(Slip Opinion)
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2015
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`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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` Syllabus
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`DIETZ v. BOULDIN
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE NINTH CIRCUIT
` No. 15–458. Argued April 26, 2016—Decided June 9, 2016
`
`Petitioner Rocky Dietz sued respondent Hillary Bouldin for negligence
`for injuries suffered in an automobile accident. Bouldin removed the
`case to Federal District Court. At trial, Bouldin admitted liability
`and stipulated to damages of $10,136 for Dietz’ medical expenses.
`The only disputed issue remaining was whether Dietz was entitled to
`more. During deliberations, the jury sent the judge a note asking
`whether Dietz’ medical expenses had been paid and, if so, by whom.
`Although the judge was concerned that the jury may not have under-
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` stood that a verdict of less than the stipulated amount would require
`a mistrial, the judge, with the parties’ consent, responded only that
`the information being sought was not relevant to the verdict. The ju-
`
`
` ry returned a verdict in Dietz’ favor but awarded him $0 in damages.
`After the verdict, the judge discharged the jury, and the jurors left
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`the courtroom. Moments later, the judge realized the error in the $0
`verdict and ordered the clerk to bring back the jurors, who were all in
`the building—including one who may have left for a short time and
`returned. Over the objection of Dietz’ counsel and in the interest of
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` judicial economy and efficiency, the judge decided to recall the jury.
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`
` After questioning the jurors as a group, the judge was satisfied that
`none had spoken about the case to anyone and ordered them to re-
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` turn the next morning. After receiving clarifying instructions, the
`reassembled jury returned a verdict awarding Dietz $15,000 in dam-
`ages. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
`
` Held: A federal district court has a limited inherent power to rescind a
` jury discharge order and recall a jury in a civil case for further delib-
`
`
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` erations after identifying an error in the jury’s verdict. The District
`Court did not abuse that power here. Pp. 4–13.
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` (a) The inherent powers that district courts possess “to manage
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`DIETZ v. BOULDIN
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`Syllabus
`their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposi-
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`tion of cases,” Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U. S. 626, 630–631, have
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`certain limits. The exercise of an inherent power must be a “reason-
`able response to the problems and needs” confronting the court’s fair
`administration of justice and cannot be contrary to any express grant
`of, or limitation on, the district court’s power contained in a rule or
`statute. Degen v. United States, 517 U. S. 820, 823–824. These two
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`principles support the conclusion here.
`
`
`First, rescinding a discharge order and recalling the jury can be a
`reasonable response to correcting an error in the jury’s verdict in cer-
`tain circumstances, and is similar in operation to a district court’s
`express power under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51(b)(3) to give
`the jury a curative instruction and order them to continue deliberat-
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`ing to correct an error in the verdict before discharge. Other inherent
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`powers possessed by district courts, e.g., a district court’s inherent
`power to modify or rescind its orders before final judgment in a civil
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`case, see Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. of America v. United States,
`320 U. S. 1, 47–48, or to manage its docket and courtroom with a
`view toward the efficient and expedient resolution of cases, see Lan-
`
`dis v. North American Co., 299 U. S. 248, 254, also support this con-
`
`clusion.
`
`
`Second, rescinding a discharge order to recall a jury does not vio-
`late any other rule or statute. No implicit limitation in Rule 51(b)(3)
`prohibits a court from rescinding its discharge order and reassem-
`bling the jury. Nor are such limits imposed by other rules dealing
`with postverdict remedies. See, e.g., Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 50(b),
`59(a)(1)(A). Pp. 4–7.
`
`(b) This inherent power must be carefully circumscribed, especially
`in light of the guarantee of an impartial jury. Because discharge re-
`leases a juror from the obligations to avoid discussing the case out-
`side the jury room and to avoid external prejudicial information, the
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`potential that a jury reassembled after being discharged might be
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`tainted looms large. Thus, any suggestion of prejudice should counsel
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`a district court not to exercise its inherent power. The court should
`determine whether any juror has been directly tainted and should al-
`so take into account additional factors that can indirectly create prej-
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`udice, which at a minimum, include the length of delay between dis-
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`charge and recall, whether the jurors have spoken to anyone about
`the case after discharge, and any emotional reactions to the verdict
`witnessed by the jurors. Courts should also ask to what extent just-
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`dismissed jurors accessed their smartphones or the internet.
