No.A-
`
`IN THE
`~uprrmr Olnurt of ±4£ J.linitrh ~tai£5
`
`PHILIP MORRIS USA INC.,
`
`v.
`
`Petitioner,
`
`MARY BROWN, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF
`THE ESTATE OF RAYFIELD BROWN,
`Respondent.
`
`APPLICATION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME
`WITHIN WHICH TO FILE A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
`TO THE FLORIDA FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
`
`TO THE HONORABLE CLARENCE THOMAS, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AND CIRCUIT JUSTICE FOR THE
`ELEVENTH CIRCUIT:
`
`Pursuant to this Court's Rule 13.5, Philip Morris USA Inc. ("PM USA") respectfully
`
`requests a 25-day extension of time, to and including September 21, 2018, within which to
`
`*
`file a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Florida First District Court of Appeal.
`
`The First District Court of Appeal issued its opinion on April 18, 2018. Philip
`
`Morris USA Inc. v. Brown, No. 1Dl5-2337, 243 So. 3d 521 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018)
`
`(per curiam). It denied PM USA's motion for rehearing on May 29, 2018. The First
`
`* Pursuant to this Court's Rule 29.6, undersigned counsel state that PM USA is a wholly
`owned subsidiary of Altria Group, Inc. No publicly held company owns 10% or more of
`Altria Group, Inc.' s stock.
`
`

`

`District's opinion is not reviewable in the Florida Supreme Court because it does not
`
`contain analysis or a citation to any other decision. See Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 530 So. 2d 286,
`
`288 n.3 (Fla. 1988). Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction to review the First District's
`
`decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) because the First District was "the highest court of a
`
`State in which a decision could be had." See, e.g., KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 132 S. Ct. 23, 24
`
`(2011) (per curiam). Unless extended, the time within which to file a petition for a writ of
`
`certiorari will expire on August 27, 2018.
`
`A copy of the First District's decision is attached hereto as Exhibit A; a copy of its
`
`order denying rehearing is attached as Exhibit B.
`
`1.
`
`This case is one of approximately 8,000 individual personal-injury claims
`
`filed in the wake of the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
`
`945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam), which prospectively decertified a sprawling
`
`class action against the major domestic cigarette manufacturers filed on behalf of"[ a ]11
`
`[Florida] citizens and residents, and their survivors, who have suffered, presently suffer
`
`or who have died from diseases and medical conditions caused by their addiction to
`
`cigarettes that contain nicotine." Id. at 1256 (internal quotation marks omitted). When it
`
`decertified the class, however, the Florida Supreme Court preserved several highly
`
`generalized jury findings from the first phase of the Engle class-action proceedings-for
`
`example, that each defendant "placed cigarettes on the market that were defective and
`
`unreasonably dangerous" in some unspecified manner and at some unspecified time over
`
`a 50-year period. Id. at 1257 n.4. The Florida Supreme Court stated that those findings
`
`2
`
`

`

`would have "res judicata effect" in subsequent cases filed by individual class members.
`
`Id. at 1269.
`
`In each of the thousands of follow-on "Engle progeny" cases filed in state and
`
`federal courts across Florida, the plaintiffs have asserted that the generalized Engle
`
`findings relieve them of the burden of proving the tortious conduct elements of their
`
`individual claims against the defendants-for example, on a claim for strict liability, that
`
`the particular cigarettes smoked by the class member contained a defect that was the legal
`
`cause of the class member's injury. Relying exclusively on claim preclusion principles,
`
`the Florida Supreme Court has held that affording such broad preclusive effect to the
`
`generalized Engle findings is consistent with federal due process. See Philip Morris
`
`USA, Inc. v. Douglas, 110 So. 3d 419, 436 (Fla.) ("That certain elements of the prima
`
`facie case are established by the Phase I findings does not violate the Engle defendants'
`
`due process rights .... "), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 332 (2013).
`
`Pursuant to the procedures established in the Florida Supreme Court's Engle
`
`decision, Plaintiff Mary Brown brought this wrongful-death action against PM USA to
`
`recover damages for the death of her husband, Rayfield Brown, from lung cancer, which
`
`she alleged was caused by smoking. Plaintiff asserted claims for strict liability,
`
`negligence, fraudulent concealment, and conspiracy to commit fraudulent concealment.
`
`The trial court ruled that, upon proving that Mr. Brown was a member of the Engle class,
`
`Plaintiff would be permitted to rely on the "res judicata effect" of the Engle findings to
`
`establish the conduct elements of her claims and would not be required to prove those
`
`elements at trial.
`
`3
`
`

