`
`No. 17-571
`
`
`IN THE
`Supreme Court of the United States
`_______________
`
`FOURTH ESTATE PUBLIC BENEFIT CORPORATION,
`Petitioner,
`v.
`WALL-STREET.COM, LLC, ET AL.,
`Respondents.
`
`
`On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
`Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
`_______________
`
`
`
`BRIEF OF PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE AND THE
`R STREET INSTITUTE AS AMICI CURIAE IN
`SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS
`
`
`CHARLES DUAN
`HAROLD FELD
`R STREET INSTITUTE
` Counsel of Record
`1212 New York
`MEREDITH F. ROSE
` AVE NW Ste 900
`PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE
`Washington, DC
`1818 N Street NW Ste 410
` 20005
`Washington, DC 20036
`202-525-5717
`202-861-0020
`cduan@rstreet.org
`hfeld@publicknowledge.org
`Counsel for Public Knowledge Counsel for R Street
`
`
`
`Institute
`
`
`
`
`
`i
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`of Suit Will Leave the Register Incomplete and
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................... I
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................... II
`INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE .......................... 1
`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................. 2
`ARGUMENT ............................................................. 5
`I. Permitting the Filing of Registration on the Eve
`Inconsistent ....................................................... 5
`II. Public Policy Favors a Complete and
`Comprehensive Public Record of Ownership ... 7
`A. The Registration Record Is Only Valuable
`To The Extent That It Is Complete ........... 7
`B. Incentives Aimed Toward Comprehensive
`Orphan Works ............................................ 9
`III. Congress Has Consistently Sought to Promote
`Discourage Delayed Registration.................... 13
`A. Congress Explicitly Sought To Prevent
`Delayed Registration ................................ 13
`B. Congress Deliberately Preserved
`Registration To Promote A Public Record14
`CONCLUSION ....................................................... 16
`
`Registration Ameliorate the Problem of
`
`the Completeness of the Public Record and
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Silvers v. Russell, 113 F. Supp. 119 (1953) ............ 11
`Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S.
`30 (1939)................................................................ 5
`
`Cases
`Statutes
`Other Authorities
`
`An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Acts
`Respecting Copyright, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075
`(1909)................................................................... 13
`
`Alan Latman, Study 19: The Recordation of
`Copyright Assignments and Licenses, in
`COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: STUDIES PREPARED FOR
`THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS,
`AND COPYRIGHTS 111 (1956) ............................... 14
`Arthur J. Levine & Jeffrey L. Squires, Notice,
`Deposit and Registration: The Importance of
`Being Formal, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1232 (1977) .... 13
`Cassidy R. Sugimoto, The Academic Advantage:
`Gender Disparities in Patenting, 10 PLoSONE 5
`(2015) .................................................................... 9
`CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
`STAT., https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last
`visited Sep. 21, 2018). ......................................... 12
`H.R. Rep. No. 94–1476 (1976) ................................ 12
`INT'L FED'N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., Investing
`in Music: The Value of Record Companies (2016)
` ............................................................................... 6
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`iii
`
`Kyle Jensen et al., Gender Differences in Obtaining
`and Maintaining Patent Rights, 36 NATURE
`BIOTECHNOLOGY 307 (2018)................................ 10
`Louis Johnston & Samuel H. Williamson, What
`Was the U.S. GDP Then?, MeasuringWorth
`(2018), https:// www. measuringworth. com/
`datasets/ usgdp/ result. php ................................. 6
`Maria A. Pallante, The Curious Case of Copyright
`Formalities, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1415 (2013)
` ............................................................................... 7
`MARIA A. PALLANTE, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE,
`Orphan Works and Mass Digitization: A Report
`of the Register of Copyrights 35 (2015). ........... 8, 9
`MARYBETH PETERS, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, Report
`on Orphan Works (2006). ................................. 7, 8
`RECORDING INDUS. ASS'N OF AM., Labels At Work:
`The Music Business in the Digital Age (2018) ..... 6
`STEPHEN E. SIWEK, Copyright Industries in the U.S.
