`(Slip Opinion)
`
`
`
` OCTOBER TERM, 2016
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`1
`
` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`
`
`
` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`
`
`
` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
`
` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
`
` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
` Syllabus
`
` HONEYCUTT v. UNITED STATES
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
` No. 16–142. Argued March 29, 2017—Decided June 5, 2017
`
`Terry Honeycutt managed sales and inventory for a Tennessee hard-
`
`ware store owned by his brother, Tony Honeycutt. After they were
`
`indicted for federal drug crimes including conspiracy to distribute a
`product used in methamphetamine production, the Government
`sought judgments against each brother in the amount of $269,751.98
`pursuant to the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, which man-
`dates forfeiture of “any property constituting, or derived from, any
`proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of”
`
`
`certain drug crimes, 21 U. S. C. §853(a)(1). Tony pleaded guilty and
`
`agreed to forfeit $200,000. Terry went to trial and was convicted.
`
`
`Despite conceding that Terry had no controlling interest in the store
`and did not stand to benefit personally from the sales of the product,
`the Government asked the District Court to hold him jointly and sev-
`erally liable for the profits from the illegal sales and sought a judg-
`
`ment of $69,751.98, the outstanding conspiracy profits. The District
`Court declined to enter a forfeiture judgment against Terry, reason-
`ing that he was a salaried employee who had not received any profits
`from the sales. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the brothers,
`as co-conspirators, were jointly and severally liable for any conspira-
`cy proceeds.
`
`
`Held: Because forfeiture pursuant to §853(a)(1) is limited to property
`the defendant himself actually acquired as the result of the crime,
`that provision does not permit forfeiture with regard to Terry Hon-
`
`eycutt, who had no ownership interest in his brother’s store and did
`not personally benefit from the illegal sales. Pp. 3–11.
`
`
`(a) Section 853(a) limits forfeiture to property flowing from,
`§853(a)(1), or used in, §853(a)(2), the crime itself—providing the first
`clue that the statute does not countenance joint and several liability,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
` HONEYCUTT v. UNITED STATES
`
`
`Syllabus
`
` which would require forfeiture of untainted property. It also defines
`
` forfeitable property solely in terms of personal possession or use.
`Section 853(a)(1), the provision at issue, limits forfeiture to property
`the defendant “obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of” the
`crime. Neither the dictionary definition nor the common usage of the
`word “obtain” supports the conclusion that an individual “obtains”
`property that was acquired by someone else. And the adverbs “di-
`rectly” and “indirectly” refer to how a defendant obtains the property;
`
`
` they do not negate the requirement that he obtain it at all. Sections
` 853(a)(2) and 853(a)(3) are in accord with this reading. Pp. 3–7.
`
`
`(b) Joint and several liability is also contrary to several other pro-
`
`visions of §853. Section 853(c), which applies to property “described
`
`
` in subsection (a),” applies to tainted property only. See Luis v. Unit-
`ed States, 578 U. S. ___, ___. Section §853(e)(1) permits pretrial asset
`
`freezes to preserve the availability of property forfeitable under sub-
`
`
` section (a), provided there is probable cause to think that a defendant
` has committed an offense triggering forfeiture and “the property at
`
`
`
` issue has the requisite connection to that crime.” Kaley v. United
`States, 571 U. S. ___, ___. Section 853(d) establishes a “rebuttable
`presumption” that property is subject to forfeiture only if the Gov-
`ernment proves that the defendant acquired the property “during the
`period of the violation” and “there was no likely source for” the prop-
`erty but the crime. These provisions reinforce the statute’s applica-
`tion to tainted property acquired by the defendant and are thus in-
`compatible with joint and several liability. Joint and several liability
`would also render futile §853(p)—the sole provision of §853 that per-
` mits the Government to confiscate property untainted by the crime.
`
`Pp. 7–9.