`

`After multiple mistrials, a jury found that Mr. Brown was an Engle class member
`
`and found in Plaintiff's favor on her strict-liability, negligence, and conspiracy claims;
`
`that jury deadlocked on the other issues in the case, but a subsequent jury awarded
`
`Plaintiff $4.375 million in compensatory damages and awarded her daughter, Jennifer
`
`Brown, $2 million in compensatory damages.
`
`On appeal to the First District Court of Appeal, PM USA raised several challenges
`
`to the judgment under state law. In addition, PM USA expressly preserved its position
`
`that the trial court violated federal due process by permitting Plaintiff to rely on the Engle
`
`findings to establish the tortious conduct elements of her claims. 1 The First District
`
`Court of Appeal affirmed in a per curiam opinion without citation or analysis.
`
`2.
`
`This Court's review would be sought on the ground that the First District
`
`Court of Appeal's decision-which rejected PM USA's due-process challenge to the
`
`broad preclusive effect afforded to the Engle Phase I findings-conflicts with this Court's
`
`due-process precedent by depriving PM USA of its property without any assurance that
`
`any jury actually found that PM USA committed tortious conduct that was the legal cause
`
`of Plaintiff's injuries. For example, on the strict-liability and negligence claims, Plaintiff
`
`1 See PM USA Initial Br. 44 ("The trial court also erred when it determined that
`Plaintiff could rely on the Engle findings to establish the conduct elements of her claims.
`That decision violates PM USA's federal due process rights because it represents an
`'extreme application[] of the doctrine of res judicata' .... ") (quoting Richards v.
`Jefferson Cty., 517 U.S. 793, 797 (1996)) (citation omitted). PM USA "acknowledge[d]
`that the Florida Supreme Court rejected this federal due process argument in Douglas,
`110 So. 3d at 422," but noted its intention "to preserve the issue for reconsideration by
`the Florida Supreme Court or review in the U.S. Supreme Court." PM USA Initial Br.
`44.
`
`4
`
`

`

`was pennitted to invoke the Engle jury's generalized findings that PM USA sold
`
`unspecified cigarettes at unspecified times that contained an unspecified defect to establish
`
`conclusively that the particular cigarettes Mr. Brown smoked were defective. The First
`
`District Court of Appeal upheld that result even though Plaintiff made no attempt to show
`
`that the Engle jury actually decided this issue in her favor. Nor could Plaintiff conceivably
`
`have made such a showing: In the Engle proceedings, the class presented many alternative
`
`theories of defect, several of which applied only to particular designs or brands of cigarettes,
`
`rather than to every design and brand, and it is impossible to detennine from the Engle
`
`findings or the Engle record which of those theories the Engle jury actually accepted. It is
`
`possible, for example, that the defect found by the Engle jury was a flaw in the filters of a
`
`brand of PM USA's cigarettes that Mr. Brown never smoked, or the use of certain additives
`
`in that brand-and that the jury found that the cigarettes that Mr. Brown did smoke were not
`
`defective.
`
`Likewise, to support the class's conspiracy to commit fraudulent concealment claim,
`
`the Engle jury was presented with numerous distinct categories of allegedly fraudulent
`
`statements by PM USA, other tobacco companies, and various industry organizations; the
`
`jury returned only a generalized finding that PM USA agreed to "conceal or omit
`
`information regarding the health effects of cigarettes or their addictive nature." Engle, 945
`
`So. 2d at 1277. The Engle jury's verdict does not indicate which tobacco-industry
`
`statements were the basis for its finding, or whether that finding rested on the concealment
`
`of infonnation about the health effects of smoking, the addictive nature of smoking, or both.
`
`5
`
`

