No. 15-446
`
`In the
`Supreme Court of the United States
`
`CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
`
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`MICHELLE K. LEE, Under Secretary of
`Commerce for Intellectual Property and
`Director, Patent and Trademark Office,
`
`Respondent.
`
`On Writ of Certiorari
`to the United States Court of Appeals
`for the Federal Circuit
`
`BRIEF OF PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE AS AMICUS
`CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT
`
`Charles Duan
`Counsel of Record
`Public Knowledge
`1818 N Street NW, Suite 410
`Washington, DC 20036
`(202) 861-0020
`cduan@publicknowledge.org
`
`Counsel for amicus curiae
`
`Rev. b68dc70d
`
`
`
`In the
`Supreme Court of the United States
`
`CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
`
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`MICHELLE K. LEE, Under Secretary of
`Commerce for Intellectual Property and
`Director, Patent and Trademark Office,
`
`Respondent.
`
`On Writ of Certiorari
`to the United States Court of Appeals
`for the Federal Circuit
`
`BRIEF OF PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE AS AMICUS
`CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT
`
`Charles Duan
`Counsel of Record
`Public Knowledge
`1818 N Street NW, Suite 410
`Washington, DC 20036
`(202) 861-0020
`cduan@publicknowledge.org
`
`Counsel for amicus curiae
`
`Rev. b68dc70d
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .
`INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE .
`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .
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`ARGUMENT .
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`ii
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`. 1
`. 1
`. 5
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`I. Petitioner’s Desired Claim Construction Stan-
`dard Is Not Appropriate for Inter Partes Re-
`view .
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`A. The Proffered Standard Is Not “Correct,”
`but Rather Driven by Litigation-Specific
`Policy Concerns .
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`B. The Volatility of That Standard Further
`Proves That It Is Policy-Driven .
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`C. The Public Interest Purpose of Inter
`Partes Review Justifies Use of a Different
`Standard .
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`II. Changing the Claim Construction Standard
`Will Encourage Improper Behavior in Inter
`Partes Review .
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`A. The Facts of This Case Illustrate Need-
`less Gamesmanship Before the Courts and
`Patent Office .
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`B. Petitioner’s Desired Standard Would In-
`crease Costs and Facilitate Undue Manip-
`ulation of Inter Partes Review .
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`. 23
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`III. Petitioner Likely Has No Standing to Raise
`the Claim Construction Question .
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`A. Cuozzo’s Injury Is Not Redressable .
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`B. Dismissal Would Comport with the Ratio-
`nale for the Standing Doctrine .
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`. 25
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`. 28
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`(i)
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`(ii)
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`CONCLUSION .
`APPENDIX A: Excerpt of Oral Argument Before
`the Federal Circuit
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`APPENDIX B: Excerpt of Oral Argument Before
`the Patent Trial and Appeal Board .
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`. 32
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`. 1a
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`. 3a
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`
`Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International,
`134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) .
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`. 1
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`Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc.
`v. University of Illinois Foundation,
`402 U.S. 313 (1971)
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`. 14
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`Brenner v. Manson,
`383 U.S. 519 (1966)
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`. 15
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`Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co.,
`576 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
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`. 20
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`Cardinal Chemical Co.
`v. Morton International, Inc.,
`508 U.S. 83 (1993) .
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`. 14
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`CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.,
`288 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
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`. 6
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`Cuozzo Speed Technologies LLC
`v. General Motors LLC,
`No. 2:12-cv-3624 (D.N.J. filed June 15, 2012) .
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`. 22
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`Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC, In re,
`793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
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`. 18–19, 21, 27–28
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`
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`(iii)
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`CVI/Beta Ventures, Inc. v. Tura LP,
`112 F.3d 1146 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
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`. 11, 30
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`Dow Chemical Co. v. Sumitomo Chemical Co.,
`257 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
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`. 8
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`Exxon Research & Engineering Co.
`v. United States,
`265 F.3d 1371 (2001) .
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`. 9–10
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`Garmin International, Inc.
`v. Cuozzo Speed Technologies LLC,
`No. IPR2012-1 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 13, 2013) .
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`. 17–20, 22,
`27–28
`
`Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc.,
`407 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
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`. 8
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`Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc.,
`Nos. 14-1513, -1520 (U.S. argued Feb. 23, 2016)
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`. 1
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`. 30
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`Hans v. Louisiana,
`134 U.S. 1 (1890) .
