(Slip Opinion)
`
`OCTOBER TERM, 2017
`
`Syllabus
`
`1
`
`NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
`prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
`See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`Syllabus
`
`HUSTED, OHIO SECRETARY OF STATE v. A. PHILIP
`RANDOLPH INSTITUTE ET AL.
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
`No. 16–980. Argued January 10, 2018—Decided June 11, 2018
`The National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) addresses the removal of
`ineligible voters from state voting rolls, 52 U. S. C. §20501(b), includ-
`ing those who are ineligible “by reason of” a change in residence,
`§20507(a)(4). The Act prescribes requirements that a State must
`meet in order to remove a name on change-of-residence grounds,
`§§20507(b), (c), (d). The most relevant of these are found in subsec-
`tion (d), which provides that a State may not remove a name on
`change-of-residence grounds unless the registrant either (A) confirms
`in writing that he or she has moved or (B) fails to return a pread-
`dressed, postage prepaid “return card” containing statutorily pre-
`scribed content and then fails to vote in any election during the peri-
`od covering the next two general federal elections.
` In addition to these specific change-of-residence requirements, the
`NVRA also contains a general “Failure-to-Vote Clause,” §20507(b)(2),
`consisting of two parts. It first provides that a state removal pro-
`gram “shall not result in the removal of the name of any per-
`son . . . by reason of the person’s failure to vote.” Second, as added by
`the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), it specifies that “nothing
`in [this prohibition] may be construed to prohibit a State from using
`the procedures” described above—sending a return card and remov-
`ing registrants who fail to return the card and fail to vote for the req-
`uisite time. Since one of the requirements for removal under subsec-
`tion (d) is the failure to vote, the explanation added by HAVA makes
`clear that the Failure-to-Vote Clause’s prohibition on removal “by
`reason of the person’s failure to vote” does not categorically preclude
`using nonvoting as part of a test for removal. Another provision
`makes this point even more clearly by providing that “no registrant
`
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`

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`HUSTED v. A. PHILIP RANDOLPH INSTITUTE
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`Syllabus
`may be removed solely by reason of a failure to vote.” §21083(a)(4)(A)
`(emphasis added).
` Respondents contend that Ohio’s process for removing voters on
`change-of-residence grounds violates this federal law. The Ohio pro-
`cess at issue relies on the failure to vote for two years as a rough way
`of identifying voters who may have moved. It sends these nonvoters
`a preaddressed, postage prepaid return card, asking them to verify
`that they still reside at the same address. Voters who do not return
`the card and fail to vote in any election for four more years are pre-
`sumed to have moved and are removed from the rolls.
`Held: The process that Ohio uses to remove voters on change-of-
`residence grounds does not violate the Failure-to-Vote Clause or any
`other part of the NVRA. Pp. 8–21.
`
`(a) Ohio’s law does not violate the Failure-to-Vote Clause. Pp. 8–
`16.
`(1) Ohio’s removal process follows subsection (d) to the letter: It
`
`
`does not remove a registrant on change-of-residence grounds unless
`the registrant is sent and fails to mail back a return card and then
`fails to vote for an additional four years. See §20507(d)(1)(B). Pp. 8–
`9.
`(2) Nonetheless, respondents argue that Ohio’s process violates
`
`
`subsection (b)’s Failure-to-Vote Clause by using a person’s failure to
`vote twice over: once as the trigger for sending return cards and
`again as one of the two requirements for removal. But Congress
`could not have meant for the Failure-to-Vote Clause to cannibalize
`subsection (d) in that way. Instead, the Failure-to-Vote Clause, both
`as originally enacted in the NVRA and as amended by HAVA, simply
`forbids the use of nonvoting as the sole criterion for removing a regis-
`trant, and Ohio does not use it that way. The phrase “by reason of”
`in the Failure-to-Vote Clause denotes some form of causation, see
`Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U. S. 167, 176, and in con-
`text sole causation is the only type of causation that harmonizes the
`Failure-to-Vote Clause and subsection (d). Any other reading would
`mean that a State that follows subsection (d) nevertheless can violate
`the Failure-to-Vote Clause. When Congress enacted HAVA, it made
`this point explicit by adding to the Failure-to-Vote Clause an expla-
`nation of how the clause is to be read, i.e., in a way that does not con-
`tradict subsection (d). Pp. 9–12.
