(Slip Opinion)
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2015
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`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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` Syllabus
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`CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. LEE,
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`UNDER SECRETARY OF COMMERCE FOR
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`INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DIRECTOR,
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`PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
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`THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
` No. 15–446. Argued April 25, 2016—Decided June 20, 2016
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`The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act creates an agency procedure
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`called “inter partes review” that allows a third party to ask the U. S.
`Patent and Trademark Office to reexamine the claims in an already-
`issued patent and to cancel any claim that the agency finds to be un-
`patentable in light of prior art. The Act, as relevant here, provides
`that the Patent Office’s decision “whether to institute an inter partes
`review . . . shall be final and non-appealable,” 35 U. S. C. §314(d), and
`grants the Patent Office authority to issue “regulations . . . establish-
`ing and governing inter partes review,” §316(a)(4). A Patent Office
`regulation issued pursuant to that authority provides that, during in-
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`
`ter partes review, a patent claim “shall be given its broadest reason-
`able construction in light of the specification of the patent in which it
`appears.” 37 CFR §42.100(b).
`
`In 2012, Garmin International, Inc., and Garmin USA, Inc., sought
`inter partes review of all 20 claims of a patent held by petitioner
`Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC, asserting, among other things, that
`claim 17 was obvious in light of three prior patents. The Patent Of-
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`fice agreed to review claim 17. It also decided to reexamine claims 10
`and 14 on that same ground because it determined those claims to be
`logically linked to the obviousness challenge to claim 17. The Patent
`Office, through its Patent Trial and Appeal Board, concluded that the
`claims were obvious in light of prior art, denied for reasons of futility
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`Cuozzo’s motion to amend the claims, and canceled all three claims.
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`Cuozzo appealed to the Federal Circuit. Cuozzo claimed that the
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`CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. LEE
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`Syllabus
`Patent Office improperly instituted inter partes review with respect
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`to claims 10 and 14, and it alleged that the Board improperly used
`the “broadest reasonable construction” standard to interpret the
`claims rather than the standard used by courts, which gives claims
`their “ordinary meaning . . . as understood by a person of skill in the
`art,” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F. 3d 1303, 1314. The Federal Cir-
`cuit rejected both arguments. It reasoned that §314(d) made the Pa-
`tent Office’s decision to institute inter partes review “nonappealable,”
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`and it concluded that the Patent Office’s regulation was a reasonable
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`exercise of the agency’s rulemaking authority.
`Held:
`1. Section 314(d) bars Cuozzo’s challenge to the Patent Office’s de-
`cision to institute inter partes review. Pp. 7–12.
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`(a) The text of §314(d) expressly states that the Patent Office’s
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`determinations whether to institute inter partes review “shall be fi-
`nal and nonappealable.” Moreover, construing §314(d) to permit ju-
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`dicial review of the Patent Office’s preliminary decision to institute
`inter partes review undercuts the important congressional objective
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`of giving the agency significant power to revisit and revise earlier pa-
`tent grants. Past practice in respect to related proceedings, including
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`the predecessor to inter partes review, also supports the conclusion
`that Congress did not intend for courts to review these initial deter-
`minations. Finally, reading §314(d) as limited to interlocutory ap-
`peals would render the provision largely superfluous in light of the
`Administrative Procedure Act. Pp. 7–9.
`(b) The “strong presumption” favoring judicial review, Mach Min-
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`ing, LLC v. EEOC, 575 U. S. ___, ___, is overcome here by these
`“ ‘clear and convincing’ ” indications that Congress intended to bar re-
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`view, Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U. S. 340, 349.
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`Given that presumption, however, the interpretation adopted here
`applies to cases in which the challenge is to the Patent Office’s de-
`termination “to initiate an inter partes review under this section,” or
`where the challenge consists of questions closely tied to the applica-
`
`tion and interpretation of statutes related to that determination.