`
`(c) The plain text and structure of §853 leave no doubt that Con-
`gress did not, as the Government claims, incorporate the principle
`that conspirators are legally responsible for each other’s foreseeable
`actions in furtherance of their common plan. See Pinkerton v. United
`States, 328 U. S. 640. Congress provided just one way for the Gov-
`
`ernment to recoup substitute property when the tainted property it-
`self is unavailable—the procedures outlined in §853(p). And as is
`clear from its text and structure, §853 maintains traditional in rem
`forfeiture’s focus on tainted property unless one of §853(p)’s precondi-
`
`tions exists. Pp. 9–10.
`816 F. 3d 362, reversed.
`SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other
`
`Members joined, except GORSUCH, J., who took no part in the considera-
`tion or decision of the case.
`
`2
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`1
`
`
` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
`
`
`
` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
`
` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
`
` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
`
`
` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
`
`
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`
` No. 16–142
`_________________
`TERRY MICHAEL HONEYCUTT, PETITIONER v.
`
`
`UNITED STATES
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`
`APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
`
`
`[June 5, 2017]
`
` JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
`
`A federal statute—21 U. S. C. §853—mandates forfeit-
`ure of “any property constituting, or derived from, any
`proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the
`result of” certain drug crimes. This case concerns how
`§853 operates when two or more defendants act as part of
`a conspiracy. Specifically, the issue is whether, under
`§853, a defendant may be held jointly and severally liable
`for property that his co-conspirator derived from the crime
`but that the defendant himself did not acquire. The Court
`holds that such liability is inconsistent with the statute’s
`
`text and structure.
`
`
`
`I
`
`Terry Michael Honeycutt managed sales and inventory
`
`for a Tennessee hardware store owned by his brother,
`Tony Honeycutt. After observing several “‘edgy looking
`
`folks’” purchasing an
`iodine-based water-purification
`product known as Polar Pure, Terry Honeycutt contacted
`the Chattanooga Police Department to inquire whether
`the iodine crystals in the product could be used to manu-
`
`facture methamphetamine. App. to Pet. for Cert. 2a. An
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
` HONEYCUTT v. UNITED STATES
`
`Opinion of the Court
`officer confirmed that individuals were using Polar Pure
`for this purpose and advised Honeycutt to cease selling it
`if the sales made Honeycutt “‘uncomfortable.’” Ibid.
`Notwithstanding the officer’s advice, the store continued
`
`to sell large quantities of Polar Pure. Although each bottle
`of Polar Pure contained enough iodine to purify 500 gal-
`lons of water, and despite the fact that most people have
`no legitimate use for the product in large quantities, the
`brothers sold as many as 12 bottles in a single transaction
`
`to a single customer. Over a 3-year period, the store
`grossed roughly $400,000 from the sale of more than
`20,000 bottles of Polar Pure.
`
`Unsurprisingly, these sales prompted an investigation
`by the federal Drug Enforcement Administration along
`with state and local law enforcement. Authorities exe-
`cuted a search warrant at the store in November 2010 and
`seized its entire inventory of Polar Pure—more than 300
`bottles. A federal grand jury indicted the Honeycutt
`brothers for various federal crimes relating to their sale of
`iodine while knowing or having reason to believe it would
`be used to manufacture methamphetamine. Pursuant to
`the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, §303, 98 Stat.
`2045, 21 U. S. C. §853(a)(1), which mandates forfeiture of
`“any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly,
`as the result of ” drug distribution, the Government sought
`forfeiture money judgments against each brother in the
`amount of $269,751.98, which represented the hardware
`
`store’s profits from the sale of Polar Pure. Tony Honeycutt
`pleaded guilty and agreed to forfeit $200,000. Terry went
`to trial. A jury acquitted Terry Honeycutt of 3 charges but
`found him guilty of the remaining 11, including conspiring
`to and knowingly distributing iodine in violation of
`§§841(c)(2), 843(a)(6), and 846.