`
`
`(3) Respondents’ and the dissent’s alternative reading is incon-
`sistent with both the text of the Failure-to-Vote Clause and the clari-
`fication of its meaning in §21083(a)(4). Among other things, their
`reading would make HAVA’s new language worse than redundant,
`since no sensible person would read the Failure-to-Vote Clause as
`prohibiting what subsections (c) and (d) expressly allow. Nor does
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`3
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`Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Syllabus
`the Court’s interpretation render the Failure-to-Vote Clause super-
`fluous; the clause retains meaning because it prohibits States from
`using nonvoting both as the ground for removal and as the sole evi-
`dence for another ground for removal (e.g., as the sole evidence that
`someone has died). Pp. 12–15.
`
`
`(4) Respondents’ additional argument—that so many registered
`voters discard return cards upon receipt that the failure to send cards
`back is worthless as evidence that an addressee has moved—is based
`on a dubious empirical conclusion that conflicts with the congression-
`al judgment found in subsection (d). Congress clearly did not think
`that the failure to send back a return card was of no evidentiary val-
`ue, having made that conduct one of the two requirements for remov-
`al under subsection (d). Pp. 15–16.
`
`(b) Nor has Ohio violated other NVRA provisions. Pp. 16–21.
`
`
`(1) Ohio removes the registrants at issue on a permissible
`ground: change of residence. The failure to return a notice and the
`failure to vote simply serve as evidence that a registrant has moved,
`not as the ground itself for removal. Pp. 16–17.
`
`
`(2) The NVRA contains no “reliable indicator” prerequisite to
`sending notices, requiring States to have good information that
`someone has moved before sending them a return card. So long as
`the trigger for sending such notices is “uniform, nondiscriminatory,
`and in compliance with the Voting Rights Act,” §20507(b)(1), States
`may use whatever trigger they think best, including the failure to
`vote. Pp. 17–19.
`
`
`(3) Ohio has not violated the NVRA’s “reasonable effort” provi-
`sion, §20507(a)(4). Even assuming that this provision authorizes fed-
`eral courts to go beyond the restrictions set out in subsections (b), (c),
`and (d) and strike down a state law that does not meet some stand-
`ard of “reasonableness,” Ohio’s process cannot be unreasonable be-
`cause it uses the change-of-residence evidence that Congress said it
`could: the failure to send back a notice coupled with the failure to
`vote for the requisite period. Ohio’s process is accordingly lawful.
`Pp. 19–21.
`838 F. 3d 699, reversed.
` ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
`and KENNEDY, THOMAS, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a
`concurring opinion. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
`GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a
`dissenting opinion.
`
`

`

`
`
`Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`1
`
`NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
`preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
`notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
`ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
`that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`No. 16–980
`_________________
`JON HUSTED, OHIO SECRETARY OF STATE,
`PETITIONER v. A. PHILIP RANDOLPH
`INSTITUTE, ET AL.
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
`[June 11, 2018]
` JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
` It has been estimated that 24 million voter registrations
`in the United States—about one in eight—are either
`invalid or significantly inaccurate. Pew Center on the
`States, Election Initiatives Issue Brief (Feb. 2012). And
`about 2.75 million people are said to be registered to vote
`in more than one State. Ibid.
` At issue in today’s case is an Ohio law that aims to keep
`the State’s voting lists up to date by removing the names
`of those who have moved out of the district where they are
`registered. Ohio uses the failure to vote for two years as a
`rough way of identifying voters who may have moved, and
`it then sends a preaddressed, postage prepaid card to
`these individuals asking them to verify that they still
`reside at the same address. Voters who do not return this
`card and fail to vote in any election for four more years are
`presumed to have moved and are removed from the rolls.
`We are asked to decide whether this program complies
`with federal law.
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`2
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`HUSTED v. A. PHILIP RANDOLPH INSTITUTE
`
`Opinion of the Court
`I
`A
` Like other States, Ohio requires voters to reside in the
`district in which they vote. Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
`§3503.01(A) (West Supp. 2017); see National Conference of
`State Legislatures, Voting by Nonresidents and Non-
`citizens (Feb. 27, 2015). When voters move out of that
`district, they become ineligible to vote there.
` See
`§3503.01(A). And since more than 10% of Americans move
`every year,1 deleting the names of those who have moved
`away is no small undertaking.
` For many years, Congress left it up to the States to
`maintain accurate lists of those eligible to vote in federal
`elections, but in 1993, with the enactment of the National
`Voter Registration Act (NVRA), Congress intervened. The
`NVRA “erect[s] a complex superstructure of federal regu-
`lation atop state voter-registration systems.” Arizona v.
`Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U. S. 1, 5 (2013).
`The Act has two main objectives: increasing voter registra-
`tion and removing ineligible persons from the States’ voter
`registration rolls. See §2, 107 Stat. 77, 52 U. S. C.
`§20501(b).
` To achieve the latter goal, the NVRA requires States to
`“conduct a general program that makes a reasonable effort
`to remove the names” of voters who are ineligible “by
`reason of ” death or change in residence. §20507(a)(4).
`——————
`1 United States Census Bureau, CB16–189, Americans Moving at
`Historically Low Rates (Nov. 16, 2016), available at https://www.
`census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2016/cb16-189.html (all Internet
`materials as last visited June 8, 2018). States must update the ad-
`dresses of even those voters who move within their county of residence,
`for (among other reasons) counties may contain multiple voting dis-
`tricts. Cf. post, at 12 (BREYER, J., dissenting). For example, Cuyahoga
`County contains 11 State House districts. See House District Map,
`Ohio House Districts 2012–2022, online at http://www.ohiohouse.gov/
`members/district-map.
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`Opinion of the Court
`The Act also prescribes requirements that a State must
`meet in order to remove a name on change-of-residence
`grounds. §§20507(b), (c), (d).
` The most important of these requirements is a prior
`notice obligation. Before the NVRA, some States removed
`registrants without giving any notice. See J. Harris, Nat.
`Munic. League, Model Voter Registration System 45 (rev.
`4th ed. 1957). The NVRA changed that by providing in
`§20507(d)(1) that a State may not remove a registrant’s
`name on change-of-residence grounds unless either (A) the
`registrant confirms in writing that he or she has moved or
`(B) the registrant fails to return a preaddressed, postage
`prepaid “return card” containing statutorily prescribed
`content. This card must explain what a registrant who
`has not moved needs to do in order to stay on the rolls, i.e.,
`either return the card or vote during the period covering
`the next two general federal elections. §20507(d)(2)(A).
`And for the benefit of those who have moved, the card
`must contain “information concerning how the registrant
`can continue to be eligible to vote.” §20507(d)(2)(B). If
`the State does not send such a card or otherwise get writ-
`ten notice that the person has moved, it may not remove
`the registrant on change-of-residence grounds.
` See
`§20507(d)(1).2
` While the NVRA is clear about the need to send a “re-
`turn card” (or obtain written confirmation of a move)
`before pruning a registrant’s name, no provision of federal
`law specifies the circumstances under which a return card
`——————
`2 The principal dissent attaches a misleading label to this return card,
`calling it a “ ‘last chance’ notice.” Post, at 6–7, 9–12 (opinion of BREYER,
`J.). It is actually no such thing. Sending back the notice does not
`represent a voter’s “last chance” to avoid having his or her name
`stricken from the rolls. Instead, such a voter has many more chances
`over a period of four years to avoid that result. All that the voter must
`do is vote in any election during that time. See 52 U. S. C.
`§20507(d)(1)(B).
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`4
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`HUSTED v. A. PHILIP RANDOLPH INSTITUTE
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`Opinion of the Court
`may be sent. Accordingly, States take a variety of ap-
`proaches. See Nat. Assn. of Secretaries of State (NASS)
`Report: Maintenance of State Voter Registration Lists 5–6
`(Dec. 2017). The NVRA itself sets out one option. A State
`may send these cards to those who have submitted
`“change-of-address information” to the United States
`Postal Service. §20507(c)(1). Thirty-six States do at least
`that. See NASS Report, supra, at 5, and n. v (listing
`States). Other States send notices to every registered
`voter at specified intervals (say, once a year). See, e.g.,
`Iowa Code §48A.28.3 (2012); S. C. Code Ann. §§7–5–
`330(F), 7–5–340(2)–(3) (2017 Cum. Supp.); see also S. Rep.