`Economy (International Intellectual Property
`Alliance 2014) ....................................................... 6
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`
`
`
`INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
`Public Knowledge1
`is
`a
`non-profit
`organization that is dedicated to preserving the
`public’s access to knowledge, promoting creativity
`through balanced intellectual property rights, and
`upholding and protecting the rights of consumers to
`use
`innovative
`technology
`lawfully. Public
`Knowledge advocates on behalf of the public
`interest
`for a balanced
`copyright
`system,
`particularly with respect to new and emerging
`technologies.
`The R Street Institute is a non-profit, non-
`partisan public-policy research organization. R
`Street’s mission is to engage in policy research and
`educational outreach that promotes free markets,
`as well as
`limited yet effective government,
`including properly calibrated legal and regulatory
`frameworks that support economic growth and
`individual liberty.
`
`
`
`1 Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.3(a), this
`brief is submitted under parties’ blanket consents
`of Jul 24-25, 2018. Pursuant to Rule 37.6, no
`counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or
`in part, and no counsel or party made a monetary
`contribution intended to fund the preparation or
`submission of the brief. No person or entity, other
`than amicus, its members, or its counsel, made a
`monetary contribution to the preparation or
`submission of this brief.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`2
`
`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
`The Court should be wary of Petitioner’s
`“application
`approach”
`to
`the
`registration
`requirement of 17 U.S.C. § 411(a), as it severely
`limits the incentive structure, policy rationale, and
`stated Congressional intent underlying § 411(a)’s
`registration
`requirement. By
`contrast,
`the
`“registration approach,” adopted by the court
`below, provides better outcomes on all three fronts.
`The Court has before
`it two opposing
`interpretations of § 411(a)’s registration language.
`Petitioners contend that “registration” for the
`purposes of this section occurs at the moment of
`filing, while respondents argue that a work is only
`“registered” once its application has been accepted
`or rejected by the Register of Copyrights. Aside
`from parties’ rhetorical incongruity, these two
`visions of registration manifest two completely
`different incentive structures, with a rational actor
`approaching registration differently in each case.
`By withholding the ability to litigate until after the
`Register
`of Copyrights has
`completed
`the
`registration process, the “registration approach”
`espoused by respondents encourages prompt,
`prophylactic registration well in advance of any
`potential
`litigation. In essence,
`it creates a
`deterrent against skipping—or untimely making—
`registration of a work. Conversely, the application
`approach treats registration as a litigation “step
`zero” whose value is limited only to cases where an
`infringement has occurred and litigation is desirous
`(or inevitable).
`This is at odds with the fundamental policy
`rationale of registration, namely maintaining a
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`3
`
`in
`comprehensive public record of ownership
`copyrighted works (a category that grows larger
`with each passing revision of the statute). The size,
`scope, and growth rate of copyright-reliant
`industries makes this uniquely important. That
`same boom growth amplifies the risks posed by
`orphan works—those works whose owners, due to
`an incomplete or untimely public record, cannot be
`determined, and which represent a substantial,
`endemic risk to the licensing marketplace.
`In addition to forestalling those dangers, the
`data provided by a robust public record can prove
`exceedingly useful to researchers and policymakers,
`as demonstrated by
`the
`insightful research
`conducted on the Patent and Trademark Office’s
`public datasets. This is uniquely important to
`anyone seeking to study the dynamics creative
`industries, where complex legal regimes, poor
`historical recordkeeping, and opaque business
`practices create a dearth of reliable data.
`When drafting the 1976 Act, Congress was
`well aware of the risks that removing formalities
`posed to the public record. By preserving and
`modifying the registration requirement into its
`modern form, Congress expressly sought not to
`erase, but to
`improve upon the 1909 Act’s
`mandatory registration system as a tool of public
`record keeping. Missing and tardy registrations
`were a well-documented problem by 1976, and the
`legislative record shows that Congress actively
`sought to ameliorate the problem by the provisions
`of the new Act.