`
`The District Court sentenced Terry Honeycutt to 60
`months in prison. Despite conceding that Terry had no
`“controlling interest in the store” and “did not stand to
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`benefit personally,” the Government insisted that the
`District Court “hold [him] jointly liable for the profit from
`the illegal sales.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 60a–61a. The
`Government thus sought a money judgment of $69,751.98,
`the amount of the conspiracy profits outstanding after
`Tony Honeycutt’s forfeiture payment. The District Court
`declined to enter a forfeiture judgment, reasoning that
`Honeycutt was a salaried employee who had not person-
`ally received any profits from the iodine sales.
`
`The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. As
`
`
`co-conspirators, the court held, the brothers are “‘jointly
`and severally liable for any proceeds of the conspiracy.’”
`816 F. 3d 362, 380 (2016). The court therefore concluded
`
`that each brother bore full responsibility for the entire
`forfeiture judgment. Ibid.
`
`The Court granted certiorari to resolve disagreement
`among the Courts of Appeals regarding whether joint and
`several liability applies under §853.1 580 U. S. ___ (2016).
`II
`
`Criminal forfeiture statutes empower the Government
`
`to confiscate property derived from or used to facilitate
`criminal activity. Such statutes serve important govern-
`mental interests such as “separating a criminal from his
`ill-gotten gains,” “returning property, in full, to those
`wrongfully deprived or defrauded of it,” and “lessen[ing]
`the economic power” of criminal enterprises. Caplin &
`Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U. S. 617, 629–
`630 (1989). The statute at issue here—§853—mandates
`——————
`1Compare United States v. Van Nguyen, 602 F. 3d 886, 904 (CA8
`2010) (applying joint and several liability to forfeiture under §853);
`United States v. Pitt, 193 F. 3d 751, 765 (CA3 1999) (same); United
`States v. McHan, 101 F. 3d 1027 (CA4 1996) (same); and United States
`v. Benevento, 836 F. 2d 129, 130 (CA2 1988) (per curiam) (same), with
`United States v. Cano-Flores, 796 F. 3d 83, 91 (CADC 2015) (declining
`to apply joint and several liability under §853).
`
`
`
`3
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
` HONEYCUTT v. UNITED STATES
`
`Opinion of the Court
`forfeiture with respect to persons convicted of certain
`serious drug crimes. The question presented is whether
`§853 embraces joint and several liability for forfeiture
`judgments.
`A creature of tort law, joint and several liability “applies
`
`
`
`when there has been a judgment against multiple defend-
`ants.” McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U. S. 202, 220–
`221 (1994). If two or more defendants jointly cause harm,
`each defendant is held liable for the entire amount of the
`harm; provided, however, that the plaintiff recover only
`once for the full amount. See Restatement (Second) of
`Torts §875 (1977). Application of that principle in the
`forfeiture context when two or more defendants conspire
`to violate the law would require that each defendant be
`held liable for a forfeiture judgment based not only on
`property that he used in or acquired because of the crime,
`but also on property obtained by his co-conspirator.
`An example is instructive. Suppose a farmer master-
`
`minds a scheme to grow, harvest, and distribute mari-
`juana on local college campuses. The mastermind recruits a
`college student to deliver packages and pays the student
`$300 each month from the distribution proceeds for his
`
`services. In one year, the mastermind earns $3 million.
`The student, meanwhile, earns $3,600. If joint and sev-
`eral liability applied, the student would face a forfeiture
`judgment for the entire amount of the conspiracy’s pro-
`ceeds: $3 million. The student would be bound by that
`judgment even though he never personally acquired any
`proceeds beyond the $3,600. This case requires determi-
`nation whether this form of liability is permitted under
`
`§853(a)(1). The Court holds that it is not.
`A
`Forfeiture under §853 applies to “any person” convicted
`
`of certain serious drug crimes. Section 853(a) limits the
`statute’s reach by defining the property subject to forfeit-
`
`4
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
` Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`ure in three separate provisions. An understanding of
`
`how these three provisions work to limit the operation of
`the statute is helpful to resolving the question in this case.