`No. 103–6, p. 46 (1993). Still other States, including Ohio,
`take an intermediate approach, see NASS Report, supra,
`at 5–6, such as sending notices to those who have turned
`in their driver’s licenses, e.g., Ind. Code §§3–7–38.2–
`2(b)(2), (c)(4) (2004), or sending notices to those who have
`not voted for some period of time, see, e.g., Ga. Code Ann.
`§21–2–234
`(Supp. 2017); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
`§3503.21(B)(2); Okla. Admin. Code §230:15–11–19(a)(3)
`(2016); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 25, §1901(b)(3) (Purdon 2007);
`Wis. Stat. Ann. §6.50(1) (2017 West Cum. Supp.).
` When a State receives a return card confirming that a
`registrant has left the district, the State must remove the
`voter’s name from the rolls. §§20507(d)(1)(A), (3). And if
`the State receives a card stating that the registrant has
`not moved, the registrant’s name must be kept on the list.
`See §20507(d)(2)(A).
` What if no return card is mailed back? Congress obvi-
`ously anticipated that some voters who received cards
`would fail to return them for any number of reasons, and
`it addressed this contingency in §20507(d), which, for
`convenience, we will simply call “subsection (d).” Subsec-
`tion (d) treats the failure to return a card as some evi-
`dence—but by no means conclusive proof—that the voter
`has moved. Instead, the voter’s name is kept on the list
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`Opinion of the Court
`for a period covering two general elections for federal office
`(usually about four years). Only if the registrant fails to
`vote during that period and does not otherwise confirm
`that he or she still lives in the district (e.g., by updating
`address information online) may the registrant’s name be
`removed. §20507(d)(2)(A); see §§20507(d)(1)(B), (3).
` In addition to these specific change-of-residence re-
`quirements, the NVRA also imposes two general limita-
`tions that are applicable to state removal programs. First,
`all such programs must be “uniform, nondiscriminatory,
`and in compliance with the Voting Rights Act of 1965.”
`§20507(b)(1). Second, the NVRA contains what we will
`call the “Failure-to-Vote Clause.” See §20507(b)(2).
` At present, this clause contains two parts. The first is a
`prohibition that was included in the NVRA when it was
`originally enacted in 1993. It provides that a state pro-
`gram “shall not result in the removal of the name of any
`person . . . by reason of the person’s failure to vote.” Ibid.
`The second part, added by the Help America Vote Act of
`2002 (HAVA), 116 Stat. 1666, explains the meaning of
`that prohibition. This explanation says that “nothing in
`[the prohibition] may be construed to prohibit a State from
`using the procedures described in [§§20507](c) and (d) to
`remove an individual from the official list of eligible vot-
`ers.” §20507(b)(2).
` These referenced subsections, §§20507(c) and (d), are
`the provisions allowing the removal of registrants who
`either submitted change-of-address information to the
`Postal Service (subsection (c)) or did not mail back a re-
`turn card and did not vote during a period covering two
`general federal elections (subsection (d)). And since one of
`the requirements for removal under subsection (d) is the
`failure to vote during this period, the explanation added
`by HAVA in 2002 makes it clear that the statutory phrase
`“by reason of the person’s failure to vote” in the Failure-to-
`Vote Clause does not categorically preclude the use of
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`HUSTED v. A. PHILIP RANDOLPH INSTITUTE
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`Opinion of the Court
`nonvoting as part of a test for removal.
` Another provision of HAVA makes this point more
`directly. After directing that “registrants who have not
`responded to a notice and . . . have not voted in 2 consecu-
`tive general elections for Federal office shall be removed,”
`it adds that “no registrant may be removed solely by rea-
`son of a failure to vote.” §21083(a)(4)(A) (emphasis added).
`B
` Since 1994, Ohio has used two procedures to identify
`and remove voters who have
`lost their residency
`qualification.
` First, the State utilizes the Postal Service option set out
`in the NVRA. The State sends notices to registrants
`whom the Postal Service’s “national change of address
`service” identifies as having moved. Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
`§3503.21(B)(1). This procedure is undisputedly lawful.
`See 52 U. S. C. §20507(c)(1).
` But because according to the Postal Service “[a]s many
`as 40 percent of people who move do not inform the Postal
`Service,”3 Ohio does not rely on this information alone. In
`its so-called Supplemental Process, Ohio “identif[ies]
`electors whose lack of voter activity indicates they may
`have moved.” Record 401 (emphasis deleted). Under this
`process, Ohio sends notices to registrants who have “not
`engage[d] in any voter activity for a period of two consecu-
`tive years.” Id., at 1509. “Voter activity” includes “casting
`a ballot” in any election—whether general, primary, or
`special and whether federal, state, or local. See id., at
`1507. (And Ohio regularly holds elections on both even
`and odd years.) Moreover, the term “voter activity” is
`——————
`3 U. S. Postal Service, Office of Inspector Gen., MS–MA–15–006,
`Strategies for Reducing Undeliverable as Addressed Mail 15 (2015); see
`also Brief for Buckeye Institute as Amicus Curiae 10. Respondents and
`one of their amici dispute this statistic. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 46; Brief
`for Asian Americans Advancing Justice et al. as Amici Curiae 27–28.
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`Opinion of the Court
`broader than simply voting. It also includes such things
`as “sign[ing] a petition,” “filing a voter registration form,
`and updating a voting address with a variety of [state]
`entities.” Id., at 295, 357.
` After sending these notices, Ohio removes registrants
`from the rolls only if they “fai[l] to respond” and “con-
`tinu[e] to be inactive for an additional period of four con-
`secutive years, including two federal general elections.”
`Id., at 1509; see Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §3503.21(B)(2).
`Federal law specifies that a registration may be canceled if
`the registrant does not vote “in an election during the
`period” covering two general federal elections after notice,
`§20507(d)(1)(B)(ii), but Ohio rounds up to “four consecu-
`tive years” of nonvoting after notice, Record 1509. Thus, a
`person remains on the rolls if he or she votes in any elec-
`tion during that period—which in Ohio typically means
`voting in any of the at least four elections after notice.
`Combined with the two years of nonvoting before notice is
`sent, that makes a total of six years of nonvoting before
`removal. Ibid.
`
`C
` A pair of advocacy groups and an Ohio resident (re-
`spondents here) think that Ohio’s Supplemental Process
`violates the NVRA and HAVA. They sued petitioner,
`Ohio’s Secretary of State, seeking to enjoin this process.
`Respondents alleged, first, that Ohio removes voters who
`have not actually moved, thus purging the rolls of eligible
`voters. They also contended that Ohio violates the
`NVRA’s Failure-to-Vote Clause because the failure to vote
`plays a prominent part in the Ohio removal scheme: Fail-
`ure to vote for two years triggers the sending of a return
`card, and if the card is not returned, failure to vote for four
`more years results in removal.
` The District Court rejected both of these arguments and
`entered judgment for the Secretary. It held that Ohio’s
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`8
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`HUSTED v. A. PHILIP RANDOLPH INSTITUTE
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`Opinion of the Court
`Supplemental Process “mirror[s] the procedures estab-
`lished by the NVRA” for removing people on change-of-
`residence grounds and does not violate the Failure-to-Vote
`Clause because it does not remove anyone “solely for
`[their] failure to vote.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 43a, 57a,
`69a–70a.
` A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
`Circuit reversed. 838 F. 3d 699 (2016). It focused on
`respondents’ second argument, holding that Ohio violates
`the Failure-to-Vote Clause because it sends change-of-
`residence notices “based ‘solely’ on a person’s failure to
`vote.” Id., at 711. In dissent, Judge Siler explained why
`he saw the case as a simple one: “The State cannot remove
`the registrant’s name from the rolls for a failure to vote
`only, and Ohio does not do [that].” Id., at 716.
` We granted certiorari, 581 U. S. ___ (2017), and now
`reverse.
`
`II
`A
` As noted, subsection (d), the provision of the NVRA that
`directly addresses the procedures that a State must follow
`before removing a registrant from the rolls on change-of-
`residence grounds, provides that a State may remove a
`registrant who “(i) has failed to respond to a notice” and
`“(ii) has not voted or appeared to vote . . . during the pe-
`riod beginning on the date of the notice and ending on the
`day after the date of the second general election for Fed-
`eral office that occurs after the date of the notice” (about
`four years). 52 U. S. C. §20507(d)(1)(B). Not only are
`States allowed to remove registrants who satisfy these
`requirements, but federal law makes this removal manda-
`tory. §20507(d)(3); see also §21083(a)(4)(A).
` Ohio’s Supplemental Process follows subsection (d) to
`the letter. It is undisputed that Ohio does not remove a
`registrant on change-of-residence grounds unless the
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`Opinion of the Court
`registrant is sent and fails to mail back a return card and
`then fails to vote for an additional four years.
`B
` Respondents argue (and the Sixth Circuit held) that,
`even if Ohio’s process complies with subsection (d), it
`nevertheless violates the Failure-to-Vote Clause—the
`clause that generally prohibits States from removing
`people from the rolls “by reason of [a] person’s failure to
`vote.” §20507(b)(2); see also §21083(a)(4)(A). Respondents
`point out that Ohio’s Supplemental Process uses a person’s
`failure to vote twice: once as the trigger for sending return
`cards and again as one of the requirements for removal.
`Respondents conclude that this use of nonvoting is illegal.
` We reject this argument because the Failure-to-Vote
`Clause, both as originally enacted in the NVRA and as
`amended by HAVA, simply forbids the use of nonvoting as
`the sole criterion for removing a registrant, and Ohio does
`not use it that way. Instead, as permitted by subsection
`(d), Ohio removes registrants only if they have failed to
`vote and have failed to respond to a notice.
` When Congress clarified the meaning of the NVRA’s
`Failure-to-Vote Clause in HAVA, here is what it said:
`“[C]onsistent with the [NVRA], . . . no registrant may be
`removed solely by reason of a
`failure
`to vote.”
`§21083(a)(4)(A) (emphasis added). The meaning of these
`words is straightforward. “Solely” means “alone.” Web-
`ster’s Third New International Dictionary 2168 (2002);
`American Heritage Dictionary 1654 (4th ed. 2000). And
`“by reason of ” is a “quite formal” way of saying “[b]ecause
`of.” C. Ammer, American Heritage Dictionary of Idioms
`67 (2d ed. 2013). Thus, a State violates the Failure-to-
`Vote Clause only if it removes registrants for no reason
`other than their failure to vote.
` This explanation of the meaning of the Failure-to-Vote
`Clause merely makes explicit what was implicit in the
`
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`HUSTED v. A. PHILIP RANDOLPH INSTITUTE
`
`Opinion of the Court
`clause as originally enacted. At that time, the clause
`simply said that a state program “shall not result in the
`removal of the name of any person from the [rolls for
`federal elections] by reason of the person’s failure to vote.”
`107 Stat. 83. But that prohibition had to be read together
`with subsection (d), which authorized removal if a regis-
`trant did not send back a return card and also failed to
`vote during a period covering two successive general elec-
`tions for federal office. If possible, “[w]e must interpret
`the statute to give effect to both provisions,” Ricci v.
`DeStefano, 557 U. S. 557, 580 (2009), and here, that is
`quite easy.
` The phrase “by reason of ” denotes some form of causa-
`tion. See Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U. S.
`167, 176 (2009). Thus, the Failure-to-Vote Clause applies
`when nonvoting, in some sense, causes a registrant’s name
`to be removed, but the law recognizes several types of
`causation. When a statutory provision includes an unde-
`fined causation requirement, we look to context to decide
`whether the statute demands only but-for cause as op-
`posed to proximate cause or sole cause. See Holmes v.
`Securities Investor Protection Corporation, 503 U. S. 258,
`265–268 (1992). Cf. CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564
`U. S. 685, 692–693 (2011).
` Which form of causation is required by the Failure-to-
`Vote Clause? We can readily rule out but-for causation. If
`“by reason of ” in the Failure-to-Vote Clause meant but-for
`causation, a State would violate the clause if the failure to
`vote played a necessary part in the removal of a name
`from the list. Burrage v. United States, 571 U. S. 204, 211
`(2014). But the removal process expressly authorized by
`subsection (d) allows a State to remove a registrant if the
`registrant, in addition to failing to send back a return
`card, fails to vote during a period covering two general
`federal elections. So if the Failure-to-Vote Clause were
`read in this way, it would cannibalize subsection (d).
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` Interpreting the Failure-to-Vote Clause as incorporating
`a proximate cause requirement would lead to a similar
`problem. Proximate cause is an elusive concept, see
`McBride, supra, at 692–693, but no matter how the term
`is understood, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the
`failure to vote is a proximate cause of removal under
`subsection (d). If a registrant, having failed to send back a
`return card, also fails to vote during the period covering
`the next two general federal elections, removal is the
`direct, foreseeable, and closely connected consequence.
`See Paroline v. United States, 572 U. S. 434, 444–445
`(2014); Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., 553 U. S.
`639, 654 (2008).
` By process of elimination, we are left with sole causa-
`tion. This reading harmonizes the Failure-to-Vote Clause
`and subsection (d) because the latter provision does not
`authorize removal solely by reason of a person’s failure to
`vote. Instead, subsection (d) authorizes removal only if a
`registrant also fails to mail back a return card.
` For these reasons, we conclude that the Failure-to-Vote
`Clause, as originally enacted, referred to sole causation.
`And when Congress enacted HAVA, it made this point
`explicit. It added to the Failure-to-Vote Clause itself an
`explanation of how it is to be read, i.e., in a way that does
`not contradict subsection (d). And in language that cannot
`be misunderstood, it reiterated what the clause means:
`“[R]egistrants who have not responded to a notice and who
`have not voted in 2 consecutive general elections for Fed-
`eral office shall be removed from the official list of eligible
`voters, except that no registrant may be removed solely by
`reason of a failure to vote.” §21083(a)(4)(A) (emphasis
`added). In this way, HAVA dispelled any doubt that a
`state removal program may use the failure to vote as a
`factor (but not the sole factor) in removing names from the
`list of registered voters.
` That is exactly what Ohio’s Supplemental Process does.
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`HUSTED v. A. PHILIP RANDOLPH INSTITUTE
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`Opinion of the Court
`It does not strike any registrant solely by reason of the
`failure to vote. Instead, as expressly permitted by federal
`law, it removes registrants only when they have failed to
`vote and have failed to respond to a change-of-residence
`notice.
`
`C
` Respondents and the dissent advance an alternative
`interpretation of the Failure-to-Vote Clause, but that
`reading is inconsistent with both the text of the clause and
`the clarification of its meaning in §21083(a)(4)(A). Re-
`spondents argue that the clause allows States to consider
`nonvoting only to the extent that subsection (d) requires—
`that is, only after a registrant has failed to mail back a
`notice. Any other use of the failure to vote, including as
`the trigger for mailing a notice, they claim, is proscribed.
`In essence, respondents read the language added to the
`clause by HAVA—“except that nothing in this paragraph
`may be construed to prohibit a State from using the proce-
`dures described in subsections (c) and (d)”—as an excep-
`tion to the general rule forbidding the use of nonvoting.
`See Brief for Respondents 37. And the Sixth Circuit
`seemed to find this point dispositive, reasoning that “ ‘ex-
`ceptions in statutes must be strictly construed.’ ” 838
`F. 3d, at 708 (quoting Detroit Edison Co. v. SEC, 119 F. 2d
`730, 739 (CA6 1941)).
` We reject this argument for three reasons. First, it
`distorts what the new language added by HAVA actually
`says. The new language does not create an exception to a
`general rule against the use of nonvoting. It does not say
`that the failure to vote may not be used “except that this
`paragraph does not prohibit a State from using the proce-
`dures described in subsections (c) and (d).” Instead, it
`says that “nothing in this paragraph may be construed” to
`have that effect. §20507(b)(2) (emphasis added). Thus, it
`sets out not an exception, but a rule of interpretation. It
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`Opinion of the Court
`does not narrow the language that precedes it; it clarifies
`what that language means. That is precisely what Con-
`gress said when it enacted HAVA: It added the “may not
`be construed” provision to “[c]larif[y],” not to alter, the
`prohibition’s scope. §903, 116 Stat. 1728.
` Second, under respondents’ reading, HAVA’s new lan-
`guage is worse than superfluous. Even without the added
`language, no sensible person would read the Failure-to-
`Vote Clause as prohibiting what subsections (c) and (d)
`exp