`(Slip Opinion)
`
`
`
` OCTOBER TERM, 2017
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`1
`
` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`
`
`
` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`
`
`
` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
`
` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
`
` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
` Syllabus
`
`NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FAMILY AND LIFE
`
`ADVOCATES, DBA NIFLA, ET AL. v. BECERRA,
`
`
`ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL.
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE NINTH CIRCUIT
` No. 16–1140. Argued March 20, 2018—Decided June 26, 2018
`
`
`The California Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive
`
`Care, and Transparency Act (FACT Act) was enacted to regulate cri-
`
`sis pregnancy centers—pro-life centers that offer pregnancy-related
`services. The FACT Act requires clinics that primarily serve preg-
`
`nant women to provide certain notices. Clinics that are licensed
`must notify women that California provides free or low-cost services,
`
`including abortions, and give them a phone number to call. Its stated
`
`
`purpose is to make sure that state residents know their rights and
`what health care services are available to them. Unlicensed clinics
`must notify women that California has not licensed the clinics to pro-
`vide medical services. Its stated purpose is to ensure that pregnant
`women know when they are receiving health care from licensed pro-
`
`fessionals. Petitioners—two crisis pregnancy centers, one licensed
`and one unlicensed, and an organization of crisis pregnancy centers—
`filed suit. They alleged that both the licensed and the unlicensed no-
`tices abridge the freedom of speech protected by the First Amend-
`ment. The District Court denied their motion for a preliminary in-
`junction, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Holding that petitioners
`could not show a likelihood of success on the merits, the court con-
`cluded that the licensed notice survived a lower level of scrutiny ap-
`plicable to regulations of “professional speech,” and that the unli-
`
`censed notice satisfied any level of scrutiny.
`Held:
`
`1. The licensed notice likely violates the First Amendment. Pp. 6–
`
`17.
`
`
`
`(a) Content-based laws “target speech based on its communica-
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
`NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FAMILY AND
`
`LIFE ADVOCATES v. BECERRA
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`tive content” and “are presumptively unconstitutional and may be
`justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tai-
`
`lored to serve compelling state interests.” Reed v. Town of Gilbert,
`
`576 U. S. ___, ___. The licensed notice is a content-based regulation.
`
`By compelling petitioners to speak a particular message, it “alters the
`
`
`content of [their] speech.” Riley v. National Federation of Blind of
`
`N. C., Inc., 487 U. S. 781, 795. For example, one of the state-
`sponsored services that the licensed notice requires petitioners to ad-
`
`vertise is abortion—the very practice that petitioners are devoted to
`
`opposing. Pp. 6–7.
`
`
`(b) Although the licensed notice is content-based, the Ninth Cir-
`cuit did not apply strict scrutiny because it concluded that the notice
`
`
`regulates “professional speech.” But this Court has never recognized
`“professional speech” as a separate category of speech subject to dif-
`
`
`ferent rules. Speech is not unprotected merely because it is uttered
`by professionals. The Court has afforded less protection for profes-
`sional speech in two circumstances—where a law requires profes-
`sionals to disclose factual, noncontroversial information in their
`“commercial speech,” see, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
`
`Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U. S. 626, 651, and where
`
`States regulate professional conduct that incidentally involves
`
`
`
`speech, see, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447, 456.
`Neither line of precedents is implicated here. Pp. 7–14.
`
`
`(1) Unlike the rule in Zauderer, the licensed notice is not limited to
`“purely factual and uncontroversial information about the terms un-
`der which . . . services will be available,” 471 U. S., at 651. Califor-
`
`nia’s notice requires covered clinics to disclose information about
`state-sponsored services—including abortion, hardly an “uncontro-
`
`
`versial” topic. Accordingly, Zauderer has no application here. P. 9.
`
`
`(2) Nor is the licensed notice a regulation of professional conduct
`
`that incidentally burdens speech. The Court’s precedents have long
`
`drawn a line between speech and conduct. In Planned Parenthood of
`Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833, for example, the joint opin-
`ion rejected a free-speech challenge to an informed-consent law re-
`quiring physicians to “give a woman certain information as part of
`
`obtaining her consent to an abortion,” id., at 884. But the licensed
`notice is neither an informed-consent requirement nor any other reg-
`ulation of professional conduct. It applies to all interactions between
`a covered facility and its clients, regardless of whether a medical pro-
`cedure is ever sought, offered, or performed. And many other facili-
`ties providing the exact same services, such as general practice clin-
`ics, are not subject to the requirement. Pp. 10–11.