`Cuozzo’s claim does not implicate a constitutional question, nor does
`it present other questions of interpretation that reach well beyond
`“this section” in terms of scope and impact. Rather, Cuozzo’s allega-
`tion that Garmin’s petition did not plead “with particularity” the
`challenge to claims 10 and 14 as required by §312 is little more than
`a challenge to the Patent Office’s conclusion under §314(a) that the
`“information presented in the petition” warranted review. Pp. 9–12.
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`2. The Patent Office regulation requiring the Board to apply the
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`broadest reasonable construction standard to interpret patent claims
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`is a reasonable exercise of the rulemaking authority granted to the
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`Cite as: 579 U. S. ____ (2016)
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`Syllabus
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`Patent Office by statute. Pp. 12–20.
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`(a) Where a statute leaves a gap or is ambiguous, this Court typ-
`ically interprets a congressional grant of rulemaking authority as giv-
`ing the agency leeway to enact rules that are reasonable in light of
`the text, nature, and purpose of the statute. United States v. Mead
`Corp., 533 U. S. 218, 229; Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
`
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`Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842–843. Here, the statute
`grants the Patent Office the authority to issue regulations “governing
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`inter partes review,” and no statutory provision unambiguously
`mandates a particular claim construction standard.
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`The Patent Office’s rulemaking authority is not limited to proce-
`dural regulations. Analogies to interpretations of other congressional
`grants of rulemaking authority in other statutes, which themselves
`do not unambiguously contain a limitation to procedural rules, can-
`not magically render unambiguous the different language in the dif-
`ferent statutory grant of rulemaking authority at issue.
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`The nature and purpose of inter partes review does not unambigu-
`ously require the Patent Office to apply one particular claim con-
`struction standard. Cuozzo’s contention that the purpose of inter
`partes review—to establish trial-like procedures for reviewing previ-
`ously issued patents—supports the application of the ordinary mean-
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`ing standard ignores the fact that in other significant respects, inter
`partes review is less like a judicial proceeding and more like a spe-
`cialized agency proceeding. This indicates that Congress designed a
`hybrid proceeding. The purpose of inter partes review is not only to
`resolve patent-related disputes among parties, but also to protect the
`public’s “paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies . . . are
`kept within their legitimate scope.” Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v.
`Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 324 U. S. 806, 816. Neither
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`the statute’s language, nor its purpose, nor its legislative history
`suggests that Congress decided what standard should apply in inter
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`partes review. Pp. 12–17.
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`(b) The regulation is a reasonable exercise of the Patent Office’s
`rulemaking authority. The broadest reasonable construction stand-
`ard helps ensure precision in drafting claims and prevents a patent
`from tying up too much knowledge, which, in turn, helps members of
`the public draw useful information from the disclosed invention and
`understand the lawful limits of the claim. The Patent Office has used
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`this standard for more than 100 years and has applied it in proceed-
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`ings which, as here, resemble district court litigation.
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`Cuozzo’s two arguments in response are unavailing. Applying
`the broadest reasonable construction standard in inter partes review
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`is not, as Cuozzo suggests, unfair to a patent holder, who may move
`to amend at least once in the review process, and who has had sever-
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`Syllabus
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`al opportunities to amend in the original application process. And
`though the application of one standard in inter partes review and an-
`other in district court proceedings may produce inconsistent out-
`comes, that structure is inherent to Congress’ regulatory design, and
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`it is also consistent with past practice, as the patent system has long
`provided different tracks for the review and adjudication of patent
`claims. The Patent Office’s regulation is reasonable, and this Court
`does not decide whether a better alternative exists as a matter of pol-
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`icy. Pp. 17–20.
`793 F. 3d 1268, affirmed.
`BREYER, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect
`to Parts I and III, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Part II,
`in which ROBERTS, C. J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, GINSBURG, and KAGAN,
`JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion. ALITO, J., filed an
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`opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which SOTOMAYOR,
`J., joined.
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` Cite as: 579 U. S. ____ (2016)
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`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`_________________
`
` No. 15–446
`_________________
` CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, PETITIONER
`
`
`v. MICHELLE K. LEE, UNDER SECRETARY OF COM-
`MERCE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DIR-
`ECTOR, PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
`[June 20, 2016]
`JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.
