`(Slip Opinion)
`
`
`
` OCTOBER TERM, 2017
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`1
`
` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`
`
`
` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`
`
`
` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
`
` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
` Syllabus
`
`HALL, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF
`
`HALL AND AS SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE OF THE ETHLYN
`
`
`LOUISE HALL FAMILY TRUST v. HALL ET AL.
`
`
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE THIRD CIRCUIT
` No. 16–1150. Argued January 16, 2018—Decided March 27, 2018
`
`Respondent Samuel Hall served as caretaker and legal advisor to his
`mother Ethlyn Hall, a property owner in the United States Virgin Is-
`
`lands. After falling out with Samuel, Ethlyn transferred her property
`
`
`into a trust and designated her daughter, petitioner Elsa Hall, as her
`successor trustee. Ethlyn sued Samuel and his law firm over the
`handling of her affairs (the “trust case”). When Ethlyn died, Elsa
`
`took Ethlyn’s place as trustee and as plaintiff. Samuel later filed a
`separate complaint against Elsa in her individual capacity (the “indi-
`vidual case”).
`
`
`
`On Samuel’s motion, the District Court consolidated the trust and
`individual cases under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a). The
`District Court held a single trial of the consolidated cases. In the in-
`
`
`dividual case, the jury returned a verdict for Samuel, but the District
`Court granted Elsa a new trial. In the trust case, the jury returned a
`verdict against Elsa, and she filed a notice of appeal from the judg-
`
`ment in that case. Samuel moved to dismiss the appeal on jurisdic-
`
`tional grounds, arguing that the judgment in the trust case was not
`final and appealable because his claims against Elsa remained unre-
`solved in the individual case. The Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
`
`cuit agreed and dismissed the appeal.
`Held: When one of several cases consolidated under Rule 42(a) is finally
`decided, that decision confers upon the losing party the immediate
`right to appeal, regardless of whether any of the other consolidated
`
`cases remain pending. Pp. 4–18.
`
`(a) Title 28 U. S. C. §1291 vests the courts of appeals with jurisdic-
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`2
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`
`HALL v. HALL
`
`
`Syllabus
`tion over “appeals from all final decisions of the district courts,” ex-
`cept those directly appealable to this Court. Under §1291, “any liti-
`gant armed with a final judgment from a lower federal court is enti-
`
`tled to take an appeal.” Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U. S. 232, 244.
`Here an appeal would normally lie from the judgment in the trust
`
`case. But Samuel argues that because the trust and individual cases
`
`
`were consolidated under Rule 42(a)(2), they merged and should be
`
`regarded as one case, such that the judgment in the trust case was
`
`merely interlocutory and not appealable before the consolidated cases
`
`in the aggregate are finally resolved. Pp. 4–5.
`
`
`
`(b) Rule 42(a)(2) provides that if “actions before the court involve a
`common question of law or fact, the court may . . . consolidate the ac-
`tions.” The meaning of the term “consolidate” in this context is am-
`
`biguous. But the term has a legal lineage stretching back at least to
`
`the first federal consolidation statute, enacted by Congress in 1813.
`
`
`Act of July 22, 1813, §3, 3 Stat. 21 (later codified as Rev. Stat. §921
`and 28 U. S. C. §734 (1934 ed.)). That history makes clear that one of
`
`multiple cases consolidated under the Rule retains its independent
`character, at least to the extent it is appealable when finally re-
`
`solved, regardless of any ongoing proceedings in the other cases.
`Pp. 5–6.
`
`(c) Under the consolidation statute—which was in force for 125
`years, until its replacement by Rule 42(a)—consolidation was under-
`
`stood not as completely merging the constituent cases into one, but as
`enabling more efficient case management while preserving the dis-
`
`tinct identities of the cases and rights of the separate parties in them.
`
`See, e.g., Rich v. Lambert, 12 How. 347; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
`
`Hillmon, 145 U. S. 285; Stone v. United States, 167 U. S. 178. Just
`
`
`five years before Rule 42(a) became law, the Court reiterated that,
`under the consolidation statute, consolidation did not result in the
`
`
`
`
`merger of constituent cases. Johnson v. Manhattan R. Co., 289 U. S.
`479, 496–497. This body of law supports the inference that, prior to
`
`Rule 42(a), a judgment completely resolving one of several consoli-
`
`dated cases was an immediately appealable final decision. Pp. 6–12.
