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` Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017)
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`Per Curiam
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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` RAY WHITE, ET AL. v. DANIEL T. PAULY, AS PERSONAL
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`REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF SAMUEL
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`PAULY, DECEASED ET AL.
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`ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
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`STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
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`No. 16–67. Decided January 9, 2017
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` PER CURIAM.
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`This case addresses the situation of an officer who—
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`having arrived late at an ongoing police action and having
`witnessed shots being fired by one of several individuals
`in a house surrounded by other officers—shoots and kills
`an armed occupant of the house without first giving a
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`warning.
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`According to the District Court and the Court of Ap-
`peals, the record, when viewed in the light most favorable
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`to respondents, shows the following. Respondent Daniel
`Pauly was involved in a road-rage incident on a highway
`near Santa Fe, New Mexico. 814 F. 3d 1060, 1064–1065
`(CA10 2016). It was in the evening, and it was raining.
`The two women involved called 911 to report Daniel as a
`“‘drunk driver’” who was “‘swerving all crazy.’” Id., at
`1065. The women then followed Daniel down the high-
`way, close behind him and with their bright lights on.
`Daniel, feeling threatened, pulled his truck over at an off-
`ramp to confront them. After a brief, nonviolent encoun-
`ter, Daniel drove a short distance to a secluded house
`where he lived with his brother, Samuel Pauly.
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`Sometime between 9 p.m. and 10 p.m., Officer Kevin
`Truesdale was dispatched to respond to the women’s 911
`call. Truesdale, arriving after Daniel had already left the
`scene, interviewed the two women at the off-ramp. The
`women told Truesdale that Daniel had been driving reck-
`lessly and gave his license plate number to Truesdale.
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`WHITE v. PAULY
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` Per Curiam
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`The state police dispatcher identified the plate as being
`registered to the Pauly brothers’ address.
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`After the women left, Officer Truesdale was joined at
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`the off-ramp by Officers Ray White and Michael Mariscal.
`The three agreed there was insufficient probable cause to
`arrest Daniel. Still, the officers decided to speak with
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`Daniel to (1) get his side of the story, (2) “‘make sure
`nothing else happened,’” and (3) find out if he was intoxi-
`cated. Id., at 1065. The officers split up. White stayed at
`the off-ramp in case Daniel returned. Truesdale and
`Mariscal drove in separate patrol cars to the Pauly broth-
`ers’ address, less than a half mile away. Record 215.
`Neither officer turned on his flashing lights.
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`When Officers Mariscal and Truesdale arrived at the
`address they had received from the dispatcher, they found
`two different houses, the first with no lights on inside and
`a second one behind it on a hill. Id., at 217, 246. Lights
`were on in the second one. The officers parked their cars
`near the first house. They examined a vehicle parked near
`that house but did not find Daniel’s truck. Id., at 310.
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`Officers Mariscal and Truesdale noticed the lights on in
`the second house and approached it in a covert manner to
`maintain officer safety. Both used their flashlights in an
`intermittent manner. Truesdale alone turned on his
`flashlight once they got close to the house’s front door.
`Upon reaching the house, the officers found Daniel’s
`pickup truck and spotted two men moving around inside
`the residence. Truesdale and Mariscal radioed White, who
`left the off-ramp to join them.
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`At approximately 11 p.m., the Pauly brothers became
`aware of the officers’ presence and yelled out “‘Who are
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`you?’” and “‘What do you want?’” 814 F. 3d, at 1066. In
`response, Officers Mariscal and Truesdale laughed and
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`responded: “‘Hey, (expletive), we got you surrounded.
`Come out or we’re coming in.’” Ibid. Truesdale shouted
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`once: “‘Open the door, State Police, open the door.’” Ibid.
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` Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017)
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`Per Curiam
`Mariscal also yelled: “‘Open the door, open the door.’”
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`Ibid.
