 (Fed. Cir. 2015). It took out of
`context a statement by this Court that Section 43(a)
`protects ‘“qualifying unregistered trademarks’” and
`that ‘“the general principles qualifying a mark for
`registration under § 2 of the Lanham Act are for the
`most part applicable in determining whether an
`unregistered mark is entitled to protection under §
`43(a).’” Id. (quoting Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco
`Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992)). In Two
`Pesos, this Court was merely stating that a mark
`eligible for registration will tend to have the source-
`identifying properties and hence be eligible for
`enforcement under Section 43(a). Two Pesos did not
`imply that unregistrable marks necessarily lack the
`source-identifying properties needed for Section 43
`enforcement.
`
`The Federal Circuit also doubted that Tam’s
`mark was enforceable under common law. See In re
`Tam, 808 F.3d at 1344. There are, however,
`examples of enforcement under common law of
`trademarks comprising ethnic slurs. See, e.g.,
`Leidersdorf v. Flint, 7 N.W. 252 (Wis. 1880) (“Nigger-
`Hair Smoking Tobacco”); McCann v. Anthony, 21 Mo.
`App. 83, 91-92 (1886) (“Old Coon Smoking Tobacco”).
`
`
`
`

`
`6
`
`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
`1. The Federal Circuit erred in holding that
`
`the Lanham Act prohibition against registering
`marks that “may disparage” violates the First
`Amendment. See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1328. The
`refusal to register a mark does not implicate the
`First Amendment rights of the mark owner.
`
`Trademark law grants a speech monopoly to
`mark owners, enabling the owner to silence others
`from using similar words or symbols. The USPTO’s
`refusal to register Tam’s mark may marginally
`reduce his ability to silence others, but that does not
`implicate – let alone violate – his right to Free
`Speech. There is no First Amendment right to
`curtail the speech of others.
`
`There is no merit to Tam’s argument that the
`disparagement
`provision
`violates
`the First
`Amendment
`because
`it
`involves
`viewpoint
`discrimination.
` If
`the Constitution prohibits
`viewpoint discrimination in the context of a mark
`registration, it is not the First Amendment that does
`so. Depending on the facts and circumstances
`presented, other Constitutional provisions, such as
`the Equal Protection, Due Process or Establishment
`Clause, might prevent
`the Government
`from
`discriminating based on content when it issues mark
`registrations. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v.
`Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 n.3 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
`concurring); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555
`U.S. 460, 481-82 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring).
`The right to silence others, however, is not a right
`that arises under the First Amendment. Therefore,
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`7
`
`
`marginally reducing that right on alleged viewpoint-
`discriminatory grounds does not violate the First
`Amendment.
`
`Even if this Court were to entertain the notion
`that First Amendment rights are implicated by a law
`that reduces a speech-monopolist’s ability to silence
`others, the refusal to register a mark is not
`significant enough to burden the mark owner’s Free
`Speech rights. Denial of a registration does not
`render a mark unenforceable. Unregistrable marks
`can be enforced under Section 43(a) of the Lanham
`Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), and under the common law.
`The Federal Circuit erred in concluding otherwise,
`causing it to overstate significantly the impact of a
`registration denial.
`
`2. Alternatively, due to the Government
`speech doctrine, the refusal to register Tam’s mark
`did not violate his First Amendment rights. See
`Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans,
`Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2246 (2015). Although a
`private party’s use of a mark is not Government
`speech, the issuance of a registration and the
`publication on the USPTO’s Principal Register are
`Government
`speech.
` Reprinted below are
`Government
`registrations
`of blatantly
`racist
`trademarks registered before Congress amended the
`Lanham Act to preclude registration of marks that
`“may disparage.”
` Infra at 21-22.
` The First
`Amendment does not compel the Government to
`issue registration certificates for such marks or
`publish those marks on its Principal Register.
`Congress made a valid decision that the Government
`should not associate itself with such marks.
`
`
`
`

