`(Slip Opinion)
`
`
`
` OCTOBER TERM, 2016
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`1
`
` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`
`
`
` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`
`
`
` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
`
` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
`
` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
` Syllabus
`
`
` SCA HYGIENE PRODUCTS AKTIEBOLAG ET AL. v.
`
` FIRST QUALITY BABY PRODUCTS, LLC, ET AL.
`
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
` No. 15–927. Argued November 1, 2016—Decided March 21, 2017
`
`In 2003, petitioners (collectively, SCA) notified respondents (collective-
`
` ly, First Quality) that their adult incontinence products infringed an
`SCA patent. First Quality responded that its own patent antedated
`
`
` SCA’s patent and made it invalid. In 2004, SCA sought reexamina-
`tion of its patent in light of First Quality’s patent, and in 2007, the
`Patent and Trademark Office confirmed the SCA patent’s validity.
`SCA sued First Quality for patent infringement in 2010. The District
`Court granted summary judgment to First Quality on the grounds of
`equitable estoppel and laches. While SCA’s appeal was pending, this
`Court held that laches could not preclude a claim for damages in-
`curred within the Copyright Act’s 3-year limitations period. Petrella
`v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U. S. ___, ___. A Federal Circuit
`
`
` panel nevertheless affirmed the District Court’s laches holding based
`on Circuit precedent, which permitted laches to be asserted against a
`claim for damages incurred within the Patent Act’s 6-year limitations
`period, 35 U. S. C. §286. The en banc court reheard the case in light
`
` of Petrella and reaffirmed the original panel’s laches holding.
`Held: Laches cannot be invoked as a defense against a claim for dam-
`
`ages brought within §286’s 6-year limitations period. Pp. 3–16.
`
`(a) Petrella’s holding rested on both separation-of-powers principles
`and the traditional role of laches in equity. A statute of limitations
`
`reflects a congressional decision that timeliness is better judged by a
`
`hard and fast rule instead of a case-specific judicial determination.
`Applying laches within a limitations period specified by Congress
`would give judges a “legislation-overriding” role that exceeds the Ju-
`diciary’s power. 572 U. S., at ___. Moreover, applying laches within
`a limitations period would clash with the gap-filling purpose for
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`SCA HYGIENE PRODUCTS AKTIEBOLAG v. FIRST
`QUALITY BABY PRODUCTS, LLC
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`which the defense developed in the equity courts. Pp. 3–5.
`(b) Petrella’s reasoning easily fits §286. There, the Court found in
`the Copyright Act’s language a congressional judgment that a claim
`filed within three years of accrual cannot be dismissed on timeliness
`grounds. 572 U. S., at ___. By that same logic, §286 of the Patent
`Act represents Congress’s judgment that a patentee may recover
`damages for any infringement committed within six years of the fil-
`
`ing of the claim.
`
`
`
`
`First Quality contends that this case differs from Petrella because a
`true statute of limitations runs forward from the date a cause of ac-
`
`tion accrues, whereas §286’s limitations period runs backward from
`the filing of the complaint. However, Petrella repeatedly character-
`ized the Copyright Act’s limitations period as running backward from
`the date the suit was filed. First Quality also contends that a true
`statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff discovers a
`cause of action, which is not the case with §286’s limitations period,
`but ordinarily, a statute of limitations begins to run on the date that
`
`the claim accrues, not when the cause of action is discovered. Pp. 5–
`8.
`
`
`(c) The Federal Circuit based its decision on the idea that §282 of
`
`the Patent Act, which provides for “defenses in any action involving
`the validity or infringement of a patent,” creates an exception to §286
`by codifying laches as such a defense, and First Quality argues that
`laches is a defense within §282(b)(1) based on “unenforceability.”
`Even assuming that §282(b)(1) incorporates a laches defense of some
`dimension, it does not necessarily follow that the defense may be in-
`
`voked to bar a claim for damages incurred within the period set out
`in §286. Indeed, it would be exceedingly unusual, if not unprecedent-
`ed, if Congress chose to include in the Patent Act both a statute of
`limitations for damages and a laches provision applicable to a dam-
`ages claim. Neither the Federal Circuit, nor any party, has identified
`a single federal statute that provides such dual protection against
`untimely claims. Pp. 8–9.