`

`In these circumstances, allowing Plaintiff to invoke the Engle findings to establish
`
`conclusively that the particular cigarettes smoked by Mr. Brown were defective, and that
`
`any tobacco-industry statements he may have seen and read were fraudulent, violates due
`
`process. See, e.g., Fayerweather v. Ritch, 195 U.S. 276, 299, 307 (1904) (holding, as a
`
`matter of federal due process, that where preclusion is sought based on a jury verdict that
`
`may rest on any of two or more alternative grounds, and it cannot be determined with
`
`certainty which alternative was actually the basis for the jury's finding, "the plea of res
`
`judicata must fail"); Richards v. Jefferson Cty., 517 U.S. 793, 797 ( 1996) ("We have long
`
`held ... that extreme applications of the doctrine of res judicata may be inconsistent with
`
`a federal right that is fundamental in character." (internal quotation marks omitted));
`
`Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415,430 (1994) ("[A State's] abrogation of a well-
`
`established common-law protection against arbitrary deprivations of property raises a
`
`presumption that its procedures violate the Due Process Clause."). That manifest due-
`
`process violation is being repeated in the thousands of pending Engle progeny cases in
`
`Florida.
`
`3.
`
`PM USA is currently evaluating whether to file a petition for a writ of
`
`certiorari raising these due-process issues in Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Boatright, 217 So.
`
`3d 166 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 2017), an Engle progeny case that culminated in a verdict of more
`
`than $30 million in favor of the plaintiff. The petition in Boatright is due on September
`
`20, 2018. Boatright is a better vehicle for plenary review than this case because, unlike
`
`the per curiam affirmance issued by the First District Court of Appeal in this case, the
`
`Second District Court of Appeal issued a written opinion in Boatright affirming the
`
`6
`
`

`

`judgment. If PM USA files a petition for a writ of certiorari in Boatright, it plans to file a
`
`petition in this case asking the Court to hold this case pending the Court' s disposition of
`
`the petition in Boatright. An extension of time until September 21 , 2018, the day after
`
`the Boatright petition is due, is warranted to permit this Court to consider the petition in
`
`this case in conjunction with the petition in Boatright.
`
`CONCLUSION
`Accordingly, PM USA respectfully requests that an order be entered extending the
`
`time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari by 25 days, to and including September 21 ,
`
`2018.
`
`Respectfully submitted.
`
`ANDREW L. FREY
`LAUREN R. GOLDMAN
`MA YER BROWN LLP
`1675 Broadway
`New York, NY 10025
`(212) 506-2500
`
`~d a. ~"'!
`
`,Ac_-,
`
`M1GUELK ESTRADA
`Counsel of Record
`AMIR C. TA YRANI
`GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
`1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20036
`(202) 955-8500
`mestrada@gibsondunn.com
`
`Counsel for Petitioner
`Philip Morris USA Inc.
`
`August 17, 2018
`
`7
`
`