`
`
`(d) Rule 42(a) was expressly modeled on the consolidation statute.
`
`Because the Rule contained no definition of “consolidate,” the term
`presumably carried forward the same meaning ascribed to it under
`the statute and reaffirmed in Johnson.
`
`Samuel nonetheless asserts that “consolidate” took on a different
`meaning under Rule 42(a). He describes the Rule as permitting two
`forms of consolidation: consolidation for limited purposes and consol-
`idation for all purposes. He locates textual authority for the former
`
`
`in a new provision, subsection (a)(1), which permits courts to “join for
`hearing or trial any or all matters at issue in the actions.” And he
`
`
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`

`

`
`
`
`
`
`3
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`
`Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`
`Syllabus
`contends that subsection (a)(2), so as not to be superfluous, must
`permit the merger of cases that have been consolidated for all pur-
`
`poses into a single, undifferentiated case. But the narrow grant of
`authority in subsection (a)(1) cannot fairly be read as the exclusive
`source of a district court’s power to consolidate cases for limited pur-
`
`poses, because there is much more to litigation than hearings or tri-
`
`
`als. Instead, that undisputed power must stem from subsection
`
`(a)(2). That defeats Samuel’s argument that interpreting subsection
`
`(a)(2) to adopt the traditional understanding of consolidation would
`
`render it duplicative of subsection (a)(1), and that subsection (a)(2)
`therefore must permit courts to merge the actions into a single unit.
`
`
`Moreover, a Federal Rules Advisory Committee would not take a
`term that had long meant that separate actions do not merge into
`
`
`one, and silently and abruptly reimagine the same term to mean that
`they do. Nothing in the pertinent Committee proceedings supports
`the notion that Rule 42(a) was meant to overturn the settled under-
`standing of consolidation; the Committee simply commented that
`Rule 42(a) “is based upon” its statutory predecessor, “but insofar as
`the statute differs from this rule, it is modified.” Advisory Commit-
`tee’s Notes on 1937 Adoption of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 42(a), 28 U. S. C.
`
`App., p. 887. The limited extent to which this Court has addressed
`consolidation since adoption of Rule 42(a) confirms that the tradi-
`
`tional understanding remains in place. See, e.g., Bank Markazi v. Pe-
`terson, 578 U. S. ___, ___–___; Butler v. Dexter, 425 U. S. 262, 266–
`
`267.
`
`This decision does not mean that district courts may not consoli-
`
`date cases for all purposes in appropriate circumstances. But con-
`stituent cases retain their separate identities at least to the extent
`
`
`that a final decision in one is immediately appealable by the losing
`
`party. Pp. 12–17.
`679 Fed. Appx. 142, reversed and remanded.
`ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
`
`
`
`
`
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`
`

`

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`
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` Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`1
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`
` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
`
`
`
` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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`
` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`
` No. 16–1150
`_________________
`ELSA HALL, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
`
`ESTATE OF ETHLYN LOUISE HALL AND AS SUCCESSOR
`
`
`
`TRUSTEE OF THE ETHLYN LOUISE HALL FAMILY
`
`
`
`
`
`TRUST, PETITIONER v. SAMUEL HALL, ET AL.
`
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`
`APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
`
`
`[March 27, 2018]
`
` CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the
`Court.
`
`Three Terms ago, we held that one of multiple cases
`
`consolidated for multidistrict litigation under 28 U. S. C.
`§1407 is immediately appealable upon an order disposing
`of that case, regardless of whether any of the others re-
`main pending. Gelboim v. Bank of America Corp., 574
`U. S. ___ (2015). We left open, however, the question
`whether the same is true with respect to cases consoli-
`dated under Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
`dure. Id., at ___, n. 4 (slip op., at 7, n. 4). This case pre-
`sents that question.
`
`
`I
`Petitioner Elsa Hall and respondent Samuel Hall are
`
`
`siblings enmeshed in a long-running family feud. Their
`mother, Ethlyn Hall, lived and owned property in the
`
`United States Virgin Islands. Samuel, a lawyer in the
`Virgin Islands, served as Ethlyn’s caretaker and provided
`
`her with legal assistance. But trouble eventually came to
`
`
`
`

`

`2
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`
`HALL v. HALL
`
`Opinion of the Court
`paradise, and Samuel and Ethlyn fell out over Samuel’s
`
`management of Ethlyn’s real estate holdings. During a
`
`visit from Elsa, Ethlyn established an inter vivos trust,
`transferred all of her property into the trust, and desig-
`nated Elsa as her successor trustee. Ethlyn then moved to
`Miami—under circumstances disputed by the parties—to
`
`live with her daughter.
