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` Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)
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`Per Curiam
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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` MARY ANNE SAUSE v. TIMOTHY J. BAUER, ET AL.
`ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
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`STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
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` No. 17–742. Decided June 28, 2018
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` PER CURIAM.
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`Petitioner Mary Ann Sause, proceeding pro se, filed this
`action under Rev. Stat. 1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, and
`named as defendants past and present members of the
`Louisburg, Kansas, police department, as well as the
`current mayor and a former mayor of the town. The cen-
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`terpiece of her complaint was the allegation that two of
`the town’s police officers visited her apartment in response
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`to a noise complaint, gained admittance to her apartment,
`and then proceeded to engage in a course of strange and
`abusive conduct, before citing her for disorderly conduct
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`and interfering with law enforcement. Among other
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`things, she alleged that at one point she knelt and began
`to pray but one of the officers ordered her to stop. She
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`claimed that a third officer refused to investigate her
`complaint that she had been assaulted by residents of her
`apartment complex and had threatened to issue a citation
`if she reported this to another police department. In
`addition, she alleged that the police chief failed to follow
`up on a promise to investigate the officers’ conduct and
`that the present and former mayors were aware of unlaw-
`ful conduct by the town’s police officers.
` Petitioner’s complaint asserted a violation of her First
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`Amendment right to the free exercise of religion and her
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`Fourth Amendment right to be free of any unreasonable
`search or seizure. The defendants moved to dismiss the
`complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief may
`be granted, arguing that the defendants were entitled to
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`qualified immunity. Petitioner then moved to amend her
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` SAUSE v. BAUER
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`Per Curiam
`complaint, but the District Court denied that motion and
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` granted the motion to dismiss.
`On appeal, petitioner, now represented by counsel,
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`argued only that her free exercise rights were violated by
`the two officers who entered her home. The Court of
`Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the
`District Court, concluding that the officers were entitled to
`qualified immunity. 859 F. 3d 1270 (2017). Chief Judge
`Tymkovich filed a concurring opinion. While agreeing
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`with the majority regarding petitioner’s First Amendment
`claim, he noted that petitioner’s “allegations fit more
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`neatly in the Fourth Amendment context.” Id., at 1279.
`He also observed that if the allegations in the complaint
`are true, the conduct of the officers “should be con-
`demned,” and that if the allegations are untrue, petitioner
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`had “done the officers a grave injustice.” Ibid.
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`The petition filed in this Court contends that the Court
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`of Appeals erred in holding that the officers who visited
`petitioner’s home are entitled to qualified immunity. The
`petition argues that it was clearly established that law
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`enforcement agents violate a person’s right to the free
`exercise of religion if they interfere, without any legiti-
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`mate law enforcement justification, when a person is at
`prayer. The petition further maintains that the absence of
`a prior case involving the unusual situation alleged to
`have occurred here does not justify qualified immunity.
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`There can be no doubt that the First Amendment pro-
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`tects the right to pray. Prayer unquestionably constitutes
`the “exercise” of religion. At the same time, there are
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`clearly circumstances in which a police officer may lawfully
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`prevent a person from praying at a particular time and
`place. For example, if an officer places a suspect under
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`arrest and orders the suspect to enter a police vehicle for
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`transportation to jail, the suspect does not have a right to
`delay that trip by insisting on first engaging in conduct
`that, at another time, would be protected by the First
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` Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)
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`Per Curiam
`Amendment. When an officer’s order to stop praying is
`alleged to have occurred during the course of investigative
`conduct that implicates Fourth Amendment rights, the
`First and Fourth Amendment issues may be inextricable.
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`That is the situation here. As the case comes before us,
`it is unclear whether the police officers were in petitioner’s
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`apartment at the time in question based on her consent,
`whether they had some other ground consistent with the
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`Fourth Amendment for entering and remaining there, or
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`whether their entry or continued presence was unlawful.
`Petitioner’s complaint contains no express allegations on
`these matters. Nor does her complaint state what, if
`anything, the officers wanted her to do at the time when
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`she was allegedly told to stop praying. Without knowing
`the answers to these questions, it is impossible to analyze
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`petitioner’s free exercise claim.
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`In considering the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the
`District Court was required to interpret the pro se com-
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`plaint liberally, and when the complaint is read that way,
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`it may be understood to state Fourth Amendment claims
`that could not properly be dismissed for failure to state a
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`claim. We appreciate that petitioner elected on appeal to
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`raise only a First Amendment argument and not to pursue
`an independent Fourth Amendment claim, but under the
`circumstances, the First Amendment claim demanded
`consideration of the ground on which the officers were
`present in the apartment and the nature of any legitimate
`law enforcement interests that might have justified an
`order to stop praying at the specific time in question.
`Without considering these matters, neither the free exer-
`cise issue nor the officers’ entitlement to qualified immun-
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`ity can be resolved. Thus, petitioner’s choice to abandon
`her Fourth Amendment claim on appeal did not obviate
`the need to address these matters.
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`For these reasons, we grant the petition for a writ of
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`certiorari; we reverse the judgment of the Tenth Circuit;
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` It is so ordered.
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` SAUSE v. BAUER
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`Per Curiam
`and we remand the case for further proceedings consistent
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` with this opinion.
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