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`The Pauly brothers heard someone yelling, “‘We’re
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`coming in. We’re coming in.’” Ibid. Neither Samuel nor
`Daniel heard the officers identify themselves as state
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`police. Record 81–82. The brothers armed themselves,
`Samuel with a handgun and Daniel with a shotgun. One
`of the brothers yelled at the police officers that “‘We have
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`guns.’” 814 F. 3d, at 1066. The officers saw someone run
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`to the back of the house, so Officer Truesdale positioned
`himself behind the house and shouted “‘Open the door,
`come outside.’” Ibid.
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`Officer White had parked at the first house and was
`walking up to its front door when he heard shouting from
`the second house. He half-jogged, half-walked to the
`Paulys’ house, arriving “just as one of the brothers said:
`‘We have guns.’” Ibid.; see also Civ. No. 12–1311 (D NM,
`Feb. 5, 2014), App. to Pet. for Cert. 75–78. When White
`heard that statement, he drew his gun and took cover
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`behind a stone wall 50 feet from the front of the house.
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`Officer Mariscal took cover behind a pickup truck.
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`Just “a few seconds” after the “We have guns” state-
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`ment, Daniel stepped part way out of the back door and
`fired two shotgun blasts while screaming loudly. 814
`F. 3d, at 1066–1067. A few seconds after those shots,
`Samuel opened the front window and pointed a handgun
`in Officer White’s direction. Officer Mariscal fired imme-
`diately at Samuel but missed. “‘Four to five seconds’”
`later, White shot and killed Samuel. Id., at 1067.
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`The District Court denied the officers’ motions for sum-
`mary judgment, and the facts are viewed in the light most
`favorable to the Paulys. Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U. S. ___,
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`___, n. (2015) (per curiam) (slip op., at 2, n.). Because this
`case concerns the defense of qualified immunity, however,
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`the Court considers only the facts that were knowable to
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`the defendant officers. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U. S.
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`WHITE v. PAULY
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` Per Curiam
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`___, ___ (2015) (slip op., at 9).
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`Samuel’s estate and Daniel filed suit against, inter alia,
`Officers Mariscal, Truesdale, and White. One of the
`claims was that the officers were liable under Rev. Stat.
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`§1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, for violating Samuel’s Fourth
`Amendment right to be free from excessive force. All three
`officers moved for summary judgment on qualified immun-
`ity grounds. White in particular argued that the Pauly
`brothers could not show that White’s use of force vio-
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`lated the Fourth Amendment and, regardless, that Sam-
`uel’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from deadly
`force under the circumstances of this case was not clearly
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`established.
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`The District Court denied qualified immunity. A di-
`vided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
`affirmed. As to Officers Mariscal and Truesdale, the court
`held that “[a]ccepting as true plaintiffs’ version of the
`facts, a reasonable person in the officers’ position should
`have understood their conduct would cause Samuel and
`Daniel Pauly to defend their home and could result in the
`commission of deadly force against Samuel Pauly by Of-
`ficer White.” 814 F. 3d, at 1076. The panel majority
`analyzed Officer White’s claim separately from the other
`officers because “Officer White did not participate in the
`events leading up to the armed confrontation, nor was he
`there to hear the other officers ordering the brothers to
`‘Come out or we’re coming in.’” Ibid. Despite the fact that
`“Officer White . . . arrived late on the scene and heard only
`‘We have guns’ . . . before taking cover behind a stone
`wall,” the majority held that a jury could have concluded
`that White’s use of deadly force was not reasonable. Id.,
`at 1077, 1082. The majority also decided that this rule—
`that a reasonable officer in White’s position would believe
`that a warning was required despite the threat of serious
`harm—was clearly established at the time of Samuel’s
`death. The Court of Appeals’ ruling relied on general
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` Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017)
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`Per Curiam
`statements from this Court’s case law that (1) “the reason-
`ableness of an officer’s use of force depends, in part, on
`whether the officer was in danger at the precise moment
`that he used force” and (2) “if the suspect threatens the
`officer with a weapon[,] deadly force may be used if neces-
`sary to prevent escape, and if[,] where feasible, some
`warning has been given.” Id., at 1083 (citing, inter alia,
`Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1 (1985), and Graham v.