`The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 35 U. S. C. §100
`
`et seq., creates a process called “inter partes review.” That
`review process allows a third party to ask the U. S. Patent
`and Trademark Office to reexamine the claims in an
`already-issued patent and to cancel any claim that the
`agency finds to be unpatentable in light of prior art. See
`§102 (requiring “novel[ty]”); §103 (disqualifying claims
`that are “obvious”).
`We consider two provisions of the Act. The first says:
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`“No Appeal.—The determination by the Director [of
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`the Patent Office] whether to institute an inter partes
`review under this section shall be final and non-
`appealable.” §314(d).
`Does this provision bar a court from considering whether
`the Patent Office wrongly “determin[ed] . . . to institute an
`inter partes review,” ibid., when it did so on grounds not
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`specifically mentioned in a third party’s review request?
`The second provision grants the Patent Office the au-
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`Opinion of the Court
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`thority to issue
`“regulations . . . establishing and governing inter
`partes review under this chapter.” §316(a)(4).
`Does this provision authorize the Patent Office to issue a
`regulation stating that the agency, in inter partes review,
`“shall [construe a patent claim according to] its broad-
`est reasonable construction in light of the specification
`of the patent in which it appears”? 37 CFR §42.100(b)
`(2015).
`
`We conclude that the first provision, though it may not
`bar consideration of a constitutional question, for example,
`does bar judicial review of the kind of mine-run claim at
`issue here, involving the Patent Office’s decision to insti-
`tute inter partes review. We also conclude that the second
`provision authorizes the Patent Office to issue the regula-
`tion before us. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533
`
`U. S. 218, 229 (2001); Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural
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`Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842 (1984).
`I
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`A
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`An inventor obtains a patent by applying to the Patent
`Office. A patent examiner with expertise in the relevant
`field reviews an applicant’s patent claims, considers the
`prior art, and determines whether each claim meets the
`applicable patent law requirements. See, e.g., 35 U. S. C.
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`§§101, 102, 103, 112. Then, the examiner accepts a claim,
`or rejects it and explains why. See §132(a).
`
`If the examiner rejects a claim, the applicant can re-
`submit a narrowed (or otherwise modified) claim, which
`the examiner will consider anew, measuring the new claim
`against the same patent law requirements. If the exam-
`iner rejects the new claim, the inventor typically has yet
`another chance to respond with yet another amended
`claim. Ultimately, the Patent Office makes a final deci-
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`Opinion of the Court
`sion allowing or rejecting the application. The applicant
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`may seek judicial review of any final rejection. See
`§§141(a), 145.
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`For several decades, the Patent Office has also pos-
`sessed the authority to reexamine—and perhaps cancel—a
`patent claim that it had previously allowed. In 1980, for
`example, Congress enacted a statute providing for “ex
`parte reexamination.” Act to Amend the Patent and
`Trademark Laws, 35 U. S. C. §301 et seq. That statute
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`(which remains in effect) gives “[a]ny person at any time”
`the right to “file a request for reexamination” on the basis
`of certain prior art “bearing on the patentability” of an
`already-issued patent.
` §§301(a)(1), 302.
`If the Patent
`Office concludes that the cited prior art raises “a substan-
`tial new question of patentability,” the agency can reex-
`amine the patent. §303(a). And that reexamination can
`lead the Patent Office to cancel the patent (or some of its
`claims). Alternatively, the Director of the Patent Office
`can, on her “own initiative,” trigger such a proceeding.
`Ibid. And, as with examination, the patent holder can
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`seek judicial review of an adverse final decision. §306.
`
`In 1999 and 2002, Congress enacted statutes that estab-
`lished another, similar procedure, known as “inter partes
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`reexamination.” Those statutes granted third parties
`greater opportunities to participate in the Patent Office’s
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`reexamination proceedings as well as in any appeal of a
`Patent Office decision. See, e.g., American Inventors
`Protection Act of 1999, §297 et seq. (2006 ed.) (superseded).