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`Applying those factors here, the District Court did not abuse its
`discretion. The jury was out for only a few minutes, and, with the ex-
`ception of one juror, remained inside the courthouse. The jurors did
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`Cite as: 579 U. S. ____ (2016)
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`Syllabus
`not speak to any person about the case after discharge. And, there is
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`no indication in the record that the verdict generated any kind of
`emotional reaction or electronic exchanges or searches that could
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`have tainted the jury. Pp. 7–10.
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`(c) Dietz’ call for a categorical bar on reempaneling a jury after dis-
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`charge is rejected. Even assuming that at common law a discharged
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`jury could never be brought back, the advent of modern federal trial
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`practice limits the common law’s relevance as to the specific question
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`raised here. There is no benefit to imposing a rule that says that as
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`soon as a jury is free to go a judge categorically cannot rescind that
`order to correct an easily identified and fixable mistake. And Dietz’
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`“functional” discharge test, which turns on whether the jurors remain
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`within the district court’s “presence and control,” i.e., within the
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`courtroom, raises similar problems. Pp. 11–13.
`794 F. 3d 1093; affirmed.
`SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
`C. J., and GINSBURG, BREYER, ALITO, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. THOMAS,
`J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KENNEDY, J., joined.
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` Cite as: 579 U. S. ____ (2016)
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`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash­
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`_________________
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` No. 15–458
`_________________
` ROCKY DIETZ, PETITIONER v. HILLARY BOULDIN
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`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`
`APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
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`
`[June 9, 2016]
`
` JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
`In this case, a jury returned a legally impermissible
`
`verdict. The trial judge did not realize the error until
`shortly after he excused the jury. He brought the jury
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`back and ordered them to deliberate again to correct the
`mistake. The question before us is whether a federal
`district court can recall a jury it has discharged, or whether
`the court can remedy the error only by ordering a new
`trial.
`This Court now holds that a federal district court has
`
`
`the inherent power to rescind a jury discharge order and
`recall a jury for further deliberations after identifying an
`error in the jury’s verdict. Because the potential of taint­
`ing jurors and the jury process after discharge is extraor­
`dinarily high, however, this power is limited in duration
`and scope, and must be exercised carefully to avoid any
`potential prejudice.
`
`I
`Petitioner Rocky Dietz was driving through an intersec­
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`tion in Bozeman, Montana, when Hillary Bouldin ran the
`red light and T-boned Dietz. As a result of the accident,
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`Dietz suffered injuries to his lower back that caused him
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` DIETZ v. BOULDIN
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`Opinion of the Court
`severe pain. He sought physical therapy, steroid injec­
`tions, and other medications to treat his pain. Dietz sued
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`Bouldin for negligence. Bouldin removed the case to
`Federal District Court. See 28 U. S. C. §§1332, 1441.
`
`At trial, Bouldin admitted that he was at fault for the
`accident and that Dietz was injured as a result. Bouldin
`also stipulated that Dietz’ medical expenses of $10,136
`were reasonable and necessary as a result of the collision.
`The only disputed issue at trial for the jury to resolve was
`whether Dietz was entitled to damages above $10,136.
`
`
`During deliberations, the jury sent the judge a note
`asking: “‘Has the $10,136 medical expenses been paid; and
`if so, by whom?’” App. 36. The court discussed the note
`with the parties’ attorneys and told them he was unsure
`whether the jurors understood that their verdict could not
`be less than that stipulated amount, and that a mistrial
`would be required if the jury did not return a verdict of at
`least $10,136. The judge, however, with the consent of
`both parties, told the jury that the information they
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`sought was not relevant to the verdict.