`
`(d) The Federal Circuit and First Quality rely on lower court patent
`
`cases decided before the 1952 Patent Act to argue that §282 codified a
`
`pre-1952 practice of permitting laches to be asserted against damages
`claims. But the most prominent feature of the relevant legal land-
`
`scape at that time was the well-established rule that laches cannot be
`invoked to bar a claim for damages incurred within a limitations pe-
`
`riod specified by Congress. In light of this rule, which Petrella con-
`firmed and restated, 572 U. S., at ___, nothing less than a broad and
`unambiguous consensus of lower court decisions could support the in-
`ference that §282(b)(1) codifies a very different patent-law-specific
`rule. Pp. 9–10.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`
`
`

`

`3
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017)
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`(e) The Federal Circuit and First Quality rely on three types of cas-
`
`es: (1) pre-1938 equity cases; (2) pre-1938 claims at law; and (3) cases
`decided after the merger of law and equity in 1938. None of these es-
`tablishes a broad, unambiguous consensus in favor of applying laches
`to damages claims in the patent context.
`
`Many of the pre-1938 equity cases do not even reveal whether the
`
`plaintiff asked for damages, and of the cases in which damages were
`sought, many merely suggest in dicta that laches might limit damag-
`es. The handful of cases that apply laches against a damages claim
`are too few to establish a settled, national consensus. In any event,
`the most that can possibly be gathered from a pre-1938 equity case is
`that laches could defeat a damages claim in an equity court, not that
`the defense could entirely prevent a patentee from recovering damag-
`es.
`Similarly, even if all three pre-1938 cases at law cited by First
`
`Quality squarely held that laches could be applied to a damages
`claim within the limitations period, that number would be insuffi-
`cient to overcome the presumption that Congress legislates against
`
`the background of general common-law principles. First Quality ar-
`gues that the small number of cases at law should not count against
`its position because there were few patent cases brought at law after
`1870, but it is First Quality’s burden to show that Congress departed
`
`from the traditional common-law rule.
`
`As for the post-1938 patent case law, there is scant evidence sup-
`
`porting First Quality’s claim that courts continued to apply laches to
`
`
`damages claims after the merger of law and equity. Only two Courts
`of Appeals held that laches could bar a damages claim, and that does
`not constitute a settled, uniform practice of applying laches to dam-
`
`ages claims. Pp. 11–15.
`(f) First Quality’s additional arguments are unconvincing and do
`
`not require extended discussion. It points to post-1952 Court of Ap-
`peals decisions holding that laches can be invoked as a defense
`against a damages claim, but nothing that Congress has done since
`1952 has altered §282’s meaning. As for the various policy argu-
`ments presented here, this Court cannot overrule Congress’s judg-
`ment based on its own policy views. Pp. 15–16.
`
`807 F. 3d 1311, vacated in part and remanded.
`ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
`
`
`
`
`and KENNEDY, THOMAS, GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`1
`
`
` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
`
`
`
` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
`
` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
`
` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
`
`
` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
`
`
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`
` No. 15–927
`_________________
`
` SCA HYGIENE PRODUCTS AKTIEBOLAG, ET AL.,
`
`
` PETITIONERS v. FIRST QUALITY BABY
`
`PRODUCTS, LLC, ET AL.
`
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`
`APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
`
`[March 21, 2017]
`
` JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
`We return to a subject that we addressed in Petrella v.
`Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U. S. ___ (2014): the
`relationship between the equitable defense of laches and
`claims for damages that are brought within the time
`allowed by a statute of limitations. In Petrella, we held
`that laches cannot preclude a claim for damages incurred
`within the Copyright Act’s 3-year limitations period. Id.,
`at ___ (slip op., at 1). “[L]aches,” we explained, “cannot be
`invoked to bar legal relief ” “[i]n the face of a statute of
`limitations enacted by Congress.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at
`13). The question in this case is whether Petrella’s reason-
`ing applies to a similar provision of the Patent Act, 35
`U. S. C. §286. We hold that it does.
`I
`Petitioners SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag and SCA
`
`Personal Care, Inc. (collectively, SCA), manufacture and
`sell adult incontinence products. In October 2003, SCA
`sent a letter to respondents (collectively, First Quality),
`alleging that First Quality was making and selling prod-
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`2
`
`
`
`SCA HYGIENE PRODUCTS AKTIEBOLAG v. FIRST
`QUALITY BABY PRODUCTS, LLC
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`ucts that infringed SCA’s rights under U. S. Patent No.