`
`
`In 2011, Congress enacted the statute before us. That
`statute modifies “inter partes reexamination,” which it
`now calls “inter partes review.” See H. R. Rep. No. 112–
`98, pt. 1, pp. 46–47 (2011) (H. R. Rep.). Like inter partes
`reexamination, any third party can ask the agency to
`initiate inter partes review of a patent claim. But the new
`statute has changed the standard that governs the Patent
`Office’s institution of the agency’s process. Instead of
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`Opinion of the Court
`requiring that a request for reexamination raise a “sub-
`stantial new question of patentability,” it now requires
`that a petition show “a reasonable likelihood that” the
`challenger “would prevail.” Compare §312(a) (2006 ed.)
`(repealed) with §314(a) (2012 ed.).
`
`The new statute provides a challenger with broader
`participation rights. It creates within the Patent Office a
`Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) composed of ad-
`ministrative patent judges, who are patent lawyers and
`former patent examiners, among others. §6. That Board
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`conducts the proceedings, reaches a conclusion, and sets
`forth its reasons. See ibid.
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`The statute sets forth time limits for completing this
`review. §316(a)(11). It grants the Patent Office the au-
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`thority to issue rules. §316(a)(4). Like its predecessors,
`the statute authorizes judicial review of a “final written
`decision” canceling a patent claim. §319. And, the statute
`says that the agency’s initial decision “whether to institute
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`an inter partes review” is “final and nonappealable.”
`§314(d); compare ibid. with §§312(a), (c) (2006 ed.)
`(repealed)
`(the “determination” that a petition
`for
`inter partes reexamination “raise[s]” “a substantial new
`question of patentability” is “final and non-appealable”),
`and §303(c) (2012 ed.) (similar in respect to ex parte
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`reexamination).
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`B
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`In 2002, Giuseppe A. Cuozzo applied for a patent cover-
`ing a speedometer that will show a driver when he is
`driving above the speed limit. To understand the basic
`idea, think of the fact that a white speedometer needle will
`look red when it passes under a translucent piece of red
`glass or the equivalent (say, red cellophane). If you attach
`a piece of red glass or red cellophane to a speedometer
`beginning at 65 miles per hour, then, when the white
`needle passes that point, it will look red. If we attach the
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`Opinion of the Court
`red glass to a plate that can itself rotate, if we attach the
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`plate to the speedometer, if we connect the plate to a
`Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver, and if we enter
`onto a chip or a disk all the speed limits on all the Nation’s
`roads, then the GPS can signal where the car is, the chip
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`or disk can signal the speed limit at that place, and the
`plate can rotate to the right number on the speedometer.
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`Thus, if the speed limit is 35 miles per hour, then the
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`white speedometer needle will pass under the red plate at
`35, not 65, and the driver will know if he is driving too
`fast.
`In 2004, the Patent Office granted the patent. See U. S.
`
`Patent No. 6,778,074 (Cuozzo Patent). The Appendix
`contains excerpts from this patent, offering a less simpli-
`fied (and more technical) description.
`C
` Petitioner Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC (Cuozzo),
`now holds the rights to the Cuozzo Patent. In 2012, Gar-
`min International, Inc., and Garmin USA, Inc., filed a
`petition seeking inter partes review of the Cuozzo Patent’s
`20 claims. Garmin backed up its request by stating, for
`example, that the invention described in claim 17 was
`obvious in light of three prior patents, the Aumayer, Ev-
`ans, and Wendt patents. U. S. Patent No. 6,633,811; U. S.
`Patent No. 3,980,041; and U. S. Patent No. 2,711,153. Cf.
`Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 321 U. S.
`275, 280 (1944) (Black, J., dissenting) (“[S]omeone, some-
`where, sometime, made th[is] discovery [but] I cannot
`agree that this patentee is that discoverer”).
`
`The Board agreed to reexamine claim 17, as well as
`claims 10 and 14. The Board recognized that Garmin had
`not expressly challenged claim 10 and claim 14 on the
`same obviousness ground. But, believing that “claim 17
`depends on claim 14 which depends on claim 10,” the
`Board reasoned that Garmin had “implicitly” challenged
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`Opinion of the Court
`claims 10 and 14 on the basis of the same prior inventions,
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`and it consequently decided to review all three claims
`together. App. to Pet. for Cert. 188a.