`
`The jury returned a verdict in Dietz’ favor but awarded
`him $0 in damages. The judge thanked the jury for its
`service and ordered them “discharged,” telling the jurors
`they were “free to go.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 25a. The
`jurors gathered their things and left the courtroom.
`
`
`A few minutes later, the court ordered the clerk to bring
`the jurors back. Speaking with counsel outside the jury’s
`presence, the court explained that it had “just stopped the
`jury from leaving the building,” after realizing that the $0
`verdict was not “legally possible in view of stipulated
`damages exceeding $10,000.” Id., at 26a. The court sug­
`gested two alternatives: (1) order a new trial or (2)
`reempanel the jurors, instructing them to award at least
`the stipulated damages, and ordering them to deliberate
`anew.
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`Dietz’ attorney objected to reempaneling the discharged
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`Opinion of the Court
`jurors, arguing that the jury was no longer capable of
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`returning a fair and impartial verdict. The court reiter­
`ated that none of the jurors had left the building, and asked
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`the clerk whether any had even left the floor where the
`courtroom was located. The clerk explained that only one
`juror had left the building to get a hotel receipt and bring
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`it back.
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`Before the jurors returned, the judge told the parties
`that he planned to order the jury to deliberate again and
`reach a different verdict. The judge explained that he
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`would “hate to just throw away the money and time that’s
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`been expended in this trial.” Id., at 28a. When the jurors
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`returned to the courtroom, the judge questioned them as a
`group and confirmed that they had not spoken to anyone
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`about the case.
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`The judge explained to the jurors the mistake in not
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`awarding the stipulated damages. He informed the jurors
`that he was reempaneling them and would ask them to
`start over with clarifying instructions. He asked the
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`jurors to confirm that they understood their duty and to
`return the next morning to deliberate anew. The next
`day, the reassembled jury returned a verdict awarding
`Dietz $15,000 in damages.
`
`On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 794 F. 3d 1093
`(2015). The court held that a district court could
`reempanel the jury shortly after dismissal as long as
`during the period of dismissal, the jurors were not exposed
`to any outside influences that would compromise their
`ability to reconsider the verdict fairly. This Court granted
`Dietz’ petition for a writ of certiorari to resolve confusion
`in the Courts of Appeals on whether and when a federal
`district court has the authority to recall a jury after dis­
`charging it. 577 U. S. ___ (2016). See Wagner v. Jones,
`758 F. 3d 1030, 1034–1035 (CA8 2014), cert. denied, 575
`U. S. ___ (2015); United States v. Figueroa, 683 F. 3d 69,
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`72–73 (CA3 2012); United States v. Rojas, 617 F. 3d 669,
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`3
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`DIETZ v. BOULDIN
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`Opinion of the Court
`677–678 (CA2 2010); United States v. Marinari, 32 F. 3d
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`1209, 1214 (CA7 1994); Summers v. United States, 11
`F. 2d 583, 585–587 (CA4 1926).
`
`II
`
`A
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`The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure set out many of the
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`specific powers of a federal district court. But they are not
`all encompassing. They make no provision, for example,
`for the power of a judge to hear a motion in limine,1 a
`motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens,2 or many
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`other standard procedural devices trial courts around the
`country use every day in service of Rule 1’s paramount
`command: the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of
`disputes.
`Accordingly, this Court has long recognized that a dis­
`
`trict court possesses inherent powers that are “governed
`not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested
`in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the
`orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Link v.
`Wabash R. Co., 370 U. S. 626, 630–631 (1962); see also
`
`
`United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32, 34 (1812). Al­
`though this Court has never precisely delineated the outer
`boundaries of a district court’s inherent powers, the Court
`has recognized certain limits on those powers.
`First, the exercise of an inherent power must be a “rea­
`
`sonable response to the problems and needs” confronting
`the court’s fair administration of justice. Degen v. United
`States, 517 U. S. 820, 823–824 (1996). Second, the exer­
`cise of an inherent power cannot be contrary to any ex­
`press grant of or limitation on the district court’s power
`contained in a rule or statute. See id., at 823; Fed. Rule
`Civ. Proc. 83(b) (districts courts can “regulate [their] prac­
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`4
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`——————
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` 1 Luce v. United States, 469 U. S. 38, 41, n. 4 (1984).