`
`
`The family squabble made its way to court in May 2011.
`
`Ethlyn, acting in her individual capacity and as trustee of
`
`her inter vivos trust, sued Samuel and his law firm in
`
`Federal District Court (the “trust case”).
`Ethlyn’s
`
`claims—for breach of fiduciary duty, legal malpractice,
`conversion, fraud, and unjust enrichment—concerned the
`
`handling of her affairs by Samuel and his law firm before
`she left for Florida.
`
`
`Then Ethlyn died, and Elsa stepped into her shoes as
`trustee and accordingly as plaintiff in the trust case.
`Samuel promptly filed counterclaims in that case against
`Elsa—in both her individual and representative capaci-
`
`ties—for intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud,
`breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and tortious inter-
`
`ference. Samuel contended that Elsa had turned their
`mother against him by taking advantage of Ethlyn’s alleged
`
`mental frailty. But Samuel ran into an obstacle: Elsa was
`
`not a party to the trust case in her individual capacity
`(only Ethlyn had been). So Samuel filed a new complaint
`against Elsa in her individual capacity in the same Dis-
`trict Court (the “individual case”), raising the same claims
`that he had asserted as counterclaims in the trust case.
`
`The trust and individual cases initially proceeded along
`
`separate tracks. Eventually, on Samuel’s motion, the
`District Court consolidated the cases under Rule 42(a) of
`the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, ordering that “[a]ll
`submissions in the consolidated case shall be filed in” the
`
`docket assigned to the trust case. App. to Pet. for Cert.
`A–15.
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`3
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`
` Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of the Court
` Just before the trial commenced, the District Court
`
`
`dismissed from the trust case Samuel’s counterclaims
`against Elsa. Those claims remained in the individual
`
`case. The parties then tried the consolidated cases to-
`gether before a jury.
`
`In the individual case, the jury returned a verdict for
`
`
`Samuel on his intentional infliction of emotional distress
`claim against Elsa, awarding him $500,000 in compensa-
`tory damages and $1.5 million in punitive damages. The
`clerk entered judgment in that case, but the District Court
`
`granted Elsa a new trial, which had the effect of reopening
`the judgment. The individual case remains pending before
`the District Court.
`
`In the trust case, the jury returned a verdict against
`
`
`Elsa, in her representative capacity, on her claims against
`
`Samuel and his law firm. The clerk entered judgment in
`that case directing that Elsa “recover nothing” and that
`“the action be dismissed on the merits.” Id., at A–12.
`Elsa filed a notice of appeal from the District Court’s
`
`
`judgment in the trust case. Samuel and his law firm
`
`moved to dismiss the appeal on jurisdictional grounds,
`
`arguing that the judgment was not final and appealable
`because his claims against Elsa remained unresolved in
`the individual case. The Court of Appeals for the Third
`
`
`Circuit agreed. When two cases have been consolidated
`
`for all purposes, the court reasoned, a final decision on one
`set of claims is generally not appealable while the second
`set remains pending. The court explained that it consid-
`ers “whether a less-than-complete judgment is appealable”
`on a “case-by-case basis.” 679 Fed. Appx. 142, 145 (2017).
`
`Here, the fact that the claims in the trust and individual
`cases had been “scheduled together and tried before a
`single jury” “counsel[ed] in favor of keeping the claims
`together on appeal.” Ibid. The court dismissed Elsa’s
`
`appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
`We granted certiorari, 582 U. S. ___ (2017), and now
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`4
`
`
`reverse.
`
`HALL v. HALL
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`
`
`II
`
`
`A
`
`Had the District Court never consolidated the trust and
`
`
`individual cases, there would be no question that Elsa
`
`could immediately appeal from the judgment in the trust
`
`case. Title 28 U. S. C. §1291 vests the courts of appeals
`
`with jurisdiction over “appeals from all final decisions of
`
`the district courts,” except those directly appealable to this
`
`Court. A final decision “ends the litigation on the merits
`
`and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the
`judgment.” Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Central Pension
`
`Fund of Operating Engineers and Participating Employ-
`ers, 571 U. S. 177, 183 (2014). The archetypal final deci-
`sion is “one[] that trigger[s] the entry of judgment.” Mo-
`hawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U. S. 100, 103
`
`
`(2009). Appeal from such a final decision is a “matter of
`
`right.” Gelboim, 574 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 1). Under
`§1291, “any litigant armed with a final judgment from a
`lower federal court is entitled to take an appeal,” Arizona
`v. Manypenny, 451 U. S. 232, 244 (1981), which generally
`must be filed within 30 days, 28 U. S. C. §2107(a).