`
`After proceedings before the Board, it concluded that
`claims 10, 14, and 17 of the Cuozzo Patent were obvious in
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`light of the earlier patents to which Garmin had referred.
`The Board explained that the Aumayer patent “makes use
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`of a GPS receiver to determine . . . the applicable speed
`limit at that location for display,” the Evans patent “de-
`scribes a colored plate for indicating the speed limit,” and
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`the Wendt patent “describes us[ing] a rotatable pointer for
`indicating the applicable speed limit.” Id., at 146a–147a.
`Anyone, the Board reasoned, who is “not an automaton”—
`anyone with “ordinary skill” and “ordinary creativity”—
`could have taken the automated approach suggested by
`the Aumayer patent and applied it to the manually ad-
`justable signals described in the Evans and Wendt pa-
`
`tents. Id., at 147a. The Board also concluded that Cuoz-
`zo’s proposed amendments would not cure this defect, id.,
`at 164a–166a, and it consequently denied Cuozzo’s motion
`to amend its claims. Ultimately, it ordered claims 10, 14,
`and 17 of the Cuozzo Patent canceled, id., at 166a.
`
`Cuozzo appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
`for the Federal Circuit. Cuozzo argued that the Patent
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`Office improperly instituted inter partes review, at least in
`respect to claims 10 and 14, because the agency found that
`Garmin had only implicitly challenged those two claims on
`the basis of the Aumayer, Evans, and Wendt patents,
`while the statute required petitions to set forth the
`grounds for challenge “with particularity.” §312(a)(3).
`Cuozzo also argued that the Board, when construing the
`claims, improperly used the interpretive standard set
`forth in the Patent Office’s regulation (i.e., it gave those
`claims their “broadest reasonable construction,” 37 CFR
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`§42.100(b)), when it should have applied the standard that
`courts normally use when judging a patent’s validity (i.e.,
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`Opinion of the Court
`it should have given those claims their “ordinary meaning
`. . . as understood by a person of skill in the art,” Phillips
`v. AWH Corp., 415 F. 3d 1303, 1314 (CA Fed. 2005)
`(en banc)).
`A divided panel of the Court of Appeals rejected both
`
`arguments. First, the panel majority pointed out that 35
`U. S. C. §314(d) made the decision to institute inter partes
`review “nonappealable.” In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies,
`LLC, 793 F. 3d 1268, 1273 (CA Fed. 2015) (internal quota-
`
`
`tion marks omitted). Second, the panel majority affirmed
`the application of the broadest reasonable construction
`standard on the ground (among others) that the regulation
`was a reasonable, and hence lawful, exercise of the Patent
`Office’s statutorily granted rulemaking authority. Id., at
`1278–1279; see §314(a)(4). By a vote of 6 to 5, the Court of
`
`Appeals denied Cuozzo’s petition for rehearing en banc.
`In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC, 793 F. 3d 1297,
`1298 (CA Fed. 2015).
`
`We granted Cuozzo’s petition for certiorari to review
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`these two questions.
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`II
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`Like the Court of Appeals, we believe that Cuozzo’s
`contention that the Patent Office unlawfully initiated its
`agency review is not appealable. For one thing, that is
`what §314(d) says. It states that the “determination by
`the [Patent Office] whether to institute an inter partes
`
`
`review under this section shall be final and nonappeala-
`ble.” (Emphasis added.)