`In light of these logical incentives, policy
`rationales, and the stated Congressional intent
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`4
`
`underlying § 411(a)’s registration requirement, the
`Court should uphold the decision below.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`5
`
`ARGUMENT
`Registration of a work with the United
`States Copyright Office,
`though no
`longer
`prerequisite for copyright protection, continues to
`serve an
`important
`function
`in the modern
`licensing market. When correctly implemented and
`maintained, registration provides a public record of
`ownership, tracking who owns what works, and
`thus providing potential licensees with information
`that is both practically and legally indispensable to
`making use of the work.
`The notion that the provisions of 17 USC §
`411 are nothing more than a vestigial remnant of
`the old system ignore both the public policy
`rationale underlying modern
`formalities, and
`Congress’s explicit
`intent
`in
`crafting
`those
`formalities. Not only are modern formalities more
`critical than ever, but they were explicitly designed
`to encourage greater and more comprehensive
`registration than occurred under the old system—
`an outcome that can only be meaningfully achieved
`by upholding the “registration approach” adopted
`by the court below.
`
`
`I.
`
`PERMITTING THE FILING OF REGISTRATION
`ON THE EVE OF SUIT WILL LEAVE THE
`REGISTER INCOMPLETE AND INCONSISTENT
`Petitioners’ view—that
`the benefits of
`registration are available
`immediately upon
`application to the Copyright Office—treats the
`registration requirement as little more than a
`strategic prelude to litigation, rather than a
`reflection of a Congressional policy to encourage a
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`6
`
`public record. A rational actor in this scenario
`would only seek to register their works once (1) an
`infringement has occurred, and (2) the rightsholder
`has decided to litigate. This skews incentives away
`from proactive
`registration;
`indeed, absent
`imminent litigation, a rational rightsholder has
`little incentive to invest the requisite time and
`money to register.
`Under this approach, the record created by
`registration is substantially diminished: Rather
`than being a substantially comprehensive list of
`ownership, the record reduces down to those works
`which have been, or will soon be, litigated. This is a
`far cry from the full public record that Congress
`sought to achieve by the incentives structure
`embodied in the 1976 Act.
`Respondents’ view, by contrast, incentivizes
`a wider range of rightsholders to register before the
`potential for litigation looms. As noted below,
`Congress explicitly designed the 1976 Act, with its
`penalties for non-registration and delay, with the
`intent “to produce a more effective deposit system
`than the present [mandatory] one.” H.R. Rep. No.
`94–1476, at 150. If
`infringement suits can
`commence only after the Register has examined the
`work and issued a certificate, then creators have
`greater incentive to submit their registration as
`close in time to the moment of fixation as
`possible—in other words, to create a near-
`contemporaneous entry in the public record of their
`ownership.
`This is a feature, not a bug. By encouraging
`copyright holders
`to preemptively
`file
`for
`registration
`rather
`than waiting until an
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`7
`
`encourages
`statute
`the
`lawsuit,
`impending
`registration by a wider swath of creators—all who
`might possibly want to file suit in the future, rather
`than only those who will actually sue. This most
`clearly effectuates a holistic, comprehensive public
`record of ownership.
`II.
`PUBLIC POLICY FAVORS A COMPLETE AND
`COMPREHENSIVE PUBLIC RECORD OF
`OWNERSHIP
`
`A.
`
`The Registration Record Is Only
`Valuable To The Extent That It Is
`Complete
`As software, news reporting, and other
`copyright-protected works have grown more central
`to the American economy, the importance of a
`licensee’s ability to easily identify owners of these
`works, and to license these works, has also grown.
`As early as 1939, Justice Black noted:
`
`It is of far greater importance to the
`public today than it was in 1790, 1831,
`1870, or 1891, that public record be
`made of copyright monopolies granted
`to further the arts and sciences, since
`these privileges have been extended
`by statute to include almost every
`conceivable type of production of the
`human mind.
`Washingtonian Publ’g Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30,
`54 (1939)) (Black, J., dissenting). That importance
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`8
`
`has grown not only due to the increased scope of
`copyright-protectable works, but also due to their
`economic impact.