`

`Exhibit A
`
`Exhibit A
`
`

`

`Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Brown, 243 So.3d 521 (2018)
`
`243 So.3d 521 (Mem)
`District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
`
`PHILIP MORRIS USA INC.,
`Appellant/ Cross-Appellee,
`V.
`Mary BROWN, as personal
`representative of the Estate of Rayfield
`Brown, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
`
`No. 1D15-2337
`I
`April 18, 2018
`I
`Rehearing Denied May 29, 2018
`
`On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.
`Harvey L. Jay, III, Judge.
`
`Attorneys and Law Firms
`
`Amir C. Tayrani of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP,
`Washington, DC; Geoffrey J. Michael of Arnold & Porter
`LLP, Washington, DC; Hassia Diolombi and Kenneth J.
`Reilly of Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP, Miami; and W.
`Edwards Muniz of Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP, Tampa,
`for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
`
`John S. Mills and Courtney Brewer of The Mills Firm, PA,
`Tallahassee; and John S. Kalil of Law Offices of John S.
`Kalil, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
`
`B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Bilbrey, J., concur; Winsor, J.,
`dissents with opinion.
`
`Opinion
`
`Per Curiam.
`
`AFFIRMED.
`
`WINSOR, J., dissenting.
`*522 The main question in this case is what happens
`when a deadlocked jury is instructed to reach whatever
`partial verdict it can-and to do so without any further
`deliberations. On the unusual facts of this case, I would
`hold that such an instruction leaves the jury incapable of
`producing a valid verdict. From the time jury deliberations
`begin until the time the jury reaches its final decision,
`
`jurors must be free to weigh and consider arguments
`and evidence, to consider other jurors' points of view, to
`attempt to persuade fellow jurors, to argue and debate-
`in other words, the jury must be free to deliberate until the
`very end. Because this jury did not have that opportunity,
`we should reverse and remand for a new trial.
`
`Mary Brown filed a wrongful-death action against Phillip
`Morris USA, Inc., alleging that her husband died from
`smoking-related illnesses. She alleged strict liability,
`negligence, fraudulent concealment, and conspiracy to
`commit fraudulent concealment. The litigation lasted
`years: One trial was continued during jury selection, and
`another ended in a mistrial after this court granted a writ
`of prohibition, see Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Brown, 96
`So.3d 468 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). A third trial ended with
`a deadlocked jury.
`
`In the next trial-the trial at issue here-the jury's verdict
`form asked (among other things) whether Philip Morris's
`actions legally caused the husband's death, the amount
`of any compensatory damages, the relative percentages
`of fault, and whether punitive damages were warranted.
`After deliberating for approximately four or five hours,
`the jury sent out a note saying it was "stuck on the
`percentage" and asking "[w]hat are our options?"
`
`After conferring with counsel, the court told the jury
`to follow instructions already given. The jury continued
`deliberating for some two additional hours before sending
`out another note. This one explained that jurors "have not
`been able to agree on question# 4 [regarding comparative
`fault] and therefore we cannot go any further." After
`more discussion with counsel, the court delivered a
`standard Allen 1 charge, asking the jury to continue its
`deliberations. But after roughly an hour more, the jury
`sent out another note: "Now hung on question # 2
`[regarding fraudulent concealment]. Some have change[d]
`their mind. It started out on question # 4. Some say
`yes, and some no. Now need white out for question # 2.
`Yesterday it was yes now today it hung [sic]."
`
`An Allen charge is a supplemental instruction courts
`frequently give when a jury struggles to reach a
`verdict. Gahley v. State, 567 So.2d 456, 459 (Fla. I st
`DCA 1990) (citing Allen v. United States, 164 U.S.
`492, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896) ).
`Lawyers for both sides offered their views on how the
`court should proceed. Both sides agreed the court could
`
`