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`Holmes Group, Inc.
`v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc.,
`535 U.S. 826 (2002)
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`. 12
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`H-W Technology, LC v. Overstock.com, Inc.,
`758 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
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`. 8
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`Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC,
`135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015) .
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`. 1
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`Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
`504 U.S. 555 (1992)
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`. 26
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`Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
`517 U.S. 370 (1996)
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`. 15
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`
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`(iv)
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`Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices Corp.,
`401 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
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`. 8
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`Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd.,
`133 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
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`. 8
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`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
`134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014) .
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`. 9, 15, 24
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`Nystrom v. Trex Co.,
`424 F.3d 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
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`. 7
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`Ormco Corp. v. Align Technology, Inc.,
`498 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
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`. 21
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`Pacing Technologies, LLC
`v. Garmin International, Inc.,
`778 F.3d 1021 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
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`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
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`. 20
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`. 5–6, 8–10, 12–13,
`16–18, 23, 25, 28, 30
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`Photo Electronics Corp. v. England,
`581 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1978) .
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`. 10
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`Podlesak & Podlesak v. McInnerney,
`123 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 1989 (1906), avail-
`able at http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=wu.
`89094999596;view=1up;seq=325 .
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`. 16
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`Power-One, Inc. v. Artesyn Technologies, Inc.,
`599 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
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`. 9
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`PPC Broadband, Inc.
`v. Corning Optical Communications RF, LLC,
`No. 15-1361 et al., 2016 WL 692368 (Feb. 22,
`2016)
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`. 30
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`(v)
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`Prater, In re,
`415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969)
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`. 9–10
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`Rhine v. Casio, Inc.,
`183 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
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`. 10
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`Schlesinger
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`418 U.S. 208 (1974)
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`. 29
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`SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp.,
`403 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
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`. 11–12
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`Smith v. Snow,
`294 U.S. 1 (1935) .
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`. 9
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`SRI International
`v. Matsushita Electric Corp. of America,
`775 F.2d 1107 (1985) .
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`. 11
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`Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment,
`523 U.S. 83 (1998) .
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`. 26
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`The Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export, Inc.,
`359 U.S. 180 (1959)
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`. 29
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`Toro Co. v. White Consolidated Industries, Inc.,
`199 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
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`. 7
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`Transonic Systems, Inc.
`v. Non-Invasive Medical Technologies Corp.,
`143 Fed. App’x 320 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
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`. 7
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`United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory
`Agency Procedures (SCRAP),
`412 U.S. 669 (1973)
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`. 29
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`
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`(vi)
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`Valley Forge Christian College
`v. Americans United for Separation of Church
`& State, Inc.,
`454 U.S. 464 (1982)
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`. 29, 31
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`Vanderlande Industries Nederland BV
`v. International Trade Commission,
`366 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
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`Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.,
`90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) .
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`Warth v. Seldin,
`422 U.S. 490 (1975)
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`. 7
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`. 5–6
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`. 26, 29
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`Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby
`Co.,
`442 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
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`. 11, 16
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`Yamamoto, In re,
`740 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
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`Zletz, In re,
`893 F.2d 319 (Fed. Cir. 1990) .
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`Constitutional Provisions
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`U.S. Const. art. III .
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`Statutes
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`35 U.S.C. § 112(a)
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`——— § 305 .
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`——— § 317(a)
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`37 C.F.R. § 42.74(a) .
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`. 28
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`. 14
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`. 14
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`(vii)
`
`Other Sources
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`erence: A Historical, Empirical, and Normative
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`. 24
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`Brief for Intervenor USPTO, In re Cuozzo Speed
`Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. June 5, 2014)
`(No. 14-1301) .
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`Brief of Appellant, In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC,
`793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 22, 2014) (No. 14-
`1301)
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`Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents (2007) .
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`
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`Cuozzo Speed Techs. LLC, No. IPR2012-1 (P.T.A.B.
`Jan. 9, 2013)
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`. 22
`
`Andrew B. Dzeguze, Did Markman and Phillips
`Answer the Right Question? A Review of the Frac-
`tured State of Claim Construction Law and the Po-
`tential Use of Equity to Unify It, 15 Tex. Intell.