`
`For another, the legal dispute at issue is an ordinary
`dispute about the application of certain relevant patent
`statutes concerning the Patent Office’s decision to insti-
`tute inter partes review. Cuozzo points to a related statu-
`tory section, §312, which says that petitions must be
`pleaded “with particularity.” Those words, in its view,
`mean that the petition should have specifically said that
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`Opinion of the Court
`claims 10 and 14 are also obvious in light of this same
`
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` prior art. Garmin’s petition, the Government replies, need
`not have mentioned claims 10 and 14 separately, for
`claims 10, 14, and 17 are all logically linked; the claims
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`“rise and fall together,” and a petition need not simply
`repeat the same argument expressly when it is so obviously
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`implied. See 793 F. 3d, at 1281. In our view, the “No
`Appeal” provision’s language must, at the least, forbid an
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`appeal that attacks a “determination . . . whether to insti-
`tute” review by raising this kind of legal question and
`little more. §314(d).
`Moreover, a contrary holding would undercut one im-
`
`portant congressional objective, namely, giving the Patent
`Office significant power to revisit and revise earlier patent
`
`grants. See H. R. Rep., at 45, 48 (explaining that the
`statute seeks to “improve patent quality and restore confi-
`dence in the presumption of validity that comes with
`issued patents”); 157 Cong. Rec. 9778 (2011) (remarks of
`Rep. Goodlatte) (noting that inter partes review “screen[s]
`out bad patents while bolstering valid ones”). We doubt
`that Congress would have granted the Patent Office this
`authority, including, for example, the ability to continue
`proceedings even after the original petitioner settles and
`drops out, §317(a), if it had thought that the agency’s final
`decision could be unwound under some minor statutory
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`technicality related to its preliminary decision to institute
`inter partes review.
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`Further, the existence of similar provisions in this, and
`related, patent statutes reinforces our conclusion. See
`§319 (limiting appellate review to the “final written deci-
`sion”); §312(c) (2006 ed.) (repealed) (the “determination”
`that a petition for inter partes reexamination “raise[s]” a
`“substantial new question of patentability” is “final and
`non-appealable”); see also §303(c) (2012 ed.); In re Hiniker
`Co., 150 F. 3d 1362, 1367 (CA Fed. 1998) (“Section 303 . . .
`is directed toward the [Patent Office’s] authority to insti-
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`tute a reexamination, and there is no provision granting
`us direct review of that decision”).
`
`The dissent, like the panel dissent in the Court of Ap-
`peals, would limit the scope of the “No Appeal” provision
`to interlocutory appeals, leaving a court free to review the
`initial decision to institute review in the context of the
`agency’s final decision. Post, at 1, 5 (ALITO, J., concurring
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`in part and dissenting in part); 793 F. 3d, at 1291 (New-
`man, J., dissenting). We cannot accept this interpretation.
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`It reads into the provision a limitation (to interlocutory
`decisions) that the language nowhere mentions and that is
`unnecessary. The Administrative Procedure Act already
`limits review to final agency decisions. 5 U. S. C. §704.
`
`The Patent Office’s decision to initiate inter partes review
`is “preliminary,” not “final.” Ibid. And the agency’s deci-
`sion to deny a petition is a matter committed to the Patent
`Office’s discretion. See §701(a)(2); 35 U. S. C. §314(a) (no
`mandate to institute review); see also post, at 9, and n. 6.
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`So, read as limited to such preliminary and discretionary
`decisions, the “No Appeal” provision would seem superflu-
`ous. The dissent also suggests that its approach is a
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`“familiar practice,” consistent with other areas of law.
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`Post, at 8. But the kind of initial determination at issue
`here—that there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the
`claims are unpatentable on the grounds asserted—is akin
`
`to decisions which, in other contexts, we have held to be
`unreviewable. See Kaley v. United States, 571 U. S. ___,
`___ (2014) (slip op., at 8) (“The grand jury gets to say—
`without any review, oversight, or second-guessing—
`whether probable cause exists to think that a person
`
`committed a crime”).
`We recognize the “strong presumption” in favor of judi-
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`cial review that we apply when we interpret statutes,
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`including statutes that may limit or preclude review.