`

`Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Brown, 243 So.3d 521 (2018)
`
`not give *523 a second Allen charge. 2 Philip Morris
`argued the court should grant a mistrial since the jury
`could not reach consensus after its Allen charge. Mrs.
`Brown, though, argued that the court should accept a
`partial verdict on the issues the jury did decide. Ultimately,
`the court brought the jury back and told them to return
`to the jury room, to white out verdict-form responses on
`which the jury was no longer unanimous, and to fill in
`answers where there was unanimity. The court specifically
`told the jurors to not deliberate any further in doing so.
`
`unanswered questions of the amount of compensatory
`damages and whether punitive damages were warranted.
`
`Over Philip Morris's objection (and motion for mistrial),
`the court accepted the partial verdict and scheduled
`another trial to resolve the remaining issues. At the end
`of that trial, the jury awarded compensatory damages
`but found Philip Morris not liable for punitive damages.
`Philip Morris appealed, contending that the trial court
`was wrong to accept the partial verdict.
`
`2
`
`In Tomlinson v. State, 584 So.2d 43 (Fla. 4th DCA
`1991), the Fourth District followed United States 1•.
`Seawell, 550 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1977), and adopted
`a per se rule that giving a second Allen charge is
`fundamental error. No other district in this state has
`adopted this rule, Nottage v. State, 15 So.3d 46, 49
`(Fla. 3d DCA 2009), and many federal courts have
`explicitly rejected it, see, e.g., United States v. Davis,
`779 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2015) ("We have
`never adopted a per se rule against successive Allen
`charges. Other circuits have held there is not a per
`se rule." (collecting cases) ). Florida's standard jury
`instructions do include a comment that the deadlock
`instruction "should be given only once," but that
`comment is based solely on Tomlinson, Fla. Std. Jury
`Instr. (Civ.) 801.3, and standard jury instructions are
`not binding precedent, BellSouth Telecomms., Inc.
`v. Meeks, 863 So.2d 287, 292 (Fla. 2003); see also
`In re Std. Jury Jnstr.1·. in Civil Cases-Report No.
`09-01 ( Reorganization of the Civil Jury lnstrs.), 35
`So.3d 666, 671 (Fla. 2010) (cautioning "that any
`comments associated with the instructions reflect only
`the opinion of the Committee and are not necessarily
`indicative of the views of this Court as to their
`correctness or applicability").
`After about six minutes in the jury room, the jury returned
`with a partial verdict, answering two of the verdict form's
`six questions. The jury agreed that the husband was a
`member of the Engle class, see Engle v. Liggett Grp.,
`Inc., 945 So.2d 1246 (Fla. 2006), and that Philip Morris's
`conspiracy to conceal was a legal cause of the husband's
`death. Because the jury found liability on one intentional-
`tort theory, its inability to provide verdicts on other
`theories or on comparative-fault percentages was not
`critical, see§ 768.81(4), Fla. Stat. (2013); see also Schoeff
`v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 232 So.3d 294, 304 (Fla.
`2017) (''[T]he comparative fault statute does not apply to
`Engle progeny cases in which the jury finds for the plaintiff
`on the intentional tort claims."). But there remained the
`
`On appeal, Philip Morris's opening position is that Florida
`does not recognize partial civil verdicts, that courts must
`declare mistrials whenever juries cannot agree on all
`issues. Philip Morris argues that no Florida appellate
`court has ever sanctioned a partial verdict like this one.
`But neither has Philip Morris cited a Florida appellate
`decision explicitly precluding the practice. Partial verdicts
`are routinely used in Florida criminal cases, see, e.g.,
`State v. Muhammad, 148 So.3d 159, 159-60 (Fla. 1st DCA
`2014); Avila v. State, 86 So.3d 511, 513 (Fla. 2d DCA
`2012), and they have been accepted in civil cases in federal
`courts, see, e.g., Kerman v. City of New York, 261 F.3d
`229, 242 n.9 (2d Cir. 2001) ("Kennan also argues that
`[the] decision to accept a partial verdict was error because
`there is no authority for this procedure. We disagree. In
`the absence of authority prohibiting such a partial verdict
`*524 in a civil case, and Kerman cites none, we believe
`that at the very least a trial judge, in the exercise of sound
`discretion, may follow such a course."); see also Bristol
`Steel & Iron Works v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 41 F.3d 182,
`190 (4th Cir. 1994); Bridges v. Clzemrex Specialty Coatings,
`Inc., 704 F.2d 175,180 (5th Cir. 1983).
`
`Regardless of whether partial verdicts are categorically
`prohibited, I would hold that the specific circumstances
`of this case warrant a new trial. With any partial verdict,
`there is a "risk that the jury will 'premature[ly] conver[t] ...
`a tentative jury vote into an irrevocable one," United
`States v. Moore, 763 F.3d 900, 911 (7th Cir. 2014);
`accord United States v. Wheeler, 802 F.2d 778, 781 (5th
`Cir. 1986), and when a jury had been unanimous on
`certain points and is later told to return to the jury
`room to answer whatever questions they can-without
`further deliberating-some jurors will feel compelled to
`vote consistent with their earlier position.
`
`"It has long been the law that a trial court should not
`couch an instruction to a jury or otherwise act in any
`
`