`Here the jury’s verdict against Elsa resolved all of the
`
`claims in the trust case, and the clerk accordingly entered
`judgment in that case providing that “the action be dis-
`missed on the merits.” App. to Pet. for Cert. A–12. With
`
`the entry of judgment, the District Court “completed its
`adjudication of [Elsa’s] complaint and terminated [her]
`action.” Gelboim, 574 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7). An
`appeal would normally lie from that judgment.
`
`But, Samuel contends, there is more to the litigation
`
`
`than the suit Elsa pursued against him in her representa-
`tive capacity. There is also his suit against her in her
`
`individual capacity, which has not yet been decided.
`
`
`Because the District Court consolidated the trust and
`
`
`
`

`

`5
`
`
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`
`
` Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`individual cases under Rule 42(a)(2), he argues, they
`
`
`merged and should be regarded as one case. Viewed that
`way, the judgment in the trust case was merely interlocu-
`tory, and more remains to be done in the individual case
`before the consolidated cases in the aggregate are finally
`resolved and subject to appeal.
`B
`Rule 42(a)—entitled “[c]onsolidation”—provides that if
`
`“actions before the court involve a common question of law
`or fact, the court may” take one of three measures. First,
`
`the court may “join for hearing or trial any or all matters
`
`at issue in the actions.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 42(a)(1).
`Second, the court may “consolidate the actions.” Rule
`42(a)(2). Third, the court may “issue any other orders to
`
`avoid unnecessary cost or delay.” Rule 42(a)(3). Whether
`the judgment entered in the trust case is an immediately
`
`appealable final decision turns on the effect of consolida-
`tion under Rule 42(a).
`Samuel, looking to dictionary definitions, asserts that
`
`
`the “plain meaning of the phrase ‘consolidate the actions’
`is . . . to unite two or more actions into one whole—that is,
`to join them into a single case.” Brief for Respondents 23
`
`(citing Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014); some inter-
`nal quotation marks and alterations omitted). But the
`
`meaning of “consolidate” in the present context is am-
`biguous. When Rule 42(a) was adopted, the term was gener-
`ally defined, as it is now, as meaning to “unite, as various
`particulars, into one mass or body; to bring together in
`
`close union; to combine.” Webster’s New International
`Dictionary 570 (2d ed. 1942). Consolidation can thus
`sometimes signify the complete merger of discrete units:
`
`
`“The company consolidated two branches.” But the term
`
`can also mean joining together discrete units without
`
`
`causing them to lose their independent character. The
`United States, for example,
`is composed of States
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`6
`
`
`HALL v. HALL
`
`Opinion of the Court
`“unite[d], as various particulars, into one mass or body,”
`
`“br[ought] together in close union,” or “combine[d].” Yet
`all agree that entry into our Union “by no means implies
`
`the loss of distinct and individual existence . . . by the
`
`States.” Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725 (1869). “She
`consolidated her books” hardly suggests that the “books”
`became “book.” The very metaphor Samuel offers—that
`consolidation “make[s] two one, like marriage”—highlights
`
`this point. Tr. of Oral Arg. 56. However dear to each
`
`
`other, spouses would be surprised to hear that their union
`extends beyond the metaphysical. This is not a plain
`
`meaning case.
`
`It is instead about a term—consolidate—with a legal
`
`lineage stretching back at least to the first federal consoli-
`dation statute, enacted by Congress in 1813. Act of July
`22, 1813, §3, 3 Stat. 21 (later codified as Rev. Stat. §921
`
`and 28 U. S. C. §734 (1934 ed.)). Over 125 years, this
`
`Court, along with the courts of appeals and leading trea-
`tises, interpreted that term to mean the joining together—
`but not the complete merger—of constituent cases. Those
`authorities particularly emphasized that constituent cases
`remained independent when it came to judgments and
`appeals. Rule 42(a), promulgated in 1938, was expressly
`based on the 1813 statute. The history against which Rule
`
`42(a) was adopted resolves any ambiguity regarding the
`meaning of “consolidate” in subsection (a)(2). It makes
`
`clear that one of multiple cases consolidated under the
`Rule retains its independent character, at least to the
`
`
`extent it is appealable when finally resolved, regardless of
`any ongoing proceedings in the other cases.