`
`(3) Outside of these two contexts, the Court’s precedents have long
`protected the First Amendment rights of professionals. The Court
`
`2
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`
`
`
`

`

`3
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`
`Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`
`Syllabus
`has applied strict scrutiny to content-based laws regulating the non-
`
`commercial speech of lawyers, see Reed, supra, at ___, professional
`
`fundraisers, see Riley, supra, at 798, and organizations providing
`specialized advice on international law, see Holder v. Humanitarian
`
`Law Project, 561 U. S. 1, 27–28. And it has stressed the danger of
`
`content-based regulations “in the fields of medicine and public
`health, where information can save lives.” Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,
`564 U. S. 552, 566. Such dangers are also present in the context of
`
`professional speech, where content-based regulation poses the same
`“risk that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regula-
`tory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information,” Turner
`Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 641. When the
`
`government polices the content of professional speech, it can fail to
`“ ‘preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will
`
`ultimately prevail.’ ” McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U. S. ___, ___–___.
`Professional speech is also a difficult category to define with preci-
`
`sion. See Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Assn., 564 U. S. 786,
`
`791. If States could choose the protection that speech receives simply
`by requiring a license, they would have a powerful tool to impose “in-
`vidious discrimination of disfavored subjects.” Cincinnati v. Discov-
`ery Network, Inc., 507 U. S. 410, 423, n. 19. Pp. 11–14.
`(c) Although neither California nor the Ninth Circuit have ad-
`
`vanced a persuasive reason to apply different rules to professional
`
`speech, the Court need not foreclose the possibility that some such
`reason exists because the licensed notice cannot survive even inter-
`
`mediate scrutiny. Assuming that California’s interest in providing
`low-income women with information about state-sponsored service is
`
`substantial, the licensed notice is not sufficiently drawn to promote
`it. The notice is “wildly underinclusive,” Entertainment Merchants
`
`
`Assn., supra, at 802, because it applies only to clinics that have a
`“primary purpose” of “providing family planning or pregnancy-related
`
`services” while excluding several other types of clinics that also serve
`low-income women and could educate them about the State’s ser-
`
`vices. California could also inform the women about its services
`“without burdening a speaker with unwanted speech,” Riley, supra,
`at 800, most obviously through a public-information campaign. Peti-
`tioners are thus likely to succeed on the merits of their challenge.
`Pp. 14–17.
`
`
`
`2. The unlicensed notice unduly burdens protected speech. It is
`unnecessary to decide whether Zauderer’s standard applies here, for
`
`
`even under Zauderer, a disclosure requirement cannot be “unjustified
`
`
`
`or unduly burdensome.” 471 U. S., at 651. Disclosures must remedy
`
`a harm that is “potentially real not purely hypothetical,” Ibanez v.
`Florida Dept. of Business and Professional Regulation, Bd. of Ac-
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`

`

`4
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`NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FAMILY AND
`
`LIFE ADVOCATES v. BECERRA
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`countancy, 512 U. S. 136, 146, and can extend “no broader than rea-
`sonably necessary,” In re R. M. J., 455 U. S. 191, 203. California has
`
`not demonstrated any justification for the unlicensed notice that is
` more than “purely hypothetical.” The only justification put forward
`
`by the state legislature was ensuring that pregnant women know
`when they are receiving medical care from licensed professionals, but
`
`California denied that the justification for the law was that women
`
`did not know what kind of facility they are entering when they go to a
`crisis pregnancy center. Even if the State had presented a nonhypo-
`thetical justification, the FACT Act unduly burdens protected speech.
`
` It imposes a government-scripted, speaker-based disclosure require-
` ment that is wholly disconnected from the State’s informational in-
`
`terest. It requires covered facilities to post California’s precise notice,
`
`
` no matter what the facilities say on site or in their advertisements.
` And it covers a curiously narrow subset of speakers: those that pri-
`
`marily provide pregnancy-related services, but not those that pro-
`
` vide, e.g., nonprescription birth control. Such speaker-based laws
` run the risk that “the State has left unburdened those speakers
`
` whose messages are in accord with its own views.” Sorrell, supra, at
`
`
` 580. For these reasons, the unlicensed notice does not satisfy Zau-
`
`derer, assuming that standard applies. Pp. 17–20.
`839 F. 3d 823, reversed and remanded.
`THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
`
`
`
`C. J., and KENNEDY, ALITO, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J., filed
`
`
`
`
`
`a concurring opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and ALITO and GORSUCH,
`
`JJ., joined. BREYER, J., filed dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG,
`
`
`
` SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`1
`
`
` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
`
`
`
` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
`
` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
`
` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
`
`
` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
`
`
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`
` No. 16–1140
`_________________
`NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FAMILY AND LIFE
`
`ADVOCATES, DBA NIFLA, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
`
`
`
`XAVIER BECERRA, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
`
`
`
`CALIFORNIA, ET AL.
`
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`
`APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`
`[June 26, 2018]
`
`JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
`The California Reproductive Freedom, Accountability,
`
`Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act (FACT Act)
`requires clinics that primarily serve pregnant women to
`
`provide certain notices. Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann.
`
`§123470 et seq. (West 2018). Licensed clinics must notify
`
`women that California provides free or low-cost services,
`including abortions, and give them a phone number to call.
`
`Unlicensed clinics must notify women that California has
`not licensed the clinics to provide medical services. The
`
`question in this case is whether these notice requirements
`violate the First Amendment.
`I
`
`A
`
`The California State Legislature enacted the FACT
`
`Act to regulate crisis pregnancy centers. Crisis pregnancy
`centers—according to a report commissioned by the Cali-
`fornia State Assembly, App. 86—are “pro-life (largely
`Christian belief-based) organizations that offer a limited
`
`
`
`

`

`2
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`
`NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FAMILY AND
`LIFE ADVOCATES v. BECERRA
`
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`range of free pregnancy options, counseling, and other
`services to individuals that visit a center.” Watters et al.,
`Pregnancy Resource Centers: Ensuring Access and Accu-
`racy of Information 4 (2011). “[U]nfortunately,” the au-
`thor of the FACT Act stated, “there are nearly 200 licensed
`
`and unlicensed” crisis pregnancy centers in California.
`App. 84. These centers “aim to discourage and prevent
`
`
`women from seeking abortions.” Id., at 85. The author of
`the FACT Act observed that crisis pregnancy centers “are
`commonly affiliated with, or run by organizations whose
`stated goal” is to oppose abortion—including “the National
`Institute of Family and Life Advocates,” one of the peti-
`
`tioners here. Ibid. To address this perceived problem, the
`FACT Act imposes two notice requirements on facilities
`that provide pregnancy-related services—one for licensed
`
`facilities and one for unlicensed facilities.
`1
`The first notice requirement applies to “licensed covered
`
`
`facilit[ies].” Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. §123471(a).
`To fall under the definition of “licensed covered facility,” a
`clinic must be a licensed primary care or specialty clinic or
`
`qualify as an intermittent clinic under California law.
`
`Ibid. (citing §§1204, 1206(h)). A licensed covered facility
`also must have the “primary purpose” of “providing fam-
`
`ily planning or pregnancy-related services.” §123471(a).
`
`And it must satisfy at least two of the following six
`
`requirements:
`“(1) The facility offers obstetric ultrasounds, obstetric
`sonograms, or prenatal care to pregnant women.
`“(2) The facility provides, or offers counseling about,
`contraception or contraceptive methods.
`“(3) The facility offers pregnancy testing or pregnancy
`diagnosis.
`
`“(4) The facility advertises or solicits patrons with of-
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`3
`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`fers to provide prenatal sonography, pregnancy tests,
`
` or pregnancy options counseling.
`“(5) The facility offers abortion services.
`“(6) The facility has staff or volunteers who collect
`
`health information from clients.” Ibid.
`
`
`The FACT Act exempts several categories of clinics that
`
`would otherwise qualify as licensed covered facilities.
`Clinics operated by the United States or a federal agency
`are excluded, as are clinics that are “enrolled as a Medi-
`
`Cal provider” and participate in “the Family Planning,
`
`Access, Care, and Treatment Program” (Family PACT
`program). §123471(c). To participate in the Family PACT
`program, a clinic must provide “the full scope of family
`planning . . . services specified for the program,” Cal.
`Welf. & Inst. Code Ann. §24005(c) (West 2018), including
`
`contraceptive
`sterilization
`and
`emergency
`pills,
`§§24007(a)(1), (2).
`
`If a clinic is a licensed covered facility, the FACT Act
`requires it to disseminate a government-drafted notice on
`site. Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. §123472(a)(1). The
`notice states that “California has public programs that
`provide immediate free or low-cost access to comprehen-
`
`sive family planning services (including all FDA-approved
`
`methods of contraception), prenatal care, and abortion for
`eligible women. To determine whether you qualify, con-
`tact the county social services office at [insert the tele-
`
`phone number].” Ibid. This notice must be posted in the
`waiting room, printed and distributed to all clients, or
`provided digitally at check-in. §123472(a)(2). The notice
`must be in English and any additional languages identi-
`fied by state law. §123472(a).
`In some counties, that
`means the notice must be spelled out in 13 different lan-
`guages. See State of Cal., Dept. of Health Care Services,
`Frequency of Threshold Language Speakers in the Medi-
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`4
`
`
`NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FAMILY AND
`LIFE ADVOCATES v. BECERRA
`
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`Cal Population by County for Jan. 2015, pp. 4–5 (Sept.
`
`2016) (identifying the required languages for Los Angeles
`County as English, Spanish, Armenian, Mandarin, Can-
`tonese, Korean, Vietnamese, Farsi, Tagalog, Russian,
`Cambodian, Other Chinese, and Arabic).
`The stated purpose of the FACT Act, including its li-
`
`censed notice requirement, is to “ensure that California
`residents make their personal reproductive health care
`
`decisions knowing their rights and the health care services
`
`available to them.” 2015 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 700, §2
`(A. B. 775) (West) (Cal. Legis. Serv.). The Legislature
`
`posited that “thousands of women remain unaware of the
`
`public programs available to provide them with contracep-
`tion, health education and counseling, family planning,
`
`prenatal care, abortion, or delivery.” §1(b). Citing the
`“time sensitive” nature of pregnancy-related decisions,
`
`§1(c), the Legislature concluded that requiring licensed
`facilities to inform patients themselves would be “[t]he
`most effective” way to convey this information, §1(d).
`2
`The second notice requirement in the FACT Act applies
`
`
`to “unlicensed covered facilit[ies].” §123471(b). To fall
`
`under the definition of “unlicensed covered facility,” a
`facility must not be licensed by the State, not have a li-
`censed medical provider on staff or under contract, and
`have the “primary purpose” of “providing pregnancy-
`related services.”
`Ibid. An unlicensed covered facility
`also must satisfy at least two of the following four
`requirements:
`“(1) The facility offers obstetric ultrasounds, obstetric
`sonograms, or prenatal care to pregnant women.
`“(2) The facility offers pregnancy testing or pregnancy
`diagnosis.
`
`“(3) The facility advertises or solicits patrons with of-
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`5
`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`fers to provide prenatal sonography, pregnancy tests,
`
` or pregnancy options counseling.
`“(4) The facility has staff or volunteers who collect
`
` health information from clients.” Ibid.
` Clinics operated by the United States and licensed primary
`
`care clinics enrolled in Medi-Cal and Family PACT are
`excluded. §123471(c).
`Unlicensed covered facilities must provide a government-
`
`drafted notice stating that “[t]his facility is not li-
`censed as a medical facility by the State of California and
`has no licensed medical provider who provides or directly
`supervises the provision of services.” Cal. Health & Safety
`
`Code Ann. §123472(b)(1). This notice must be provided on
`
`site and in all advertising materials. §§123472(b)(2), (3).
`
`Onsite, the notice must be posted “conspicuously” at the
`
`entrance of the facility and in at least one waiting area.
`§123472(b)(2). It must be “at least 8.5 inches by 11 inches
`and written in no less than 48-point type.” Ibid. In adver-
`tisements, the notice must be in the same size or larger
`font than the surrounding text, or otherwise set off in a
`way that draws attention to it. §123472(b)(3). Like the
`licensed notice, the unlicensed notice must be in English
`
`and any additional languages specified by state law.
`§123471(b). Its stated purpose is to ensure “that pregnant
`women in California know when they are getting medical
`care from licensed professionals.” Cal. Legis. Serv., §1(e).
`B
`
`After the Governor of California signed the FACT Act,
`petitioners—a licensed pregnancy center, an unlicensed
`
`pregnancy center, and an organization composed of crisis
`pregnancy centers—filed this suit. Petitioners alleged
`that the licensed and unlicensed notices abridge the free-
`dom of speech protected by the First Amendment. The
`
`District Court denied their motion for a preliminary
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`6
`
`
`NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FAMILY AND
`
`LIFE ADVOCATES v. BECERRA
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`
`
`
`injunction.
`
`The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
`
`National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Harris,
`839 F. 3d 823, 845 (2016). After concluding that petition-
`ers’ challenge to the FACT Act was ripe,1 id., at 833, the
`
`Ninth Circuit held that petitioners could not show a like-
`lihood of success on the merits.
`It concluded that the
`licensed notice survives the “lower level of scrutiny” that
`
`applies to regulations of “professional speech.” Id., at 833–
`842. And it concluded that the unlicensed notice satisfies
`any level of scrutiny. See id., at 843–844.
`We granted certiorari to review the Ninth Circuit’s
`
`
`decision. 583 U. S. ___ (2017). We reverse with respect to
`both notice requirements.
`
`
`II
`
`
`We first address the licensed notice.2
`
`A
`
`
`The First Amendment, applicable to the States through
`
`the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits laws that abridge
`the freedom of speech. When enforcing this prohibition,
`our precedents distinguish between content-based and
`
`content-neutral regulations of speech. Content-based
`
`regulations “target speech based on its communicative
`
`
`content.” Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U. S. ___, ___
`(2015) (slip op., at 6). As a general matter, such laws “are
`presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only
`
`if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored
`
`to serve compelling state interests.” Ibid. This stringent
`standard reflects the fundamental principle that govern-
`——————
`1We agree with the Ninth Circuit’s ripeness determination.
`2Petitioners raise serious concerns that both the licensed and unli-
`
` censed notices discriminate based on viewpoint. Because the notices
` are unconstitutional either way, as explained below, we need not reach
`
`that issue.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
` Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`ments have “‘no power to restrict expression because of its
`message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.’”
`
`Ibid. (quoting Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S.
`92, 95 (1972)).
`
`The licensed notice is a content-based regulation of
`speech. By compelling individuals to speak a particular
`
`message, such notices “alte[r] the content of [their]
`speech.” Riley v. National Federation of Blind of N. C.,
`Inc., 487 U. S. 781, 795 (1988); accord, Turner Broadcast-
`ing System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 642 (1994); Miami
`Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241, 256
`
`(1974). Here, for example, licensed clinics must provide a
`government-drafted script about the availability of state-
`sponsored services, as well as contact information for how
`
`to obtain them. One of those services is abortion—the
`very practice that petitioners are devoted to opposing. By
`requiring petitioners to inform women how they can ob-
`tain state-subsidized abortions—at the same time peti-
`tioners try to dissuade women from choosing that option—
`the licensed notice plainly “alters the content” of petition-
`
`ers’ speech. Riley, supra, at 795.
`B
`
`Although the licensed notice is content based, the Ninth
`
`Circuit did not apply strict scrutiny because it concluded
`
`that the notice regulates “professional speech.” 839 F. 3d,
`at 839. Some Courts of Appeals have recognized “profes-
`
`sional speech” as a separate category of speech that is
`subject to different rules. See, e.g., King v. Governors of
`
`
`New Jersey, 767 F. 3d 216, 232 (CA3 2014); Pickup v.
`Brown, 740 F. 3d 1208, 1227–1229 (CA9 2014); Moore-
`
`King v. County of Chesterfield, 708 F. 3d 560, 568–570
`(CA4 2014). These courts define “professionals” as indi-
`viduals who provide personalized services to clients and
`who are subject to “a generally applicable licensing and
`
`regulatory regime.” Id., at 569; see also, King, supra, at
`
`7
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`
`
`

`

`8
`
`
`NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FAMILY AND
`LIFE ADVOCATES v. BECERRA
`
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`232; Pickup, supra, at 1230. “Professional speech” is then
`
`defined as any speech by these individuals that is based on
`
`“[their] expert knowledge and judgment,” King, supra, at
`232, or that is “within the confines of [the] professional
`relationship,” Pickup, supra, at 1228. So defined, these
`
`courts except professional speech from the rule that content-
`
`based regulations of speech are subject to strict scru-
`tiny. See King, supra, at 232; Pickup, supra, at 1053–
`
`1056; Moore-King, supra, at 569.
`
`But this Court has not recognized “professional speech”
`as a separate category of speech. Speech is not unpro-
`
`tected merely because it is uttered by “professionals.” This
`
`Court has “been reluctant to mark off new categories of
`speech for diminished constitutional protection.” Denver
`Area Ed. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC,
`
`
`518 U. S. 727, 804 (1996) (KENNEDY, J., concurring in
`part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in
`
`part). And it has been especially reluctant to “exemp[t] a
`category of speech from the normal prohibition on content-
`based restrictions.” United States v. Alvarez, 567 U. S.
`
`709, 722 (2012) (plurality opinion). This Court’s prece-
`dents do not permit governments to impose content-based
`restrictions on speech without “‘persuasive evidence . . . of
`
`a long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition’” to that
`effect. Ibid. (quoting Brown v. Entertainment Merchants
`Assn., 564 U. S. 786, 792 (2011)).
`
`This Court’s precedents do not recognize such a tradi-
`
`tion for a category called “professional speech.” This Court
`has afforded less protection for professional speech in two
`
`circumstances—neither of which turned on the fact that
`professionals were speaking. First, our precedents have
`
`applied more deferential review to some laws that require
`professionals to disclose factual, noncontroversial infor-
`mation in their “commercial speech.” See, e.g., Zauderer v.
`
`Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio,
`471 U. S. 626, 651 (1985); Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz,
`
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`9
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` Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of the Court
` P. A. v. United States, 559 U. S. 229, 250 (2010); Ohralik
`
`v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447, 455–456 (1978).
`Second, under our precedents, States may regulate profes-
`sional conduct, even though that conduct incidentally
`involves speech. See, e.g., id., at 456; Planned Parenthood
`
`of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833, 884 (1992)
`
`(opinion of O’Connor, KENNEDY, and Souter, JJ.). But
`neither line of precedents is implicated here.
`1
`This Court’s precedents have applied a lower level of
`
`scrutiny to laws that compel disclosures in certain con-
`texts. In Zauderer, for example, this Court upheld a rule
`requiring lawyers who advertised their services on a
`
`contingency-fee basis to disclose that clients might be re-
`quired to pay some fees and costs. 471 U. S., at 650–653.
`
`Noting that the disclosure requirement governed only
`“commercial advertising” and required the disclosure of
`“purely factual and uncontroversial information about the
`terms under which . . . services will be available,” the
`Court explained that such requirements should be upheld
`unless they are “unjustified or unduly burdensome.” Id.,
`
`at 651.
`The Zauderer standard does not apply here. Most obvi-
`ously, the licensed notice is not limited to “purely factual
`
`and uncontroversial information about the terms under
`which . . . services will be available.” 471 U. S., at 651; see
`also Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
`Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U. S. 557, 573 (1995) (explain-
`ing that Zauderer does not apply outside of these circum-
`stances). The notice in no way relates to the services that
`
`licensed clinics provide. Instead, it requires these clinics
`to disclose information about state-sponsored services—
`including abortion, anything but an “uncontroversial”
`topic. Accordingly, Zauderer has no application here.
`
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`10
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`NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FAMILY AND
`LIFE ADVOCATES v. BECERRA
`
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`2
`
`In addition to disclosure requirements under Zauderer,
`this Court has upheld regulations of professional conduct
`that incidentally burden speech. “[T]he First Amendment
`
`does not prevent restrictions directed at commerce or
`conduct from imposing incidental burdens on speech,”
`Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U. S. 552, 567 (2011), and
`
`professionals are no exception to this rule, see Ohralik,
`supra, at 456. Longstanding torts for professional mal-
`practice, for example, “fall within the traditional purview
`of state regulation of professional conduct.” NAACP v.
`Button, 371 U. S. 415, 438 (1963); but cf. id., at 439 (“[A]
`State may not, under the guise of prohibiting professional
`
`misconduct, ignore constitutional rights”). While drawing
`the line between speech and conduct can be difficult, this
`Court’s precedents have long drawn it, see, e.g., Sorrell,
`
`supra, at 567; Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336
`U. S. 490, 502 (1949), and the line is “‘long familiar to the
`bar,’” United States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. 460, 468 (2010)
`
`(quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y State
`
`Crime Victims Bd., 502 U. S. 105, 127 (1991) (KENNEDY,
`J., concurring in judgment)).
`In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, for
`
`
`example, this Court upheld a law requiring physicians to
`
`obtain informed consent before they could perform an
`
`abortion. 505 U. S., at 884 (joint opinion of O’Connor,
`KENNEDY, and Souter, JJ.). Pennsylvania law required
`physicians to inform their patients of “the nature of the
`procedure, the health risks of the abortion and childbirth,
`and the ‘probable gestational age of the unborn child.’”
`
`Id., at 881. The law also required physicians to inform
`patients of the availability of printed materials from the
`State, which provided information about the child and
`
`various forms of assistance. Ibid.
`
`The joint opinion in Casey rejected a free-speech chal-
`lenge to this informed-consent requirement. Id., at 884. It
`
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` 11
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` Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)
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`Opinion of the Court
`described the Pennsylvania law as “a requirement that a
`doctor give a woman certain information as part of obtain-
`ing her consent to an abortion,” which “for constitutional
`purposes, [was] no different from a requirement that a
`doctor give certain specific information about any medical
`procedure.” Ibid. The joint opinion explained that the law
`regulated speech only “as part of the practice of medicine,
`subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the
`State.” Ibid. (emphasis added). Indeed, the requirement
`that a doctor obtain informed consent to perform an opera-
`tion is “firmly entrenched in American tort law.” Cruzan
`
`
`v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U. S. 261, 269 (1990);
`see, e.g., Schloendorff v. Society of N. Y. Hospital, 211
`
`N. Y. 125, 129–130, 105 N. E. 92, 93 (1914) (Cardozo, J.)
`(explaining that “a surgeon who performs an operation
`without his patient’s consent commits an assault”).
`The licensed notice at issue here is not an informed-
`
`consent requirement or any other regulation of professional
`
`
`conduct. The notice does not facilitate informed consent to
`a medical procedure. In fact, it is not tied to a procedure
`
`at all. It applies to all interactions between a covered
`facility and its clients, regardless of whether a medical
`procedure is ever sought, offered, or performed. If a cov-
`ered facility does provide medical procedures, the notice
`
`provides no information about the risks or benefits of
`those procedures. Tellingly, many facilities that provide
`the exact same services as covered facilities—such as
`general practice clinics, see §123471(a)—are not required
`
`to provide the licensed notice. The licensed notice regu-
`
`lates speech as speech.
`
`3
`
`two contexts discussed above—
`the
`Outside of
`
`disclosures under Zauderer and professional conduct—this
`Court’s precedents have long protected the First Amend-
`
`ment rights of professionals. For example, this Court has
`
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`NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FAMILY AND
`LIFE ADVOCATES v. BECERRA
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`Opinion of the Court
`
`applied strict scrutiny to content-based laws that regulate
`
`
` the noncommercial speech of lawyers, see Reed, 576 U. S.,
`at ___ (slip op., at 10) (discussing Button, supra, at 438);
`In re Primus, 436 U. S. 412, 432 (1978); professional fund-
`raisers, see Riley, 487 U. S., at 798; and organizations that
`provided specialized advice about international law, see
`
`Holde