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` Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017)
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`BREYER, J., dissenting
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`1
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`_________________
`No. 16A841 (16–7792)
`_________________
`ROLANDO RUIZ v. TEXAS
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`ON APPLICATION FOR STAY
`[March 7, 2017]
`The application for stay of execution of sentence of death
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`presented to Justice Thomas and by him referred to the
`Court is denied.
`Justice Breyer, dissenting.
`Petitioner Rolando Ruiz has been on death row for 22
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`years, most of which he has spent in permanent solitary
`confinement. Mr. Ruiz argues that his execution “violates
`the Eighth Amendment” because it “follow[s] lengthy
`[death row] incarceration in traumatic conditions,” princi-
`pally his “permanent solitary confinement.” Petition 25. I
`believe his claim is a strong one, and we should consider it.
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`This Court long ago, speaking of a period of only four
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`weeks of imprisonment prior to execution, said that a
`prisoner’s uncertainty before execution is “one of the most
`horrible feelings to which he can be subjected.”
`
`In re
`Medley, 134 U. S. 160, 172 (1890). Here the prisoner has
`undergone death row imprisonment, not of four weeks, but
`of 22 years.
`Moreover, in 1890, this Court recognized long-standing
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`“serious objections” to extended solitary confinement. The
`Court pointed to studies showing that “[a] considerable
`number of the prisoners fell, after even a short confine-
`ment, into a semi-fatuous condition, from which it was
`next to impossible to arouse them, and others became
`violently insane; others still, committed suicide; while
`those who stood the ordeal better were not generally re-
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`2
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` RUIZ v. TEXAS
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`BREYER, J., dissenting
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`formed, and in most cases did not recover sufficient men-
`tal activity to be of any subsequent service to the commu-
`nity. It became evident that some changes must be made
`in the system,” as “its main feature of solitary confinement
`was found to be too severe.” Id., at 168.
`
`Others have more recently pointed out that a terrible
`“human toll” is “wrought by extended terms of isolation”
`and that “[y]ears on end of near-total isolation exact a
`terrible” psychiatric “price.” Davis v. Ayala, 576 U. S. __,
`__—__ (2015) (KENNEDY, J., concurring) (quoting In re
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`Medley, supra, at 170) (slip op., at 2-4). As a result it has
`been suggested that, “[i]n a case that present[s] the issue,”
`this Court should determine whether extended solitary
`confinement survives Eighth Amendment scrutiny. Davis
` v. Ayala, supra, at 3–4 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.). This I
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`believe is an appropriate case to conduct that constitu-
`tional scrutiny.
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`Here the “human toll" that accompanies extended soli-
` tary confinement is exacerbated by the fact that execution
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`is in the offing. Moreover, Mr. Ruiz has developed symp-
`toms long associated with solitary confinement, namely
`severe anxiety and depression, suicidal thoughts, halluci-
`nations, disorientation, memory loss, and sleep difficulty.
`Further, the lower courts have recognized that Mr. Ruiz
`has been diligent in pursuing his claims, finding the 22–
`year delay attributable to the State or the lower courts.
`Ruiz v. Quarterman, 504 F. 3d 523, 530 (CA5 2007) (quot-
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`ing Ruiz v. Dretke, 2005 WL 2620193, *2 (WD Tex., Oct.
`13, 2005)). Nor are Mr. Ruiz’s 20 years of solitary con-
`finement attributable to any special penological problem
`or need. They arise simply from the fact that he is a pris-
`oner awaiting execution. App. E to Petition 16.
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`If extended solitary confinement alone raises serious
`constitutional questions, then 20 years of solitary con-
`finement, all the while under threat of execution, must
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`raise similar questions, and to a rare degree, and with
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`Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017)
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`BREYER, J., dissenting
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` particular intensity. That is why I would grant a stay of
`execution, allowing the Court to examine the record more
`fully.
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`3
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