`C
`
`Lord Mansfield pioneered the consolidation of related
`
`cases in England, and the practice quickly took root in
`American courts. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145
`
`U. S. 285, 292 (1892). In 1813, Congress authorized the
`
`
`
`

`

`7
`
`
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` Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`newly formed federal courts, when confronted with “causes
`
`of like nature, or relative to the same question,” to “make
`such orders and rules concerning proceedings therein as
`may be conformable to the principles and usages belonging
`to courts for avoiding unnecessary costs or delay in the
`administration of justice” and to “consolidate[]” the causes
`when it “shall appear reasonable.” §3, 3 Stat. 21. This
`consolidation statute applied at law, equity, and admi-
`ralty, see 1 W. Rose, A Code of Federal Procedure §823(a)
`
`(1907) (Rose), and remained in force for 125 years, until its
`replacement by Rule 42(a).
`
`From the outset, we understood consolidation not as
`
`completely merging the constituent cases into one, but
`
`instead as enabling more efficient case management while
`preserving the distinct identities of the cases and the
`rights of the separate parties in them. In Rich v. Lambert,
`12 How. 347 (1852), for example, we considered an appeal
`from several consolidated cases in admiralty. The appel-
`
`lees, the owners of cargo damaged during shipment, raised
`a challenge to our jurisdiction that turned on the nature of
`the consolidation. At the time, we could exercise appellate
`
`jurisdiction only over cases involving at least $2,000 in
`
`controversy. The damages awarded to the cargo owners in
`the consolidated cases surpassed $2,000 in the aggregate,
`
`but most of the constituent cases did not individually clear
`that jurisdictional hurdle. Id., at 352–353.
`
`We declined to view the consolidated cases as one for
`
`purposes of appeal, concluding that we had jurisdiction
`only over those constituent cases that individually in-
`
`
`volved damages exceeding $2,000. Ibid. As we explained,
`
`“although [a consolidated] proceeding assumes the form of
`
`a joint suit, it is in reality a mere joinder of distinct causes
`
`of action by distinct parties, arising out of a common
`injury, and which are heard and determined, so far as the
`merits are concerned, the same as in the case of separate
`libels for each cause of action.” Id., at 353. Consolidation
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`8
`
`
`HALL v. HALL
`
`Opinion of the Court
`was “allowed by the practice of the court for its conven-
`ience, and the saving of time and expense to the parties.”
`
`Ibid.
`
`The trial court’s decree, we noted, had the effect of
`
`individually resolving each constituent case. Ibid. (“The
`same decree . . . is entered as in the case of separate
`suits.”); see Black’s Law Dictionary 532 (3d ed. 1933)
`
`(“decree” is a “judgment of a court of equity or admiralty,
`answering for most purposes to the judgment of a court of
`
`common law”). Accordingly, we did “not perceive . . . any
`ground for a distinction as to the right of appeal from a
`decree as entered in these cases from that which exists
`
`where the proceedings have been distinct and separate
`
`throughout.” Rich, 12 How., at 353; see Hanover Fire Ins.
`Co. v. Kinneard, 129 U. S. 176, 177 (1889) (evaluating
`appellate jurisdiction over a writ of error in one of several
`consolidated cases without reference to the others).
`
`We elaborated on the principles underlying consolida-
`
`tion in Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U. S.
`285. Hillmon, a staple of law school courses on evidence,
`involved three separate actions instituted against differ-
`ent life insurance companies by one Sallie Hillmon, the
`
`beneficiary on policies purchased by her husband John.
`Sallie claimed she was entitled to the sizable proceeds of
`
`the policies because John had died while journeying
`through southern Kansas with two companions in search
`of a site for a cattle ranch. The three companies countered
`that John was in fact still alive, having conspired with one
`
`of the companions to murder the other and pass his corpse
`off as John’s, all as part of an insurance fraud scheme.
`
`The trial court consolidated the cases and tried them
`together. Id., at 285–287.