`
`8
`
`
`The disparagement provision of Section
`3.
`
`2(a) is not void for vagueness under the Due Process
`Clause. Section 2(a) imposes no criminal or civil
`penalties and proscribes no conduct. As a result, it
`is reviewed deferentially for vagueness.
`
`The term “may disparage” contains commonly
`understood words, and this Court even employed
`“disparage” to articulate the test for permissible
`legislative prayer under the Establishment Clause.
`Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). Section
`2(a) also does not encourage and authorize arbitrary
`and discriminatory enforcement. The Lanham Act
`and USPTO regulations create a transparent and
`fair process for evaluating registration applications.
`
`4. The disparagement provision of Section
`2(a) should be interpreted according to its plain
`language. Both the plain language of the Lanham
`Act and its legislative history demonstrate that a
`mark is not eligible for registration if it “may
`disparage.” Proof of actual disparagement is not
`required. Likewise, under the plain language of
`Section 2(a), proof that the mark owner intended to
`disparage is not required for the mark to be
`ineligible for registration.
`
`When the TTAB applies the disparagement
`provision of Section 2(a), it looks for evidence that a
`“substantial composite” of the referenced group
`(here, people of Asian descent) find that a mark is
`disparaging. While evidence of the views of a
`“substantial composite” is one way of demonstrating
`that a mark “may disparage,” it is not the only way.
`This Court should not imply that the TTAB’s
`
`
`
`

`
`9
`
`
`“substantial composite” test is the only way to
`demonstrate that a mark “may disparage.”
`ARGUMENT
`
`I. THE DISPARAGEMENT PROVISION
` DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FIRST
` AMENDMENT.
`
`A. Tam’s First Amendment Rights Were Not
`Affected.
`
`1. Refusal To Register A Mark May
`Affect The Owner’s Ability To Enjoin
`Others From Speaking, But The Right
`To Silence Others Is Not A First
`Amendment Right.
`The Federal Circuit erred in treating
`a.
`the refusal to issue a service mark registration as
`burdening Tam’s First Amendment rights. In re
`Tam, 808 F.3d at 1345.
`turns
`position
`The Federal Circuit’s
`trademark law on its head. Trademark law is not a
`device to protect the First Amendment rights of the
`mark owner, but to decrease the speech rights of
`everyone else. Trademark law grants a mark owner
`a speech monopoly. See George Nelson Found. v.
`Modernica, 12 F. Supp. 3d 635, 644-45 (S.D.N.Y.
`2014) (‘“The user who first appropriates the mark
`obtains [an] enforceable right to exclude others . . .
`.”’) (citation omitted). The law empowers the owner
`to enjoin others from using similar words and
`symbols.
`
`
`
`

`
`10
`
`When the USPTO refuses to issue (or cancels)
`a registration, that action might marginally affect
`the owner’s ability to enjoin others from speaking,
`but there is no First Amendment right to prevent
`others from speaking. Trademark law – and the
`mark registration process – do not exist to advance
`the First Amendment, but despite the First
`Amendment.
`Every trademark or service mark injunction
`involves enforcing a speech monopoly on behalf of
`the mark owner and silencing others who wish to use
`similar words or symbols. See, e.g., San Francisco
`Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic
`Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987) (affirming injunction
`barring a group from using the words “Gay Olympic
`Games”); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns,
`28 F.3d 769, 772, 778-79 (8th Cir. 1994) (enjoining
`use of “Michelob Oily” by party commenting on oil
`spill in river supplying water to Anheuser-Busch
`brewery); Hershey’s Co. v. Art Van Furniture, Inc.,
`2008 WL 4724756 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 24, 2008)
`(enjoining furniture company from using a design of
`a brown sofa emerging from a wrapper on its web
`site because the image resembled a Hershey’s bar).
`As a result, “the primary cost of recognizing
`property rights in trademarks is the removal of
`words from (or perhaps non-entrance into) our
`language.” Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318
`F.3d 900, 906 (9th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted)