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`
`1
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` Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2017)
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`BREYER, J., dissenting
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
` Nos. 16–9448 and 17–5083
`_________________
` QUENTIN MARCUS TRUEHILL
`
`v.
`FLORIDA
`ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME
`
`
`COURT OF FLORIDA
`
`
`
`
`
`
`16–9448
`
`
`
`17–5083
`
`
`TERENCE OLIVER
`
`v.
`FLORIDA
`ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME
`
`
`COURT OF FLORIDA
`
`
` [October 16, 2017]
`
` The petitions for writs of certiorari are denied.
`
`
` JUSTICE BREYER, dissenting from the denial of certiorari.
`
`
`
`
`In part for the reasons set forth in my opinion in Hurst
`
`v. Florida, 577 U. S. __, __ (2016) (concurring opinion in
`
`judgment), I would vacate and remand for the Florida
`Supreme Court to address the Eighth Amendment issue in
`these cases.
`I therefore join the dissenting opinion of
`JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR in full.
`
`
`
`
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`1
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` Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2017)
`
` SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
`
`
`16–9448
`
`_________________
` Nos. 16–9448 and 17–5083
`_________________
` QUENTIN MARCUS TRUEHILL
`
` v.
`FLORIDA
`ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME
`
`
`COURT OF FLORIDA
`
`
`17–5083
`
`
`TERENCE OLIVER
`
`v.
`FLORIDA
`ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME
`
`
`COURT OF FLORIDA
`
`
` [October 16, 2017]
`
` JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG
`
`
` and JUSTICE BREYER join, dissenting from the denial of
`
`
` certiorari.
`At least twice now, capital defendants in Florida have
`
`
`raised an important Eighth Amendment challenge to their
`
`
` death sentences that the Florida Supreme Court has failed
`to address. Specifically, those capital defendants, peti-
`tioners here, argue that the jury instructions in their cases
`impermissibly diminished the jurors’ sense of responsibil-
`ity as to the ultimate determination of death by repeatedly
`
`
`emphasizing that their verdict was merely advisory. “This
`Court has always premised its capital punishment deci-
`
`sions on the assumption that a capital sentencing jury
`recognizes the gravity of its task,” and we have thus found
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`unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment comments
`that “minimize the jury’s sense of responsibility for deter-
`mining the appropriateness of death.” Caldwell v. Missis-
`sippi, 472 U. S. 320, 341 (1985).
`
`
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`TRUEHILL v. FLORIDA
`
` SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
`
`
`
`
` Although the Florida Supreme Court has rejected a
`
`Caldwell challenge to its jury instructions in capital cases
`in the past, it did so in the context of its prior sentencing
`scheme, where “the court [was] the final decision-maker
`and the sentencer—not the jury.” Combs v. State, 525 So.
`2d 853, 857 (1988). In Hurst v. Florida, 577 U. S. ___, ___
`(2016) (slip op., at 10), however, we held that process,
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`“which required the judge alone to find the existence of an
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`aggravating circumstance,” to be unconstitutional.
`With the rationale underlying its previous rejection of
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`the Caldwell challenge now undermined by this Court in
`Hurst, petitioners ask that the Florida Supreme Court
`revisit the question. The Florida Supreme Court, how-
`ever, did not address that Eighth Amendment challenge.
`
`This Court has not in the past hesitated to vacate and
`
`
`remand a case when a court has failed to address an im-
`portant question that was raised below. See, e.g., Beer v.
`
`
`United States, 564 U. S. 1050 (2011) (remanding for con-
` sideration of unaddressed preclusion claim); Youngblood v.
`
`West Virginia, 547 U. S. 867 (2006) (per curiam) (remand-
`ing for consideration of unaddressed claim under Brady v.
`
`
` Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963)). Because petitioners here
`raised a potentially meritorious Eighth Amendment chal-
`lenge to their death sentences, and because the stakes in
`capital cases are too high to ignore such constitutional
`
`challenges, I dissent from the Court’s refusal to correct
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`that error.
`
`
`
`