`First, the provision at issue here, §853(a)(1), limits forfeit-
`ure to “property constituting, or derived from, any pro-
`ceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the
`result of ” the crime. Second, §853(a)(2) restricts forfeiture
`to “property used, or intended to be used, in any manner
`or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of,” the
`crime. Finally, §853(a)(3) applies to persons “convicted of
`engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise”—a form of
`conspiracy—and requires forfeiture of “property described
`in paragraph (1) or (2)” as well as “any of [the defendant’s]
`interest in, claims against, and property or contractual
`rights affording a source of control over, the continuing
`criminal enterprise.” These provisions, by their terms,
`limit forfeiture under §853 to tainted property; that is,
`property flowing from (§853(a)(1)), or used in (§853(a)(2)),
`the crime itself. The limitations of §853(a) thus provide
`the first clue that the statute does not countenance joint
`and several liability, which, by its nature, would require
`forfeiture of untainted property.
`
`Recall, for example, the college student from the earlier
`hypothetical. The $3,600 he received for his part in the
`marijuana distribution scheme clearly
`falls within
`§853(a)(1): It is property he “obtained . . . as the result of ”
`the crime. But if he were held jointly and severally liable
`for the proceeds of the entire conspiracy, he would owe the
`Government $3 million. Of the $3 million, $2,996,400
`would have no connection whatsoever to the student’s
`participation in the crime and would have to be paid from
`the student’s untainted assets. Joint and several liability
`would thus represent a departure from §853(a)’s re-
`
`striction of forfeiture to tainted property.
`
`
`In addition to limiting forfeiture to tainted property,
`§853(a) defines forfeitable property solely in terms of
`
`
`
`
`
`5
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
` HONEYCUTT v. UNITED STATES
`
`Opinion of the Court
`personal possession or use. This is most clear in the spe-
`cific text of §853(a)(1)—the provision under which the
`Government sought forfeiture in this case. Section
`853(a)(1) limits forfeiture to property the defendant “ob-
`tained . . . as the result of ” the crime. At the time Con-
`gress enacted §853(a)(1), the verb “obtain” was defined as
`“to come into possession of ” or to “get or acquire.” Ran-
`dom House Dictionary of the English Language 995
`(1966); see also 7 Oxford English Dictionary 37 (1933)
`(defining “obtain” as “[t]o come into the possession or
`enjoyment of (something) by one’s own effort, or by re-
`quest; to procure or gain, as the result of purpose and
`effort”). That definition persists today. See Black’s Law
`Dictionary 1247 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “obtain” as “[t]o
`bring into one’s own possession; to procure, esp. through
`effort”); cf. Sekhar v. United States, 570 U. S. ___, ___–___
`(2013) (slip op., at 4–5) (“Obtaining property requires ‘. . .
`the acquisition of property’”). Neither the dictionary
`definition nor the common usage of the word “obtain”
`supports the conclusion that an individual “obtains” prop-
`
`erty that was acquired by someone else. Yet joint and
`several liability would mean just that: The college student
`
`would be presumed to have “obtained” the $3 million that
`the mastermind acquired.
`
`Section 853(a)(1) further provides that the forfeitable
`property may be “obtained, directly or indirectly.” The
`
`adverbs “directly” and “indirectly” modify—but do not
`erase—the verb “obtain.” In other words, these adverbs
`refer to how a defendant obtains the property; they do not
`negate the requirement that he obtain it at all. For in-
`stance, the marijuana mastermind might receive pay-
`ments directly from drug purchasers, or he might arrange
`
`to have drug purchasers pay an intermediary such as the
`college student. In all instances, he ultimately “obtains”
`
`the property—whether “directly or indirectly.”