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`Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 575 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (slip
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`op., at 4) (internal quotation marks omitted). This pre-
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`sumption, however, may be overcome by “‘clear and con-
`vincing’” indications, drawn from “specific language,”
`“specific legislative history,” and “inferences of intent
`drawn from the statutory scheme as a whole,” that Con-
`gress intended to bar review. Block v. Community Nutri-
`tion Institute, 467 U. S. 340, 349–350 (1984). That stand-
`
`ard is met here. The dissent disagrees, and it points to
`
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`Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management, 470 U. S. 768
`
`(1985), to support its view that, in light of this presump-
`tion, §314(d) should be read to permit judicial review of
`any issue bearing on the Patent Office’s preliminary deci-
`sion to institute inter partes review. See post, at 4–5.
`Lindahl is a case about the judicial review of disability
`determinations for federal employees. We explained that
`
`a statute directing the Office of Personnel Management to
`“‘determine questions of disability,’” and making those
`decisions “‘final,’” “‘conclusive,’” and “‘not subject to
`review,’” barred a court from revisiting the “factual un-
`derpinnings of . . . disability determinations”—though it
`permitted courts to consider claims alleging, for example,
`that the Office of Personnel Management “‘substantial[ly]
`
`depart[ed] from important procedural rights.’” 470 U. S.,
`at 771, 791. Thus, Lindahl’s interpretation of that statute
`preserved the agency’s primacy over its core statutory
`function in accord with Congress’ intent. Our interpreta-
`
`tion of the “No Appeal” provision here has the same effect.
`Congress has told the Patent Office to determine whether
`inter partes review should proceed, and it has made the
`
`agency’s decision “final” and “nonappealable.” §314(d).
`Our conclusion that courts may not revisit this initial
`
`determination gives effect to this statutory command.
`Moreover, Lindahl’s conclusion was consistent with prior
`judicial practice in respect to those factual agency deter-
`minations, and legislative history “strongly suggest[ed]”
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`that Congress intended to preserve this prior practice. Id.,
`at 780. These features, as explained above, also support
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`our interpretation: The text of the “No Appeal” provision,
`along with its place in the overall statutory scheme, its
`
`role alongside the Administrative Procedure Act, the prior
`
`interpretation of similar patent statutes, and Congress’
`purpose in crafting inter partes review, all point in favor
`of precluding review of the Patent Office’s institution
`
`decisions.
`
`
`Nevertheless, in light of §314(d)’s own text and the
`presumption favoring review, we emphasize that our
`interpretation applies where the grounds for attacking the
`decision to institute inter partes review consist of ques-
`tions that are closely tied to the application and interpre-
`tation of statutes related to the Patent Office’s decision to
`initiate inter partes review. See §314(d) (barring appeals
`of “determinations . . . to initiate an inter partes review
`under this section” (emphasis added)). This means that we
`
`need not, and do not, decide the precise effect of §314(d) on
`appeals that implicate constitutional questions, that de-
`pend on other less closely related statutes, or that present
`other questions of interpretation that reach, in terms of
`scope and impact, well beyond “this section.” Cf. Johnson
`v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361, 367 (1974) (statute precluding
`review of “any question of law or fact under any law ad-
`ministered by the Veterans’ Administration” does not bar
`review of constitutional challenges (emphasis deleted and
`internal quotation marks omitted)); Traynor v. Turnage,
`485 U. S. 535, 544–545 (1988) (that same statute does not
`bar review of decisions made under different statutes
`enacted at other times). Thus, contrary to the dissent’s
`suggestion, we do not categorically preclude review of a
`final decision where a petition fails to give “sufficient
`notice” such that there is a due process problem with the
`entire proceeding, nor does our interpretation enable the
`agency to act outside its statutory limits by, for example,
`
`canceling a patent claim for “indefiniteness under §112” in
`inter partes review. Post, at 10–13. Such “shenanigans”
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`may be properly reviewable in the context of §319 and
`under the Administrative Procedure Act, which enables
`reviewing courts to “set aside agency action” that is “con-
`trary to constitutional right,” “in excess of statutory juris-
`diction,” or “arbitrary [and] capricious.” Compare post, at
`13, with 5 U. S. C. §§706(2)(A)–(D).
`
`By contrast, where a patent holder merely challenges
`the Patent Office’s “determin[ation] that the information
`presented in the p