`The copyright-dependent segments of the
`economy are large, and fast-moving. According to
`one industry study, industries that depend on
`copyright licensing accounted for over $1.9 trillion
`of U.S. GDP in 2013—an economic impact orders of
`magnitude greater than the total GDP at the time
`of the 1790 Act. STEPHEN E. SIWEK, Copyright
`Industries in the U.S. Economy 2 (International
`Intellectual Property Alliance 2014); Louis
`Johnston & Samuel H. Williamson, What Was the
`U.S. GDP Then?, MeasuringWorth (2018), https://
`www. measuringworth. com/ datasets/ usgdp/
`result. php. The recording industry alone contracts
`with over 2,500 domestic streaming services in the
`United States, and licenses over 4 million tracks
`globally. See RECORDING INDUS. ASS'N OF AM.,
`Labels At Work: The Music Business in the Digital
`Age 7 (2018); INT'L FED'N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC
`INDUS., Investing in Music: The Value of Record
`Companies (2016).
`To comply with the licensing requirements of
`copyright
`law,
`potential
`users—including
`businesses, filmmakers, educational and cultural
`institutions, to name only a few—need robust,
`reliable, and usable information. That in turn
`requires the existence of a comprehensive public
`ledger of protectable works. “The maintenance of a
`complete public record is vital to a functioning
`marketplace
`for
`the
`transfer of
`rights
`in
`copyrighted works and,
`concomitantly,
`their
`exploitation in both original and derivative forms.”
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`9
`
`Arthur J. Levine & Jeffrey L. Squires, Notice,
`Deposit and Registration: The Importance of Being
`Formal, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1232, 1253 (1977).
`To be useful, the public record must be
`comprehensive; to be comprehensive, it must be
`promptly and regularly updated. Because copyright
`protection inheres at the moment of fixation, the
`onus for maintaining the record’s timeliness falls
`on copyright holders, who hold all the necessary
`information to keep the record up-to-date. “It goes
`without saying that we cannot build a robust and
`accurate database of
`copyright
`title unless
`copyright owners provide the necessary data.”
`Maria A. Pallante, The Curious Case of Copyright
`Formalities, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1415, 1421
`(2013). A licensee cannot reasonably trust an out-
`of-date record any more than a policy advocate can
`rely on a seven-month-old newspaper.
`
`B.
`
`Toward
`Aimed
`Incentives
`Comprehensive
`Registration
`Ameliorate
`the Problem
`of
`Orphan Works and Generate
`Scientifically and Socially Useful
`Data
`When a potential licensee cannot identify the
`owner of a copyright, they face what is known as an
`“orphan work” problem. An orphan work is one
`where “the owner of a copyrighted work cannot be
`identified and located by someone who wishes to
`make use of the work in a manner that requires
`permission of the copyright owner.” MARYBETH
`PETERS, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, Report on Orphan
`Works 1 (2006). In these scenarios, “the user cannot
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`10
`
`identify and/or locate the owner and therefore
`cannot determine whether, or under what
`conditions, he or she may make use of the work.”
`MARIA A. PALLANTE, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE,
`Orphan Works and Mass Digitization: A Report of
`the Register of Copyrights 35 (2015).
` A potential licensee is faced with a choice:
`find a substitute work (which may not serve their
`needs), or use the orphan work, with a risk that
`“the copyright owner could emerge after the use
`has commenced and seek substantial remedies,
`including
`“substantial
`infringement damages,
`injunctions, and attorneys’ fees.” Id. at 38.
`Orphan works are a known, and much-
`debated problem in copyright: They have been the
`subject of two multi-year Copyright Office studies,
`which referred to their proliferation as a “major
`source of gridlock in the digital marketplace.” Id. at
`35. They have been called “the starkest failure of
`the copyright framework to adapt,” id. at 28, and
`also a “by-product of the United States’ modern
`copyright system [that] has been with us since the
`day the 1976 Act went into effect.” PETERS, supra at
`43.
`
`While the stymieing of one potential licensee
`is a nuisance, the aggregate impact of these
`obstacles is substantial. The burden of orphan
`works is, at present, a “major cause of gridlock in
`the digital marketplace”:
`
`The consequences of this uncertainty
`reverberate through all types of uses
`and users, all types and ages of works,
`and across all creative sectors. By
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`11
`
`to use a work without
`electing
`permission, users run the risk of an
`infringement
`suit
`resulting
`in
`litigation costs and possible damages.