`6,375,646 B1 (’646 patent). App. 54a. First Quality re-
`sponded that one of its patents—U. S. Patent No.
`
`
`5,415,649 (Watanabe patent)—antedated the ’646 patent
`and revealed “the same diaper construction.” Id., at 53a.
`
`As a result, First Quality maintained, the ’646 patent was
`invalid and could not support an infringement claim. Ibid.
`SCA sent First Quality no further correspondence regard-
`ing the ’646 patent, and First Quality proceeded to develop
`and market its products.
`In July 2004, without notifying First Quality, SCA
`
`asked the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) to initiate a
`reexamination proceeding to determine whether the ’646
`patent was valid in light of the Watanabe patent. Id., at
`49a–51a. Three years later, in March 2007, the PTO
`issued a certificate confirming the validity of the ’646
`patent.
`In August 2010, SCA filed this patent infringement
`
`action against First Quality.
`
` First Quality moved for
`summary judgment based on laches and equitable estop-
`
` pel, and the District Court granted that motion on both
`grounds. 2013 WL 3776173, *12 (WD Ky., July 16, 2013).
`
`SCA appealed to the Federal Circuit, but before the
`Federal Circuit panel issued its decision, this Court de-
`cided Petrella. The panel nevertheless held, based on a Fed-
`
`
`eral Circuit precedent, A. C. Aukerman Co. v. R. L.
`
`Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F. 2d 1020 (1992) (en banc), that
`
`SCA’s claims were barred by laches.1
`The Federal Circuit then reheard the case en banc in
`
`order to reconsider Aukerman in light of Petrella. But in a
`6-to-5 decision, the en banc court reaffirmed Aukerman’s
`holding that laches can be asserted to defeat a claim for
`——————
`1The panel reversed the District Court’s holding on equitable estop-
`pel, concluding that there are genuine disputes of material fact relating
`to that defense. 767 F. 3d 1339, 1351 (2014).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`damages incurred within the 6-year period set out in the
`
`Patent Act. As it had in Aukerman, the en banc court
`concluded that Congress, in enacting the Patent Act, had
`“codified a laches defense” that “barred recovery of legal
`remedies.” 807 F. 3d 1311, 1323–1329 (2015). Judge
`
`Hughes, joined by four other judges, dissented.2 Id., at
`1337–1342 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
`part). We granted certiorari. 578 U. S. ___ (2016).
`
`II
`
`
`
`Laches is “a defense developed by courts of equity” to
`protect defendants against “unreasonable, prejudicial
`
`delay in commencing suit.” Petrella, supra, at ___, ___
`(slip op., at 1, 12). See also 1 D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies
`§2.3(5), p. 89 (2d ed. 1993) (Dobbs) (“The equitable doc-
`trine of laches bars the plaintiff whose unreasonable delay
`in prosecuting a claim or protecting a right has worked a
`prejudice to the defendant”). Before the separate systems
`of law and equity were merged in 1938, the ordinary rule
`was that laches was available only in equity courts.3 See
`County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y., 470
`U. S. 226, 244, n. 16 (1985). This case turns on the appli-
`cation of the defense to a claim for damages, a quintessen-
`
`tial legal remedy. We discussed this subject at length in
`
`
`
`3
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`——————
`2The dissenting judges concurred in the portion of the majority opin-
`
`ion relating to the application of laches to equitable relief. 807 F. 3d, at
`
`
`
`1333, n. 1 (opinion of Hughes, J.); see also id., at 1331–1333 (majority
`
`
`opinion). We do not address that aspect of the Federal Circuit’s judg-
`
`
`ment. Nor do we address the Federal Circuit’s reversal of the District
`Court’s equitable estoppel holding. Id., at 1333 (reinstating original
`panel holding on equitable estoppel).
`
` 3“The federal courts always had equity powers as well as law power,
`but they operated, until the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, by
`distinctly separating equity cases and even had separate equity rules.”
`
` 1 Dobbs §2.6(1), at 148, n. 2; see also Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v.
` Mayacamas Corp., 485 U. S. 271, 279 (1988). It is in this sense that we
`
`refer in this opinion to federal courts as equity or law courts.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
` SCA HYGIENE PRODUCTS AKTIEBOLAG v. FIRST
`QUALITY BABY PRODUCTS, LLC
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`
`4
`
`
`
`Petrella.