`
`
`The court, for purposes of determining the number of
`peremptory juror challenges to which each defendant was
`entitled, treated the three cases as though they had
`
`merged into one. Ibid. On appeal we disagreed, holding
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`9
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` Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`that each defendant should receive the full complement of
`
`
` peremptory challenges. Id., at 293. That was because,
`“although the defendants might lawfully be compelled, at
`the discretion of the court, to try the cases together, the
`
`causes of action remained distinct, and required separate
`
`verdicts and judgments; and no defendant could be de-
`prived, without its consent, of any right material to its
`defence . . . to which it would have been entitled if the
`
`cases had been tried separately.” Ibid. On remand, one
`
`case settled, and a consolidated trial of the others “re-
`sult[ed] in separate judgments” for Sallie. Connecticut
`
`Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 188 U. S. 208, 209 (1903).
`In Stone v. United States, 167 U. S. 178, 189 (1897), we
`
`held that a party appealing from the judgment in one of
`
` two cases consolidated for trial could not also raise claims
`with respect to the other case. John Stone was the sole
`
`
`
` defendant in one case and one of three defendants in the
`other. Id., at 179–181. After a consolidated trial, the jury
`returned a verdict in the case against Stone alone; its
`verdict in the multidefendant case was set aside. Id., at
`181. Stone appealed from the judgment in his case, argu-
`ing that the failure to grant a peremptory challenge in the
`multidefendant case affected the jury’s verdict in his. Id.,
`
`at 189. We rejected that claim, punctiliously respecting
`the distinction between the constituent cases. There was
`
`“no merit in the objection,” we said, because in the case
`before us Stone had “had the benefit of the three peremp-
`
`tory challenges” to which he was entitled in that case.
`Ibid.; see Stone v. United States, 64 F. 667, 672 (CA9 1894)
`
`(“The two cases, although consolidated, were separate and
`distinct. Defendant had exercised all the rights and privi-
`leges he was entitled to in this case.”).
`
`And just five years before Rule 42(a) became law, we
`reiterated that, under the consolidation statute, consolida-
`
`tion did not result in the merger of constituent cases.
`
`Johnson v. Manhattan R. Co., 289 U. S. 479, 496–497
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`10
`
`
`HALL v. HALL
`
`Opinion of the Court
` (1933). A major case of its day, Johnson arose from the
`
`“financial embarrassment” during the Great Depression of
`two companies involved in operating the New York sub-
`way system. Johnson v. Manhattan R. Co., 61 F. 2d 934,
`
`936 (CA2 1932). In the resulting litigation, the District
`
`Court consolidated two suits, apparently with the intent to
`“effect an intervention of the parties to the [first suit] in
`
`the [second] suit”—in other words, to make the two suits
`
`one. Id., at 940. Judge Learned Hand, writing for the
`
`Second Circuit on appeal, would have none of it: “consoli-
`dation does not merge the suits; it is a mere matter of
`
`convenience in administration, to keep them in step. They
`
`remain as independent as before.” Ibid. We affirmed,
`
`
`relying on Hillmon and several lower court cases reflecting
`
`the same understanding of consolidation. Johnson, 289
`
`U. S., at 497, n. 8. We explained once more that “consoli-
`dation is permitted as a matter of convenience and econ-
`omy in administration, but does not merge the suits into a
`single cause, or change the rights of the parties, or make
`those who are parties in one suit parties in another.” Id.,
`
`at 496–497.
`
`Decisions by the Courts of Appeals, with isolated depar-
`tures,* reflected the same understanding in cases involv-
`ing all manners of consolidation. See, e.g., Baltimore S. S.
`
`
`
`Co., Inc. v. Koppel Indus. Car & Equip. Co., 299 F. 158,
`160 (CA4 1924) (“the consolidation for convenience of trial
`did not merge the two causes of action” or “deprive either
`——————
`*See, e.g., Edward P. Allis Co. v. Columbia Mill Co., 65 F. 52, 54
`
`(CA8 1894) (involving two suits “consolidated, and tried as one action,”
`
`with the “complaint in the first suit . . . treated as a counterclaim
`interposed in the second suit”). State practice was varied. Compare,
`e.g., East Bay Municipal Util. Dist. v. Kieffer, 99 Cal. App. 240, 263
`
`(1929) (denial of rehearing) (“By such consolidation the three proceed-
`
`ings became one proceeding and should have been determined by a
`
`single verdict, ‘a single set of findings and a single judgment.’ ”), with
`
`
`Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Helmert, 196 Ark. 1073, 121 S. W. 2d 103 (1938)
`
`(consolidated cases resulted in separate judgments).