` 2 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501, 507–508 (1947).
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`Opinion of the Court
` tice in any manner consistent with federal law”); see, e.g.,
`
`
` Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U. S. 250, 254
`(1988) (holding that a district court cannot invoke its
`inherent power to circumvent the harmless-error inquiry
`prescribed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a)).
`
`These two principles—an inherent power must be a rea­
`sonable response to a specific problem and the power
`cannot contradict any express rule or statute—support the
`conclusion that a district judge has a limited inherent
`power to rescind a discharge order and recall a jury in a
`civil case where the court discovers an error in the jury’s
`verdict.
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`First, rescinding a discharge order and recalling the jury
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`can be a reasonable response to correcting an error in the
`jury’s verdict in certain circumstances. In the normal
`course, when a court recognizes an error in a verdict be­
`fore it discharges the jury, it has the express power to give
`the jury a curative instruction and order them to continue
`deliberating. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 51(b)(3) (“The court
`. . . may instruct the jury at any time before the jury is
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`discharged”); 4 L. Sand et al., Modern Federal Jury In­
`structions–Civil ¶78.01, Instruction 78–10, p. 78–31 (2015)
`
` (Sand) (when a jury returns an inconsistent verdict,
`“[r]esubmitting the verdict . . . to resolve the inconsisten­
`cies is often the preferable course”). The decision to recall
`a jury to give them what would be an identical predis­
`charge curative instruction could be, depending on the
`circumstances, similarly reasonable.
`
`This conclusion is buttressed by this Court’s prior cases
`affirming a district court’s inherent authority in analogous
`circumstances. For example, the Court has recognized
`that a district court ordinarily has the power to modify or
`rescind its orders at any point prior to final judgment in a
`civil case. Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. of America v.
`
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` United States, 320 U. S. 1, 47–48 (1943); see also Fed.
`Rule Civ. Proc. 54(b) (district court can revise partial final
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` DIETZ v. BOULDIN
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`Opinion of the Court
`judgment order absent certification of finality); Fernandez
`v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 642, 644, 5 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1961)
`(Harlan, J., in chambers) (district court has inherent
`power to revoke order granting bail).
`Here, the District Court rescinded its order discharging
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`the jury before it issued a final judgment. Rescinding the
`discharge order restores the legal status quo before the
`court dismissed the jury. The District Court is thus free to
`reinstruct the jury under Rule 51(b)(3).
`This Court has also held that district courts have the
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`inherent authority to manage their dockets and court­
`rooms with a view toward the efficient and expedient
`resolution of cases. See, e.g., Landis v. North American
`
`Co., 299 U. S. 248, 254 (1936) (district court has inherent
`power to stay proceedings pending resolution of parallel
`actions in other courts); Link, 370 U. S., at 631–632 (dis­
`
`trict court has inherent power to dismiss case sua sponte
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`for failure to prosecute); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501
`U. S. 32, 44 (1991) (district court has inherent power to
`vacate judgment procured by fraud); United States v.
`Morgan, 307 U. S. 183, 197–198 (1939) (district court has
`inherent power to stay disbursement of funds until revised
`payments are finally adjudicated).
`
`This Court’s recognition of these other inherent powers
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`designed to resolve cases expeditiously is consistent with
`recognizing an inherent power to recall a discharged jury
`and reempanel the jurors with curative instructions.
`
`Compared to the alternative of conducting a new trial,
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`recall can save the parties, the court, and society the
`costly time and litigation expense of conducting a new
`trial with a new set of jurors.
`Second, rescinding a discharge order to recall a jury
`
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`does not violate any other rule or statute. Rule 51(b)(3)
`states that a court “may instruct the jury at any time
`before the jury is discharged.” A judge obviously cannot
`instruct a jury that is discharged—it is no longer there.
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`Opinion of the Court
`But there is no implicit limitation in Rule 51(b)(3) that
`prohibits a court from rescinding its discharge order and
`reassembling the jury. See Link, 370 U. S., at 630 (hold­
`ing that Rule 41(b)’s allowance for a party to move to
`dismiss for failure to prosecute did not implicitly abrogate
`the court’s power to dismiss sua sponte). Other rules
`dealing with postverdict remedies such as a motion for a
`new trial or a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
`verdict, see Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 50(b), 59(a)(1)(A), simi­
`larly do not place limits on a court’s ability to rescind a
`
`prior order discharging a jury.
` Accordingly, a federal
`district court can rescind a discharge order and recall a
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`jury in a civil case as an exercise of its inherent powers.
`B
`
`Just because a district court has the inherent power to
`rescind a discharge order does not mean that it is appro­
`priate to use that power in every case. Because the exer­
`cise of an inherent power in the interest of promoting
`efficiency may risk undermining other vital interests
`related to the fair administration of justice, a district
`
`court’s inherent powers must be exercised with restraint.
`
`See Chambers, 501 U. S., at 44 (“Because of their very
`
`potency, inherent powers must be exercised with restraint
`and discretion”).
`
`The inherent power to rescind a discharge order and
`recall a dismissed jury, therefore, must be carefully cir­
`cumscribed, especially in light of the guarantee of an
`impartial jury that is vital to the fair administration of
`justice. This Court’s precedents implementing this guar­
`antee have noted various external influences that can
`taint a juror. E.g., Remmer v. United States, 347 U. S.
`227, 229 (1954) (“In a criminal case, any private communi­
`cation, contact, or tampering, directly or indirectly, with a
`juror during a trial about the matter pending before the
`jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively preju­
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` DIETZ v. BOULDIN
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`Opinion of the Court
`dicial”). Parties can accordingly ask that a juror be ex­
`cused during trial for good cause, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.
`47(c), or challenge jury verdicts based on improper extra­
`neous influences such as prejudicial information not ad­
`
`mitted into evidence, comments from a court employee
`about the defendant, or bribes offered to a juror, Warger v.
`Shauers, 574 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 10) (citing
`
`Tanner v. United States, 483 U. S. 107, 117 (1987)); see
`also Mattox v. United States, 146 U. S. 140, 149–150
`
`(1892) (external prejudicial information); Parker v. Glad-
`den, 385 U. S. 363, 365 (1966) (per curiam) (bailiff com­
`ments on defendant); Remmer, 347 U. S., at 228–230
`(bribe offered to juror).
`
`The potential for taint looms even larger when a jury is
`reassembled after being discharged. While discharged,
`jurors are freed from instructions from the court requiring
`them not to discuss the case with others outside the jury
`room and to avoid external prejudicial information. See,
`e.g., 4 Sand ¶71.02 (standard instruction to avoid extrane­
`
`ous influences); see also id., ¶71.01, Instructions 71–12 to
`71–14 (avoid publicity). For example, it is not uncommon
`for attorneys or court staff to talk to jurors postdischarge
`for their feedback on the trial. See 1 K. O’Malley et al.,
`Federal Jury Practice and Instructions §9:8 (6th ed. 2006)
`(debating appropriateness of practice).
`
`Any suggestion of prejudice in recalling a discharged
`jury should counsel a district court not to exercise its
`inherent power. A district court that is considering
`whether it should rescind a discharge order and recall a
`jury to correct an error or instead order a new trial should,
`of course, determine whether any juror has been directly
`tainted—for example, if a juror discusses the strength of
`the evidence with nonjurors or overhears others talking
`about the strength of the evidence. But the court should
`also take into account at least the following additional
`factors that can indirectly create prejudice in this context,
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`8
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`Opinion of the Court
`any of which standing alone could be dispositive in a
`particular case.
`First, the length of delay between discharge and recall.
`
`
`The longer the jury has been discharged, the greater the
`likelihood of prejudice. Freed from the crucible of the
`jury’s group decisionmaking enterprise, discharged jurors
`may begin to forget key facts, arguments, or instructions
`from the court. In taking off their juror “hats” and return­
`ing to their lives, they may lose sight of the vital collective
`role they played in the impartial administration of justice.
`And they are more likely to be exposed to potentially
`prejudicial sources of information or discuss the case with
`others, even if they do not realize they have done so or
`forget when questioned after being recalled by the court.
`
`How long is too long is left to the discretion of the district
`court, but it could be as short as even a few minutes,
`
`depending on the case.
`Second, whether the jurors have spoken to anyone about
`
`the case after discharge. This could include court staff,
`attorneys and litigants, press and sketch artists, witnesses,
`spouses, friends, and so on.
` Even apparently innocu-
`ous comments about the case from someone like a court­
`room deputy such as “job well done” may be sufficient to
`taint a discharged juror who might then resist reconsider­
`ing her decision.
`Third, the reaction to the verdict. Trials are society’s
`
`way of channeling disputes into fair and impartial resolu­
`tions. But these disputes can be bitter and emotional.
`And, depending on the case, those emotions may be broad-
`casted to the jury in response to their verdict. Shock,
`gasps, crying, cheers, and yelling are common reactions to
`a jury verdict—whether as a verdict is announced in the
`courtroom or seen in the corridors after discharge.
`In such a case, there is a high risk that emotional reac­
`
`tions will cause jurors to begin to reconsider their decision
`and ask themselves, “Did I make the right call?” Of
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` DIETZ v. BOULDIN
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`Opinion of the Court
`course, this concern would be present even in a decision to
`reinstruct the jury to fix an error after the verdict is an­
`nounced but before they are discharged. See Fed. Rule
`Civ. Proc. 51(b)(3). Even so, after discharging jurors from
`their obligations and the passage of time, a judge should
`be reluctant to reempanel a jury that has witnessed emo­
`tional reactions to its verdict.
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`In considering these and any other relevant factors,
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`courts should also ask to what extent just-dismissed jurors
`accessed their smartphones or the internet, which provide
`other avenues for potential prejudice.
`It is a now-
`ingrained instinct to check our phones whenever possible.
`Immediately after discharge, a juror could text something
`about the case to a spouse, research an aspect of the evi­
`dence on Google, or read reactions to a verdict on Twitter.
`Prejudice can come through a whisper or a byte.
`Finally, we caution that our recognition here of a court’s
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`inherent power to recall a jury is limited to civil cases
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`only. Given additional concerns in criminal cases, such as
`attachment of the double jeopardy bar, we do not address
`here whether it would be appropriate to recall a jury after
`discharge in a criminal case. See Smith v. Massachusetts,
`543 U. S. 462, 473–474 (2005).
`
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`Applying these factors, the District Court here did not
`abuse its discretion by rescinding its discharge order and
`recalling the jury to deliberate further. The jury was out
`for only a few minutes after discharge. Only one juror
`may have left the courthouse, apparently to retrieve a
`hotel receipt. The jurors did not speak to any person
`about the case after discharge. There is no indication in
`the record that this run-of-the-mill civil case—where the
`parties agreed that the defendant was liable and disputed
`damages only—generated any kind of emotional reaction
`or electronic exchanges or searches that could have tainted
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`the jury. There was no apparent potential for prejudice
`by recalling the jury here.
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` Cite as: 579 U. S. ____ (2016)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
` III
`Dietz asks us to impose a categorical bar on reempanel­
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`ing a jury after it has been discharged. He contends that,
`at common law, a jury once discharged could never be
`brought back together again. Accordingly, he argues,
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`without a “‘long unquestioned’ power” of courts recalling
`juries, a federal district court lacks the inherent power to
`rescind a discharge order. See Carlisle v. United States,
`517 U. S. 416, 426–427 (1996) (district court lacked inher­
`ent authority to grant untimely motion for judgment of
`acquittal).
