`
` Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017)
`
`
`Per Curiam
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`MICHAEL DAMON RIPPO, PETITIONER v.
`
`
`
` RENEE BAKER, WARDEN
`
`
`ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA
`
`No. 16–6316. Decided March 6, 2017
`
` PER CURIAM.
`A Nevada jury convicted petitioner Michael Damon
`
`Rippo of first-degree murder and other offenses and sen-
`tenced him to death. During his trial, Rippo received
`information that the judge was the target of a federal
`bribery probe, and he surmised that the Clark County
`District Attorney’s Office—which was prosecuting him—
`was playing a role in that investigation. Rippo moved for
`the judge’s disqualification under the Due Process Clause
`of the Fourteenth Amendment, contending that a judge
`could not impartially adjudicate a case in which one of the
`parties was criminally investigating him. But the trial
`judge declined to recuse himself, and (after that judge’s
`indictment on federal charges) a different judge later
`denied Rippo’s motion for a new trial. The Nevada Su-
`preme Court affirmed on direct appeal, reasoning in part
`that Rippo had not introduced evidence that state authori-
`ties were involved in the federal investigation. Rippo v.
`State, 113 Nev. 1239, 1246–1250, 946 P. 2d 1017, 1023–
`
`1024 (1997) (per curiam).
`
`In a later application for state postconviction relief,
`Rippo advanced his bias claim once more, this time point-
`ing to documents from the judge’s criminal trial indicating
`that the district attorney’s office had participated in the
`investigation of the trial judge. See, e.g., App. to Pet. for
`Cert. 236–237, 397. The state postconviction court denied
`
`relief, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. Rippo v.
`State, 132 Nev. ___, ___, 368 P. 3d 729, 743–745 (2016). It
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`RIPPO v. BAKER
`
`
`Per Curiam
`likened Rippo’s claim to the “camouflaging bias” theory
`that this Court discussed in Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U. S.
`899 (1997). The Bracy petitioner argued that a judge who
`accepts bribes to rule in favor of some defendants would
`seek to disguise that favorable treatment by ruling against
`defendants who did not bribe him. Id., at 905. We ex-
`
`plained that despite the “speculative” nature of that theory,
`
`
`the petitioner was entitled to discovery because he had
`also alleged specific facts suggesting that the judge may
`have colluded with defense counsel to rush the petitioner’s
`case to trial. See id., at 905–909. The Nevada Supreme
`Court reasoned that, in contrast, Rippo was not entitled to
`discovery or an evidentiary hearing because his allega-
`tions “d[id] not support the assertion that the trial judge
`was actually biased in this case.” 132 Nev., at ___, 368
`P. 3d, at 744.*
`
`We vacate the Nevada Supreme Court’s judgment be-
`cause it applied the wrong legal standard. Under our
`precedents, the Due Process Clause may sometimes de-
`mand recusal even when a judge “ ‘ha[s] no actual bias.’ ”
`Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U. S. 813, 825 (1986).
`Recusal is required when, objectively speaking, “the prob-
`ability of actual bias on the part of the judge or deci-
`
`sionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.”
`Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U. S. 35, 47 (1975); see Williams v.
`Pennsylvania, 579 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 6)
`
`(“The Court asks not whether a judge harbors an actual,
`subjective bias, but instead whether, as an objective mat-
`ter, the average judge in his position is likely to be neu-
`——————
`*The court further relied on its bias holding to determine that Rippo
`
`had not established cause and prejudice to overcome various state
`procedural bars. 132 Nev., at ___, 368 P. 3d, at 745. Because the court
`below did not invoke any state-law grounds “independent of the merits
`
`of [Rippo’s] federal constitutional challenge,” we have jurisdiction to
`review its resolution of federal law. Foster v. Chatman, 578 U. S. ___,
`
`___ (2016) (slip op., at 8).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
` Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017)
`
`
`Per Curiam
`tral, or whether there is an unconstitutional potential for
`bias” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Our decision in
`Bracy is not to the contrary: Although we explained that
`the petitioner there had pointed to facts suggesting actual,
`subjective bias, we did not hold that a litigant must show
`as a matter of course that a judge was “actually biased in
`[the litigant’s] case,” 132 Nev., at ___, 368 P. 3d, at 744—
`much less that he must do so when, as here, he does not
`allege a theory of “camouflaging bias.” The Nevada Su-
`preme Court did not ask the question our precedents
`
`require: whether, considering all the circumstances al-
`leged, the risk of bias was too high to be constitutionally
`tolerable. As a result, we grant the petition for writ of
`
`
`certiorari and the motion for leave to proceed in forma
`pauperis, and we vacate the judgment below and remand
`
`the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
`
`opinion.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`3
`
`
`
`It is so ordered.
`
`
`