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
` 11
`
`
`
` Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
` party of any right or relieve it of any burden incident to
` the libel or cross-libel as a separate proceeding”); Taylor v.
`
`Logan Trust Co., 289 F. 51, 53 (CA8 1923) (parties to one
`constituent case could not appeal orders in the other be-
`cause “consolidation did not make the parties to one suit
`
`parties to the other”; cited in Johnson); Toledo, St. L. & K.
`C. R. Co. v. Continental Trust Co., 95 F. 497, 506 (CA6
`
`
`1899) (consolidation “operates as a mere carrying on to-
`gether of two separate suits supposed to involve identical
`issues” and “does not avoid the necessity of separate de-
`crees in each case”; cited in Johnson).
`One frequently cited case illustrates the point. In Adler
`
`v. Seaman, 266 F. 828, 831 (CA8 1920), the District Court
`“sought to employ consolidation as a medium of getting
`the two independent suits united,” but the Court of Ap-
`peals made clear that the consolidation statute did not
`authorize such action. The court explained that constitu-
`ent cases sometimes “assume certain natural attitudes
`toward each other, such as ‘in the nature of ’ a cross-bill or
`intervention.” Id., at 838. Be that as it may, the court
`
`continued, “this is purely a rule of convenience, and does
`not result in actually making such parties defendants or
`
` interveners in the other suit.” Ibid. The court described
`
`“the result of consolidation” as instead “merely to try cases
`
` together, necessitating separate verdicts and judgments or
`separate decrees,” and to “leave” the constituent cases
`“separate, independent action[s].” Id., at 838, 840.
`
`
`Treatises summarizing federal precedent applying the
`
`consolidation statute also concluded that consolidated
`cases “remain distinct.” 1 Rose §823(c), at 758. They
`recognized that consolidated cases should “remain sepa-
`
`rate as to parties, pleadings, and judgment,” W. Simkins,
`Federal Practice 63 (rev. ed. 1923), and that “[t]here must
`be separate verdicts, judgments or decrees, even although
`the consolidating party wished for one verdict,” 1 Rose
`§823(c), at 758; see also G. Virden, Consolidation Under
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`12
`
`
`HALL v. HALL
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in 141
`
`
`F. R. D. 169, 173–174 (1992) (Virden) (“as of 1933 and the
`Johnson case of that year, it was well settled that consoli-
`
`dation in the federal courts did not merge the separate
`cases into a single action”).
`
`
`Several aspects of this body of law support the inference
`that, prior to Rule 42(a), a judgment completely resolving
`one of several consolidated cases was an immediately
`
`appealable final decision. We made clear, for example,
`that each constituent case must be analyzed individually
`on appeal to ascertain jurisdiction and to decide its dispo-
`sition—a compartmentalized analysis that would be gratu-
`itous if the cases had merged into a single case subject to a
`single appeal. We emphasized that constituent cases
`should end in separate decrees or judgments—the tradi-
`
`tional trigger for the right to appeal, for which there would
`be no need if an appeal could arise only from the resolu-
`
`
`tion of the consolidated cases as a whole. We explained
`that the parties to one case did not become parties to the
`
`other by virtue of consolidation—indicating that the right
`of each to pursue his individual case on appeal should not
`
`be compromised by the litigation conduct of the other.
`
`And, finally, we held that consolidation could not prejudice
`
`rights to which the parties would have been due had
`consolidation never occurred. Forcing an aggrieved party
`to wait for other cases to conclude would substantially
`impair his ability to appeal from a final decision fully
`
`resolving his own case—a “matter of right,” Gelboim, 574
`U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 1), to which he was “entitled,”
`Manypenny, 451 U. S., at 244.
`D
`
`
`Against this background, two years after Johnson, the
`
`
`Rules Advisory Committee began discussion of what was
`to become Rule 42(a). The Rule, which became effective in
`1938, was expressly modeled on its statutory predecessor,
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
` Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`the Act of July 22, 1813. See Advisory Committee’s Notes
`on 1937 Adoption of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 42(a), 28 U. S. C.
`App., p. 887. The Rule contained no defin