`
`
`The other provisions of §853(a) are in accord with the
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`6
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`7
`
`
`
` Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`limitation of forfeiture to property the defendant himself
`obtained. Section 853(a)(2) mandates forfeiture of prop-
`
`erty used to facilitate the crime but limits forfeiture to “the
`person’s property.” Similarly, §853(a)(3) requires forfeit-
`ure of property related to continuing criminal enterprises,
`but contrary to joint and several liability principles, re-
`quires the defendant to forfeit only “his interest in” the
`enterprise.
`
`Section 853(a)’s limitation of forfeiture to tainted prop-
`
`erty acquired or used by the defendant, together with the
`plain text of §853(a)(1), foreclose joint and several liability
`for co-conspirators.
`
`B
`Joint and several liability is not only contrary to
`
`§853(a), it is—for the same reasons—contrary to several
`other provisions of §853. Two provisions expressly incor-
`porate the §853(a) limitations. First, §853(c) provides that
`“[a]ll right, title, and interest in property described in
`subsection (a)”—e.g., tainted property obtained as the
`result of or used to facilitate the crime—“vests in the
`
`United States upon the commission of the act giving rise
`to forfeiture.” Consistent with its text, the Court has
`previously acknowledged that §853(c) applies to tainted
`property only. See Luis v. United States, 578 U. S. ___,
`___ (2016) (slip op., at 8).
`Second, §853(e)(1) authorizes pretrial freezes “to pre-
`
`serve the availability of property described in subsection
`(a) . . . for forfeiture.” Pretrial restraints on forfeitable
`property are permitted only when the Government proves,
`at a hearing, that (1) the defendant has committed an
`offense triggering forfeiture, and (2) “the property at issue
`has the requisite connection to that crime.” Kaley v. United
`
`States, 571 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 3); see also
`
`
`id., at ___, n. 11 (slip op., at 15, n. 11) (“[F]orfeiture ap-
`plies only to specific assets”).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

` HONEYCUTT v. UNITED STATES
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Another provision, §853(d), does not reference subsec-
`
`tion (a) but incorporates its requirements on its own
`terms. Section 835(d) establishes a “rebuttable presump-
`tion” that property is subject to forfeiture only if the Gov-
`ernment proves that “such property was acquired by [the
`defendant] during the period of the violation” and that
`
`“there was no likely source for such property other than”
`the crime. Contrary to all of these provisions, joint and
`several liability would mandate forfeiture of untainted
`property that the defendant did not acquire as a result of
`
`the crime.
`It would also render futile one other provision of the
`
`statute. Section 853(p)—the sole provision of §853 that
`permits the Government to confiscate property untainted
`by the crime—lays to rest any doubt that the statute
`permits joint and several liability. That provision governs
`forfeiture of “substitute property” and applies “if any
`property described in subsection (a), as a result of any act
`or omission of the defendant” either:
`
`“(A) cannot be located upon the exercise of due
`diligence;
`
`“(B) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited
`with, a third party;
`
`
` “(C) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the
` court;
`
`“(D) has been substantially diminished in value; or
`“(E) has been commingled with other property
`
`which
` cannot be divided without difficulty.”
`§853(p)(1).
`Only if the Government can prove that one of these five
`conditions was caused by the defendant may it seize “any
`other property of the defendant, up to the value of” the
`
`tainted property—rather than the tainted property itself.
`
`§853(p)(2). This provision begins from the premise that
`the defendant once possessed tainted property as “de-
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`8
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
` Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`scribed in subsection (a),” and provides a means for the
`Government to recoup the value of the property if it has
`been dissipated or otherwise disposed of by “any act or
`omission of the defendant.” §853(p)(1).
`
`Section 853(p)(1) demonstrates that Congress contem-
`
`plated situations where the tainted property itself would
`fall outside the Government’s reach. To remedy that
`situation, Congress did not authorize the Government to
`confiscate substitute property from other defendants or co-
`conspirators; it authorized the Government to confiscate
`assets only from the defendant who initially acquired the
`
`property and who bears responsibility for its dissipation.