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`We disagree. Even assuming that the common-law
`tradition is as clear as Dietz contends, but see, e.g., Prus-
`sel v. Knowles, 5 Miss. 90, 95–97 (1839) (allowing postdis­
`charge recall), the common law is less helpful to under­
`standing modern civil trial practice. At common law, any
`error in the process of rendering a verdict, no matter how
`technical or inconsequential, could be remedied only by
`ordering a new trial. But modern trial practice did away
`with this system, replacing it with the harmless-error
`standard now embodied in Rule 61. See Kotteakos v.
`United States, 328 U. S. 750, 758, 760 (1946) (recognizing
`predecessor statute to Rule 61 codified the “salutary pol-
`icy” of “substitu[ing] judgment for automatic . . . rules”).
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`Jury practice itself no longer follows the strictures of the
`common law. The common law required that juries be
`sequestered from the rest of society until they reached a
`verdict. Tellier, Separation or Dispersal of Jury in Civil
`Case After Submission, 77 A. L. R. 2d 1086 (1961). This
`generally meant no going home at night, no lunch breaks,
`no dispersing at all until they reached a verdict. Id., §2;
`see also Lester v. Stanley, 15 F. Cas. 396, 396–397 (No.
`8,277) (Conn. 1808) (Livingston, Circuit Justice) (following
`common law). Courts are no longer required to impose
`these requirements on juries in order to prevent possible
`prejudice. See Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S.
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` DIETZ v. BOULDIN
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`Opinion of the Court
`539, 554 (1976) (cases requiring sequestration to avoid
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`trial publicity “are relatively rare”); Drake v. Clark, 14
`F. 3d 351, 358 (CA7 1994) (“Sequestration is an extreme
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`measure, one of the most burdensome tools of the many
`available to assure a fair trial”). Accordingly, while courts
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`should not think they are generally free to discover new
`inherent powers that are contrary to civil practice as
`recognized in the common law, see Carlisle, 517 U. S., at
`426–427, the advent of modern federal trial practice limits
`the common law’s relevance as to the specific question
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`whether a judge can recall a just-discharged jury.
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`Dietz also argues that the nature of a jury’s deliberative
`process means that something about the jury is irrevoca­
`bly broken once the jurors are told they are free to go.
`According to Dietz, with their bond broken, the jurors
`cannot be brought back together again as a “jury.” In
`other words, once a jury is discharged, a court can never
`put the jury back together again by rescinding its dis­
`charge order—legally or metaphysically.
`
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`We reject this “Humpty Dumpty” theory of the jury.
`Juries are of course an integral and special part of the
`American system of civil justice. Our system cannot func­
`tion without the dedication of citizens coming together to
`perform their civic duty and resolve disputes.
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`But there is nothing about the jury as an entity that
`ceases to exist simply because the judge tells the jury that
`they are excused from further service. A discharge order
`is not a magical invocation. It is an order, like any other
`order.
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`And, like any order, it can be issued by mistake. All
`judges make mistakes. (Even us.) See Brown v. Allen,
`344 U. S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in judg­
`ment) (“We are not final because we are infallible, but we
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`are infallible only because we are final”). There is no
`benefit to imposing a rule that says that as soon as a jury
`is free to go a judge categorically cannot rescind that order
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` Cite as: 579 U. S. ____ (2016)
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`Opinion of the Court
`to correct an easily identified and fixable mistake, even as
`the jurors are still in the courtroom collecting their things.
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`Dietz does not suggest the Court adopt a magic-words
`rule, but instead urges the adoption of a “functional”
`discharge test based on whether the jurors remain within
`the “presence and control” of the district court, where
`control is limited to the courtroom itself. Tr. of Oral Arg.
`5–7. Similarly, the dissent suggests that it is the chance
`“to mingle with bystanders” that creates a discharge that
`cannot be undone. Post, at 1–2 (opinion of THOMAS, J.)
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`(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). These
`tests do not avoid the problems that Dietz and the dissent
`identify with a prejudice inquiry. Under a courtroom test,
`what if a juror has one foot over the line? What if she just
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`stepped out to use the restroom? Under a courthouse test,
`what if she is just outside the doors? Reached her car in
`the parking lot? Under a bystander test, is a courtroom
`deput