`Prop. L.J. 457 (2007)
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`. 13
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`(viii)
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`Robert L. Harmon et al., Patents and the Federal
`Circuit (11th ed. 2013)
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`. 12
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`Russell B. Hill & Frank P. Cote, Ending the Federal
`Circuit Crapshoot: Emphasizing Plain Meaning
`in Patent Claim Interpretation, 42 IDEA 1 (2002)
`
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`. 7
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`H.R. Rep. No. 112-98 (2011)
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`. 24
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`Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution:
`Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1249 (2006) .
`
`. 30
`
`Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the
`America Invents Act: Part II of II, 21 Fed. Cir. B.J.
`539 (2012) .
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`Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges
`Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 Harv. J.L.
`& Tech. 1 (2001) .
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`. 11
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`Opening Claim Construction Brief of Defendants,
`Cuozzo Speed Techs. LLC v. Gen. Motors LLC,
`No. 2:12-cv-3624 (D.N.J. Apr. 18, 2013) .
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`. 22
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`Patent Owner’s Response, Garmin Int’l, Inc. v.
`Cuozzo Speed Techs. LLC, No. IPR2012-1 (P.T.A.B.
`Mar. 11, 2013)
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`. 22
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`Reply Brief of Appellant, In re Cuozzo Speed
`Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. June 23, 2014)
`(No. 14-1301) .
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`. 27
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`Michael Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in
`Patent Prosecution, 21 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 179
`(2007) .
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`. 15
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`(ix)
`
`RPX Corp., NPE Litigation: Costs by Key Events
`(2015),
`https: / / www.rpxcorp.com / wp - content /
`uploads / sites / 2 / 2015 / 05 / Final - NPE - Litigation -
`Costs-by-Key-Events1.pdf .
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`. 24
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`U.S. Patent No. 6,778,074 (filed Mar. 18, 2002) .
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`. 17
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`
`INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
`
`Public Knowledge1 is a non-profit organization ded-
`icated to preserving the openness of the Internet and
`the public’s access to knowledge, promoting creativity
`through balanced intellectual property, and upholding
`and protecting consumers’ rights to use innovative tech-
`nology lawfully. Public Knowledge advocates on behalf
`of the public interest for a balanced patent system, par-
`ticularly with respect to new and emerging technologies.
`Public Knowledge has previously served as amicus in
`patent cases. E.g., Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc.,
`Nos. 14-1513, -1520 (U.S. argued Feb. 23, 2016); Kimble v.
`Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015); Alice Corp.
`Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
`
`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
`
`1. This Court should reject the invitation to change
`the claim construction standard applied during inter
`partes review, because the proposed alternative is an in-
`ferior standard for that specialized proceeding.
`The primary argument of Cuozzo and its supporting
`amici is that the claim construction standard applied by
`district courts reaches the “correct” or “actual” construc-
`tion, and so the Board should use the “correct” standard.
`But the district court standard is far from objectively
`“correct.” Claim construction before district courts is an
`
`1Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.3(a), Petitioner granted
`blanket consent, and Respondent consented separately. Pursuant
`to Rule 37.6, no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in
`part, and no counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended
`to fund the preparation or submission of the brief. No person or en-
`tity, other than amicus, its members, or its counsel, made a monetary
`contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.
`
`1
`
`
`
`2
`
`incomparably complex, uncertain, and unpredictable pro-
`cess. Words in patent claims are often construed to have
`meanings far from their ordinary definitions.
`These counterintuitive constructions arise, at least in
`part, because courts seek to protect the inventive con-
`tribution of patents, even when those patents are poorly
`drafted. Having no power to amend patents, courts will
`regularly bend over backwards to construe patents in
`ways that preserve their value to their owners.
`This willingness to favor patent owners in district
`court claim construction is a measured policy choice, not
`the objectively “correct” result. Indeed, it has led to
`what can only be described as a mess in the state of claim
`construction law, recognized by commentators and even
`judges of the Federal Circuit. And it suggests that the
`district court claim construction standard is not a rule
`of general applicability, but rather one that should be at
`most cabined to the specific forum in which it was born,
`namely district court litigation of patents.