`By foregoing use of these works, a
`significant part of the world’s cultural
`heritage
`embodied
`in
`copyright-
`protected works may not be exploited
`and may therefore fall into a so-called
`“20th century digital black hole.” This
`outcome is difficult to reconcile with
`the objectives of the copyright system
`and may unduly restrict access to
`millions of works that might otherwise
`be available to the public.
`Pallante, Orphan Works and Mass Digitization,
`supra at 35.
`Not only does spotty registration damage
`search and licensing efforts by users, but it also
`deprives researchers and scientists of useful data.
`The Patent and Trademark Office releases and
`updates comprehensive datasets on its patent and
`trademark filings. These have proven to be fertile
`ground for researchers studying the demographics
`of market participation and innovation. The Office’s
`Patent Claim, Examination, and Assignment
`Datasets have provided a wealth of valuable
`insight. Using these datasets, researchers have
`learned
`that patenting rates among women
`applicants have climbed substantially in the past
`decades. Cassidy R. Sugimoto, The Academic
`Advantage: Gender Disparities in Patenting, 10
`PLoSONE 5 (2015), However, researchers also
`discovered that the gender gap—with women
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`12
`
`comprising only 10% of patent holders—is strongly
`tied to several structural problems, including
`higher rejections for traditionally female-sounding
`names, as well as systematic disparities in rejection
`rates, limiting language, and appeals outcomes.
`Kyle Jensen et al., Gender Differences in Obtaining
`and Maintaining Patent Rights, 36 NATURE
`BIOTECHNOLOGY 307 (2018).
`Copyright, despite
`its centrality to the
`modern economy, generates no comparable wealth
`of data. What little information is available is
`provided largely by corporate players, who have a
`vested interest in portraying their investments and
`market conditions in the most favorable possible
`light. Moreover, complex private ordering of
`licensing, ownership transfers, and work-for-hire
`provisions—compounded by a pervasive use, in
`some sectors, of non-disclosure agreements—makes
`gleaning a real picture of these markets a
`Herculean task. See, e.g., Joseph F. Aceto,
`Intellectual Property Licensing and Confidentiality
`Agreements, an Overview, Am. Mgmt. Ass’n (last
`visited Oct. 17, 2018), https:// www. amanet. org/
`training/ articles/ intellectual- property- licensing-
`and- confidentiality- agreements- an- overview. aspx
`(describing confidentiality provisions as “[a]rguably
`one of the most critical aspects in any agreement”
`over intellectual property).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`13
`
`III. CONGRESS HAS CONSISTENTLY SOUGHT TO
`PROMOTE THE COMPLETENESS OF THE
`PUBLIC RECORD AND DISCOURAGE DELAYED
`REGISTRATION
`the copyright
`Prior
`to
`the 1976 Act,
`registration system faced a problem: Courts took an
`increasingly
`lax stance on
`the
`registration
`requirement, allowing suits over works that had
`been published years—and,
`in some cases,
`decades—before the owner filed for registration.
`The legal and legislative history of the 1976 Act
`shows that Congress was abundantly aware of this
`trend, and sought to correct it. In constructing the
`1976 Act, Congress went to great lengths to both
`address
`the
`growing problem
`of delayed
`registration, and preserve
`the benefits
`that
`registration provided.
`
`A.
`
`Congress Explicitly Sought To
`Prevent Delayed Registration
`Delayed registration was a known problem
`by 1976. The structure of the 1976 Act indicates
`that Congress intended to cure the problem by
`incentivizing creators to register their works as
`soon as possible to the point of fixation.
`In the decades leading up to the 1976 Act,
`courts had repeatedly given broad leeway to
`rightsholders who waited to register their work. In
`many cases, the requirement for timeliness in
`deposit was rendered practically null; courts held
`that delays from 14 months, Washingtonian Publ’g
`Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, to thirteen years,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`14
`
`Silvers v. Russell, 113 F. Supp. 119 (1953), were all
`acceptably “timely.”