`Connor, 490 U. S. 386 (1989); emphasis deleted; internal
`quotation marks and alterations omitted). The court
`concluded that a reasonable officer in White’s position
`would have known that, since the Paulys could not have
`shot him unless he moved from his position behind a stone
`wall, he could not have used deadly force without first
`warning Samuel Pauly to drop his weapon.
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`Judge Moritz dissented, contending that the “majority
`impermissibly second-guesses” Officer White’s quick
`choice to use deadly force. 814 F. 3d, at 1084. Judge
`Moritz explained that the majority also erred by defining
`the clearly established law at too high a level of generality,
`in contravention of this Court’s precedent.
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`The officers petitioned for rehearing en banc, which 6 of
`the 12 judges on the Court of Appeals voted to grant. In a
`dissent from denial of rehearing, Judge Hartz noted that
`he was “unaware of any clearly established law that sug-
`gests . . . that an officer . . . who faces an occupant pointing
`a firearm in his direction must refrain from firing his
`weapon but, rather, must identify himself and shout a
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`warning while pinned down, kneeling behind a rock wall.”
`817 F. 3d 715, 718 (CA10 2016). Judge Hartz expressed
`his hope that “the Supreme Court can clarify the govern-
`ing law.” Id., at 719.
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`The officers petitioned for certiorari. The petition is now
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`granted, and the judgment is vacated: Officer White did
`not violate clearly established law on the record described
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`by the Court of Appeals panel.
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`WHITE v. PAULY
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` Per Curiam
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` Qualified immunity attaches when an official’s conduct
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`“‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitu-
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`tional rights of which a reasonable person would have
`known.’ ” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op.,
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`at 4–5). While this Court’s case law “‘do[es] not require a
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`case directly on point’” for a right to be clearly established,
`“‘existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
`constitutional question beyond debate.’” Id., at ___ (slip
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`op., at 5). In other words, immunity protects “‘all but the
`plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the
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`law.’” Ibid.
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`In the last five years, this Court has issued a number of
`opinions reversing federal courts in qualified immunity
`cases. See, e.g., City and County of San Francisco v.
`Sheehan, 575 U. S. ___, ___, n. 3 (2015) (slip op., at 10, n.3)
`(collecting cases). The Court has found this necessary
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`both because qualified immunity is important to “‘society
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`as a whole,’” ibid., and because as “‘an immunity from
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`suit,’” qualified immunity “‘is effectively lost if a case is
`erroneously permitted to go to trial,’” Pearson v. Callahan,
`555 U. S. 223, 231 (2009).
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`Today, it is again necessary to reiterate the longstand-
`ing principle that “clearly established law” should not be
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`defined “at a high level of generality.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,
`563 U. S. 731, 742 (2011). As this Court explained dec-
`ades ago, the clearly established law must be “particular-
`ized” to the facts of the case. Anderson v. Creighton, 483
`U. S. 635, 640 (1987). Otherwise, “[p]laintiffs would be
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`able to convert the rule of qualified immunity . . . into a
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`rule of virtually unqualified liability simply by alleging
`violation of extremely abstract rights.” Id., at 639.
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`The panel majority misunderstood the “clearly estab-
`lished” analysis: It failed to identify a case where an of-
`ficer acting under similar circumstances as Officer White
`was held to have violated the Fourth Amendment. In-
`stead, the majority relied on Graham, Garner, and their
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` Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017)
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`Per Curiam
`Court of Appeals progeny, which—as noted above—lay out
`excessive-force principles at only a general level. Of
`course, “general statements of the law are not inherently
`incapable of giving fair and clear warning” to officers,
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`United States v. Lanier, 520 U. S. 259, 271 (1997), but “in
`the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be
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`apparent,” Anderson v. Creighton, supra, at 640. For that
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`reason, we have held that Garner and Graham do not
`by themselves create clearly established law outside
`“an obvious case.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U. S. 194,
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`199 (2004) (per curiam); see also Plumhoff v. Rickard,
`572 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 13) (emphasiz-
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`ing that Garner and Graham “are ‘cast at a high level of
`generality’”).