`Inter partes review is a significantly different pro-
`ceeding, and thus it warrants a significantly different
`claim construction standard. The opportunity to amend
`evaporates the adjudicator’s need to bend over back-
`wards to use claim construction to rewrite poorly drafted
`patents. Furthermore, inter partes review was designed
`to advance the public interest in improving patent quality.
`The broadest reasonable interpretation standard, used
`during that proceeding, also was designed to advance the
`public interest in patent clarity. That standard is thus
`well justified for use in inter partes review.
`The broadest reasonable interpretation standard is
`well suited for inter partes review. Petitioner’s alterna-
`tive is inferior and unjustified. This Court should affirm.
`
`
`
`3
`
`2. Besides being less appropriate to inter partes re-
`view, Petitioner’s standard would have the ill effect of
`encouraging manipulative tactics during that proceeding,
`which will increase costs for all parties and subvert the
`mission and resources of the proceeding.
`Cuozzo’s litigation behavior, shown through facts pre-
`sented in this brief, exemplifies this undue exploitation
`of process. By definition, the district court standard that
`Cuozzo supports cannot interpret a claim more broadly
`(that is, to encompass more subject matter) than the
`broadest reasonable interpretation. Yet, in this case,
`Cuozzo’s patent received a narrow interpretation, and
`Cuozzo seeks to have the patent read to encompass more
`subject matter, not less.
`In other words, Cuozzo is asking for a narrower claim
`construction standard in order to obtain a broader claim
`construction.
`It can-
`Why, then, does Cuozzo pursue this case?
`not be to alter the outcome of the inter partes review,
`as the district court standard will leave Cuozzo’s patent
`claims equally invalid—a broader reading of a claim can-
`not be valid when a narrower one is invalid for obvious-
`ness. Instead, the record reveals that Cuozzo seeks a
`broader claim construction in order to facilitate its in-
`fringement arguments in unrelated litigation—a manipu-
`lative attempt to commandeer inter partes review to ends
`external to the proceeding.
`The district court claim construction standard opens
`the door to widespread engagement in such tactics. That
`standard, notorious for its unpredictability, will offer at-
`torneys numerous opportunities to exploit ambiguities in
`patents, to draw out adjudication, and to engage in col-
`lateral interest fishing expeditions as Cuozzo did. These
`
`
`
`4
`
`tactics raise costs for all parties, and they demean the ad-
`judicatory process. Avoidance of these possibilities fur-
`ther justifies affirming the Court of Appeals.
`3. The odd facts of this case do not merely highlight
`Cuozzo’s misaligned interests; they suggest that Cuozzo
`actually lacks standing to resolve the claim construction
`standard in the first place.
`This Court only has jurisdiction if Cuozzo can show
`standing, which requires a redressable injury. But the
`injury here, namely invalidation of several patent claims,
`cannot be redressed by changing the claim construction
`standard. Since Cuozzo asks for a broader claim construc-
`tion, its patent claims will still be as obvious and invalid
`as they were when the inter partes review proceeding ini-
`tially concluded. Cuozzo cannot show that it would actu-
`ally benefit from a favorable decision of this Court, and so
`Cuozzo lacks standing.
`Lack of standing here is no mere technical defect, but
`rather goes to the heart of the standing doctrine itself.
`Standing ensures that courts do not issue advisory opin-
`ions, and more importantly that courts have a solid ex-
`emplary fact pattern upon which to rest their decisions.
`Cuozzo’s case presents no such solid fact pattern: rather
`than illustrating the actual difference between the claim
`construction standards at issue, it illustrates an uninfor-
`mative, backwards situation. Any ruling on the claim con-
`struction question would be based not on the facts of this
`case but rather on abstract and hypothetical statements
`of patent philosophy proffered by Cuozzo and amici. This
`Court should not issue such a ruling.
`
`
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`This brief addresses only the question presented relat-
`ing to the proper standard for claim construction during
`inter partes review.
`
`I. Petitioner’s Desired Claim Construction
`Standard Is Not Appropriate for Inter
`Partes Review
`
`This Court should affirm the decision of the Court
`of Appeals that the broadest reasonable interpretation
`standard for claim construction is properly applied dur-
`ing inter partes review. The competing standard, an-
`nounced most prominently in the Federal Circuit’s de-
`cision Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir.