`

`Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Brown, 243 So.3d 521 (2018)
`
`way that would appear to coerce any juror to reach
`a hasty decision or to abandon a conscientious belief
`in order to achieve a unanimous position." Thomas 1•.
`State, 748 So.2d 970, 976 (Fla. 1999). In deciding whether
`a court's instructions have violated this principle, we
`examine de novo the totality of the circumstances to see if
`the instructions "create a serious risk of coercion.'' Id. at
`978. Considering the totality of the unique circumstances
`here, a new trial is warranted.
`
`While attorneys argued about how to handle the jury's last
`note, the jury, having already changed its collective mind
`on some issues, remained together in the jury room. And
`there is no reason to suppose the jurors' fluid deliberations
`stopped while the attorneys argued. Cf United States v.
`Byrski, 854 F.2d 955, 962 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that "the
`state of jury deliberations is ever-changing"). When later
`told to end their deliberations (essentially to memorialize
`where they left off earlier), reasonable jurors might not
`have understood their options. They might not have
`understood that they were not locked into the positions
`they held immediately before sending their last note-that
`their vote could accommodate any new view intervening
`discussions produced. They might not have understood
`that their remaining duty was more than a ministerial
`duty to record their earlier positions. Cf Harrison v.
`Gillespie, 640 F.3d 888, 899 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining
`that jurors' preliminary votes can play important roles in
`the deliberative process but that these informal polls "do
`not constitute a final verdict"); cf also Brutton v. State,
`632 So.2d 1080, 1083 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) ("The court's
`questioning created an impression that the juror did not
`have an absolute right to recede from her vote in the jury
`room during the polling process.").
`
`When the jurors' last note told the court they were "hung"
`on some issues, no juror was then obligated to maintain
`his or her tentative vote on any issue. See United States
`v. Straaclz, 987 F.2d 232, 243 (5th Cir. 1993) ("[A] jury
`has not reached a valid verdict until deliberations are
`
`over .... " (quoting United States v. Taylor, 507 F.2d 166,
`168 (5th Cir. 1975)) ). Yet any juror wanting to explain (or
`even identify) his or her changed view would feel restricted
`by the court's specific instruction to cease deliberations.
`To the point of the final instruction, juror deliberations
`had been fluid-the jury found (and then lost) agreement
`on some issues-but by precluding further deliberations,
`the court precluded further opportunities for additional
`changed minds. Cf Straach, 987 F.2d at 243 (noting that
`"continuing deliberations may shake views expressed on
`counts previously considered" (quoting Taylor, 507 F.2d
`atl68)).
`
`*525 It is no answer to say that the jury was polled, with
`each juror announcing that the verdict was his or her own.
`The question is not whether all jurors did, in fact, vote
`for the ultimate verdict; the question is whether all jurors
`did so knowing they could change their minds-or try to
`change others' minds. The subsequent poll offers therefore
`no cure. See ~Moore, 763 F.3d at 910 (determining that trial
`court's error in instructing jury to return a partial verdict
`while deliberations were ongoing was not cured by polling
`of the jury).
`
`For these reasons, I would reverse and remand for a
`new trial. This would make it unnecessary to address
`Philip Morris's independent argument that alleged juror
`misconduct requires a new trial. As to Mrs. Brown's
`conditional cross appeal, I would reject Philip Morris's
`Tipsy Coachman arguments, and I would hold that Mrs.
`Brown may seek punitive damages on her negligence and
`strict-liability claims in a new trial. See Soffer v. R.J.
`Reynolds Tobacco Co., 187 So.3d 1219, 1221 (Fla. 2016).
`But Mrs. Brown asserted she would abandon her cross
`appeal if she prevailed in the main appeal, which-despite
`my view-she now has.
`
`All Citations
`
`243 So.3d 521 (Mem), 43 Fla. L. Weekly D813
`
`End of Document
`
`© 2018 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
`
`

`

`Exhibit B
`
`Exhibit B
`
`

`

`DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST DISTRICT
`2000 Drayton Drive
`Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
`Telephone No. (850)488-6151
`
`May 29, 2018
`
`Philip Morris USA Inc.
`
`V.
`
`Appellant/ Petitioner(s),
`
`BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
`
`CASE NO.: 1015-2337
`L.T. No.: 2007-CA-11175-BXXX-M
`
`Mary Brown, as Personal
`Representative etc.
`
`Appellee / Respondent(s)
`
`Appellant's motion filed May 3, 2018, for rehearing, rehearing en bane, written opinion and
`certification is denied.
`
`I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is (a true copy of) the original court order.
`
`Dana G. Bradford
`Courtney Brewer
`W. Edward Muniz
`Hassia Diolombi
`Michael L. Walden
`
`Served:
`
`John S. Mills
`John S. Kalil
`Kenneth Reilly
`Geoffrey J. Michael
`Leslie J Bryan
`Amir C. Tayrani
`
`jm
`
`KRISTINA SAMUELS, CLERK
`
`