`Petrella arose out of a copyright dispute relating to the
`film Raging Bull. 572 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8). The
`Copyright Act’s statute of limitations requires a copyright
`holder claiming infringement to file suit “within three
`years after the claim accrued.” 17 U. S. C. §507(b). In
`Petrella, the plaintiff sought relief for alleged acts of in-
`
`fringement that accrued within that 3-year period, but the
`lower courts nevertheless held that laches barred her
`
`claims. See 695 F. 3d 946 (CA9 2012). We reversed,
`holding that laches cannot defeat a damages claim
`brought within the period prescribed by the Copyright
`Act’s statute of limitations. Petrella, 572 U. S., at ___–___
`(slip op., at 11–14). And in so holding, we spoke in broad
`terms. See id., at ___ (slip op., at 13) (“[I]n the face of a
`statute of limitations enacted by Congress, laches cannot
`be invoked to bar legal relief ”).
`
`Petrella’s holding rested on both separation-of-powers
`
`principles and the traditional role of laches in equity.
`Laches provides a shield against untimely claims, id., at
`___ (slip op., at 19), and statutes of limitations serve a
`similar function. When Congress enacts a statute of limi-
`tations, it speaks directly to the issue of timeliness and
`provides a rule for determining whether a claim is timely
`enough to permit relief. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 11). The
`enactment of a statute of limitations necessarily reflects a
`congressional decision that the timeliness of covered
`claims is better judged on the basis of a generally hard
`and fast rule rather than the sort of case-specific judicial
`determination that occurs when a laches defense is asserted.
`Therefore, applying laches within a limitations period
`specified by Congress would give judges a “legislation-
`overriding” role that is beyond the Judiciary’s power. Id.,
`at ___ (slip op., at 14). As we stressed in Petrella, “courts
`
`are not at liberty to jettison Congress’ judgment on the
`timeliness of suit.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 1).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`5
`
`
`
`
`Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Applying laches within the limitations period would also
`
`clash with the purpose for which the defense developed in
`
` the equity courts. As Petrella recounted, the “principal
`application” of laches “was, and remains, to claims of an
`equitable cast for which the Legislature has provided no
`fixed time limitation.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 12); see also
`R. Weaver, E. Shoben, & M. Kelly, Principles of Remedies
`Law 21 (2d ed. 2011); 1 Dobbs §2.4(4), at 104; 1 J. Story,
`Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence §55(a), p. 73 (2d
`ed. 1839). Laches is a gap-filling doctrine, and where
`there is a statute of limitations, there is no gap to fill.4
`Petrella, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 14); see also 1 Dobbs
`§2.4(4), at 108 (“[I]f the plaintiff has done only what she is
`permitted to do by statute, and has not misled the defend-
`ant [so as to trigger equitable estoppel], the basis for
`barring the plaintiff seems to have disappeared”).
`
`With Petrella’s principles in mind, we turn to the pre-
`sent dispute.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`III
`
`
`A
`
`Although the relevant statutory provisions in Petrella
`
`and this case are worded differently, Petrella’s reasoning
`easily fits the provision at issue here. As noted, the stat-
`ute in Petrella precludes a civil action for copyright in-
`fringement “unless it is commenced within three years
`——————
`4The dissent argues that there is a “gap” in the statutory scheme
`
`because the Patent Act’s statute of limitations might permit a patentee
` to wait until an infringing product has become successful before suing
`
`for infringement. Post, at 2–3 (opinion of BREYER, J.). We rejected a
`
` version of this argument in Petrella, 572 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at
`
`
` 16–17), and we do so here. The dissent’s argument implies that, insofar
`
`as the lack of a laches defense could produce policy outcomes judges
`
`deem undesirable, there is a “gap” for laches to fill, notwithstanding the
`
`presence of a statute of limitations. That is precisely the kind of
`
`
`“legislation-overriding” judicial role that Petrella rightly disclaimed.
`
`Id., at ___ (slip op., at 14).
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
` SCA HYGIENE PRODUCTS AKTIEBOLAG v. FIRST
`QUALITY BABY PRODUCTS, LLC
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`after the claim accrued.” 17 U. S. C. §507(b). We saw in
`this language a congressional judgment that a claim filed
`within three years of accrual cannot be dismissed on time-
`liness grounds. 572 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 11); see also
`id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 14–15).