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`This is not a case where it is obvious that there was a
`violation of clearly established law under Garner and
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`Graham. Of note, the majority did not conclude that
`White’s conduct—such as his failure to shout a warning—
`constituted a run-of-the-mill Fourth Amendment violation.
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`Indeed, it recognized that “this case presents a unique set
`of facts and circumstances” in light of White’s late arrival
`on the scene. 814 F. 3d, at 1077. This alone should have
`been an important indication to the majority that White’s
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`conduct did not violate a “clearly established” right.
`Clearly established federal law does not prohibit a reason-
`able officer who arrives late to an ongoing police action in
`circumstances like this from assuming that proper proce-
`dures, such as officer identification, have already been
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`followed. No settled Fourth Amendment principle re-
`quires that officer to second-guess the earlier steps al-
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`ready taken by his or her fellow officers in instances like
`the one White confronted here.
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`On the record described by the Court of Appeals, Officer
`White did not violate clearly established law. The Court
`notes, however, that respondents contend Officer White
`arrived on the scene only two minutes after Officers
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`WHITE v. PAULY
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` Per Curiam
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` Truesdale and Mariscal and more than three minutes
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`before Daniel’s shots were fired. On the assumption that
`the conduct of Officers Truesdale and Mariscal did not
`adequately alert the Paulys that they were police officers,
`respondents suggest that a reasonable jury could infer
`that White witnessed the other officers’ deficient perfor-
`mance and should have realized that corrective action was
`necessary before using deadly force. Brief in Opposition
`11, 22, n. 5. This Court expresses no position on this
`potential alternative ground for affirmance, as it appears
`that neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals
`panel addressed it. The Court also expresses no opinion
`on the question whether this ground was properly pre-
`served or whether—in light of this Court’s holding today—
`Officers Truesdale and Mariscal are entitled to qualified
`immunity.
`For the foregoing reasons, the petition for certiorari is
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`granted; the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated;
`and the case is remanded for further proceedings con-
`sistent with this opinion.
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`It is so ordered.
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` Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017)
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` GINSBURG, J., concurring
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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` RAY WHITE, ET AL. v. DANIEL T. PAULY, AS PERSONAL
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`REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF SAMUEL
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`PAULY, DECEASED ET AL.
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`
`ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
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`STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
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`No. 16–67. Decided January 9, 2017
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` JUSTICE GINSBURG, concurring.
`I join the Court’s opinion on the understanding that it
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`does not foreclose the denial of summary judgment to
`Officers Truesdale and Mariscal. See 814 F. 3d 1060,
`1068, 1073, 1074 (CA10 2016) (Court of Appeals empha-
`sized, repeatedly, that fact disputes exist on question
`whether Truesdale and Mariscal “adequately identified
`themselves” as police officers before shouting “Come out or
`we’re coming in” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
`Further, as to Officer White, the Court, as I comprehend
`its opinion, leaves open the propriety of denying summary
`judgment based on fact disputes over when Officer White
`arrived at the scene, what he may have witnessed, and
`whether he had adequate time to identify himself and
`order Samuel Pauly to drop his weapon before Officer
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`White shot Pauly. Compare id., at 1080, with ante, at 8.
`See also Civ. No. 12–1311 (D NM, Feb. 5, 2014), pp. 7, and
`n. 5, 9, App. to Pet. for Cert. 75–76, and n. 5, 77 (suggest-
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`ing that Officer White may have been on the scene when
`Officers Truesdale and Mariscal threatened to invade the
`Pauly home).