`Congress was keenly aware of these cases;
`the committee report notes that “[t]here have been
`cases under the present
`law
`in which the
`mandatory
`deposit
`provisions
`have
`been
`deliberately and repeatedly ignored, presumably on
`the assumption that the Library is unlikely to
`enforce them.” H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 152
`(1976). In an attempt to correct this frustrating
`trend, the new law included fines and “increased
`inducements” for registration and deposit. Id. at
`150. This included a $2,500 fine—a number that,
`adjusted for inflation, represents nearly $11,000 in
`2018 dollars. CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S.
`BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., https://data.bls.gov/cgi-
`bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited Sep. 21, 2018). Congress
`explicitly viewed these provisions as a way “to
`produce a more effective deposit system than the
`present [mandatory] one,” H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476,
`at 150—that is, one that would effectuate a greater
`number of registrations and deposits, with less
`delay on the part of rightsholders.
`
`
`Congress Deliberately Preserved
`Registration To Promote A Public
`Record
`the
`of
`awareness
`Given Congress’s
`importance of a comprehensive registration record,
`the 1976 Act is consistently designed to encourage
`early registration, even while removing other
`formalities such as mandatory deposit and printed
`notice.
`
`B.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`15
`
`Prior to the 1976 Act, copyright was issued—
`and revoked—by government action. In order to
`obtain protection, authors had to submit their
`works to the government for examination and
`deposit. “The requirement that an author must, as
`a precondition to the full benefits of copyright,
`register his claim and deposit his work with a
`designated public official antedates American
`copyright law and has been a part of every
`copyright law enacted in this country.” Arthur J.
`Levine & Jeffrey L. Squires, Notice, Deposit and
`Registration: The Importance of Being Formal, 24
`UCLA L. REV. 1232, 1253 (1977). Under the 1909
`Act, a work had to go through a number of
`formalities to obtain copyright protection, including
`registration with the Copyright Office; deposit at
`the Library of Congress; and the inclusion of a
`conforming notice printed on the work itself. An Act
`to Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting
`Copyright, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
`The 1976 Act sought to weaken the harsh
`consequence of failure to comply with formalities—
`invalidation of
`the copyright2—but even so,
`Congress still maintained the importance of a
`comprehensive
`registration
`record. As
`one
`
`
`2 These changes were largely made to implement
`the Berne Convention, which called for nations to
`remove formalities precedent to copyright. Even so,
`Congress did not fully implement Berne: The
`treaty’s moral rights schema was not implemented,
`and the encouragements toward registration are
`another deviation from the Convention.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`16
`
`Congressional study on copyright registration
`noted,
`
`In the absence of a basic copyright
`registry system, identifying the work,
`the first owner of the copyright, the
`date from which the term is computed,
`and other pertinent information, the
`recording of transfers would often fail
`to identify the work covered by the
`transfer, the term of the copyright,
`and especially the derivation of the
`transferee’s claim to ownership.
`Alan Latman, Study 19: The Recordation of
`Copyright Assignments and Licenses, in COPYRIGHT
`LAW REVISION: STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE
`SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND
`COPYRIGHTS 111, 124 (1956). In other words,
`Congress not only saw ex ante the potential dangers
`posed by removing
`formalities, but—as
`the
`legislative record shows—sought explicitly
`to
`mitigate them through the structure of the new
`Act.
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`Thus, Congress took deliberate steps to
`preserve the registration and deposit requirements
`by attaching them to a complex web of benefits and
`penalties. This is a testament to the unique and
`ultimately irreplaceable role that registration plays
`in the market for creative works; namely, its value
`in creating and maintaining a comprehensive
`public record of ownership rights.
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`17
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`CONCLUSION
`For the above reasons, the Court should
`uphold the decision of the Eleventh Circuit.
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`HAROLD FELD
`
`Counsel of Record
`MEREDITH F. ROSE
`PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE
`1818 N Street Northwest
`Suite 410
`Washington, DC 20036
`202-861-0020
`hfeld@publicknowledge.org
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