`
`The same reasoning applies in this case. Section 286 of
`the Patent Act provides: “Except as otherwise provided by
`law, no recovery shall be had for any infringement com-
`mitted more than six years prior to the filing of the com-
`plaint or counterclaim for infringement in the action.” By
`the logic of Petrella, we infer that this provision represents
`a judgment by Congress that a patentee may recover
`damages for any infringement committed within six years
`of the filing of the claim.
`
`
`
`
`
`6
`
`
`B
`First Quality contends that this case differs from Pet-
`
`rella because §286 of the Patent Act is not a true statute of
`
`limitations. A true statute of limitations, we are told,
`“runs forward from the date a cause of action accrues,” but
`§286 “runs backward from the time of suit.” Brief for
`Respondents 41.
`Petrella cannot reasonably be distinguished on this
`ground. First Quality thinks it critical that §286 “runs
`backward from the time of suit,” Brief for Respondents 41,
`but Petrella described the Copyright Act’s statute of limi-
`tations in almost identical terms. We said that this provi-
`sion “allows plaintiffs . . . to gain retrospective relief run-
`ning only three years back from the date the complaint was
`filed.” 572 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6–7) (emphasis added).
`See also id., at ___ (slip op., at 11) (“[A] successful plaintiff
`can gain retrospective relief only three years back from
`
`the time of suit”). And we described the Copyright Act’s
`statute of limitations as “a three-year look-back limita-
`tions period.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 4).
`First Quality contends that the application of a true
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
`7
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`statute of limitations, like the defense of laches (but unlike
`§286), takes into account the fairness of permitting the
`adjudication of a particular plaintiff ’s claim. First Quality
`argues as follows: “When Congress enacts [a true statute
`of limitations], it can be viewed as having made a consid-
`ered judgment about how much delay may occur after a
`plaintiff knows of a cause of action (i.e., after accrual)
`before the plaintiff must bring suit—thus potentially
`leaving no room for judges to evaluate the reasonableness
`
`of a plaintiff ’s delay on a case-by-case basis under laches.”
`Brief for Respondents 42. According to First Quality, §286
`of the Patent Act is different because it “turns only on
`when the infringer is sued, regardless of when the pat-
`entee learned of the infringement.” Ibid.
`
`This argument misunderstands the way in which stat-
`utes of limitations generally work. First Quality says that
`the accrual of a claim, the event that triggers the running
`of a statute of limitations, occurs when “a plaintiff knows
`of a cause of action,” ibid., but that is not ordinarily true.
`As we wrote in Petrella, “[a] claim ordinarily accrues
`‘when [a] plaintiff has a complete and present cause of
`action.’” 572 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4); see Graham
`
`County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States
`
`ex rel. Wilson, 545 U. S. 409, 418–419 (2005). While some
`claims are subject to a “discovery rule” under which the
`limitations period begins when the plaintiff discovers or
`
`should have discovered the injury giving rise to the claim,
`
`that is not a universal feature of statutes of limitations.
`See, e.g., ibid. (limitations period in 31 U. S. C. §3731(b)(1)
`begins to run when the cause of action accrues); TRW Inc.
`v. Andrews, 534 U. S. 19, 28 (2001) (same with regard to
`15 U. S. C. §1681p). And in Petrella, we specifically noted
`that “we have not passed on the question” whether the
`Copyright Act’s statute of limitations is governed by such
`a rule. 572 U. S., at ___, n. 4 (slip op., at 4, n. 4).
`
`For these reasons, Petrella cannot be dismissed as appli-
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`8
`
`
`
`
` SCA HYGIENE PRODUCTS AKTIEBOLAG v. FIRST
`
`QUALITY BABY PRODUCTS, LLC
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`cable only to what First Quality regards as true statutes of
`limitations. At least for present purposes, nothing de-
`pends on this debatable taxonomy. Compare Automobile
`Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U. S. 696, 704
`
`(1966) (describing §286 as “enacting a uniform period of
`limitations”); 1 Dobbs §2.4(4), at 107, and n. 33 (same),
`with A. Stucki Co. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 963 F. 2d
`360, 363, n. 3 (CA Fed. 1992) (Section 286 “is not, strictly
`
`speaking, a statute of limitations”); Standard Oil Co. v.
`Nippon Shokubai Kagaku Co., Ltd., 754 F. 2d 345, 348
`(CA Fed. 1985) (“[Section] 286 cannot properly be called a
`‘statute of limitations’ in the sense that it defeats the right
`to bring suit”).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`C
`The Federal Circuit based its decision on a different
`
`footing. Section 286 of the Patent Act begins with the
`
`phrase “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law,” and ac-
`cording to the Federal Circuit, §282 of the Act is a provi-
`sion that provides otherwise. In its view, §282 creates an
`exception to §286 by codifying laches as a defense to all
`patent infringement claims, including claims for damages
`
`suffered within §286’s 6-year period. 807 F. 3d, at 1329–
`1330. Section 282(b), which does not specifically mention
`
`laches, provides in relevant part as follows:
`
`“The following shall be defenses in any action involv-
`ing the validity or infringement of a patent and shall
`be pleaded:
`“(1) Noninfringement, absence of liability for in-
`
`fringement or unenforceability.”
`The en banc majority below never identified which word
`
`or phrase in §282 codifies laches as a defense, but First
`Quality argues that laches falls within §282(b)(1) because
`laches is a defense based on “unenforceability.” Brief for
`Respondents 28–33.
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`SCA disputes this interpretation of §282(b)(1), arguing
`
`that laches does not make a patent categorically unen-
`forceable. Reply Brief 6–8; see Aukerman, 960 F. 2d, at
`1030 (“Recognition of laches as a defense . . . does not
`affect the general enforceability of the patent against
`others”). We need not decide this question. Even if we
`
`assume for the sake of argument that §282(b)(1) incorpo-
`
`rates a laches defense of some dimension, it does not nec-
`essarily follow that this defense may be invoked to bar a
`claim for damages incurred within the period set out in
`§286.
`Indeed, it would be exceedingly unusual, if not
`unprecedented, if Congress chose to include in the Patent
`
`Act both a statute of limitations for damages and a laches
`provision applicable to a damages claim. Neither the
`Federal Circuit, nor First Quality, nor any of First Quali-
`
`ty’s amici has identified a single federal statute that pro-
`vides such dual protection against untimely claims.
`
`D
`
`In holding that Congress codified a damages-limiting
`laches defense, the Federal Circuit relied on patent cases
`decided by the lower courts prior to the enactment of the
`Patent Act. After surveying these cases, the Federal
`Circuit concluded that by 1952 there was a well-
`
`established practice of applying laches to such damages
`claims and that Congress, in adopting §282, must have
`chosen to codify such a defense in §282(b)(1). 807 F. 3d, at
`1321–1329. First Quality now presses a similar argu-
`ment. We have closely examined the cases on which the
`
`Federal Circuit and First Quality rely, and we find that
`they are insufficient to support the suggested interpreta-
`tion of the Patent Act. The most prominent feature of the
`relevant legal landscape at the time of enactment of the
`Patent Act was the well-established general rule, often
`repeated by this Court, that laches cannot be invoked to
`bar a claim for damages incurred within a limitations
`
`9
`
`
`
`

`

`
`10
`
`
`
`SCA HYGIENE PRODUCTS AKTIEBOLAG v. FIRST
`
`QUALITY BABY PRODUCTS, LLC
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
` period specified by Congress. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht,
`
`
` 327 U. S. 392, 395 (1946) (“If Congress explicitly puts a
`limit upon the time for enforcing a right which it created,
`there is an end of the matter”); United States v. Mack, 295
`U. S. 480, 489 (1935) (“Laches within the term of the
`statute of limitations is no defense at law”); Wehrman v.
`Conklin, 155 U. S. 314, 326 (1894) (“Though a good de-
`fense in equity, laches is no defense at law. If the plaintiff
`at law has brought his action within the period fixed by
`the statute of limitations, no court can deprive him of his
`
`right to proceed”); Cross v. Allen, 141 U. S. 528, 537 (1891)
`(“So long as the demands secured were not barred by the
`statute of limitations, there could be no laches in prosecut-
`ing a suit”). Petrella confirmed and restated this long-
`standing rule. 572 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 12) (“[T]his
`
`Court has cautioned against invoking laches to bar legal
`relief ”). If Congress examined the relevant legal land-
`scape when it adopted 35 U. S. C. §282, it could not have
`missed our cases endorsing this general rule.
`
`The Federal Circuit and First Quality dismiss the signif-
`icance of this Court’s many reiterations of the general rule
`because they were not made in patent cases. But as the
`dissenters below noted, “[p]atent law is governed by the
`same common-law principles, methods of statutory inter-
`pretation, and procedural rules as other areas of civil
`
`litigation.” 807 F. 3d, at 1333 (opinion of Hughes, J.).