`2005),2 is the one applied in district courts and the Inter-
`national Trade Commission during patent infringement
`litigation. But this standard, termed the Phillips or dis-
`trict court standard in this brief, should not be applied in
`inter partes review.
`The Phillips standard is designed not to arrive at the
`“correct” claim construction, but rather to achieve pol-
`icy objectives such as assisting patent owners in view of
`concerns about the limitations of patent litigation. Inter
`partes review presents different concerns, such as pro-
`moting the public interest in patent quality. These differ-
`ences warrant a different standard for claim construction.
`This Court should reject Petitioners’ invitation to apply
`an ill-fitting claim construction standard to inter partes
`review, and so it should affirm the Court of Appeals.
`
`2The standard far predates Phillips. Vitronics Corp. v. Concep-
`tronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996), applied the same standard,
`and Phillips merely reaffirmed the holding of Vitronics. See Phillips,
`415 F.3d at 1312.
`
`5
`
`
`
`6
`
`A. The Proffered Standard Is Not “Cor-
`rect,” but Rather Driven by Litigation-
`Specific Policy Concerns
`
`Contrary to suggestions by Cuozzo and its support-
`ing amici, the district court claim construction standard
`does not reflect “what claims actually mean.”3 Quite the
`opposite, the Phillips standard is designed not to reach
`the objectively correct meaning of the claim, but rather
`to accommodate policy interests particular to the unique
`nature of patent litigation, and in particular the inability
`of courts to rewrite patents even in view of inadvertent
`or careless drafting. These litigation-specific policy con-
`cerns make the Phillips standard only applicable to situ-
`ations like district court litigation.
`1. As an initial matter: despite Cuozzo’s character-
`ization, the district court claim construction standard is
`far from the “ordinary meaning” of the claims.
`Although the ordinary meaning of a claim term carries
`significant weight, Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13, courts
`regularly depart from that ordinary meaning. For ex-
`ample, the patent specification may redefine a term in a
`way that “differs from the meaning it would otherwise
`possess”; there, “the inventor’s lexicography governs”
`rather than the ordinary meaning. Id. at 1316 (citing CCS
`Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366
`(Fed. Cir. 2002)). Or the prosecution history of a patent
`may suggest a departure from ordinary meaning, for ex-
`ample “making the claim scope narrower than it would
`otherwise be.” Id. at 1317 (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Con-
`ceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582–83 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
`
`3E.g., Br. Pet’r 17; see also Br. Interdigital et al., Feb. 29, 2016
`(repeatedly describing Phillips construction as “correct”).
`
`
`
`7
`
`Numerous decisions illustrate how district court claim
`construction diverges greatly from ordinary meaning:
`
`• In Toro Co. v. White Consolidated Industries, Inc.,
`the word “including” was construed to mean “per-
`manently affixed to”—obviously not the ordinary
`meaning. 199 F.3d 1295, 1300–02 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
`
`• In Nystrom v. Trex Co., the term “board” was con-
`strued to encompass not any board, but rather only
`“wood cut from a log,” despite the court recognizing
`that the claim language included no such require-
`ment. 424 F.3d 1136, 1143 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
`
`• In Transonic Systems, Inc. v. Non-Invasive Medi-
`cal Technologies Corp., the district court construed
`“calculating” and “determining” not to have their
`ordinary meanings of performing a calculation, but
`rather to require application of a specific formula for
`a “dilution curve.” See 143 Fed. App’x 320, 322 (Fed.
`Cir. 2005). The Federal Circuit reversed, determin-
`ing that the terms required application of a different
`formula. See id. at 327–28.
`
`See generally Russell B. Hill & Frank P. Cote, Ending the
`Federal Circuit Crapshoot: Emphasizing Plain Mean-
`ing in Patent Claim Interpretation, 42 IDEA 1, 15–22
`(2002) (noting the Federal Circuit’s “[r]efusing to apply
`the plain and ordinary meaning to simple terms”).