`Permitting the Government to force other co-conspirators
`to turn over untainted substitute property would allow the
`Government to circumvent Congress’ carefully constructed
`statutory scheme, which permits forfeiture of substitute
`property only when the requirements of §§853(p) and (a)
`are satisfied. There is no basis to read such an end run
`into the statute.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`III
`
`Against all of this, the Government asserts the “bedrock
`principle of conspiracy liability” under which “conspirators
`are legally responsible for each other’s foreseeable actions
`in furtherance of their common plan.” Brief for United
`States 9; see also Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U. S. 640
`(1946). Congress, according to the Government, must be
`presumed to have legislated against the background prin-
`ciples of conspiracy liability, and thus, “when the traceable
`proceeds of a conspiracy are unavailable, [§]853 renders
`conspirators jointly and severally liable for the amount of
`the proceeds foreseeably obtained by the conspiracy.”
`Brief for United States 10. Not so.
`
`
`The plain text and structure of §853 leave no doubt that
`
`Congress did not incorporate those background principles.
`Congress provided just one way for the Government to
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`9
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`10
`
`
`
`HONEYCUTT v. UNITED STATES
`
`Opinion of the Court
`recoup substitute property when the tainted property
`itself is unavailable—the procedures outlined in §853(p).
`And, for all the Government makes of the background
`principles of conspiracy liability, it fails to fully engage
`with the most important background principles underlying
`§853: those of forfeiture.
`Traditionally, forfeiture was an action against the tainted
`
`
`
`property itself and thus proceeded in rem; that is,
`proceedings in which “[t]he thing [was] primarily consid-
`ered as the offender, or rather the offence [was] attached
`primarily to the thing.” The Palmyra, 12 Wheat. 1, 14
`(1827). The forfeiture “proceeding in rem st[ood] inde-
`pendent of, and wholly unaffected by any criminal pro-
`ceeding in personam” against the defendant. Id., at 15.
`
`
`Congress altered this distinction in enacting §853 by
`effectively merging the in rem forfeiture proceeding with
`the in personam criminal proceeding and by expanding
`
` forfeiture to include not just the “thing” but “property . . .
`derived from . . . any proceeds” of the crime. §853(a)(1).
`
`But as is clear from its text and structure, §853 maintains
`traditional in rem forfeiture’s focus on tainted property
`unless one of the preconditions of §853(p) exists. For those
`who find it relevant, the legislative history confirms as
`much: Congress altered the traditional system in order to
`“improv[e] the procedures applicable in forfeiture cases.”
`S. Rep. No. 98–225, p. 192 (1983). By adopting an in
`personam aspect to criminal forfeiture, and providing for
`substitute-asset forfeiture, Congress made it easier for the
`
`
`
`Government to hold the defendant who acquired the tainted
`
`property responsible. Congress did not, however, enact
`any “significant expansion of the scope of property subject
`
`to forfeiture.” Ibid.2
`——————
`2Section 853(o) directs that “the provisions of [§853] shall be liberally
`construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.” The Government points
`to this as license to read joint and several liability into the statute. But
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`
`11
`
`
`Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`IV
`
`Forfeiture pursuant to §853(a)(1) is limited to property
`the defendant himself actually acquired as the result of
`the crime. In this case, the Government has conceded that
`Terry Honeycutt had no ownership interest in his broth-
`er’s store and did not personally benefit from the Polar
`Pure sales. App. to Pet. for Cert. 60a. The District Court
`agreed. Id., at 40a. Because Honeycutt never obtained
`tainted property as a result of the crime, §853 does not
`require any forfeiture.
`
`The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
`Circuit is reversed.
`
`
`It is so ordered.
`
` JUSTICE GORSUCH took no part in the consideration or
`
`decision of this case.
`
`——————
`
`the Court cannot construe a statute in a way that negates its plain text,
`
`and here, Congress expressly limited forfeiture to tainted property that
`
`the defendant obtained. As explained above, that limitation is incom-
`
`patible with joint and several liability.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`