`
`In light of the general rule regarding the relationship
`between laches and statutes of limitations, nothing less
`than a broad and unambiguous consensus of lower court
`decisions could support the inference that §282(b)(1) codi-
`
`fies a very different patent-law-specific rule. No such
`
`consensus is to be found.5
`——————
` 5Because we conclude that First Quality fails to show that there was
`
`
`
` a special laches rule in the patent context, we need not address whether
`it is ever reasonable to assume that Congress legislated against the
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`IV
`
`
`The pre-1952 cases on which First Quality relies fall
`into three groups: (1) cases decided by equity courts before
`1938; (2) cases decided by law courts before 1938; and (3)
`cases decided after the merger of equity and law in 1938.
`We will discuss each group separately.
`A
`
`Pre-1938 equity cases
`
`The pre-1938 equity cases are unpersuasive for several,
`
`often overlapping reasons. Many do not even reveal
`whether the plaintiff asked for damages. Indeed, some
`say nothing at all about the form of relief that was sought,
`see, e.g., Cummings v. Wilson & Willard Mfg. Co., 4 F. 2d
`
`453 (CA9 1925), and others state only that the plaintiff
`wanted an accounting of profits, e.g., Westco-Chippewa
`Pump Co. v. Delaware Elec. & Supply Co., 64 F. 2d 185,
`
`186 (CA3 1933); Wolf Mineral Process Corp. v. Minerals
`
`Separation North Am. Corp., 18 F. 2d 483, 484 (CA4 1927).
`The equitable remedy of an accounting, however, was not
`the same as damages. The remedy of damages seeks to
`compensate the victim for its loss, whereas the remedy of
`an accounting, which Congress abolished in the patent
`context in 1946,6 sought disgorgement of ill-gotten profits.
`See Birdsall v. Coolidge, 93 U. S. 64, 68–69 (1876); 1
`Dobbs §4.3(5), at 611 (“Accounting holds the defendant
`liable for his profits, not for damages”); A. Walker, Patent
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`——————
` background of a lower court consensus rather than the contrary deci-
`
`sions of this Court. Cf. 807 F. 3d, at 1338 (opinion of Hughes, J.) (“For
`
`
`even if there were differing views in the lower [federal] courts, it would
`be nearly impossible to conclude that there was a uniform understand-
`ing of the common law that was inconsistent with Supreme Court
`precedent. In our judicial system, the Supreme Court's understanding
`is controlling”).
` 6See 60 Stat. 778; see also Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replace-
`
`
`ment Co., 377 U. S. 476, 505 (1964).
`
`
`
`
`11
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`
` 12
`
`
`
`
` SCA HYGIENE PRODUCTS AKTIEBOLAG v. FIRST
`QUALITY BABY PRODUCTS, LLC
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`Laws §573, p. 401 (1886) (distinguishing between the two
`
`remedies); G. Curtis, Law of Patents §341(a), p. 461 (4th
`ed. 1873); 2 J. Pomeroy, Treatise on Equitable Remedies
`§568, p. 977 (1905).
`First Quality argues that courts sometimes used the
`
`
`term “accounting” imprecisely to refer to both an account-
`ing of profits and a calculation of damages, Brief for Re-
`spondents 19–20, but even if that is true, this loose usage
`shows only that a reference to “accounting” might refer to
`damages. For that reason, the Federal Circuit did not rely
`on cases seeking only an accounting, 807 F. 3d, at 1326,
`n. 7, and we likewise exclude such cases from our analysis.
`Turning to the cases that actually refer to damages,
`
`
`we note that many of the cases merely suggest in dicta
`that laches might limit recovery of damages. See, e.g.,
`Hartford-Empire Co. v. Swindell Bros., 96 F. 2d 227, 233,
`modified on reh’g, 99 F. 2d 61 (CA4 1938). Such dicta
`“settles nothing.” Jama v. Immigration and Customs
`Enforcement, 543 U. S. 335, 351, n. 12 (2005). See also
`Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank,
`
`N. A., 530 U. S. 1, 9–10 (2000); Metropolitan Stevedore Co.
`v. Rambo, 515 U. S. 291, 300 (1995).
`
`As for the cases in which laches was actually held to bar
`a claim for damages, e.g