`Indeed, the Federal Circuit has specifically admon-
`ished against reliance on ordinary dictionary meanings
`in construing claims. It has said, for instance, that “a
`general-usage dictionary cannot overcome credible art-
`specific evidence of the meaning or lack of meaning of a
`claim term.” Vanderlande Indus. Nederland BV v. Int’l
`
`
`
`8
`
`Trade Comm’n, 366 F.3d 1311, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2004). And
`it has “cautioned against the use of non-scientific dictio-
`naries” in claim construction. Dow Chem. Co. v. Sum-
`itomo Chem. Co., 257 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
`(citing Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133
`F.3d 1473, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). Complex and uncertain
`canons and rules, not “ordinary meaning,” govern claim
`construction under Phillips.4
`2. These unexpected and counterintuitive interpre-
`tations arise because the precepts of district court claim
`construction are aimed not so much at objective “correct-
`ness” but rather at policy objectives such as protecting
`patentees from the limitations of court litigation.
`District courts have a very limited menu of decisions
`they can reach: they can declare a patent invalid or not,
`and they can declare a patent infringed or not. In partic-
`ular, courts usually cannot revise the content of patents:
`“A district court can correct a patent only if, among other
`things, ‘the error is evident from the face of the patent.’ ”
`H-W Tech., LC v. Overstock.com, Inc., 758 F.3d 1329, 1333
`(Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark
`Cards, Inc., 407 F.3d 1297, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
`Courts will use claim construction to help patent own-
`ers avoid the severity of these all-or-nothing results. This
`Court once said that “if the claim were fairly susceptible
`
`4That Phillips occasionally described its own standard as “ordi-
`nary meaning,” e.g., 415 F.3d at 1314, is of little moment. The court
`took “ordinary meaning” to refer to “the meaning that the term
`would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the
`time of the invention,” id. at 1313, an inquiry that encompasses all
`the complexity described above. See also Medrad, Inc. v. MRI De-
`vices Corp., 401 F.3d 1313, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[W]e must look at
`the ordinary meaning in the context of the written description and
`the prosecution history.”).
`
`
`
`9
`
`of two constructions, that should be adopted which will se-
`cure to the patentee his actual invention, rather than to
`adopt a construction fatal to the grant.” Smith v. Snow,
`294 U.S. 1, 14 (1935). More recently, the Federal Circuit
`has explained that the opportunity to amend claims “is
`not available in an infringement action in district court,”
`and so “district courts may find it necessary to interpret
`claims to protect only that which constitutes patentable
`subject matter to do justice between the parties.” In re
`Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citing In
`re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404 (C.C.P.A. 1969)).
`Demonstrating this willingness in claim construction
`to bend over backwards to avoid invalidating a patent,
`Exxon Research & Engineering Co. v. United States in-
`volved a patent claim that the district court had found in-
`definite. See 265 F.3d 1371, 1374 (2001). But the Federal
`Circuit was willing to perform the task of construing the
`patent terms to save it from indefiniteness, “however dif-
`ficult that task may be” and “even though that task may
`be formidable and the conclusion may be one over which
`reasonable persons may disagree.” Id. at 1375.5
`That willingness to undertake “formidable” claim con-
`struction efforts arises out of a desire to protect paten-
`tees from the harsh disposition of invalidation. Exxon
`
`5To the extent that it relied on the “insolubly ambiguous” stan-
`dard for indefiniteness, Exxon Research was overruled by Nautilus,
`Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2130 n.9 (2014). Nev-
`ertheless, Exxon Research is instructive of the manner in which
`courts construe claims under Phillips. Furthermore, although
`Exxon Research itself predates Phillips, the command of Exxon Re-
`search to undertake “formidable” claim construction was repeatedly
`followed after Phillips. See, e.g., Power-One, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs.,
`Inc., 599 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also id. at 1348–49 (re-
`quiring 754 words to construe the word “near”).
`
`
`
`10
`
`Research explained that construing even poorly drafted
`claims would “protect the inventive contribution of paten-
`tees, even when the drafting of their patents has been less
`than ideal.” Id. And the predecessor court to the Federal
`Circuit cleanly summed up how claim construction could
`resolve the tension between limited district court capabil-
`ities and protection of patentees:
`
`By construing a claim as covering only pat-
`entable subject matter, courts are able, in ap-
`propriate cases, to hold claims valid in order
`to protect the inventive concept or the inven-
`tor’s contribution to the art. The patentee at
`that time usually may not amend the claims to
`obtain protection commensurate with his ac-
`tual contribution to the art.”
`
`In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404 n.30 (C.C.P.A. 1969);
`cf. Rhine v. Casio, Inc., 183 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir.
`1999) (where possible, “claims should be construed to sus-
`tain their validity”), quoted in Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1327;
`Photo Elecs. Corp. v. England, 581 F.2d 772, 776 (9th Cir.
`1978) (“[P]atent claims should be construed liberally to
`uphold the patent’s validity rather than to destroy the in-
`ventor’s right to protect the substance of his invention.”).
`Use of claim construction to “protect the inventive
`concept” is a policy choice, not mere “correctness.” That
`policy limits the applicability of the Phillips standard.
`
`B. The Volatility of That Standard Fur-
`ther Proves That It Is Policy-Driven
`
`The confused and unpredictable state of claim con-
`struction law further highlights that the district court
`standard is driven by policy, not accuracy.
`
`
`
`11
`
`Underlining the degree to which litigation claim con-
`struction is not driven by pure correctness:
`in one in-
`stance, the Federal Circuit twice construed the same
`claim terms in the same patent, and reached two differ-
`ent results. CVI/Beta Ventures, Inc. v. Tura LP, 112
`F.3d 1146, 1160 & n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (comparing the de-
`cisions). Reviewing the decisions, Professor (now Fed-
`eral Circuit judge) Kimberly Moore found no justification
`for the discrepancy, and concluded that the cases “create
`doubt as to whether the Federal Circuit serves as a test of
`‘accuracy’ of district court claim construction.” Kimberly
`A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve
`Patent Cases?, 15 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1, 21 (2001).
`The Federal Circuit tried—and failed—to treat claim
`construction as devoid of policy. In SmithKline Beecham
`Corp. v. Apotex Corp., the court asserted that claim con-
`struction “is not a policy-driven inquiry,” rather being
`merely “a contextual interpretation of language.” 403
`F.3d 1331, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Rader, J.). “For this pre-
`cise reason,” the court went on, “a court must construe
`claims without considering the implications of covering a
`particular product or process.” Id. at 1341.
`SmithKline is correct that, were accused products
`relevant to claim construction, then claim construction
`would necessarily be policy-driven. And less than a year
`later, the exact same judge wrote that patent claims
`“must inevitably be construed in context of the accused
`device.” Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich &
`Bradsby Co., 442 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Rader,
`J.) (characterizing SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of
`Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1118 (1985)). Judge Rader proved the
`very thing he sought to reject: that district court claim
`construction is based on policy, not mere correctness.
`
`
`
`12
`
`Inconsistencies like these have drawn criticisms, ex-
`plicitly stating what the Federal Circuit inevitably im-
`plies: that claim construction is driven by policy con-
`siderations. Two leading patent law treatises both re-
`ject the premise of SmithKline, concluding instead that
`patent claim construction is at least in part “based . . .
`on patent policy.” 5A Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on
`Patents § 18.03[2][f] (2007); accord Robert L. Harmon
`et al., Patents and the Federal Circuit § 6.2(d)(v), at 490
`(11th ed. 2013) (SmithKline “reached far and made some
`bad law”). Even a judge of the Federal Circuit bemoaned
`that the court’s claim constructions derived from “inter-
`pretive necromancy” and that its decisions “resemble re-
`ality, if at all, only by chance.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1330
`(Mayer, J., dissenting) (quoting Holmes Group, Inc. v.
`Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 833
`(2002)).
`Going further, commentators have concluded that
`“there is no single best claim meaning for a given patent
`claim.” Thomas Chen, Patent Claim Construction: An
`Appeal for Chevron Deference, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1165, 1179
`(2008); accord Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence
`Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construc-
`tion, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743, 1745 (2009) (“[C]laim con-
`struction may be inherently indeterminate . . . .”). Schol-
`ars have recommended that claim construction focus less
`on linguistic precision and more on “normative disputes
`over policy issues.” Tun-Jen Chiang & Lawrence B.
`Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction in
`Patent Law, 123 Yale L.J. 530, 536 (2013). These views
`further confirm that the Phillips claim construction stan-
`dard is not “correct,” but rather a measured policy re-
`sponse to a particular legal proceeding.
`
`
`
`13
`
`The tortured and unpredictable record of claim con-
`struction rejects the premise that the Ph
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